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1. Introduction 
 
Several challenges confronting health care systems have lead to an increased discussion in the 
political as well as the academic arena about the operation and design of health care systems, 
henceforth abbreviated HCS. Among these challenges are demographic developments, in 
particular aging societies, rapid medical developments allowing for enhanced diagnostic and 
therapeutic options at higher costs, higher demands on the side of the patients regarding 
responsiveness, quality, access and choice, and the financial pressure exerted on the welfare 
states of open economies embedded in a globalized world.  
The input to the HCS, the expenditure for health, has reached or is at least perceived to have 
reached levels that made it incompatible with other political targets, for instance the lowering 
of the non-wage labor costs in order to decrease unemployment or the aim to reduce public 
deficits. 
The output of the HCS, both in terms of health output and beyond-health outputs, like 
enabling patients to take a more active role in the decision making, is at the same time seen as 
dissatisfying, at least when compared to some HCS, which are performing significantly better 
and are offered as benchmarks.  
 
In the core of the debate on health system organization and health policy is the perception that 
the resources available for health care provision are limited. It is concluded, that the level of 
health care expenditure (henceforth HCE) and also its growth must be contained or at least 
controlled. Moreover, even in quarters where the actual reduction of the resources was not 
seen as an option, it is argued that the HCS should at least deliver more outputs given the 
resources it consumes. These demands are to a substantial degree powered by the observation 
that the performance of HCS differs substantially, a message spread by purely academic 
studies as well as studies done by institutions like the OECD or the WHO which are by far 
more influential in the political domain. From these motives – the wish to control costs and in 
particular the demand to limit the increase of growth which dominated the political arena and 
in nearly all developed countries – the politically motivated question arose, whether and how 
it is possible to use resources allocated to the HCS in a more efficient way. The demand to 
increase what is labeled “performance” – either by having the same outputs at lower costs or 
by obtaining more and better outputs at the same level of costs – became a dominant issue; 
see Parkin (1989), Smith (2002) and OECD (2002).  
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Pragmatically, there arose the question how this could be done, where to start and what to do.  
Regarding the starting points, it is on the one hand clear that the input and the output sides of 
HCS are also influenced by factors which are beyond political or public control. Factors like 
health related attitudes, life styles or demographic developments matter for the citizen’s health 
status and thus for health expenditure. But on the other hand, the institutional design of the 
HCS is presumably also a source of variation in both parameters and furthermore institutional 
features are amenable to intentional change and intervention. 
Consequentially, much theoretical and empirical work has been conducted in the fields of 
institutional economics and comparative social sciences in order to evaluate how the 
institutional setting and the organizational form of the HCS impact on its performance. And as 
a result regarding to the question of what to do, there are several established theories about 
how a HCS operates, what the potential problems for efficiency and performance are and how 
the HCS should be designed in order to use the resources available to produce as much output 
as possible. In short, there was and is considerable effort invested in the question of how to 
make a HCS more efficient by changing its institutional design. It must be remarked, that this 
effort is sustained by the observation, that the success of organizational reforms which were 
based on institutional theories is anything but unambiguous.  
 
This ambiguity also originates from the problem of capturing and evaluating the overall 
impact of institutions on performance or more specifically, efficiency. While efficiency is a 
straightforward concept, its empirical measurement is much less straightforward and its 
implementation in health care not as unanimously a target as in other domains. So, 
complementary to research on the question of how a HCS should be designed from a 
theoretical point of view to be an efficient “instrument” for health production, conceptual 
work on efficiency and in particular on the actual measurement of HCS efficiency also 
progressed substantially. This strain of research, which became a major effort only in the 
recent years, produces the information required to evaluate whether the hypotheses about the 
effects of certain institutional settings on HCS performance actually hold true. In the absence 
of a valid indicator of performance or efficiency, research into institutional sources of 
efficiency and performance must remain at the level of formal reasoning. As Murray/Frenk 
(2001) put it, the inquiry of HCS performance is also a step towards an evidence based health 
policy: does an institutional change, after everything is taken into account, actually have the 
intended effect? The fact that health care is subject to normative considerations like equality 
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and equity which are often contradicting efficiency as a criterion, renders the overall 
evaluation of a HCS even more difficult. 
 
But there is another issue, one step downstream from the problems of what to do, which 
consists of the chances of implementing what is presumed to be the right thing. Looking at the 
political efforts to redesign HCS reveals that having the theoretically derived blueprint of how 
an optimal HCS should look like is by no means sufficient to achieve any change, let alone 
any improvement. Reforms of HCS as well as the actual health policy and the political 
processes of health system change have created a widely shared perception that the capability 
of governments to reform the HCS according to the answers and insights obtained in health 
system research, so as to bring it back into line with competing political aims and the 
preferences of the electorate differs substantially; see comparative studies like 
Saltman/Figueras (1997), Raffel (1997), or Powell/Wessen (1999) but also the country studies 
in Oliver/Mossialos (2005). In some countries, the HCS was changed substantially and 
frequently in response to perceived problems, at times back and forth between two completely 
different models. In other countries, the HCS remained basically unchanged despite known 
problems and high pressure arising from these problems, both in terms of political and 
economic costs. The reasons for these differences are, as the analysis of health care reform 
indicates, found both in the political system and in the institutional setting of the HCS itself; 
see in particular Immergut (1990).  
 
Thus, one has two observations. First, that institutional settings may under some crucial but 
often unspecified conditions improve HCS performance, but the effect of institutional settings 
is despite clear theoretical foundations much less straightforward than one would wish. 
Second, that HCS are amenable to politically motivated changes of the institutional setting to 
a different degree.  
And, based on these two observations, one can divide the institutional sources of observable 
variation among different countries in the ‘target variables’ of health policy – viz. resource 
input and health output, performance and efficiency of the HCS – into two groups: 
a) institutional factors influencing the current efficiency and performance of the HCS, 
which refer to the current institutional setting of the HCS. 
b) institutional factors influencing the chances to increase efficiency and performance by 
implementing changes. These encompass features of the HCS, but also features from the 
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broader institutional environment of the HCS, most notably the political system, in which 
the HCS is embedded.  
 
The central questions which shall be tackled in the present study are therefore:  
a) Why are some HCS more efficient and better performing than others and is this 
attributable to the differences in the institutional design?,      and 
b) Why are some HCS more amenable to institutional changes than others? 
 
Both questions are reflected in the public and political discussion: How should a HCS be 
designed to optimally provide the quantity and quality of health that is preferred by the 
electorate and how can such a HCS be created?  
 
These rather broad questions need to be differentiated further, also to allow a treatment in 
theoretical as well as empirical studies.  
First, with regard to the observation that HCS differ in their performance as well as their 
institutional design, the question is whether there are systematic relationships between both. It 
is tempting to attribute the former to the latter, but this relationship by no means a logical 
necessity. And, if there are systematic associations of institutional features and performance 
aspects, are these in line with the hypotheses stated in the theoretical works on HCS? Apart 
from isolated institutional features, this study will investigate the broader institutional 
arrangements – ‘syndromes’ of institutional features going together. Do these ‘institutional 
syndromes’ correspond to the standard types of HCS, e.g. public integrated, public contracted 
and corporatist etc.? Are there features interacting in a way that has an impact on performance 
and efficiency of the HCS, which is more than the impact of each feature taken alone? One 
finding of the research on changes in institutional arrangements in HCS is that introducing an 
isolated feature may not work. Institutional features interact, enforce each other but at times 
are countervailing, and to achieve the intended effect, policy makers have to change several 
features at once.  
Second, with regard to the fact that HCS differ in their amenability to changes and reforms, 
the study want to explain, why this is the case, i.e. why the chances to create a HCS that is 
more in line with the preferences of the government and the electorate differ among countries 
but also among types of HCS. 
And, as a third point, the interaction among the two aspects – the HCS’ current setting and the 
chances of changing the current setting – is of interest. One theoretical result of health system 
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analyses is that preferences of the actors in charge of running the HCS – be they corporatist or 
public-administrated – systematically diverge from the preferences of the population: In 
health care, everybody’s costs are somebody’s income. Thus any HCS, if left to its own 
devices and left to proceed according to its own “logic”, is likely to diverge from the 
electorate’s preferences, in particular in terms of resource consumption. To counteract this 
tendency, some kind of external control is required. The government as the political agent of 
the electorate, is in charge of intervening or changing the HCS, if the necessity arises. A HCS 
in which changes are hard to implement is more likely to “drift away” from the electorate’s 
preferences and to be characterized by lower performance, higher levels of expenditure and 
higher rates of expenditure growth.  
 
This study will address in particular institutional aspects, because, as noted above, 
institutional settings have the advantage of being – in principle – amenable to intentional 
change, even in the short run. The theoretical foundation and the method of the study will be 
based on the assumption that institutions matter and will inquire into the mechanisms and in 
particular into the magnitude of these effects: 
ad a) with regard to variations in efficiency and performance among HCS, the study will 
test the empirical relevance of institutional features for which predictions can be derived 
from institutional economics. Special focus will be put on the principal-agent-
relationships and the control mechanisms used to avoid opportunistic behavior and 
various forms of rent-extraction by the agents in the HCS. Delegation of tasks is a central 
element of HCS, and the concrete questions is, whether HCS that are organized in a way, 
that is theoretically efficient are empirically more efficient than HCS in which this is not 
the case.  
ad b) with regard to the questions of reasons for differing ’reformability’ of HCS, I want 
to identify the features in the HCS, the way it is organized, in combination with features 
of the political environment which are conducive to reforms or obstruct reforms, 
combining veto player theory and theories of interest group organization. The concrete 
question is, what the possibilities of a government are, to intervene and to change the 
HCS and what the possibilities of the societal actors in the HCS are, to obstruct these 
interventions and changes. 
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Definition of Health and Health Care Systems 
Health is in studies on health systems often left either undefined or is defined in terms of 
common sense. A HCS can be defined as all institutions and actors who are promoting, 
restoring or maintaining the “health” of a population, defined in whatever way, see e.g. the 
definition in the World Health Report; WHO (2000). However, this rather wide definition 
raises problems if one wants to study HCS performance. For instance, Murray/Frenk (2001) 
see health production very encompassing, by arguing that it is the Ministry of Health’s 
responsibility to ensure that people quit smoking. Even if one accepts that the government 
shall overrule personal preferences by educating people of what is best for them, one can 
question whether this is part of the HCS.  
The definition of what a HCS is depends on the definition of what health is. The HCS may 
produce a range of outputs, some of which are only indirectly related to health in a biological 
sense, while other are not related to health at all. For instance, there is the distinction between 
health output and beyond-health-output; see in particular Mooney (1992) and Mooney (1998). 
Producing biological health does for instance not require that the staff in the HCS is in any 
way “responsive” to patients, giving them information or even a say in medical decision-
making, Nor does producing biological health require that money is spend for things like high 
accommodation standards in hospitals. However, if citizens demand these outputs, which they 
clearly do, and are willing to pay for them, which they do with less willingness, it is 
legitimate for the HCS to produce them. Thus, when evaluating a HCS’ performance or 
efficiency, all outputs must be taken into account. Moreover, different aspects of health and 
different outputs can be produced with different efficiency by a HCS. 
 
In this study, some features and aspects of health have to be excluded. As a consequence 
those sectors of the HCS, which are producing this kind of health, are also excluded from the 
analysis.  
The first element excluded, based on pragmatic reasons, is mental health. While surely an 
important aspect of health, problems arise from the availability of data and from measuring 
mental health in an objective and comparable way. With no reliable dependent variable, one 
cannot explain the impact of institutions in this sector. 
The second element excluded, based on conceptual reasons, is long term care for the elderly. 
Age is not an illness, and long term care is not aiming at the restoration of health, but is the 
coping with an inevitable process, against which there is no medical remedy. 
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Part I: The Study of Health Care Systems 
 
2. Why study Health Care Systems? Themes, Methods and Findings 
Research on HCS is driven by practical problems and it aims at giving practical advice. Only 
few societal subsystems are as closely intertwined with the academic community studying the 
theme as it is the case for health policy. Ideas and theoretical notions developed in formal 
health economics, e.g. the idea that incentives set by the HCS impact on individuals’ behavior 
and that health policy has to set the ‘right’ incentives to mitigate problems in the HCS, diffuse 
or are actively, by way of scientific advice, transported into the political arena; see Saltman 
(2002). At times theoretically derived advice is implemented in the HCS, and doing so 
provides a kind of natural or quasi experiment to test hypotheses developed in the scientific 
community; see Newhouse (1993) on the RAND Insurance Experiment, as the most 
prominent example. Research is stimulated by the developments of HCS, the particularities of 
health care and the problems occurring in HCS, which deliver an abundance of themes for 
research. As a consequence, the empirical and theoretical work on HCS often leads to policy 
implications.  
 
2.1. Research on Health Care Systems: The Major Issues 
In this section, I will briefly present the major themes which currently occupy those involved 
in health policy and those doing scientific research on HCS.  
 
Core Issues in Health Care 
The issues in health system research are numerous and manifold. The themes enumerated 
under this heading have been an issue from the very beginning of HCS research. The list 
presented here is by far not complete.  
 
a) Equity in access and access to health care are persistent issues of HCS research, see 
Wagstaff/et al. (1999). A “perfect” HCS, producing the best possible health at the highest 
quality in an economically efficient way is still no good, if it does so only for a fraction of the 
population.  
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b) Financing – the level of health care expenditure, HCE, is a major issue – and most likely 
always will be. For a long time the aim of cost containment was seen as undisputed; see Abel-
Smith (1963), Parkin (1989) and the studies on cost containment efforts in Mossialos/Le 
Grand (1999). Recently, there are also arguments which question the assumption that HCE is 
“too high” and that it must be contained, see Aaron (2003). A closely related issue is the way 
the HCS is financed, whether it is close to a market where individuals buy and offer services 
or close to the model of the government providing a public good in the way it provides public 
services like education. Financing modes – e.g. taxation, pay-roll-contributions or co-
payments – have substantial impacts on other policy areas and are connected to developments 
in other sectors. For instance, if the HCS is tax funded, funding is comparatively independent 
from developments in unemployment rates. If the HCS is predominantly financed by 
contributions levied from wages and salaries, the available funding immediately reflects 
changes in employment rates and wage developments. From the perspective of cost control, 
the government has control over the global budget, if it is funded from general taxation (or 
public debt). If health is funded from wages and salaries, it is more difficult to set a limit to 
what is available for health care; see Mossialos et al. (2002).  
 
c) Rationing in the setting of limited resources is also an issue in health care. Resources are 
always limited, the HCS always competes with other political and social aims and the HCS is 
never able to meet all demands. Consequentially, allocative decisions have to be made. These 
can concern medical services provided in the individual case but also the HCS as a whole, by 
deciding how much shall be spent for health care at societal level. As Dowie (2001) observes, 
in allocating a medical service to a person, one takes away resources from other usage. By 
producing an outcome, e.g. process utility and responsiveness, one puts cost-pressure on the 
production of other outcomes of the HCS, e.g. health status. Many studies look into the way 
these allocative decisions are made – and made they are. As Brown (1991) argued, rationing 
is omnipresent in health care just as it is in other forms of welfare services, albeit most often 
done by implicit ways. Implicit rationing occurs in the sense that the medical staff makes an 
ad hoc decision about a certain service in a certain situation. A more explicit form is priority 
setting, like the Oregon approach, where the elected legislature was presumed to ‘draw the 
line’, see Fox/Leichter (1991) and Brown (1991). More explicit rationing takes the form of 
budgets, prices, waiting times, eligibility conditions, regulations of scopes of coverage. As 
Garber (2004) argues, political actors tend to delegate rationing issues – such as coverage of 
services, which are by nature rather political issues than technical issues – to the staff working 
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in the HCS, in order to avoid the political costs arising from taking a public stand on coverage 
policy or rationing.  
 
d) Cost effectiveness is a theme closely related to rationing and cost containment. Is it possible 
to improve the cost-effectiveness/cost-benefit ratio of the HCS? For instance by focusing 
either on those medical interventions which create much benefit, by focusing on those 
medical interventions for which substantial evidence of medical effectiveness exists or by 
focusing on interventions, which are cost effective with regard to the output they achieve; see 
Garber (2004) on this issue. There is now an extensive body of research on evidence based 
medicine, how it is developed, how it is adopted by the HCS, i.e. how actors in the HCS can 
be motivated to use this as a criterion. But also what the implications of including economic 
evaluation are for the provision of health and for the distribution of power and competencies 
in the HCS; see Woolf et al. (1999), Patridge (2003), Garber (2004) and Jost (2004). Again, 
this theme is by nature a normative one, which becomes evident if cost benefit principles are 
applied to the individual case. For instance Skinner/Wennberg (1998) or Luce/Rubenfeld 
(2002) take up the question of whether HCE can be reduced by limiting the intensive care 
provided to people who are very likely to die despite all efforts made. As a normative 
question, such decisions should be made explicitly and consciously.  
 
e) Public health recently also became a strong theme. The appropriateness of the HCS per se 
as an instrument to produce health outcomes is an even more general issue. The HCS as a 
whole can be seen as an instrument installed to produce health. However the HCS is but one 
factor influencing health states. There are other factors (like education, diet and life style) but 
also other forms of policy (regulations on inoculation, traffic safety, anti-smoking 
campaigns), which might be more important for health status. Indeed, studies like Tengs 
(1997), Filmer/Pritchett (1999), and Kenkel (2003) indicate, that the HCS might not be the 
optimal instrument to achieve health. Instead, policy measures aiming at an improvement of 
other factors, like education, prevention and sanitation, are much more effective. A theoretical 
argument supporting this is, that the HCS is all about healing illnesses. It might be both more 
effective and more efficient for producing health, to avoid the occurrence of illnesses in the 
first place by other policy instruments. Studies on the cost saving effects of prevention yields 
similar conclusions; see Gandjour/Lauterbach (2005). 
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Responses to Recent Developments 
While the issues pointed out above are “classical” ones, there are more recent developments 
which created new pressures and new issues to which HCS respond very differently.  
A strong pressure on health care financing arises from technological progress – new 
technologies are developed, which allow treating conditions hitherto untreatable. The 
diffusion and the determinants of the usage of technological innovations are a theme of its 
own, see Bech (2003). Advanced medical techniques, devices and medicines improve the 
health output, but they also incur substantial costs. Technological development is seen as a 
‘major driver’ for HCE; see Newhouse (1992), Okunade/Murthy (2002) and Moise (2003). 
An additional impact of the growing medical knowledge and possibilities is the growth of 
expectations and demands: there is the general philosophy that everything that can be done for 
the patient should and must be done and that prices and cost effectiveness, in particular the 
question of the marginal utility in relation to the price, must not be criteria for medical 
decisions. Hence, as the domain of what is technically possible grows, so do the expectation 
and the demands of the public, and in the end the expenditure; see Smith et al. (1997).  
A second source of pressure is the demographic development, which raises two kinds of 
problems. First, people get older on average and older people seemingly require more health 
care, causing higher costs; see Polder et al. (2002), Moise/Jacobzone (2003), Bains (2003) and 
Dormont et al. (2006). However, despite the plausibility of the argument, the impact of an 
aging society on future HCE is debated. Empirical studies, e.g. Seshamani/Gray (2004) and 
Werblow et al. (2007), indicate that it is not age per se, but the proximity to death which 
influences HCE. Second, the current practices with regard to length of occupational 
engagement do usually not pay heed to the demographic development: people are retiring at a 
point in time, when many years of life are still before them. In countries where only the 
population active in the labor market finances the HCS, while retired people are either 
exempted completely or pay only a nominal contribution, this causes long term problems of 
intergenerational redistribution; Böcken et al. (2000). 
The overall economic environment and situation also puts pressure on the HCS for two 
reasons. First, the money devoted to health care must be generated by the country’s economy, 
i.e. persons or enterprises. If a country’s available overall income is high and moreover grows 
steadily, society will demand and be ready to spend more for health care. This however is a 
clear instance of a ratchet effect, where the status quo of health care provision is locked in and 
can only be increased but not reduced. HCS developed most of their features during periods 
of substantial economic growth and relied on high growth rates for HCE. But in times of 
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economic stagnation or even recession, HCS have to meet the challenge of coping with 
limitations to available funding1. And the degree to which HCS proved to be able to 
adaptation differs substantially. Furthermore, states and economic areas are competing among 
each other for factors relevant for economic welfare. The opening up of the economies has 
made this competition more or less global. If private enterprises, as it is the case in many 
countries, are involved in the financing of health care either by paying contribution via wages 
and salaries or by general taxation, they have the possibility as well as the incentive to avoid 
these burdens by relocating to other countries where the burden is lower. 
A last source of pressure are political restrictions set by an external institution, like the EMU 
or the IMF. The IMF actively intervenes in national health policy by encouraging 
privatization and the limiting of public financing for health and has substantial impact on 
health policy in developing countries. For some of the cases included in the present study, the 
EMU plays an equivalent role, and indirectly sets factual limits to HCE by limiting 
governmental expenditure. Even if both, the government and the society to which the 
government is politically accountable, agree that the resources devoted to health care shall 
keep on growing even if they have to be financed by running debts, the restrictions imposed 
by the EMU make this impossible.  
 
In short, HCS as well as the welfare states in which they are embedded, face a set of common 
problems, to which they respond by varying degrees and with different strategies; see Parkin 
(1989), Mechanic/Rochefort (1996) and Pierson (2001). 
 
Institutional Sources of Health System Performance, Achievement and Efficiency 
Given the variety of issues and themes in health policy and HCS research outlined in the 
previous section, it is clear that a study cannot treat all aspects of it, but has to choose some of 
the issues. The present study will focus on a question which – while the problems and 
challenges confronting HCS differ to some degree – is a universal theme in all HCS: 
performance, achievement, efficiency and the possibility of their creation.  
 
1 Moran (2000) argues that HCS developed in economies dominated by sectors which at the time of their 
creation had high potentials for productivity growth. Now, the focus of the economies has changed from 
industrial production to services where productivity growth is limited, which in turn also limits the surplus 
available for the welfare state.  
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Health System Performance, Achievement and Efficiency 
A HCS is in the most straightforward conception an instrument to achieve a certain aim, viz. 
the production of health for the population. As an instrument to transform financial resources 
and labor force into health output, a HCS should achieve its aim to the highest level feasible 
and without wasting resources in doing so.  
In the political debate as well as the academic research, these two criteria are denoted as 
achievement and efficiency of the HCS, often combined into the rather unspecific concept of 
performance. While the notions of achievement, performance and efficiency have a certain 
common sense meaning, the problems associated with using them as criteria to evaluate HCS 
are manifold and severe. They will be discussed in chapter 9 in more detail. At this stage, a 
preliminary working definition will be sufficient.  
Achievement – a term I prefer to performance, because the latter often is mixed up with 
efficiency – shall refer to the levels of outcome (in particular health of the population) 
reached, and thus also reflects issues of coverage and equality in access.  
Efficiency can have many definitions, two of them are: 1) Does the HCS produce health for 
those persons who actually have access at the least possible costs? 2) Does the HCS produce 
for the total population the maximum of health feasible the input devoted to health care? 
Under the first definition, only the health levels of those who actually have access is the 
output indicator, while under the second definition, the health level of the overall population 
is the output indicator. The selection of HCS on which this study is based however makes this 
distinction secondary, because all countries chosen have near universal access to health care. 
Including the United States would be a different thing altogether: Asking whether the 
American HCS is efficient with regard to those who have access might yield a different 
answer than asking whether the American HCS is efficient with regard to the total population 
of the country.  
 
Despite their synonymous usage, the notions concern different things and the one does not 
entail the other. When defining HCS performance as the outcome level reached, a country 
might underperform, because too little health is produced, or some services are not produced 
and some conditions remain untreated. One may say, correctly, that the achievement level in 
the country is low. But at the same time, this HCS might be efficient, producing the maximum 
of health output feasible given the limited input available. While some services are not 
produced, those which are, are produced at the least costs. Societies’ preferences may differ 
with regard to the question, what health services should be provided by the HCS and to 
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whom, but one can assume that they all agree on the point, that the HCS should not waste 
resources for its operation. As Retzlaff-Roberts et al. (2004) point out, it does not matter for 
efficiency, whether the society has decided to produce much or little health. There are 
countries which produce much health, like Sweden, or little health, like Mexico. But both 
cases do so in an efficient way. Acknowledging this implies that one need to be very careful 
about using the terms like efficiency, achievement and in particular a catch-all notion like 
performance, if they are not clearly defined. Most studies skip this conceptual problem of 
efficiency, achievement and performance by using straightforward indicators, like life 
expectancy for output, and HCE for input. Both, input and output, can also be combined into a 
ratio as a very simple indicator of efficiency, such as “health care costs per life year”.  
 
Having clarified the dependent variables of the study, viz. achievement and efficiency, 
empirical evidence shows that even by very simple proxies for each, HCS differ substantially, 
just as they do by more refined efficiency indicators; see Retzlaff-Robers et al. (2004), WHO 
(2000) and Bhat (2005). The finding of a high variation in performance, achievement and 
efficiency among HCS is a constant result, and quite independent of the sophistication of the 
measures used.  
 
Institutional Determinants of Health System Performance, Achievement and Efficiency 
Having defined the dependent variables, the question is how to explain the variation in them. 
With the tasks of the HCS being clearly defined, a major question is, how institutions impact 
on the degree to which the HCS is able to perform the tasks. Research on HCS is to a good 
deal driven by the normative motivation to gain knowledge about the functioning of the HCS 
in order to improve its performance respectively bring it back into line with the preferences of 
the electorate. Thus, there is an extensive strain of literature summing up evidence of the 
impact of institutional settings on HCS performance aiming at least implicitly, at providing 
advice for governments2. To learn from those HCS which seemingly perform better is a 
central motive in comparative work on HCS:  ‘(...) international comparisons should be of 
interest not simply for curiosity’s sake, but for insights that they give people about their own 
country. All countries can learn from elsewhere, and may be better able to assess their own 
ways of dealing with issues by observing how others do it’; Parkin (1989: 75). Thus, the first 
theme of the study will be the institutional factors which might account for variations in HCE, 
 
2 See for instance Wille/Albring (1998), Beske (2002), Johnston (2004), and Oliver/Mossialos (2005). 
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HCS achievement and efficiency after factors beyond political control (like technical 
development and demographic factors) are controlled for. The theoretical tool used to link 
certain institutional and organizational forms to a certain level of efficiency is the institutional 
economics framework, especially the principal-agent approach; see chapter 4. 
 
Creating Health System Performance and Efficiency 
While a range of developments – e.g. the demographic development and to some degree the 
technical progress – are not under the control of the political system, the institutional design 
and the organization of the HCS are in principle amenable to control and conscious change. 
Given the ‘will to change’ and the available knowledge created by comparative research on 
HCS, one would expect governments to intervene and change their HCS until it works 
perfectly. However, this is clearly not the case. While changes, can be observed, also oriented 
at insights from the scientific analysis of HCS, one also observes institutional stability, 
despite high levels of dissatisfaction with the HCS and incompatibilities with other political 
aims. So knowledge about how to design the “perfect HCS” is not enough. Knowledge needs 
to be implemented, either by way of small operational changes or by large scale reforms, in 
any case by the action of the government as the actors politically in charge. The degree to 
which change occurs and why HCS differ in terms of how amenable to change they are, is the 
second theme of the study.  
 
2.2. Institutions, Performance and Institutional Change: A Review of the Literature 
The themes selected for this study in turn raise three questions which have been treated in 
various depth in the literature, which shall be very briefly reviewed in this section.  
First, what institutional mechanisms can be built into the HCS in order to achieve a high 
“performance”, i.e. achievement levels and efficiency, and what effects do institutional 
settings exert on various aspects of HCS achievement and efficiency?  
Second, which instruments for influencing the HCS’ operation do governments have at hand 
under a current design of HCS and what is their impact on HCS achievement and efficiency?  
Third, what determines a government’s ability to use the available instruments for influencing 
the operation of the HCS and what determines whether a HCS is amenable to changes?  
 
 15
                                                
The following review on the literature is structured along these questions. Since the literature 
even to these selected aspects is very encompassing, a further distinction is loosely based on 
the methods used by the studies.  
 
2.2.1. Institutional Sources of Variation in Health System Input and Output  
Health policy is about influencing the inputs and the outputs of the HCS, and the instrument 
of health policy is primarily the design of the institutional setting. Thus, it is necessary to 
know the magnitude of the effect institutional settings have and moreover, what effects 
individual institutional features exert. Life expectancy as the main output and HCE as the 
main input of the health system differ among countries for a range of causes. While 
exogenous factors – e.g. demographic factors, the environment, the state of technological 
development, health related attitudes and behavior like diet and life style – explain a good 
deal of the variation in both, there is a considerable share in variation, which is not due to 
these factors. And one reason why there is such an interest in the impact of institutional 
settings is the institutionalist’ assumption that these differences in achievement and efficiency 
are at least partly due to institutional factors, in particular the organization of the HCS. If this 
is true, the variation between the best performing and the least performing HCS is also a 
proxy of the potential for improvement by institutional changes. The question is, whether the 
research was up to now able to prove the effect of institutions.  
 
Case Studies of Health Care Systems 
Case studies dominate the research on HCS and the number of case studies even on single 
HCS is large3. Thematically, they encompass all aspects of HCS, like accessibility, the roles 
of states and markets, centralization and decentralization, the question of solidarity vs. private 
responsibility, the rights of patients, the responsiveness of the HCS, quality etc.; see 
Saltman/Figueras (1998) for an overview. Since research in recent years tends to focus on 
expenditure related issues, the interaction between institutional factors, expenditure levels and 
expenditure development is usually an aspect.  
With regard to the question of the impact of institutional factors on efficiency and the 
expenditure level however, the results of the case studies are ambiguous. Several case studies 
 
3 See for Germany Webber (1988), Webber (1989), Knappe et al. (1989), Rosewitz/Webber (1990), 
Döhler/Manow-Borgwardt (1991), Alber (1992), Manow (1994), Perschke-Hartmann (1994), Behaghel (1994), 
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describe in detail, which regulations have been introduced and which effects were expected. 
But a clear proof that the excepted effects actually occurred is not yet given, often because the 
effects are manifold and contradictory.  
In an early study on the incentives set by institutions and in particular contractual relations 
between patients, providers and insurance, De Alessi (1989) derived the implications of 
different modes how these relationships can be designed and, studying the US, found 
evidence for the predictions. Studies on remuneration modes, like Delattre/Dormont (2003), 
also find that remunerating physicians by fixed fees per defined service results in more 
services and in particular more services per case, supporting the argument that physicians 
induce a demand for the services offered by them.  
In a review of the research on the effects of financial incentives (i.e. remuneration modes), 
Chaix-Couturier et al. (2000) found evidence that such incentives have the intended impact on 
expenditure – for instance lower prescription volumes if the prescriber has a limited budget 
for prescriptions – but also incur a range of risks for the quality of care, in particular by 
installing a latent conflict of interests between the patient and the physicians; see Ma (1994), 
Lynch (1998) and more specific Garcia Marinoso/Jelovac (2003) for referral practices under 
different settings, see also for payment modes and quality issues in in-patient care Shmueli et 
al. (2002) and Norton/et al. (2002).  
Maioni (1999) discusses the introduction of measures expected to change the incentives in the 
Canadian HCS, but cannot give a definite evaluation. While there is evidence of some cost 
containment, the HCS did not profit from the introduction of competition elements because 
the latter also introduced conflicts and tensions between the various actors and governmental 
levels in charge of the HCS. The study by Danzon (1992) indicates that the organizational 
structure of the Canadian HCS, by involving many layers of government, also creates a costly 
administrative overhead, which should be taken into account when the expenditure for health 
is calculated; see also the comparison of the NHS and the HMO model in Feachem et al. 
(2002).  
Studies on satisfaction, like Carlsen/Grytten (2000), find that consumer satisfaction increases 
parallel to the density of providers, which in turn goes together with higher costs and more 
services provided per case and in total. Like many other studies, this hints at a tradeoff, which 
is often ignored by policy makers: while costs are higher under some institutional settings, the 
Döhler/Manow (1995), Döhler/Manow (1997), Röttgers (1999), Wille/Albring (1998), Bandelow (1998), 
Oberender/Zerth (2001) and Sauerland (2002). 
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quality and the satisfaction are higher too. It is difficult to purport that money is “wasted”, if 
there is indeed something bought for the money.  
Studies comparing institutional setups on a theoretical level, like Diamond (1992), predict that 
the integration of financing and provision is of advantage, in particular when the entities in 
charge of both functions have to compete. The study by Feachem/Sekhri et al. (2002) 
comparing an American Health Maintenance Organization, HMO, and a public integrated 
health service, the British NHS, finds support for the performance increasing effects of 
competition. While the NHS as well HMOs have integrated the financing function with the 
provision of care, HMOs compete for clients while the NHS has a monopoly. Similar results 
are reported by a study by Cutler et al. (2000).  
Elements of competition were a major feature of many reform efforts in the past. It was 
assumed, that the introduction of competition in the HCS would increase its performance by 
incentivizing actors to show more effort. For instance, if insurance funds in a corporatist HCS 
compete, they are expected to have an incentive to negotiate lower prices with the suppliers, 
offering the realized savings to the insured and thereby attracting more insured. The evidence 
however differs from that prediction. A study done by Greß (2002) for the Netherlands did 
find no such effect. An equivalent study by Tamm et al. (2007) for Germany finds that effects 
are very small, at least in the short run. Citizens do not shift to the cheaper insurance quickly, 
but there might be stronger effects in the long run.  
 
The same reasoning on the effects of competition was the basis for restructuring a HCS as a 
whole along principles of competition. The argument was, that theoretically, many of the 
problems in health care arise because neither the supply nor the consumption of health care is 
guided by the market mechanism. Patients don’t pay for what they consume, and providers 
have a substantial control over the demand for their own services. It was thought that 
introducing market elements would remove some of the problems. The introduction of the 
internal market in the UK was a large scale effort to introduce competition in a system, which 
was virtually free of competition until then. The District Health Authorities were expected to 
buy services from the cheapest suppliers, but in practice the managers did not have an 
incentive to do so and the expected effect did not occur. The same was the case in the 
fundholder model; see the evaluations of the various elements of the “Internal Market” model 
in Booer (1994), Light (1999) and in particular the summary of research in Le Grand et al. 
(1998). 
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A HCS’ achievement is also influenced by the quality, and regarding quality of medical care, 
one reasoning for introducing competition among providers recurs to the argument that 
patients are able to perceive the quality of treatment and if they think it to be inappropriate, 
they can change the provider. Since providers don’t want to lose customers, they have an 
incentive to invest effort in assuring quality. Thus institutional settings which increase choice 
should also increase quality of treatment. One finding in this context is the study by Sari 
(2002), which analyzed the impact of the wave of mergers in the US Hospital sector on 
quality, and indeed found diminishing effects on at least some quality indicators. But it can 
also be argued that the patient is – lacking medical knowledge – unable to evaluate quality 
and might orient himself on visible but meaningless indicators like the usage of technology.  
 
Another instance of changing institutionally created incentives are co-payments. Oftentimes, 
medical services and products are offered free of charge, which sets an incentive for the 
consumer to consume services until s/he derives no longer any utility from them. The only 
limit are personal constraints, for instance time, see Torgerson et al. (1994), or availability, 
e.g. the capacity of the providers. The theoretically expected effect would be that the price is 
made relevant for the consumer, comparable to a “normal” market setting, and this introduces 
a cost-benefit calculation in the patients’ decision on medical consumption. The patient is 
more likely to ask for the price and the expected benefit, and is more likely to renounce 
services with a poor cost-benefit-ratio. This reduces the overall costs, because the services or 
products are no longer supplied and consumed at zero costs. But an alternative mechanism 
may be that the costs are actually not reduced, but merely shifted – that additional resources 
are feed into the HCS and only the share paid by the state remained constant; see 
Hoffmeyer/McCarthy (1994) for an overview on studies on the effects of co-payments for 
medical services.  
Other studies, most pronounced the study by Scheil-Adlung (1998), explicitly negate any 
effect of co-payment-based measures that actually works by changes in the incentives for 
actors: ’Cost control in public healthcare expenditure by means of the market-based 
incentives described appears to be virtually impossible’ (ibid. : 134). The use of incentives 
and other policy measures based on institutional economics have – according to Scheil-
Adlung’s observations – merely the effect to open up new sources of finance (as is the case 
for co-payments) or to shift the costs, thereby stabilizing the public share of health 
expenditure. But they do neither impact on the quantity of services consumed nor improve 
quality. 
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A structural feature often used to contain costs is gatekeeping. The argument rests on the 
observation that secondary care (and even services provided by secondary providers) is 
typically more expensive – irrespective of being provided by outpatient specialists working in 
their own practice or by the outpatient department of a hospital. It is argued that gatekeeping 
may help to contain costs by assuring that care is provided at the level of care with the lowest 
degree of specialization and thus, presumably, at the lowest costs. To make sure that this 
actually happens, the patients are by default only referred to secondary, specialized providers, 
if the gatekeeper – the first contact General Practitioner (GP) – thinks this is appropriate. The 
evidence of this mechanism and the net-effect of gatekeeping is debated. Using data on the 
OECD countries, Delnoij et al. (2000) find only one effect of gatekeeping on expenditure: 
expenditure growth is slower in countries with gatekeeping than in countries without. There 
are no effects on the level of total HCE. The authors conclude that while the effects at the 
micro level – between the patient, the GP, and the secondary provider – are clear, they do not 
show up at the macro level.  
Another institutional setting with attractive properties is the fundholder model. The idea is 
that fundholding combines several properties and incentives to an optimal constellation. 
Fundholding means that a fixed budget is allocated to a provider, e.g. a GP, per patient 
enlisted with this provider. The fixed budget sets an incentive for the GP to deliver only those 
services which are necessary and to choose the most cost effective ones. Because of the GPs 
medical knowledge, the GP is able to evaluate alternatives according to the expected cost-
effectiveness in any given case. While the difference between the allocated budget and the 
expenditure cannot be realized as profit, the GP is incentivized by the possibility of investing 
the difference in the equipment of the practices. On the upside, this sets an incentive to 
minimize the costs per patient but also to attract more patients as clients by offering good 
service. On downside, this sets the incentive to undersupply service, to attract healthy patients 
and to get rid of less healthy ones who are likely to cause higher costs, an activity labeled 
“cream skimming”. To counter act the first problem is necessary to give patients a free choice 
among the fundholders so that the GP does not provide to few services, or poor quality. The 
overall impact of fundholding is debated, depending very much on the details of the design; 
see Breyer/Zweifel (1997: chap 8) for a detailed discussion of the model, Fattore (1999) and 
Croxon et al. (2001) for empirical evidence from the UK, where the model was actually in 
use. 
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Qualitative Comparisons 
Given the complexity of HCS, a strategy to obtain insight on how the institutional setting 
affect efficiency, achievement and various indicators of “performance” is to compare few 
HCS in detail, using qualitative comparative research designs. Even though qualitative 
comparative studies of HCS usually do not focus on efficiency as such, cost containment, the 
question of how to design the HCS in a way that costs are contained and the evaluation of 
measures taken by the government are a central part in this strain of research. However, a gap 
exists between theoretical and empirical work: Studies conducted by economists view the 
organization of HCS as a special case of industrial organization and remain theoretical 
comparing models of HCS; see for instance Diamond (1992), Dranove/Satterthwaite (2000) 
and Blomqvist (2001). Studies conducted by social and political scientists compare real HCS, 
but often only implicitly refer to concepts of institutional economics4. Often, the introduction 
of appropriate individual incentives as a measure to contain the overall costs is discussed 
under labels like the introduction of market elements, public-private-mix, privatization etc. 
Nevertheless, these studies are in fact looking at the incentive effects of these measures for 
the actors in the HCS. For instance, Moran (1999) studied reform measures in countries 
representing the three basic types of HCS (NHS, corporatist and market) aiming at a 
limitation of the demand of expensive high-technology or aiming at restricting the supply of 
medical services. Stewart (1999) analyzed the effect of privatization – in the sense of shifting 
the ‘public-private-mix’ from solidarity to private responsibility – as a strategy to increases 
efficiency. Strategies of decentralization, studied for instance by Trottier et al. (1999) not only 
look at the responsiveness aspects of decentralization, but also at the increase of efficiency 
expected from this strategy. Some studies compare complete HCS (for instance the 
contributions in Hoffmeyer/McCarthy (1994) or compare the incentives set in the same 
domain / relationship in different countries; see the contributions in López-Casasnovas 
(1991), De Alessi (1989), McClellan (1997) or the detailed review on the effects of activity 
based financing methods in Street et al. (2007).  
Contrary to other fields of social policy, there are several ‘experimental studies’ available 
which seem to indicate that incentives, in particular co-payments, have an impact on the 
consumption of medical services. The most clear cut instance is the ‘RAND Insurance 
Experiment’, see the documentation in Leibovitz et al. (1985), Manning et al. (1987), 
 
4 The ideas of institutional economics and the role of incentives for actors as a leading concept of reforms is 
widely used in practice: Freeman/Moran (2000) find a convergence in the content of recent reform projects in 
very different HCS aiming at the creation of micro and macro-efficiency, i.e. to ensure, that a bundle of input 
and output is produced, that is optimal given the preferences of the electorate.  
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Newhouse (1993) and Newhouse (2004). The experiment explicitly tested for price effects on 
medical consumption and found substantial, and also strong effects if prices are made relevant 
for health consumption. Increased co-payment diminishes the consumption of services, both 
with respect to the frequency of usage and the costs of usage episodes. But the effect depends 
on the income level: for high income groups, which use medical services most often, the 
diminishing effect is weakest; it is stronger in the middle income groups and strongest in low 
income groups. However, the RAND experiment also found adverse effects: for those who are 
both poor and sick, the reduction of consumption proved to be harmful, leading to a mortality 
increased by 10%, Newhouse (2004: 108). Reduced were in particular services and treatments 
of non-acute nature, like the treatment of hypertension. While this does not immediately affect 
the present well being, since it is not a hindrance to the usual ‘way of life’, it might decreases 
life expectancy in the long run.  
Despite coming close to a ‘true’ experiment, the RAND group and the results were criticized 
for several reasons. Rice (1998): 130ff) argued firstly that the external validity can be 
challenged. The sample of persons included, which was then randomly assigned to the 
experimental groups with different levels of involvement in payment, was in itself already 
highly selective and not representative for the overall population. Second, while the patient 
may well decide on the initial contact, it is the supplier who decides on the next steps, i.e. the 
services consumed and usually does so in an authoritative way. The patient is neither in the 
position nor factually able to make an informed decision on what services to consume. 
Further, under the RAND experiment, the people who were included in the experiment only 
made up a small fraction in each providers pool of clients. Their reduced demand posed no 
threat to the provider’s income. But if all clients of a provider were subject to a diminished 
demand due to increased co-payments, the provider might react by increasing demand, using 
his role and the informational advantage, i.e. the reduction in overall HCE due to demand 
reducing effect of co-payments may be compensated by more supply induced demand.  
The study of Cockx/Brasseur (2003), on the ‘natural experiment’ of the increasing co-
payment rates for several kinds of medical services in Belgium, also found diminishing 
effects of co-payments on usage, but despite the large relative increase in prices – 35 % for 
home visits by general practitioners, 45 % for visits with general practitioners and 60 % for 
visits to specialist – the elasticity of the consumption was only low, and much of the cost 
saving effect was equalized by substitution effects. These observations lead Cockx and 
Brasseur to conclude, that ‘the efficiency gain of the reform, if any, is modest’ (ibid.: 881).  
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The introduction of co-payments, which are frequently used as an ad-hoc measure to increase 
available funding, makes them a feasible theme of qualitative intervention studies: does the 
introduction of a co-payment for a certain service or product has the intended effects or not? 
The prediction is, that as long as the service or the product are free, the consumption is 
basically unconstrained. Introducing a price, is supposed to limit the consumption to the level 
where the benefit exceeds costs. Because medicines are often the first product subjected to co-
payments, there are several before/after-studies on the usage and effects of co-payments for 
medicines. Most of these studies only test for demand side measures, that is measures which 
change the costs of consumption for the patients, either in the form of direct co-payments or 
in the form of deductibles and varying degrees of cost coverage by an insurance. Most studies 
find the predicted effect of lower consumption of medicines if they are subject to co-
payments. But even elaborate studies like O'Brien (1989) are very careful when drawing 
conclusions because co-payments might lead to a cost-shifting instead of an actual reduction 
of consumption and costs. And indeed, studies taking into account the prescriber, who makes 
the actual decision on medical consumption. Hassell/et al. (2003) found that GPs as the main 
prescribers of medicines respond to the introduction of co-payments with sophisticated 
strategies, which allow their patients to elude the costs, e.g. by diagnosing patients with 
conditions which qualify for an exemption from co-payments. 
Thus, summarizing the literature with regard to the role of institutional aspects as 
determinants of efficiency and costs, the results of qualitative comparative studies are 
ambiguous. The RAND experiment showed that institutional changes, while having certain 
intended effects, also have effects, which are unintended and may counteract the former ones 
to a degree which makes the overall improvement debatable.  
 
Quantitative Comparisons 
Quantitative comparative studies search for the determinants of quantitative properties of the 
HCS, using either intra-national or international data. A typical application of the former is 
the analysis of the behavior of GPs in a country, which was partly already covered above. A 
typical application of the latter strategy is the analysis of levels of HCE using pooled data 
from various countries for many points in time. Because HCS are often evaluated with regard 
to their consumption of inputs, a question studied intensely is: Why does HCE differ so much 
among countries? As was elaborated in the introduction, the input alone is of limited value in 
terms of actually evaluating the performance of a HCS, if it is not combined with a measure 
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of output. Nevertheless, the theme of expenditure is clearly the predominant issue in 
quantitative studies. 
Questions concern the role of the GDP for the expenditure level, the classical question raised 
by Newhouse (1977), the role of demographic factors; Barros (1998) and Karatzas (2000), 
and the impact of technology Okunade/Murthy (2002). Since the development of health 
expenditure as well as other independent variables, most notably GDP, have a clear one-way-
trend over time, the question whether the effects found are real or spurious is crucial – and is 
answered differently by various authors5.  
The quantitative literature can be divided into several strains. The first basic question is, what 
societal and economic factors determine the amount of money a society is spending for health. 
The second question is about the institutional sources of variation in HCE.  
 
a) Non-Institutional Factors Influencing Expenditure for Health  
The question, “Why HCE does differ so much among countries?” was the basis of the 
classical study by Newhouse (1977), who found that the most relevant factor in HCE is GDP 
and concluded that institutions don’t matter for HCE. Neither does – at least in industrialized 
countries – additional HCE improve health. According to his findings, health care is a luxury, 
and the physiological limit of life expectancy can be reached by spending comparatively little 
for health care. Once a life expectancy of about 70 to 80 years is reached, even multiplying 
HCE by several magnitudes does not increase the life expectancy any further; see chapter 10 
for a more detailed discussion. For the additional resources spent, societies ’buy more care, 
but little additional curing’ (Newhouse 1977: 122). The finding of diminishing returns of 
HCE in terms of health status was supported by many follow up studies, see 
Newhouse/Friedlander (1980), Pritchett/Summers (1996), WHO (2000: 43) or 
Self/Grabowski (2003): 844). 
Nevertheless, the conclusion that health is a luxury and more of it is demanded as people get 
richer (which in turn makes them more healthy by default) stimulated political debates 
because of its political implications but also many studies on the validity of the findings.  
What remains still open is the nature of the relationship between HCE and GDP. It is also 
questioned, whether there actually a relationship. Does higher GDP lead to higher HCE, and if 
so, by what mechanism? While the bivariate correlation of both is well supported, and also 
 
5 Central question is the problem of unit-roots and co-integration: since GNP and health expenditure have a clear 
increasing trend over time, it is possible that the found correlation is spurious. Results, even of studies using 
most advanced methods, is ambiguous. 
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found in multivariate studies, the existence of a connection is nevertheless debated. Both 
figures (GDP and HCE) are growing over time. This may – even in the absence of any 
causality – create a spurious relationship, discussed in the econometric discussion under the 
label co-integration respectively unit-root-problem. Various studies answered the question 
differently, some tests report co-integration for individual countries, some for all; see 
Hansen/King (1996), Blomqvist/Carter (1997), Gerdtham/Löthgren (1998), 
Gerdtham/Löthgren (1998), Gerdtham/Löthgren (1999), Okunade/Karakus (2001), 
Gerdtham/Löthgren (2002), Jewell et al. (2003) and Freeman (2003). The issue is studied so 
intensely, because of the implications a definite answer would have: if health is indeed a 
luxury, or at least certain services are luxuries, the question arises, why the state or the public 
should be forced pay for that. 
But even if one assumes that there is a true correlation among HCE and GDP, there is much 
debate about the underlying mechanism; see also chapter 9 for the problem. While the view 
that GDP causes HCE is clearly dominating, the causality may just as well work the other way 
around. Studies like Bhargava et al. (2001), Sachs (2001) or Van Zon/Muysken (2001) argue, 
that better health of the population leads to an increase in GDP, because healthier people are 
more productive, live longer and in doing so less human capital is wasted. Support for this 
interpretation also comes from studies on the economic impact of AIDS on economic 
development; Sala-i-Martin (2005) and Philipson/Soares (2005). 
 
Demographic and socioeconomic developments like the aging of the population or high 
unemployment rates (which are a factor for health status), were often found to be of little 
impact, while the effect of health related life styles were significant; see Gerdtham/Jönsson 
(2000). Regarding overall social developments, the study by Schmidt (1999) tested for the 
effects of the increased participation of women in the labor market. The underlying idea is 
that it were and are usually women who perform a range of tasks related to health care in the 
household. For instance, women are taking care of the older generation, usually their parents, 
or take care of their children if they are ill. If women are employed, they have no time to 
perform these tasks, and their workforce has to be replaced by professional personnel, which 
in turn raises the HCE. The effects found significantly confirm the hypothesis. 
 
Another factor increasing HCE is the technological progress, but its effect is – both in terms 
of existence and magnitude – also subject to debate. The extensive usage of new technologies 
and medicines is a factor in the political debate, and Okunade/Murthy (2002) found that the 
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technological development, proxied by R&D investments is a statistically significant ‘major 
driver’ for HCE. However, this finding in turn raises the question, what institutional and 
political factors influence the widespread usage of new technologies. The decision to invest in 
high-end medical technology and also to make intensive use of the technology may be a 
consequence of the institutional settings but also the societal preferences. Further, there is also 
contradictory evidence: the Japanese HCS is, as Anderson et al. (2003), point out, highly 
endowed with high technology equipment which is also used intensely, but in terms of HCE it 
nevertheless ranks low among OECD countries.  
 
b) Institutional Factors of Health Care Expenditure and Health System “Performance” 
While in particular GDP is – for whatever reason – the most important factor in statistical 
models explaining HCE, another strain of quantitative studies explicitly focuses on the impact 
of the institutional setting in the HCS on HCE and indicators of performance. Summing up 
about three decades of empirical research on HCE and their own encompassing research on 
institutional factors for HCE, Gerdtham/Jönsson (1998) and Gerdtham /Jönsson (2000) report 
the following insights: Gatekeeping seems to have an decreasing impact on HCE, and so have 
payment systems in which patients pay first and receive reimbursement later. In-patient care 
is seemingly more expensive than outpatient care, which implies that if a service can be 
provided either by a hospital or by a GP respectively an out-patient specialist, it should be 
provided outside of the hospital; see the argument on gatekeeping mentioned above. The 
density of providers (physicians per head) and in particular remuneration modes which are 
based on the quantity of services provided increase HCE. This in turn supports the supply-
induced-demand argument which will be discussed in more detail below.  
However, the research is fragmented, and the results are not consistent, and authors like 
Gerdtham and Jönsson who have reviewed a substantial number of studies are very careful 
when drawing conclusions. 
One strain looks at the impact of specific institutional features on HCE, but also on output 
related aspects of HCS performance. Among the issues covered by studies are for instance 
referral rates from general practitioners to specialist and hospitals, Franks et al. (1999), 
Croxon et al. (2001) and Garcia Marinoso/Jelovac (2003); the relative impact of economic 
and medical priorities on the behavior of salaried medical consultants; Iversen (1998); the 
differences in waiting time for hospital admission when the gatekeeper has a financial stake in 
the decision, Propper et al. (2002); the determinants of waiting times, Siciliani/Hurst (2003); 
the impact of prospective payment for hospitals on the length of stay, Norton/et al. (2002) and 
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Shmueli/Intrator et al. (2002); the impact non-profit / for-profit status of hospitals on the 
expenditure per case; Wilcox-Gök (2002); the impact of DRG remuneration, Dismuke 1999 
and other forms of budgeting, see Wilton/Smith (1998); the impact of prospective payments 
on length of stay in hospitals, Norton/et al. (2002); the treatment intensity in dental care under 
different remuneration modes, Chalkley/Tilley (2006); and the prescription behavior of 
physicians, Hellerstein (1998) and Lundin (2000). 
 
Other, in particular intra-national studies analyzed several institutional features 
simultaneously or combinations of features. Again the question is, does a certain institutional 
change or a coordinated change of several institutional features aiming at changing the 
incentives of actors in the HCS actually improve the performance, either by lowering 
expenditure or by improving quality treatment. An instance of such a study is the study by 
Lynch (1998) who inquired whether the physicians in the UK react to incentives set under the 
new institutional setting, maximized the share of good risks among their patients and whether 
the introduced competition did indeed have positive effects on the services of the physicians. 
The first hypothesis could be confirmed weakly, which means that the so called ‘cream 
skimming’ occurs, but is not a common feature. The introduced competition however had no 
effect on the physicians’ behavior; see also Fattore (1999: 761), Croxon/Propper et al. (2001) 
and Propper/Croxon et al. (2002) for quantitative evaluations of the fundholder model.  
 
Role of the Government for Health System Performance 
A major institutional feature of a HCS is the role of the government. Because health care 
provision is in many countries an integral part of the state’s functions, there are many studies 
on the role of the government for health care.  
A consistent finding of the quantitative studies is that expenditure levels in public-integrated 
HCS are usually lower by a significant amount; see Gerdtham et al. (1998) for a review. The 
mechanisms are not fully clear. It can be argued that the state just limits the funding available, 
and thus makes the HCS not more efficient but just undersupplies services. It can also be 
argued that the government as a “steward” keeps those actors in check, for whom HCE is 
income and who thus have an interest in high levels and high growth rates. If this is the 
mechanism underlying the effect found, it would indeed be an improvement in efficiency.  
An example of a study using features of the political and societal environment in addition to 
the standard explanatory variables like NHS type, is offered by Schmidt (1999). As a feature 
of the political environment, Schmidt studied the impact of so called ‘etatist problem solving 
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routines’, i.e. the tendency of a state to solve problems by spending more money. A more 
elaborate argument is that funding health care is a distributional conflict and that the state may 
reconcile the conflict by standing in with additional funding raised in a diffused way by 
general taxation. The relationship found is in line with the argument. 
 
A very different argument underlying lower expenditure levels in state-governed HCS is 
given by Anderson et al. (2003) who look at the basic organization of demand and supply in a 
HCS as determinant of HCE, in particular the prices charged by providers, e.g. GPs and 
hospitals. Whether or not there is an explicit bargaining between the supply and the demand 
side in a HCS, both sides are always existing and the are factually bargaining – explicitly and 
visible or implicitly. HCE can be seen as divided into one share which goes into the 
production of services and products, which are given to the patients. But another share is 
realized by the providers as income. If the latter can enforce their demands to a higher degree 
in the overall bargain, the HCE will be higher, but moreover, since they can also obtain a 
larger share of the “cake” it may well be that in the end less resources end up with the patients 
than in other countries. Anderson et al. argue that this is the case in the US: prices for medical 
services and goods are high as a consequence of a fragmented demand side, which consists of 
hundreds of Health Maintenance Organizations and insurance funds. While there is some 
aggregation of demand in form of the MEDICARE and the MEDICAID programs, ‘most 
money flows from households to the providers of health care through a vast network of 
relatively uncoordinated pipes and capillaries of various size’; Anderson et al. (2003: 102). In 
other HCS, demand for services is much more organized and centralized, either by a National 
Health Service, NHS, where the state is the only purchaser or by aggregating individual 
demand in form of several large insurance funds, or one monopolistic national level insurance 
fund, which also negotiate together with the supply side. In terms of this reasoning, a NHS 
leads lower expenditure, because it has much more bargaining power when prices are 
negotiated.  
 
Apart from the studies comparing systems where the HCS is fully integrated into the public 
administration and subjected to immediate government control, there is a number of studies 
available which inquire into the effects of other, less immediate relationships between the 
political system and the HCS. Using data on the Swiss Cantons, Vatter/Rüefli (2003) study 
several genuinely political factors, e.g. the political orientation of the government, and found 
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a significant effects for them on the level of public spending; for instance left-wing 
governments tend to increase the public health expenditure. 
A relatively simple institutional feature of a HCS, which is easily usable for international 
comparisons as proxy of “state control”, is the share of HCE borne by the state. The question 
is, whether the institutional feature of “state involvement” respectively “political control” 
increases or decreases HCS performance and efficiency; see Leu (1986), Jönsson (1990), and 
Santerre et al. (1991). The argument underlying the expectation is basically, that the state, by 
virtue of its superordinate position vis-à-vis the providers of medical services, can force them 
to accept conditions (prices and quantity constraints) which they would not accept in a 
voluntary agreement; see Danzon (1992: 22). As for the results, Santerre et al. found an 
decreasing effect of the size of the government’s share in financing on the level of health 
spending. Santerre et al. also found that high levels of government involvement went together 
with higher levels of infant mortality.  
Thus, it is once unclear whether government involvement actually leads to an increase in 
efficiency or just to a situation in which under-funding results in undersupply. The latter 
interpretation is also supported by the finding of higher waiting times and limited access to 
health care in public-integrated HCS; see Siciliani/Hurst (2003).   
 
Measuring and Explaining Health System Efficiency 
As outlined above, studying isolated parameters – like input or output – of a HCS, is not 
sufficient to make a statement about the HCS’ efficiency. Consequentially, there are also 
attempts to measure the productive efficiency, i.e. the ratio of input to output. The approaches 
and problems are just outlined here, but will be discussed in more detail in chapter 9. A first 
approach is primarily concerned with measuring efficiency and to capture the variation in 
HCS performance and productive efficiency – without paying heed to the question, which of 
the many institutional factors are influencing HCS achievement and efficiency. Because non-
institutional factors are usually controlled for, this strain can be seen as an overall test of 
whether the institutional setting of a HCS has an impact or not.  
An example of the basic idea of comparing institutional settings of HCS as a “black box”, i.e. 
without dividing them analytically, is the study by Grubaugh and Santerre (1994). They 
conduct a regression analysis of performance indicators, in their case HCE as input and infant 
mortality as output, on exogenous features of the country, treating the features of the HCS as 
non-observable and using country dummy variables as proxies for the HCS. Using the values 
of a country A in the independent variables plus the country dummy for country B, one can 
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calculate an expected value for the output indicator country A would have, if it had the HCS 
of country B; see Grubaugh/Santerre (1994). A problem is of course, that the country dummy 
does not only contain the effect of the HCS, but all other unspecified features as well.  
This “black-box”-method of looking at institutional effects without analytically dividing them 
into individual institutional variables, can also be applied at a sub-national level. For instance 
the study by Hauck et al. (2003) uses multilevel random intercept model to estimate the 
effects of wards, which are nested in District Health Authorities, which in turn are nested in 
Regional Health Authorities, to capture the share in several outcome variables which is do to 
– unspecified – features of the administrative unit. The finding most noteworthy is that the 
administrative unit’s impact differ substantially among various indicators of outcome: while 
the features (whatever they are) of an administrative unit have a strong impact on a certain 
outcome variable, like mortality, it is irrelevant for other outcome variables.  
Another method also based on predicted values of a regression consists of looking at how 
close a state is to what the best operating HCS would achieve in a comparable situation. This 
is the idea underlying the WHO efficiency measurement and many other studies based on 
productivity frontiers; see Gravelle et al. (2003), Retzlaff-Roberts/Chang et al. (2004), Bhat 
(2005) and Greene (2003). 
Finally, another way to study performance of HCS is to look at the effect of the HCE it 
consumes on health status. Again, the results found for the impact of HCE on different HCS 
outputs differ. The survey in Babazono/Hillman (1994) reports a significant decreasing effect 
of HCE on infant mortality – and positive relationship among HCE and life expectancy. Their 
own study however did not find such relationships. Grubaugh/Santerre (1994) conclude, that 
it is not so much the HCS as a system, but exogenous factors like socioeconomic factors or 
life style, which impact on infant mortality as the performance indicator they use, with regard 
to output. Anderson/Poullier (1999) conclude in their survey that the way the HCS in general 
and the delivery of health in particular are organized does not impact on the usual outcome 
indicators. 
 
2.2.2. Institutional Changes in Health Care Systems 
Given the “objective” pressures but also the more “subjective” dissatisfaction with the HCS in 
many countries, changes and reforms aiming at improvements, however defined, are frequent 
and there is extensive research on health system reform, analyzing institutional health policy 
making: what was the problem, what was intended, what was actually done, and: did it work? 
With regard to reforms and the “reformability” of HCS, case studies and qualitative 
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comparisons clearly prevail. Most often with a focus on describing the content of a country’s 
major reform projects (see for instance the introduction of a national health service in 
southern Europe studied by Guillén (1999) or definite reform projects; see for instance 
Manow (1994), Perschke-Hartmann (1994) and Maioni (1999). A major result of the 
historically oriented studies of health system development – see for instance Wilsford (1994), 
Hacker (1996), Maioni (1997), Tuohy (1999), Pauly (2002), Hacker (2004) and 
Altenstetter/Busse (2005) – is the high degree of path dependency and the constraints created 
by institutional developments for the future development. Other studies do research into the 
reasons and the ‘windows of opportunities’ for reforms; e.g. Geva-May/Maslove (2000). The 
most dominant form are studies which give an overview on the content of reform projects in 
several countries, try to identify trends or evaluate the impact and success of reform projects6.  
A quantitative study, which at least implicitly studies the interaction of reformability and the 
expenditure level is again the study by Schmidt (1999). Schmidt uses the theory developed by 
Olson (1982) on the age of a democracy and the establishment of distributional coalitions. 
The central argument is that over time interest groups establish themselves, gain more and 
more influence in the political process and thereby obtain obstruction power with regard to 
reforms relevant for them. For this reason, it is more and more difficult for the state to enact 
reforms against interest groups that would make them worse off. In the case of HCS, reform 
measures aiming at containing costs directly go at the expenses of the groups currently 
profiting from the large quantities of financial resources going into the HCS, viz. all actors 
providing services or products. The theory as well as the operationalization – by the time 
since the introduction of popular votes for the population – are straightforward but subject to 
two problems: First, the theory can only explain a constant decrease in reformability over 
time. But no windows of opportunities, no interaction effects with changes in the political 
system or changes in the relationships among interest groups and the government, for instance 
due to changes in government compositions and not the increasing reform activities 
observable in almost all industrialized countries. Second, the empirical test is subject to the 
same problems as is the effect of GDP on health expenditure: Health expenditure has a clear 
trend over time, and time is, what is measured by age of a democracy. This may create a 
spurious correlation, just as in the quantitative studies described above. 
 
 
6 See OECD (1994), OECD (1996), Saltman/Figueras (1997), Drache/Sullivan (1999), Böcken/Butzlaff et al. 
(2000), Ritsatakis et al. (2000), and Oliver /Mossialos (2005). 
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While description of reform activities dominates the research, there are also studies 
investigating the chances and the success of reforms with reference to a theoretical 
framework. The usage of the theoretical framework is however comparable to the rather 
informal applications of institutional economics for comparisons of “performance”: they often 
use the vocabulary of veto points and veto players as the predominant theory to explain 
reforms, see Tsebelis (1995), study the role of organized groups for reforms and see the 
access of societal groups to these points as critical for the success of a reform. For instance, 
Moran (2000) sums up the low reformability of the US health system with the words that 
„supplier interests still control the critical veto points in the decision-making-system“ (ibid: 
151). Döhler/Manow-Borgwardt (1991) explicitly refer to veto power that accrued with the 
societal groups in the German HCS as the state delegated more and more tasks to them, which 
is in their argumentation the main reason; see also Schulenburg (1987), Hassenteufel (1996) 
and Giaimo/Manow (1999). But the usage of the underlying theoretical concept remains 
implicit, often rather ad hoc, and its potential to structure the complex processes and 
interactions among interest groups, the organizational form of the HCS, the wider political 
context and the political system was not studied in a comparative way. Neither was the 
interaction among the political system as an environment of the HCS studied in comparison 
with respect to the resulting consequences for HCS reformability and government capacities. 
With regard to the interaction among the political system and the HCS, the promising 
approach developed by Immergut (1992), which clearly suggested an extension of the cases 
Immergut herself studied, was not followed up. On the whole, the research on HCS reforms 
remained highly descriptive, and inductively. A fact attributable to the importance attached to 
take duly into account the complexity of the processes and the systems.  
 
2.2.3. Open Questions and Methodological Problems 
The research on HCS is manifold and covers virtually all aspects of health care organization 
and provision and also the developments in these aspects. However, the findings obtained by 
the individual studies, only a fraction of which was reviewed in the above section, indicate 
that there are still open questions abound and that the research efforts, while substantial, are 
not as cumulative as one would like them to be.  
 
Looking at qualitative approaches, in particular case studies, it is observable that they deliver 
detailed information on a HCS and the way it works. But they also hold the implicit view that 
each HCS is an entity sui generis and not really comparable to others. Even if one understands 
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how a certain HCS works, how it reacted to a certain institutional change and why something 
worked out the way it did – and many studies give excellent insights in the intricate workings 
of a specific HCS – these insights are limited to the specific HCS from which the insights 
were obtained. Further, and this is a serious obstacle to obtaining cumulative insights, the 
diversity of features which are covered by case studies make it impossible to accumulate 
information with regard to a certain aspect of HCS organization, e.g. which delegation 
relationships exist, how they are organized and how they affect the HCS’ performance. Even 
in edited volumes, e.g. Mossialos/LeGrand (1999a) or the “Health System in Transition” 
Reports by the European Observatory on Health Systems, which feature the advantage of 
having at least a common frame, the way a certain feature is studied in different countries 
differ between the individual contributions. For some HCS, certain issues are in the focus of 
interest, like devolution. In others, these issues are never treated, albeit there may be similar 
developments.  
 
Looking at quantitative studies, e.g. on the determinants of HCE, HCS output and the impact 
of institutions on both, several points have to be acknowledged:  
a) Methodological problems, in particular the debate on co-integration of GDP and HCE 
resulted in the situation that even the answers to “old” problems are moot; see 
Kanavos/Mossialos (1996) for a critical evaluation of the “lessons for health policy”. 
b) Even more problematic is the fact, that many of the relationships found in cross-national 
research are macro relationships and are lacking comprehensibility. Even if one accepts that 
NHS/public-integrated systems have lower levels of expenditure, the question remaining is: 
What feature in the NHS system is causing the lower HCE and how does that work? And, is 
less HCE actually a sign of higher efficiency? Or, looking at another question: Why do people 
in richer societies spend more on HCE, respectively in Newhouse’ perspective, select 
institutions which consume more money to produce more and a different kind of health care? 
As Kanavos/Mossialos (1996) emphasize, the relationships found at the macro level can be 
interpreted in many ways. They conclude that:  
„The literature in this field is quite extensive but by no means conclusive. A 
number of methodological problems arise in the treatment of the data, which make 
the conclusions problematic and subject to review.“ (Kanavos/Mossialos 1996: 4) 
c) Quantitative studies differ in regard to which institutional features they include and how 
these are proxied. Looking at the way an institutional feature is proxied, there is already a lot 
of intra-category variation within each study, which is all the bigger when different studies 
using different operationalizations of an institutional feature are compared. The cause of the 
 33
problem is the following: The usual database regarding the countries and the time frame of 
quantitative analysis is the is OECD Health Data, which covers the OECD countries from 
1960 on. The data on HCE and its composition and HCS output as provided in the OECD 
Database is sufficiently consistent, albeit there too are breaks in the series. But the data on the 
institutional features for a time frame like this is of much poorer quality; often enough there is 
no institutional data. As a consequence, only some features can be used, and even they are 
very rough and have a large intra-category variation. For instance, Gerdtham et al. (1998) as a 
study using the most encompassing set of institutional features, use dummy variables for NHS 
system type, gatekeeping by general practitioners, fee-for-service remuneration etc. Prima 
facie there is a consensus which HCS classify as NHS/public-integrated systems. But due to 
the large variation in the way HCS of the NHS/public-integrated type are actually organized 
at a given point in time, there is a large variation among cases in the NHS/public-integrated 
type category. As a consequence, effects found in a regression analysis for the type-variables 
(usually coded as a dummy variable) will be small. So when study A finds an effect for 
gatekeeping and study B doesn’t this does not imply much about gatekeeping but rather 
implies that both studies operationalized gatekeeping differently and that moreover, the way 
gatekeeping is handled in practice, differs among countries.  
d) Methods which use the HCS as a whole, as a “black box” without dividing it analytically 
into components which may exert a certain effect, capture the effect of the overall setting of 
the HCS, but cannot tell what feature of the HCS is most relevant. Strictly speaking, not even 
the conclusion that it is the country’s HCS is certain. For instance, including a country 
dummy variable for the US when analyzing HCS quantitatively increases the fit of 
quantitative models substantially. The US-dummy variable has almost always a significant 
increasing effect on HCE, and often enough a decreasing effect on health outputs. While this 
tells us, that the US is a special case, it does not tell us anything about what features of the US 
cause these effects. Nor does the effect of the US-dummy mean that it is the US health system 
rather than US life style which is the cause.  
 
So while producing advice for health policy making is clearly an aim pursued by much of 
research, there is little certain and workable advice to be obtained for policy makers and even 
less requested and used by the latter. While much of research suggest policy changes, indeed 
giving recommendations for health policy is a requirement in some journals on health 
economics and policy, the transfer of knowledge from the academic research to the policy 
makers is difficult. In a review on the usage of evidence provided by scientists to policy 
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makers, Innvaer et al. (2002) found a range of factors which make this transfer difficult, also 
evidence of selective use of research findings by policy makers. Pawson et al. (2005) suggest 
ways to improve this critical connection. They suggest to renounce the ceteris paribus 
statements which so often result from theoretical studies, but instead to elaborate the theory, 
and in particular its assumptions and whether they are met in the domain the policy maker has 
in mind, because the success of interventions in a field as complex as health care will depend 
on the context.  
 
2.3. Working Program 
Regarding the present study’s working program, I want to emphasize the following points: 
The first problem is that effects of institutions on HCS “performance” show up seemingly 
unsystematic. Some findings come up more consistently than others, but for many findings 
the occurrence is not stable. Even if one looks at the effects in a certain domain, e.g. 
mortality, the effect of an institutional setting might be found for infant mortality but not for 
adult mortality. This is true for case studies as well as quantitative/qualitative comparisons. A 
certain regulation has the impact expected in one HCS, but completely fails to achieve its 
aims in another one. The explanation I suggest is that effects are conditional. It is not the 
presence or absence of a certain feature, but the combination of several features, which has an 
effect. As Pawson et al. put it, the question is not an unconditional “What works?”, since there 
are no ‘magic bullets’. But rather a highly conditional “What is it about this kind of 
intervention that works, for whom, in what circumstances, in what respects and why?”; 
(Pawson et al. 2005: 31). If there is one consistent finding, it is that institutional features work 
differently in different institutional environments.  
This immediately leads to a second problem which limits research on institutional effect in 
health care: the limited availability of comparable institutional data. In particular quantitative 
studies have to rely on very crude institutional data. And one solution coming into one’s mind 
is of course that the manifold case study literature could provide this missing information. But 
in practice it is impossible to collect the information necessary for institutional analysis from 
a review of the case study literature, because the descriptions in the literature covered very 
different themes, different periods or are even inconsistent in stating how things are regulated 
in a HCS.  
The present study will firstly contribute to redress the lack of comparable institutional data by 
gathering such data, secondly analyze the impact of institutional settings by combining 
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institutional information. The working program resulting from this overall aim encompasses 
the following steps: 
a) Development of a Framework for the Comparison of Health Systems 
The institutional complexity of the HCS prohibits a comparison which takes into account all 
features. Thus, a comparison must be guided by a theory, and the first step of a comparison is 
the development of a theoretical framework. HCS “performance”, achievement, efficiency 
and also reformability are properties of the HCS as a macro phenomenon. What the study is 
interested in, is the effect of institutions, which are also macro phenomena. However, in the 
present study, all explanations of macro properties and the differences therein will be based 
on the micro level, i.e. individual behavior which is both comprehensible and rational: 
Individuals behave self-interested but are influenced by the institutional setting in which they 
are acting. At aggregate level, the behavior of individuals will lead to certain macro level 
features. Thus, macro level features seen as independent are linked to macro level features 
seen as dependent, by the micro level of rational individual behavior. For instance, assume 
that a certain remuneration mode sets an incentive to over supply services. All providers 
respond to this institutional setting by oversupplying services, because this is the rational 
thing to do. This will at the aggregate level, result in higher levels of expenditure, caused by 
the institutional features, but intermediated by rational behavior. Based on the explanatory 
framework of institutional economics and the new institutionalism as theoretical tools for 
explaining variation in “performance” and the chances to improve performance, I will develop 
in a first step a unified framework to compare HCS with respect to delegation relationships, 
incentives and control, which is applicable to any HCS, independent of organizational form or 
type. Next, the independent institutional features were operationalized by deriving an Health 
Care System Inventory, HCSI, of observable features of the HCS.  
b) Collecting Data on Institutional Settings  
The Health Care System Inventory allows for a systematical, directly comparable description 
of HCS and their political environment with regard to delegation problems, their control, the 
possibility to exert control over the agent from the outside as well as properties of the HCS 
and the political environment relevant for the reformability of HCS. This institutional data 
was collected – together with data on performance and efficiency of the HCS – for 22 OECD 
countries for two points in time, 1995 and 2004; see Kotzian (2007b) and chapter 8. 
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c) Descriptive Analysis 
The framework defines a property space and the first, descriptive question is, what are the 
basic dimensions underlying the manifold organizational features of HCS and where are the 
HCS located in this property space? A second descriptive question is, whether there are 
typical ‘institutional syndromes’, several features going together and do these institutional 
syndromes correspond to standard types of HCS? To answer both questions, I will use the 
collected and combined institutional data to locate and to cluster the 22 HCS included in this 
study with regard to similarities, differences, and institutional syndromes of features typically 
going together.  
d) Causal Analysis: Control and Performance, Indirect Veto Power and Institutional Change 
The causal analysis shall test, whether there is a consistent relationship between control and 
performance as predicted by the institutional economics approach underlying the analysis. 
aa) The first question is, is there a relationship among control and performance in HCS? Once 
the data on the delegation relationships and control mechanism in a HCS is collected, it can be 
used to evaluate the design of the overall HCS as well as on a sectorial basis, with regard to 
the efficiency of the institutional setting: HCS, in which either fewer delegation relationships 
exist or in which the incentive problems inherent to delegation are better controlled, should be 
more efficient than HCS in which many delegation relationship exist, of which many are not 
or only insufficiently controlled. 
bb) The second questions is, how can the variation in the ‘reformability’, i.e. the chance to 
change the HCS be explained and whether reformability, the very chance to improve 
performance, already affects efficiency and achievement. I will propose a conceptualization of 
why and how the variation in reformability and amenability to institutional changes depends 
on the political system, the organization of the HCS, but also on features of the societal 
groups in the HCS. The empirical question is hence, which of these factors is most relevant 
for the occurrence of change.  
e) Institutional Interplay and its Effect 
As outlined above, HCS “performance”, and in particular productive efficiency consists of 
two complementary aspects: output and input. More precisely, quantity and quality of health 
care as the central output and HCE as the central input. The theory of delegation relationships 
and agency in its application to health care will be elaborated in detail in chapter 4 below. The 
theory predicts that the delegation of tasks – e.g. of restoring health – to an actor in the setting 
of where one side has more information than the other induces problems, in particular the 
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temptation to exploit this relationship – either by extracting more money or by providing less 
output. Control mechanisms, either in form of external control or in the form of setting 
incentives for actors, impact on both aspects in different, often opposing ways. Take the 
example of a remuneration mode for medical providers. A remuneration mode might be 
appropriate to contain the costs, because it uncouples income from the quantity of services. 
But it may also uncouple income from effort, thus lowering quality of health care and lower 
levels of certain services, thus lowering the overall output level. Thus, to achieve efficiency, 
some institutional features will have to go together in an optimal way. This notion was first 
raised by Alber (1995), who referred to “institutional syndromes” as institutional features 
which usually occur together. In addition to look for co-occurrences of institutional features, 
the question is: What institutional syndromes should – from the perspective of the delegation 
approach – go together, to make the HCS a good and efficient instrument of health 
production? And, if these features go together, does it actually matter? 
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Part II: Theoretical Basis 
 
3. Explaining the Effects of Institutional Settings in Health Care  
 
Why is there such a dominance of institutional analysis in health system research? Health care 
is empirically not provided by pure market mechanism but by other institutional 
arrangements, involving a country-specific mixture of market elements, organized societal 
groups, public administration and direct state intervention. A share of the current 
performance, but in particular the institutional development is the product of a basically 
political process, involving voters and political actors on the one side and institutions and 
organized groups in the HCS on the other side. Because HCS are dominated by institutions 
which often completely replace market mechanisms, the question is: What are the 
implications of these institutions for health system achievement and efficiency? How does the 
institutional setting for instance influences the current productive efficiency of the HCS? And 
how does the institutional setting influence the direction and dynamic of a HCS’ institutional 
development?  
 
In this chapter, I will briefly elaborate on why health is neither produced nor allocated by an 
institution-free market. Next I will sketch the general approach employed in this study to 
answer how institutions affect HCS performance and development, by elaborating on how an 
micro-level based institutionalist explanation of macro-level phenomena works. 
 
3.1. Market vs. Non-Market Provision of Health Care 
Given standard economic theory, the provision and allocation of a good by the market 
mechanism will lead to efficient production and a Pareto-optimal allocation when compared 
to any other form of provision and allocation. However, the market mechanism grants these 
optimality only if several assumptions are met. Health – as a good, as a service, but also the 
insurance against the risks of illness – has properties making it potentially subject to several 
forms of market failure, resulting in sub-outcomes, or at least outcomes, which are explicitly 
rejected by the society. These failures in turn justify the introduction of other forms of 
provision and allocation from a welfare point of view. The following illustration will focus on 
the main problems; see the literature beginning with Arrow (1963), Culyer (1989), Rice 
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(1998) and Gaynor et al. (2000) for a detailed discussion. Among the assumptions which are 
made by the economic market model but which are not met in health care are the following: 
a) Consumers are sovereign and perfectly informed – the first aspect means that the consumer 
can determine whether s/he consumes a product or not. For health, this assumption may not be 
met for several reasons: The consumer – i.e. the patient – may be physically unable to make 
the decision at the point in time when the decision has to be made. Further, while it is usually 
the patient who initiates the first contact to a medical provider, it is not the patient who 
decides, what and how much services are consumed. Instead, the medical provider, i.e. the 
physician or the hospital, decides what is done, often with little or no involvement of the 
patient. As a consequence, supply and demand of medical services are not independently 
determined and then enter the marketplace. Instead, to some degree, the supply side 
determines the demand for its own services. Even more problematic is the assumption that 
consumers are perfectly informed. For health care the assumption implies that the patient 
knows perfectly well what medical service s/he requires. This means that s/he is assumed to 
be able to diagnose the illness, to know which treatments are possible, their respective 
chances of success and side-effects, as well as their price and cost effectiveness. Empirically 
this is obviously not the case. Instead, one of the central featured in health is the asymmetrical 
distribution of information among providers and consumers of health care. The consumer is 
assumed to choose the provider who offers the best service in terms of a combination of price 
and quality. While the information about the price is in principle available, it is very often 
completely irrelevant. Nevertheless, the consumer is interested in getting high quality 
treatment. But the consumer does not have information on quality, when s/he chooses a 
provider. Moreover, the consumer is by all likelihood unable to evaluate the treatment quality 
ex post, since the outcome of a medical treatment is only party dependent on the providers 
services; see Arrow (1963), Culyer (1971), Nelson (1970) and Sloan (2001).  
b) Absence of externalities –immunization is the classical example of a positive externality. 
By getting immunized, an act involving costs both in financial terms and in terms of a risk for 
her personal health, a citizen also reduces the probability of falling ill for others. Albeit 
realizing a utility (a reduced risk of contagion) these fellow citizens are however not 
contributing to the costs of the immunization. Thus, at the aggregated level of society, the 
public good “immunization” and the lower risk of catching a contagious illness is not 
provided at the optimal level but at a lower level; see the discussion in Breyer/Zweifel (1997; 
chap. 5). 
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c) Absence of free riding – It might be, from the point of an individual, be worth the risk to 
skip paying for health care on a regular basis, i.e. independent of the actual consumption. The 
individual might speculate that most other citizens will to pay for a medical infrastructure, 
which will be available to all, whether the individual did contribute to it or not. At the 
aggregate level, this may imply an under-investing in health care. By making some form of 
health insurance obligatory, the state can remove this problem.  
d) Economies of scale – The provision of a medical infrastructure is characterized by 
economies of scale and what Breyer/Zweifel (1997) call the “option good characteristic”. 
Health care requires substantial investments in an infrastructure. Because many medical 
devices are expensive it makes sense, once the investment in a new medical device is made, to 
make as much use of it as possible. So it makes sense to centralize the provision of services 
requiring sophisticated technology in one place, e.g. to pool resources of many patients to 
purchase technology which neither could afford alone. Second, the existence of a medical 
infrastructure is an option good: it necessary that medical capacities are kept ready to use, 
even if the citizens do not currently need them and underestimate the chances that they will 
require them in the future. 
 
Many of these problems can – and empirically are – treated by a form of insurance, which is 
acting as an intermediate agent, or “care taker”, performing many of the tasks the consumer of 
health should perform but cannot; see also chapter 4. Instead of risking to pay the price of a 
medical service which might be very high and not foreseeable, each citizens regularly pays a 
certain amount on a regular basis to a health fund or a government agency. This “purchaser” 
pools the risks of all members, pays for the provision of a medical services in the case of 
need, but also pays for the provision of a medical infrastructure and capacities, independent of 
whether the capacities are used currently. Insofar, a health insurance does not differ in its task 
form other kinds of insurance. However, the application of the market mechanism for health 
insurance is also subject to problems, once again due to the asymmetric distribution of 
information. The argument is based on Akerlof’s ‘market for lemons’ example; see Akerlof 
(1970). An insurance fund when calculating its contribution uses the aggregate data on 
probability of illness and the average costs accrued by them. While the citizen might be 
ignorant of the costs associated with the illnesses he already experienced, he might have an 
inkling, e.g. from experience, the probability of illness. Based on this, he can at least make a 
guess on the average costs which he would have to pay for health care. Given this calculation, 
he can decide whether the insurance offer is attractive to not, i.e. whether he is better of 
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paying the contribution regularly or to pay for health out of his own pocket only in those cases 
he requires them. Consequentially, the offer made by the insurance fund is in particular 
attractive for those who know that they would have to pay more for health on average, since 
their probability of illness and average costs for illness are higher than the population average. 
For those with lower probability of getting ill, the offer is not attractive since the contribution 
or premium is above the expected value of what the have to pay for health. As a consequence, 
if the citizens have the choice, whether to sign up or not with an insurance offering an 
“uniform tariff”, only those with probabilities and costs of illness above the population 
average on which the insurance’s calculation is base will sign up. Consequently, the 
calculation of the insurance fund will not hold, its average expenditure will be higher and in 
the next period, higher contributions will have to be charged. If citizens have a choice, those 
whose expected average expenditure for health is now lower than the increased contribution 
charged, will exit. As these ‘good risks’ leave, the average probability of illness and the costs 
of illness of those remaining in the insurance increases. The contribution has to be raised 
again and so on. In the end, the insurance market will collapse, because the only ones who 
would be willing to enter an insurance contract are the ones for which the costs arising are 
higher. Two solutions to this kind of market failure are discussed, see Breyer/Zweifel (1997), 
Pauly (1974), Manning/Marquis (1996) and Neudeck/Podczeck (1996). The first is 
institutional, and requires that everybody is forced to sign up with an insurance guaranteeing 
that the insurance’s calculation holds because the whole population is client of the insurance. 
The second possible solution is that the insurance can conduct a health check on entry and 
calculate the respective risk and an risk-equivalent contribution, comparable to the premium 
in other types of insurance. However, this results in different contributions for different 
clients, and immediately goes against the principle of solidarity on which many HCS rely.  
 
Evaluation: Institutional Solutions to Market Failure in Health Care  
Whether these potential market failures justify the degree of replacement of the market 
mechanism by other forms of allocation which one can observe, whether these market failures 
could or should have been tackled by instruments more market oriented, and whether the 
replacements installed are actually leading to lower or higher overall welfare is debated; see 
Zweifel/Breyer (1997: pp 127).  
 
Empirically, the market mechanism as a mean to allocate health was over time either 
substantially complemented or completely substituted by other, non-market forms of 
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organizing the provision of health. Historically, the first way to provide it were markets: 
medically educated people offered medical services and the patient, if ill, paid for these 
services on the basis of a bilateral relationship similar to the purchase of any other goods and 
services. In the later phases of industrialization, also because of political considerations fueled 
by the extension of suffrage, resulted in more institutionalized and non-market forms for the 
provision and allocation of health care. Since the importance of health for the individual is so 
high, with its very life at stake, the question of access to health care is a political one. While 
the fact that a person cannot afford a car will not make voters support a party offering re-
distributional policy, the fact that a citizen might have for financial reasons no access to 
health care and will have to suffer or even to die earlier, will mobilize political support for re-
distributional policies.  
The market as the allocative mechanism occurs only in some countries respectively only in 
selected, and in a way non-vital, sectors of health care, like dental care. Recently there is a 
trend to install market mechanisms, i.e. to extend this allocation mode in scope and 
magnitude. 
 
The starting point for the present study is the empirical observation that health is not allocated 
by the market, but by non-market mechanisms, which vary substantially among countries. 
Various institutions were introduced into the once institution free market for health care, and 
it is their effect one has to study if one wants to explain why HCS differ in performance and 
efficiency. 
 
3.2. Effects of Institutions: Methodological Foundations 
Studying Institutions: Problems of Macro-Level Explanations 
The very existence, present form and consequences of institutions are a central theme of 
social sciences, i.e. sociology, political sciences and economics. Albeit all three disciplines 
differ substantially with regard to the explanatory strategies used, i.e. how they approach the 
study of institutions and what constitutes an explanation, there is an observable convergence. 
In sociology, the usual explanatory strategy, based on the ‘sociological method’ proposed by 
Emile Durkheim, was that an explanation had to be based at macro level, by studying how 
institutions affect societal outcomes and other institutions. Parson’s structural functionalism 
and Niklas Luhmann’s system theory are modern variants of this paradigm; see Esser (2000). 
With regard to the analysis of HCS this approach will look for features of the HCS as a 
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system, e.g. remuneration modes, which are related to other system level features, like 
performance. Central to this approach is that the analysis remains at system level, explaining 
macro-level features with macro- features. The study of institutions, in particular the 
sociological approach, is subject to three problems: 
 
Incompleteness – albeit there are regularities among macro features, there are no macro-laws 
that apply universally; there are always exemptions to the rule. Hence, one has either to 
engage in the unproductive effort of ad hoc explanations or to specify the conditions under 
which the macro rule applies.  
Incomprehensibility – even if a certain universal macro law is found – why does it exist? And 
how does it actually work? 
Causality – causality is impossible to establish at macro level: controlled experiments, the 
only basis for valid causal inference, are impossible as societal level, so there is always 
insecurity about the question what is cause and what is consequence. 
 
These problems seem to be very abstract but nevertheless, they are present in virtually every 
study of institutions, including HCS; see the overview by Goldthorpe (2000) and Bollen et al. 
(1993) for a discussion of the problems inherent to macro-comparative research. The review 
of the literature as well as the summaries of health policy making based on institutionalist 
theories of the HCS showed in particular one thing, viz. that the three problems mentioned in 
the above paragraph are virulent in the research on health care: institutional features work, but 
not everywhere, there are exemptions. While it is clear a macro level relationship is present, it 
is not clear why it sometimes has the effect, or which is causing what – the relationship 
between GDP and HCE is the most flagrant example of this.  
 
Micro-Level based Explanations of Macro Phenomena 
Institutions are macro-level phenomena, and so are the features of interest, e.g. HCS 
achievement and efficiency. The question is then not only, what effects do institutions have, 
but also: By which mechanisms do institutions exercise these effects? The New Institutional 
Economics approach in economics and the New Institutionalism respectively Actor-Centered-
Institutionalism in political sciences and sociology both provide a similar answers to the 
second question. Both cope with the problems by using an explanatory strategy – 
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methodological individualism – which bases the explanation upon the behavior of 
individuals.7  
Given that causality in the absence of experimental evidence, which is unavailable in the 
study of macro level phenomena, cannot be established in a definite way, one can at least try 
to maximize the plausibility of the explanation proposed, i.e. in the terms of Renate Mayntz, 
“causally reconstruct” the processes and events that lead to the phenomenon one wants to 
explain; see Mayntz/Scharpf (1995). To achieve plausibility, one has to resort to some level, 
where understanding of what happening is possible. While one cannot actually understand the 
behavior of macro-phenomena like a HCS or a society (basically, because neither a HCS nor a 
society does “act”), one can understand the behavior of individuals: putting oneself in their 
position, imaging, one had been in their situation, had believed and known what they have 
believed and known, had been confronted with the same opportunities and restrictions they 
have been confronted with, wanted what they wanted, one can arrive at same decision on what 
to do as they did.  
In the core of the micro-macro-explanation respectively the methodological individualism 
explanation of the effects of institutions, are the three following statements. 
1) Institutions are an important part of the environment in which human behavior takes part, 
and the impact of institutions is exercised by the restrictions and opportunities the set for 
individual behavior. 
2) Individuals behave rational and strive to maximize their own utility given the restrictions 
and opportunities of the situation they are in. This is the step where the causality is established 
in the sense of providing a explanation which is plausible, since it rests on the comprehensible 
behavior of individuals.    
3) Macro level phenomena are themselves the product of aggregated individual behavior.  
 
The basic notion of how the effect of an institution can be explained underlying this study is, 
that the impact of institutions is exercised by the impact they exert on individual behavior. 
The first step of such an explanation consists in translating the institutional environment into 
opportunities and restrictions for human behavior. The universal behavioral assumption is that 
individuals are acting self interested and rational, albeit rationality may limited, e.g. due to 
problems of information etc. But confronted with a institutional environment, individual 
 
7 In social sciences, i.e. sociology this strategy is labeled micro-macro explanation and was proposed by 
Coleman 1990, in economics it is labeled methodological individualism, see Furubotn/Richter (1998), whereas 
in political science it runs under the label of actor-centered institutionalism; see Scharpf (1997a) and 
Mayntz/Scharpf (1995). 
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actors will behave in a certain way. What they will do and why, can be understood by looking 
at their situation and motives. When aggregated over all actors, a certain macro level effect 
will be found; see Esser (1993); chap 4) for the three steps of this ‘sociological explanation’. 
 
However, one can also provide a radically different interpretation by seeing institutions as 
epi-phenomena, fully endogenous with no actual causal effect of their own and chosen for a 
reason, as Newhouse (1977) does to some degree. To illustrate this view of institutions, one 
could argue that for example the feature that physicians are remunerated by fee for service is 
not the actual reason that the supply of services and the costs of consumption is so high. 
Rather, this mode is chosen for reasons of preferences, to achieve just this: to make sure that 
the patients are supplied with every possible medical service, whether it is necessary or not.  
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4. Delegation Relationships and Incentives in Health Care  
4.1. Delegation and Delegation Relationships  
What is Delegation?  
The term principal-agent-relationship respectively delegation-relationship is generally defined 
as the delegation of a task by one actor, the principal, to another actor, the agent, by way of an 
implicit or explicit, ad hoc or long-term contract. In exchange for a remuneration paid by the 
principal, the agent performs a task which the principal cannot or does not want to perform 
himself.  
 
By entering into an exchange, agent and principal realize advantages. The agent acquires 
specialized knowledge or equipment that the principal lacks and as a consequence can 
perform the task better or cheaper than the principal. Because of its advantages, delegation 
and delegation relationships are a common feature of many economic and political activities. 
For instance the hiring of a electrician to repair a TV is a typical example of a short time 
delegation with a very specific task, while the hiring of a executive manager by the owner of a 
firm is a more long-term one with a much broader and less specified task; see 
Pratt/Zeckhauser (1985) or Eisenhardt (1989). In the political arena the creation of a 
committee or a public agency like the FDA to evaluate new medicines is another example of 
delegation; see Epstein/O´Halloran (1999), but one can also see the political system as a 
whole as a delegation network, see the Bergman et al. (2000), and Strom et al. (2003). 
 
But delegation is also subject to problems, which become immediately obvious when looking 
at some examples. The problems have two reasons, the first one is that information is 
incomplete and distributed asymmetrically, the second one is that preferences differ among 
principal and agent.  
a) When looking for an agent, the principal might be unable to evaluate potential agents ex 
ante with regard to their skill, knowledge and willingness to show effort. Making a guess 
about the respective fractions of good and bad applicants in the job market, the principal 
might offer payment oriented at the average ability of potential applicants. But for those 
agents who think they are worth more in terms of payment, the contract is not attractive, while 
it is so for those who know that they are less able. By putting a certain contract out for tender, 
the principal might just attract less able agents; see Akerlof (1970) for the problem of adverse 
 47
selection. After entering the contractual relationship, the principal may neither be able to see 
what the agent is actually doing, nor be able to recognize how much effort the agent invests in 
the job. After the task is done, the principal might be unable to draw an inference from the 
outcome on the agent’s skill or effort, on whether the agent has done a good or poor job. This 
is usually the case, if the outcome not only dependents on the effort and skill of the agent but 
is also influenced by other, random factors. If the owner of the firm hires a new manager, and 
things go well, this might be the case, despite the manager’s ineptitude. But the firm may go 
downhill, even despite the fact that a very skilled manager is putting very much effort in his 
work. This problem is denoted asymmetric information – the agent knows more than the 
principal, which is the very reason why the agent is hired; respectively hidden action – the 
principal might not be able to observe, what the agent is actually doing.  
b) Thise lack of information becomes even more problematic, if and to the degree that the 
interests of the agent and the principal diverge: the owner’s interest is that the firm prospers 
and it is in his interest, that the manager devotes as much effort to this end as possible. Once 
hired, the manger might also be interested in the prospering of the firm, but he might also be 
interested in having a quiet job, with as little effort and as little pressure as possible. The 
problem also occurs with more clearly defined tasks: the owner of a TV is interested in 
getting his TV repaired at the lowest costs and as fast as possible. The electrician repairing the 
TV may work a little slower, if he is paid by the hour than he would if it were his own TV or 
as he would if he were paid a fixed price. He might also replace more parts then are 
necessary. Both kinds of behavior are called opportunistic behavior, and are basically an 
exploitation of the principal by the agent. In both examples, the agent can do this, because the 
principal does not have information about the problem and what is appropriate and does not 
observe, what the agent is actually doing.  
 
The avoidance of the problems arising from informational asymmetries and diverging 
preferences in delegation relationships is a central theme in institutional and contractual 
economics, see the literature beginning with Williamson (1963), Milgrom/Roberts (1992), 
Holmstrom/Milgrom (1991), Bohn (1987), Gibbons (1998), Prendergast (1999) as well as in 
the design of political delegation; see Bartolini (1999), Bartolini (2000) and Strom/Müller et 
al. (2003). The basic idea of exercising control in a delegation relationship is to design the 
‘optimal contract’, which firstly allows to hire the best agent by offering a certain contract 
which is either attractive only to those agents with certain properties or which at least allows 
the principal to distinguish among agents with much or little skill and to pay them 
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accordingly. Secondly, with regard to the agent’s behavior once he entered the delegation 
relationship, the contract should set incentives to make the agent act in accordance with the 
principal’s preferences. This is what I denote in this study as “built-in control”: control that is 
built into the relationship. Control, which operating by directly affecting the behavioral 
incentives, as opposed to external control as a form of control that is visibly exercised by a 
third actor, which I will treat in chapter 5. 
 
Delegation in Health Care 
The provision of health care, albeit organized in very different ways in the various HCS, has 
two central features, which influence the productive efficiency of the HCS as an instrument of 
providing health care. The first central feature is delegation of tasks by way of “delegation 
relationships” between principals and an agents in the way described above. The central 
delegation relationship is the one between the patient and the provider of medical services, 
which has been complemented by additional delegation relationships, mostly concerning 
administrative tasks. The second central feature in the HCS is asymmetrical distribution of 
information in these relationships. 
 
a) Delegation as a Central Feature in Health Care  
In the core of health care provision is the bilateral delegation relationship in which the patient 
delegates the restoration of his health to a provider of medical services. The motives and 
advantages of both sides are similar to the delegation of any other specialized service, like 
hiring an electrician to repair a TV. The principal delegates the task, since he himself is not 
able to perform this task respectively because both sides realize advantages; see Smith/Stepan 
et al. (1997), Scott/Vick (1999) and Scott/Farrar (2003).  
In principle, the task of restoring one’s health can be delegated in a bilateral and ad hoc way 
just as any other task. The patient may chose among various agents, i.e. providers, and enter a 
bilateral contract with one of them, in which he pays for a certain medical service. This kind 
of provision would, just as any market, not require any organization in charge of the 
allocation process as such. But health is usually not provided by a market where the patient 
buys medical products and services ad hoc on a bilateral basis in the moment he needs them 
and directly pays for them. Instead this core delegation relationship, in which medical goods 
and services flow from the provider to the consumer who in exchange pays for these, has for 
various reasons – market failure but in particular political motives – been complemented by 
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other delegation relationships. In particular those organizational tasks arising from the very 
fact that health is not supplied by a bilateral market consisting only of patients and physicians 
are delegated to organizations and corporative actors, acting as Zweifel and Breyer call them 
‘complementary care takers’ on a permanent basis. For example, since the patients do not pay 
the providers ad hoc and individually for the services they consume, but pay a constant 
contribution, the organizational and administrative tasks necessary for the collection of these 
contributions and their transfer to the providers performed are delegated by the patients to 
‘complementary care takers’, viz. the state or other organizations like insurance funds; see 
Smith et al. (1997: 38); and Breyer/Zweifel (1997: chap. 8). for this conceptualization.  
Once it was politically decided to provide health not by a pure market, several organizational 
tasks arise, and the delegation of these tasks in a permanent way to intermediate actors is the 
central organizational feature of HCS.  
 
b) Informational Asymmetries in Health Care 
A central feature of the delegation relationships in health care are informational asymmetries. 
Just as in the examples of the delegation in the economic or political domain given above, the 
assumption of perfectly informed actors is not met.  
As a first example, the patient delegates the task to restore his health to a specialized agent, 
the provider of medical services. He does this for the reason of getting healthy again. Usually 
patients have at least some choice in selecting the provider, i.e. which physician or hospital 
they go to. Even if costs are irrelevant, patients are interested in getting high quality health 
care. To make this choice, they need information, which they usually neither have ex ante nor 
can obtain ex post: the patient’s information is incomplete in the moment he makes his 
choice, i.e. selects a provider. He does not have reliable or valid information on the quality of 
the provider, how skilled he is, whether he keeps his knowledge up to date, how often he has 
performed a certain task, how much effort he invests in performing a task etc. The principal’s 
information also remains incomplete during the relationship. The principal can, due to his lack 
of medical knowledge, not evaluate whether the physician’s diagnosis is correct and whether 
he is doing the right things, e.g. selects the best therapy given the diagnosis. Moreover, there 
are often instances, where the principal cannot observe the agent’s behavior at all, for instance 
how laboratory analyses or surgical operations are performed in a hospital. Last, the patient’s 
knowledge remains incomplete after the relationship has ended, i.e. the medical service was 
performed. The provider’s efforts are only one component in the process of restoring health, 
which is also influenced by other factors, often of random nature. As the patient cannot make 
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an inference from the eventual outcome on the provider’s quality, he cannot make ex post 
evaluations of the provider on which future choices could be based8.  
The same problems characterize the organizational tasks performed by the “complementary 
caretakers”, i.e. Health Insurance Funds, Health Authorities, Health Maintenance 
Organizations etc. Take the following example: Organizational tasks, like collecting the 
contributions from the insured, negotiating contracts with providers, paying providers etc, are 
delegated by the patients to insurance funds. They conduct these tasks, offer a certain bundle 
of medical services covered and charge a contribution in exchange. Again, the patient’s 
interest is that the insurance fund performs these tasks in the most efficient way, i.e. without 
wasting the patient’s contributions. While the way the insurance fund is actually operating is 
not observable, the contribution charged by a fund is observable by the patient. He can 
compare contribution rates offered and the services covered by various funds when deciding 
where to sign up9. But again, the outcome – here: the level of contributions charged – 
provides no valid information about how good the insurance fund performs. An insurance 
fund’s contribution may be high because many of its customers became ill and the insurance 
fund had large expenses. It may also be high, because the insurance fund works internally 
inefficient and wastes a lot of resources due to ‘organizational slack’. The patient can observe 
what contribution is charged, but not, how the fund is working or what happens to his 
contribution nor which share of the contribution is consumed by the insurance fund itself for 
its internal operation. 
 
To sum up the argument of informational asymmetries, one has to state that the original 
principal, the patient, who is the ‘origin’ of all delegation in a HCS, has only very limited ex 
ante information on which to base the decision which agent to choose. Once the patient has 
entered into a contractual relationship, he can not observe what the various agents in the 
‘chain of delegation’ are doing, a problem called hidden action. Nor can the patient use an 
observable outcome as a definitive criterion when making a choice among various suppliers 
 
8 A consumer might not know, what to expect in a restaurant, he has never been to. However, he may have a 
meal there once and gather this information, which he can use when deciding where to have the next lunch. In 
health, this inference is usually more difficult, since the impact of the providers effort on the outcome is less 
deterministic, the principal might remain ill despite the most intense efforts of a very skilled and knowledgeable 
physician, or he may become cured, despite the activities of a unskilled and negligent provider; see Culyer 
(1971) and Breyer/Zweifel (1997; section 5.2.4).  
9 If both elements of an insurance package, catalogue of covered services and contribution vary, the task of 
finding the best offer is difficult, since the patient has the make a tradeoff between additional services covered 
and higher contributions. In doing so, he may be uniformed about the costs of services covered and not covered, 
as well as the probabilities, that he will need such services. If the catalogue of services an insurance has to cover 
is fixed externally by the state, the patient can base his decision on the contribution only. 
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of medical or organizational services because the outcome cannot be attributed in a 
deterministic way to the agent’s effort or skill.  
 
Opportunistic Behavior and Health System Performance 
So, delegation in health care takes place in the setting of incomplete information and hidden 
action. Just as in any delegation relationship, this informational problem gets problematic if 
and to the degree that the preferences of the agent and the principal differ. Just as in any other 
form of behavior, all actors, patients as well as the various agents, are assumed to be 
motivated by self interest and to behave rational. In a situation like this, the agents they may 
use their informational advantage and the fact, that their actions cannot be observed, to exploit 
the principal. The term ‘opportunistic behavior’ refers to the situation in which the agent 
increases his utility at the expenses of the principal.  
The utility an agent tries to maximize is positively related to his income and negatively related 
to his workload and effort10. Opportunistic behavior can concern both elements of the agent’s 
utility. With regard to the question of HCS “efficiency” as a concept consisting of input and 
output, the two kinds of opportunistic behavior of the agents impact on overall “performance” 
of the HCS by influencing either the input component or the output component: 
a) An agent’s opportunistic behavior can take the form of extracting financial rents. He 
increases his utility by increasing his financial income at the expense of the principal. This in 
turn will increases the quantity of (financial) resources consumed by the HCS, without 
creating more output or improving the health status of the population. HCS performance is 
diminished, since more input is required, which is not invested into the production of health, 
but extracted by the agents. The typical example thereof is the provider induced demand, i.e. 
the fact that the provider of medical services can oversupply medical services of no objective 
use merely for the reason, to increase his income, while the patient due to his lack of 
knowledge can not recognize that a service is unnecessary.  
b) Opportunistic behavior of the agent can also take the form of increasing his utility by 
reducing workload and effort, that is by ‘shirking’. A provider can perform a task in a 
negligent way, provide poor quality of service. An agent in charge of organizing the provision 
of health care might do little or do nothing at all to foster the principal’s interest in the 
organization of health care. Just as in other delegation relationships, this is possible because 
the principal cannot observe what the agents is doing. This type of opportunistic behavior 
 
10 See for the financial and non-financial motives of physicians Scott (2001). 
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decreases HCS performance by reducing the output and also the health status achieved by the 
HCS.   
 
Strategies to Avoid Opportunistic Behavior in Health Care 
To counteract the tendency for opportunistic behavior, two strategies are possible, both of 
which I will denote as ‘control’. The first strategy of control consists of including control into 
the delegation relationship itself. The extensive literature in on delegation and incentives in 
health care is mostly concerned with the design of contracts, which enable the principal to 
hire the optimal agent and further set the ‘right’ incentives for the agent, to act in line with the 
principal’s preferences. The second, alternative form of control, which I treat in the next 
chapter, consists of exercising control from the outside: an external actor, vested with the 
means to collect and to evaluate information, observes the operation of the HCS and 
intervenes, if things are not going well11. 
 
The focus of the theoretical and empirical work within the institutional economics 
respectively the delegation relationship approach to HCS is on expenditure. It has to be 
stressed that the agency problems and opportunistic behavior concern not only the extraction 
of financial rents, but also the quality of the medical services provided. HCS achievement and 
efficiency, the variables I want to explain in this study, are based on the combination of costs 
on the one side and the quality/output on the other. Both are per se of equal importance for 
HCS “overall performance”. The design of a delegation relationship has an impact on both 
forms of opportunistic behavior, and therefore is of equal importance for quality and costs of 
health care. Moreover, a control instrument which is appropriate to avoid the extraction of 
financial rents might aggravate the problem of shirking and reduce the quality of health care12. 
 
11 See Eisenhardt (1989). Smith et al (1997) call this control by behavioral incentives or by integrating the agent 
into a hierarchical chain of command and control, as it is the case in agency relationship in firms. 
12 Take for instance the remuneration modes for provider of medical services: under a capitation remuneration, 
the provider has no incentive to oversupply the patient with services, since his ‘profit’ is the difference between 
the fixed amount of money he gets for the patient and what he actually spends for the patient. This does not only 
mean, that the supplier restricts his services to the medically necessary. It can also mean, that the provider offers 
less than what is necessary, under supplies services and engages in reducing costs at expenses of the patient. On 
the other hand, the remuneration by fee for services sets an incentive to increase the number of services, since 
the income is directly dependent on the number of services supplied. The extraction of financial rents takes the 
form of oversupplying the patient with services which may be not necessary from a medical point of view. But 
again, this says nothing about the quality of the services provided: under fee for service, the supplier can try to 
increase the number of services conducted in a working day by reducing the time invested in each service, for 
instance, by making superficial examinations etc. As a consequence, while the two remuneration modes are 
dissimilar with regard to the extraction of financial rents, they are similar with regard to quality. Looking at HCS 
performance as a bundle of costs and quality, it is not clear, which aspect is more relevant. 
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Thus, health policy makers might be confronted with a trade off between control of the 
extraction of financial rents and the quality.  
 
4.2. Delegation in Health Care: Actors, Tasks and Incentive Problems 
This section will sketch the basic delegation relationships in health care, describe who is the 
principal, who is the agent in each relationship, the nature of the delegated task, the incentive 
problems inherent to this delegation relationship as well as the mechanisms proposed to 
counteract the problems of opportunistic behavior. To get a list of the possible actors and 
delegation relationships in the HCS one can use as a template the basic functions a HCS has 
to fulfill to achieve its basic aim, viz. to produce health for the population. Basically, the 
functions can be divided into productive and administrative tasks.  
a) In any HCS, health services must be provided, medical products must be developed and 
produced. Health services applied to a person can be divided into those which can be 
delivered in an ambulatory way, i.e. the patient visits the provider, who performs a task, and is 
able to leave afterwards. This is what I will call ambulatory or primary care, the agent is 
variously labeled as primary care provider or General Practitioner; GP. There are other 
medical services, where the patient has to undergo more invasive actions, e.g. operation, and 
has to stay in care of the provider. This is will be called in-patient care. Usually, two the types 
are performed by tow separate agents, the primary physician, and the hospitals. But the 
distinction is shifty: hospitals, i.e. ‘poly-clinics’, may provide ambulatory services and a 
primary care physician may also provide operations, for instance if he has a certain contingent 
of beds in a hospital whose infrastructure he can use. Other medical services do not require 
the presence of the patient: examples for this would be analysis of tissue samples, and 
diagnostics of blood samples, more generally services conducted by a laboratory. Compared 
to the physicians, these services require specialized knowledge and equipment to a degree and 
are characterized by economies of scale, which justify a organizational concentration. These 
services may be provided by a stand alone organization, but again, these services might also 
be conducted for instance by the hospital itself. But even there, they will be organizationally 
focused in a unit, since the nature of the task fosters concentration of performing the task in 
one place. 
 
b) Medical products can be distinguished into medicines and medical devices – both of them 
have to be produced and distributed. The agents in charge of these tasks are pharmaceutical 
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industry, the producers of medical devices and the distribution chains for both, pharmacies, 
wholesalers, sellers of medical devices etc.  
All these supply side agents will exist in any HCS, since it makes sense for the provider of 
services to specialize in certain task and to outsource others. But they may be self-employed 
or part of the public administration. Furthermore, the existence of these providers is 
independent from the way the financing of health care is organized. 
 
c) If HCS is not organized as a pure “bilateral spot-market”, but the relationship between 
producer and consumer was complemented by a third party (an insurance, or a public agency) 
a range of administrative tasks accrue: the memberships must be organized, contributions 
must be collected, providers must be contracted, providers must be paid for the services they 
deliver etc. As a consequence, if the HCS is not organized as a market, there will be at least 
one actor in charge of the purely administrative task of collecting, pooling and distributing the 
funds. As will be discussed below in more detail, the privileged situation of this actor allows 
it in principle to conduct other tasks as well, requiring information which is available either 
on the side of the provider and on the side of the consumers of health care. In practice, the 
organizational forms of this “third party” are manifold. They can be Health Insurance Funds, 
Health Authorities, Local Governments or the regional division of a National Health Service. 
The actor will be denoted as administrative organization, respectively purchaser.  
 
d) As I will describe later on, it makes sense to see the government as the electorate’s agent 
by which the population in a country decides on how health care is provided. By electing a 
party which offers a certain health policy, the electorate decides on the basics of health care: 
Whether there is an organized HCS or a health care market, but also, how the state decides on 
the make-or-buy question of either delegating health care tasks or to integrate them into the 
state administration. In a democracy, the government is the electorate’s main instrument to act 
collectively, and hence the government is the electorate’s agent in charge of the overall design 
of the HCS. 
 
Looking at the delegation, one can say that some of these tasks are always delegated or 
outsourced, like pharmaceutical research and the provision of medicines. There is for instance 
no HCS where the state itself produces pharmaceuticals, albeit it subsidies firms to do so. Just 
as the way these tasks are performed in various HCS differs, so does the list of actors and 
delegation relationships vary. And the way the control of delegation-relationships is organized 
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varies even more. So, to compare HCS regarding the existence and the control of delegation-
relationships in a systematic way one needs a template. The following list is such a template, 
which will allow to make an inventory of delegation and control in all HCS, irrespective of 
their type.  
• The citizen as the original principal at the beginning the delegation chain, in his role as 
patient, payers of contributions, consumer and voter. 
• Administrative organizations concerned with collecting and administrating the 
financial aspect of HCS: the collection of contribution and the reimbursement of the 
provider. This can be the insurance funds (collecting contributions and distributing 
them to the providers) or a public administration (collecting taxes and paying the 
wages and salaries of the medical personnel) in a NHS 
• The providers of medical services and goods: physicians, hospitals, producers of  
medical devices and services laboratories , the pharmaceutical industry. 
• The state as the agent in charge of a meta-control over the HCS,  
Because of the multi-step delegation, i.e. delegation chains, actors are agents in one 
relationship, but principal in the other one. For instance, the insurance fund is the agent by 
which the patient organizes the financial administration of the HCS. But the fund is also the 
principal of the providers of health services; see for the various delegated tasks and the forms 
of opportunistic behavior Rice (1998; chapters 3 and 4), Breyer/Zweifel (1997: 188) and 
Santerre/Neun (2000): 293).  
Each relationship is defined by the delegated task, the problems inherent to the relationship 
and the measures implemented to counteract these problems. In the end, a HCS can be 
described by what delegation relationships exist and how they are controlled. The main 
hypothesis of the present study is, that this – delegation and control – will either determine or 
at least affect the performance and the efficiency of the HCS. In the following, I will describe 
the tasks, nature of the informational asymmetry, the problems of control and ways by which 
this can be controlled for the delegation relationship among the above mentioned actors. With 
regard to the problems and their control, I will cover the implications for both quality and 
quantity, since both are equally relevant for HCS “performance”. 
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Patient-Provider-Relationship  
a) Delegated Task  
This delegation relationship is the core of the provision of health care and exists 
independently from how the provision or financing is organized. The patient requires the 
services of the physician because he does not know what the cause of his illness is, does not 
know how it can be treated and cannot perform the treatment by himself. So, the patient 
delegates this task to a specialized agent by way of a permanent or ad hoc contract. So far, 
there is no difference to the purchase of other services a consumer can or does not want to 
perform personally. Just as in the case of other examples of delegation, the patient does this 
for the reason, which is here to get healthy again. Here, as in other examples, it is his interest 
to get the best value for his money. The term ‘money’ here equally refers to the ad hoc 
payment of a service in a market for health care or the payment of a contribution independent 
of the quantity of services provided, e.g. by way of taxes or contributions. In exchange for this 
payment, which flows either direct from the patient to the provider or via an administrative 
organizations described later on, the provider offers medical services and goods aiming at the 
restoration of health.   
 
b) Incentive Problems 
The asymmetrical distribution of information in the patient-provider-relationship has 
consequences for quality and costs.  
As with regard to the quality of services, the patient is interested in getting high quality, even 
if he does not have to pay for the services. Usually the patients have some choice in selecting 
the provider, i.e. which physician they go to, but have no information on which to base this 
choice. The patient cannot evaluate the quality of a physician ex ante, cannot guess his effort, 
his skill, nor his knowledge, e.g. whether the physicians is up to date with newer medical 
research or whether his decisions are based on what he learned decades ago. As a 
consequence, the patient does not know when selecting, whether the physician is good or bad. 
Given his lack of knowledge, the patient remains ignorant as long as the interaction, i.e. the 
treatment, continues. Even if he observes that the provider does something, the patient can not 
evaluate if whether what the physician is doing is appropriate to the medical problem at hand. 
Last, the patient cannot attribute an outcome to the physician’s actions since the restoration of 
health is influenced by other factors as well. In this setting, it is hard for the patient to enforce 
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quality because quality is basically unrecognizable and thus cannot be a criterion in the 
decision making. Indeed, some of the evidence seems to indicate that patients rely on the 
usage of equipment as an indicator of quality. On the side of the provider, the incentives are to 
reduce the effort. Both, because its effort and thus disutility and also, because assuring quality 
is time consuming, and decreasing the “turnover”. So while salaried and fee-for-service 
remunerated providers differ in their incentives to provide more services, they are in a similar 
situation as far as quality is concerned.  
 
The financial aspect of the problems in the patient-provider relationship arise are also due to 
the lack of information. The initial decision to enter the relationship rests with the patient: if 
the patient fees ill, she visits a physician or provider. But once the initial contact is made, it is 
the provider himself who decides on what is done. It is the supplier, who decides, what is 
demanded, i.e. the supplier controls the demand for his own services. Lien 2004 enumerate 
three ways by which the provider can induce demand: he can persuade the patient that a 
certain service is necessary, he can offer only a fixed bundle of services, e.g. a certain 
package of diagnostic tests, which the patient can either accept or reject. Or the provider can 
show effort, which is observable by the patient, who – presuming that higher quality is offered 
– will demand more health care. In the setting that the patient can neither control nor evaluate 
the necessity of a medical measure, the supplier can use this situation to increase his income, 
by oversupplying medical services, and this supply induced demand is a central concern of 
theoretical and empirical works; see Reinhardt (1985), Rice (1984), Hay/Leahy (1982), Ma 
(1994), Ma/McGuire (1997), Delattre/Dormont (2003) and Chalkley/Tilley (2006). However, 
the motive for oversupplying services needs not to be as selfish as assumed in the economic 
analysis. The provider may also be motivated by the philosophy of doing virtually everything 
that is possible for the patient. There may also be the motive to making the patient satisfied by 
living up to her expectations. The provider may also be motivated by the risk of a medical 
malpractice suit, if it turns out that an additional service, for instance a more advance 
diagnosis, would have avoided damage for the patient; see Smith et al. (1997: 43), Kersnik 
(2001), Barigozzi/Levaggi (2005) and Dusheiko et al. (2004). 
The problems inherent to the delegation relationship between patient and provider in the 
setting of lacking knowledge and hidden action are threefold: First, the provider may bill 
services he did not actually deliver. Second, the provider may (over-)supply medical services 
which are not actually necessary. Third, the provider may shirk from a task, by putting 
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insufficient effort in performing the job, i.e. provide poor quality of services. Given the lack 
of specialized knowledge, the patient may recognize neither of the three. 
The following section will shortly discuss the most prominent designs and control 
mechanisms in use. I will structure the control mechanism by their aim, i.e. whether they 
avoid problems relating to quality or to the extraction of financial rents. 
 
c) Control Mechanisms 
The principal agent relationship between the patient and the provider is the one most intently 
studied in health care. Numerous articles have developed contracts and mechanisms, which 
ensure that the patients gets the best provider in the first place, and that the provider behaves 
in line with the patients preferences, i.e. ensure that the provider makes the same decision the 
patient would have made, if the patient would have had the necessary information; see the 
extensive literature starting with Mooney/Ryan (1993: 132), Rochaix (1989), Chaix-
Couturier/Durand-Zaleski et al. (2000) and Lien/Ma et al. (2004) for theoretical and empirical 
literature on the patient provider relationship. Most contract and mechanisms are very 
complicated, and the ones implemented in practice are much more simple.  
 
Basic Financial Control 
In HCS where the patient is completely excluded from payments, there is the real possibility 
of fraud. The provider might bill more services than were actually delivered. A basic financial 
control against cheating, can be exercised by involving the patient. Albeit the patient cannot 
evaluate, whether a service was useful or not, she can at least check, whether a service was 
delivered at all. To do this, the patient, as the one who experienced the services, needs to see 
the bill the provider submits to the funding organization. The cost reimbursement method, 
where the patient receives a bill which is then handed in with the insurance for 
reimbursement, allows for this basic form of control. A pure service-in-kind-principle isolates 
the patient from the billing and payment of services. In HCS where the latter principle is 
implemented, the patient has no idea of what the services she consumed actually costs. If the 
patient has to pay the bill in advance and submit it to the insurance fund to get reimbursed, 
she has at least an information on the price of certain services.13  
 
13 To have an idea about the prices of medical services is an information, which is useful for the patient in other 
contexts, for instance if he has to chose among several insurance offers, which cover varying catalogues of 
services at different contribution rates. 
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To be of effect as a mean to avoid cheating, the possibility of control as such may be not 
sufficient: the patient must have some incentive to check the bill. If she gets complete 
remuneration for it, she will not have an interest in the bill, but will just pass it on to the 
insurance without looking at it. If however, the possibility to check the bill is complemented 
by an incentive, a deductible, the patient has the incentive to check the bill at least with regard 
to whether everything which is billed was actually delivered. While it may be to bothersome 
for the individual patient to engage in this form of control, the patient may delegate this basic 
control at least partly to the administrative organization; see the respective section later on. 
But while the health insurance fund as a central clearing institution may identify cases in 
which a provider bills a seemingly unlikely number of services, the question, whether the 
provider for instance actually performed five x-rays or only four, can only be answered by the 
patient. 
 
Remuneration Modes 
One of the main design-elements of a HCS is the way, the provider of medical services is 
remunerated. The incentive to oversupply medical services is strongly dependent on the way 
the provider is remunerated. I will discuss the main remuneration modes for providers of me, 
not differentiating among hospitals or primary care, but denote, which mode is typically in 
use for each type of care; see Breyer/Zweifel (1997) for an overview. 
a) Fee for service remuneration – under this remuneration mode, the supplier receives a fee 
for each service he supplies. The fee maybe either a fixed amount per service or depend on 
the overall quantity of services. For instance in Germany there is an overall budget for the 
primary care sector and the fees are based on a system of points: the number of points 
determines the relative price of each service. But the financial value of a point depends on the 
lump sum / budget negotiated between a health insurance fund (Krankenkasse) and a regional 
physician association and the quantity of services provided by the members of that 
association. The financial value of a point is the budget divided by the sum of points of all 
services provided in an accounting period. If the physicians as a group supply more services, 
the number of points increases and the actual value of a point decreases. If the physicians 
limit their supply of services, the value of a point increases. But in each case, fixed as well as 
flexible fees, this remuneration mode sets an incentive to increase the quantity of services 
supplied. If the fees are fixed, producing more services immediately increases the income. If 
the fee decreases with the number of all services supplied, the incentive exists nevertheless. 
Each supplier has the choice either to increase the quantity of services supplied or to restrain 
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his supply in order to retain a high value of a service. The logic of the situation is that of a 
collective good ‘tragedy of the commons’. If a provider restrains himself, there is no 
guarantee that others do so as well. If they do not, they obtain more income, because they can 
bill more points, plus they might profit from his self-restraint by higher values for a point. 
Hence it is rational for all supplier to supply as many services a possible.  
 
b) Case based remuneration – an example hereof are Diagnostic Related Groups, DRG. A 
case, an illness, is defined and the provider receives a certain amount was assigned to it. This 
amount of money can be calculated from the information the administrative organizations 
collects over the years on average costs of a case etc. The financial incentive is on the one 
side to minimize the actual effort and resources invested in each case, since the profit is the 
difference between the lump-sum per case and the actual costs, on the other side to increase 
the number of cases. 
 
c) Capitation – under capitation remuneration, a provider, be it a hospital or a physician, 
receives a fixed sum for each patient enrolled. This sum can be paid for all potential patients, 
e.g. for all patients who registered with a certain GP, independent of whether they actually 
visited the GP. Or it can be based on the number of patient living in the area for which the 
provider, e.g. hospital, is responsible. The capitation can also be a fixed sum for each patient 
who actually visited the provider.  
 
d) Budgets – the remuneration by budgets is also a mode which can be used for both hospitals 
and physicians. The provider calculates, either prospective or based on past costs, a budget 
per accounting period, which is given to him by the administrative organization. If the budget 
is based data from the past and adapted constantly, this sets an incentive to increase the costs 
and to work inefficiently. If the budget of the next period is reduced, if the budget of the 
current period is not exhausted, this sets an incentive to exhaust the budget under any 
circumstances. 
 
e) Per diem – this is a remuneration mode typically in use for hospital remuneration. The 
hospital gets for each “patient-day” a certain amount of money. This amount can be 
negotiated directly between the hospital and the administrative organization or be related to 
the current total cost of the hospital, which is divided by the number of patient-days. The 
incentive set for the provider is it to maximizes the number of patient-days, for instance, by 
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prolonging the length of stay. The provider will try to use the capacity to its full extent at any 
time, i.e. to keep the hospital as occupied as possible with no vacant capacities. This is not 
only motivated by the wish to maximize the income, but also by the wish to cover the actual 
operation costs. The first days in a hospital are usually the most expensive ones, since most of 
the diagnostic and surgical activities happen during this period. To send patients home as soon 
as possible, would mean that the costs incurred during the first days are not covered. Given 
that spare capacities are politically wished for, i.e. one wants to have some capacity reserves 
ready in case of unforeseen contingencies, the fact that hospitals are seemingly permanently 
operating at the limit of their capacity induces political decision makers to increase the bed 
capacity, a process which in the long run creates substantial over capacities, which are 
however not recognized as such. 
 
f) Salary – physicians may be employed by the administrative organization, at a fixed salary. 
This fixes the financial part of the utility, and removes the incentive to increase the income by 
supplying or billing more services. However, it makes the effort the central variable by which 
the provider can increase his utility – i.e. by reducing his workload. This remuneration mode 
is also of importance, if the physicians are only for instance, if the hospitals receive a budget, 
but the physicians working in the hospitals are remunerated on a fee for service basis, they 
still have the incentive to increase supply.  
 
g) Coverage of costs or by input – in this form of remuneration, the provider simply bills all 
the costs arising during his work to the administrative organization, which pays for them. The 
incentive set is to increase the number of services, to increase the input and the costs, since a 
share of the costs, how ever marginal, presents the provider’s profit. 
 
What are the financial and quality effects of the remuneration modes? It is important to 
recognize, that the effects are double-edged. The utility of the provider is dependent on the 
workload and the income. If the provider’s income is dependent on the quantity of services 
delivered, he has the motive and the opportunity (due to the informational advantage and the 
missing control) to increase his income by increasing the number of services, the phenomenon 
of provider or supply induced demand. The provider will increase the income by trading off 
increased dis-utility arising from additional workload against increased utility from additional 
income, until an optimal combination is achieved. If the income the provider receives is fixed, 
he cannot influence his utility by influencing his income. Given a fixed income, a provider’s 
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financial profit is the difference between what the amount he receives and the amount he 
spends, his utility is the difference between the fixed utility arising from the income and the 
dis-utility arising from workload and effort, which he can influence by choosing a level of 
effort and workload. Under these remuneration modes, providers have an incentive to reduce 
the quantity of services to what is medically necessary or even below that.  
Regarding workload and effort, it has to stated that there is always, independent of how the 
provider is remunerated, the incentive to reduce the workload, by reducing the effort invested 
in the performing of a task. 
 
Quality Assurance 
While the effect of remuneration modes on the supply of services and thus on aggregate 
health expenditure is presumably substantial and widely studied, their impact on quality is 
studied less often, theoretically as well as empirically. Interestingly, quality cannot be assured 
in a feasible way by any remuneration mode of the provider.14 Two remuneration modes may 
be very different with regard to how they impact on the issue of over-supplying services, but 
be similar with regard to the question of quality. Neither of the abovementioned remuneration 
modes ensures quality or effort. If the physician can increase his income by performing more 
services, he may do so by inducing demand. But to perform more services, he may be forced 
investing less effort and less time in each. If the physician is salaried, he may increase his 
(net)utility by reducing his effort and thus the disutility associated with hard work. The 
incentive to minimize effort is omnipresent, the agent’s utility is always higher, if the same 
task is performed with less effort. 
How can quality in the provider patient relationship be ensured? Either by explicit quality 
control, exercised by an independent actor (e.g. the administrative organization), the 
professional association of the providers (by way of peer-review), or by the state (by licensing 
and regulations on continual education) -or de-centrally by competition and free choice.  
As for the explicit control of the providers by an external organization, these organizations 
might not be able to know, where to look for quality problems; even the patient might be 
unaware of a quality problem. The administrative organization in charge of handling the 
billing might identify cases of substantial over-billing, but it does not observe, not experience 
the quality provided. It may however act as an ombudsman in cases in which the patient 
experienced mal-treatment.  
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More decentralized is the control by the patient, who immediately experiences some aspects 
of the provider’s quality. Even though the patient may not be able to attribute the outcome to 
what the provider was doing, he still may get an idea on whether the provider shows some 
effort or not. By voting by feet, i.e. by leaving physicians which treat the patient bad, the free 
choice forces providers to treat patients well and competition creates a counteracting effect to 
the ever-present incentive of providers to increase their utility by reducing effort and quality.  
Apart from the ex post evaluation, there are mechanisms which allow a quality assurance 
already at the initial stages of the physician patient interaction. When looking for potential 
providers, the patient is confronted with the problem of entering into a delegation relationship 
with a provider of unknown quality, knowledge and skill. The patient visits the physician, 
who makes a diagnosis and proposes a treatment. The patient does not know, whether the 
diagnosis is correct or the treatment is the optimal one. Even if the patient is not involved in 
the payment, he is still interested in getting the most effective treatment. If the patient is 
involved in payment, he can be further assumed to be interested in getting the most cost 
effective treatment. Lacking medical knowledge, the patient can not evaluate the proposed 
treatment with regard to either criterion. The work by Rochaix (1989) has shown, that in this 
situation the possibility of getting a second opinion, i.e. a diagnosis and a proposal of a 
treatment, might act as a control mechanism, independent of whether the patient actually use 
this option; see also Chalkley/Malcomson (1998). 
Free choice of the provider and the option, to get a second opinion are hence quality ensuring 
features, relating to the output and quality aspect of performance. Independent of whether the 
remuneration modes of the provider set an incentive to over-supply or under-supply services, 
the free choice is a security-net, counteracting the ever present incentive to reduce the 
workload by reducing the quality of a service  
 
Patient-Administrative Organization Relationship 
a) Types of Administrative Organizations and Delegated Tasks  
Administrative organizations and Purchasers, which are complementing the patient-provider 
relationship, are created and involved, because the flow of money has in virtually every HCS 
been made an indirect one. The patient usually does not pay the provider ad hoc for the 
services he consumed. Instead, the patients pays a contribution on a regular basis, usually 
14 Indeed the only remuneration mode would be the one used in ancient China, where physicians of a village 
received payment only as long as all inhabitants were healthy. 
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independent of whether and how many services were consumed, to an intermediary agent, the 
administrative organization respectively the purchaser. As Smith et al (1997) put it, the 
indirect flow of funds from the consumer to the provider is the central feature of health care. 
The way this indirect flow of money is organized, is the central organizational feature of a 
particular HCS. Another basic aspect of this feature is the double edged impact of having an 
intermediate actor between consumer and provider. As Anderson et al. (2003), argue, the 
administrative organization per se costs money to operate: people employed by the purchaser 
must be paid, and so must the infrastructure like offices. On the other hand, the purchaser is a 
possibility to aggregate demand and to obtain better conditions and prices than an individual 
patient could achieve. Another task delegated to the purchaser consists of controlling the 
providers of medical services on behalf of the patients.  
As for the labeling, the terms “purchasers” and “administrative organization” will be used 
synonymously throughout the study. The term “purchaser” usually implies a “purchaser-
provider” split, i.e. the fact that the providers are organizationally independent from but 
contracted by the organization doing the administration of the HCS. The occurrence of a 
purchaser provider split is often used synonymous with the term public integrated, where the 
public administration is in charge of organizing health care. As the empirical section will 
show, the distinction is less clear than the formal criterion would suggest. As for the 
organizational form of the administrative organization, there are several options. Historically 
the first examples of administrative organizations were mutualities run by guilds, but also 
firms, which as employers are interested in healthy employees. Today, the organizational 
forms range from commercial enterprises, like HMOs, to private or public insurance funds, 
but also to the public administration, e.g. the public administration of a NHS.  
 
The constellation “Patient-Administrative Organization/Purchaser-Provider” is the most 
obvious example of a multi-step delegation chain. The patient delegates various tasks to the 
purchaser, which in turn performs some of the tasks, mostly the administrative ones, but also 
delegates tasks further to the providers of medical services, by contracting them on behalf of 
the clients. The tasks performed by the administrative organizations / purchasers are manifold. 
Mostly, they concern issues and tasks, which are useful and to be wished for, but not feasible 
for the patient to conduct themselves, since they involve economies of scale or the 
aggregation of information which arises decentrally. The administrative organization is hence 
an agent, in the relationship to the patient, but also a principal, in the relationship to the 
providers. In the latter delegation relationship, the task of providing medical services is 
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delegated to the provider and the informational asymmetries and incentives are the same in 
this relationship as they are in the relationship among the patient and the provider. The only 
difference is, that the administrative organization has more possibilities to exercise control, by 
gathering information available de-centrally, controlling the bills, identify cost effective 
measures, identify provider who constantly charge more services etc.  
 
a) The first and foremost task is the administration of the money in the HCS. Since the flow of 
money from the patient to the provider is an indirect one in most HCS, there is always the 
need for a complementary agent, who takes care of managing this flow. Insurance funds, 
HMOs, but also the state administration all perform the task of collecting the money from the 
consumers and of paying the providers out of this “common pool”. This is the central raison 
d’être of these administrative organizations / purchasers, and the reason they were created. 
However, once created, they can also take care of other tasks in addition to this one. 
 
b) As second task is the administration and coordination of the relationship with the providers. 
This encompasses in particular the negotiation of prices and remuneration modes. By 
delegating the negotiation of prices and conditions of medical services and goods to the 
administrative organizations/ purchasers, the patients realize several advantages. Since the 
administrative organization represents the aggregated demand of many consumers, it has a 
higher bargaining power and can achieve better terms and conditions, in particular lower 
prices15. With regard to the fulfillment of this task, a critical question is the one raised by 
Mooney and Ryan: ‘The standard theory of agency assumes that such schedules are set by the 
principals and will be, at least in part, a function of outcome. In health care, methods of 
remuneration are usually set by some third party (government or insurance companies). The 
question then becomes: how can we get this third party to define optimal methods of 
remuneration?’ (Mooney/ Ryan 1993: 131/2). Indeed, one of the crucial problems is that of 
collusion between the administrative organization/purchaser, because higher expenditure 
levels are also in the interest of the administrative organization/ purchaser.  
 
c) A third task of the administrative organization/purchaser is the exercise of control over the 
suppliers of health services and products on behalf of the principals.  
 
15 Historically, this bargaining power arising to the aggregation of demand by the mutualities was one of the 
reasons why providers, mostly self-employed and not organized in associations concerned with the negotiation 
of prices (only in terms of medical association to aggregate and share knowledge etc.) were opposed to insurance 
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A first aspect of this control is financial control, i.e. the control that the provider does not 
cheat by handing in faked bills or that the provider is not systematically oversupplying 
services. Since the purchaser is in contact with many providers, it can gather the information 
arising from many treatment episodes. This information is necessary to exercise control by 
identifying providers which constantly supply more services than could be expected on 
average or stand out for other, unexplainable reasons. The purchaser can, in principle, identify 
potential cases of provider-induced-demand and sanction them.  
A second aspect of control concerns quality aspects but also issues of cost effectiveness. The 
patient himself can not be expected to perform these tasks for two reasons. First, for the 
individual patient, it is way too much effort to acquire enough medical knowledge to evaluate 
the appropriateness of a medical service or to evaluate, which of several feasible therapies 
yields the best result with the highest probability or which is the most cost-effective, i.e. has 
the best “improvement in health status per price ratio”. Second, the patient only has 
information based on what medical services he consumed personally, i.e. one case. Since the 
outcomes of medical treatment at individual level have substantial random components, the 
patient cannot make an inference form one observed case on the effectiveness of a treatment.  
But both tasks, quality control and cost-effectiveness evaluation, make sense for an 
administrative organization / purchaser involved in a large number of bilateral patient-
provider-relationships. The purchaser can collect information on whether some providers are 
doing a good job, for instance by making a survey among patients or by looking how often a 
certain provider succeeded in restoring health in certain, comparable cases, using what 
therapies and at what costs. A purchaser can, based on existing knowledge, perform the task 
of checking whether the therapy chosen by a provider for a given diagnosis is appropriate, 
either by acquiring medical knowledge or by hiring medically educated persons to do the 
evaluation. Further, the purchaser can generate knowledge by aggregating and evaluating 
information that exists de-centrally in the HCS and use this information to enhance the HCS’ 
performance. The administrative organization/purchaser is in the unique position to have 
access to information about which treatments were used for what cases of illness, at what 
price and whether the treatments chosen were effective for restoring the patient’s health. The 
administrative organization/purchaser can collect this information for many cases and partly 
eliminate the random components by conducting a statistical analysis and identify systematic 
differences among treatments and providers. The administrative organization/purchaser can 
funds and reacted by aggregating supply, to gain bargaining power, see Ryll (1993) and Barros/Martinez-Giralt 
(2005). 
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for instance use the kind of services and their prices as listed in the bills submitted by the 
providers in combination with the information on the outcome (whether the patient’s health 
was restored or ameliorated after the services was provided or whether the illness continued, 
which can be identified by the administrative organization/purchaser based on the question, 
whether the patient continued to consume medical services after this treatment episode) to 
generate information on the effectiveness but also the cost-effectiveness of treatment 
alternatives. Given this knowledge, the administrative organization/purchaser can publish the 
information to make it available to the patients. It can also restrict the set of providers 
available for the patient to chose from to those who fulfill certain standards (for instance by a 
kind of preferred provider list). Or it can set benchmarks and force the providers to use the 
most cost-effective treatment, for instance by remunerating only those services which have 
proved themselves as to be of a certain effectiveness16. This kind of control can equally be 
exercised on pharmaceuticals, by demanding evidence on the impact of a drug, as a 
precondition for remuneration by the administrative organization/purchaser or making cost 
effectiveness analysis based on experience with certain alternative medicines for similar 
illnesses; see Neumann (2004).  
To sum up the arguments, the administrative organization/purchaser is in the position to 
improve HCS performance in various ways, like evidence based medicine, utilization review, 
cost-effectiveness analyses etc.; see Smith (2002) on the various problems and opportunities 
of exercising control by collecting and supplying information. 
 
The capability of the administrative organization/purchaser to aggregate and analyze 
information is conceptually independent of the organizational form of the HCS: the task can 
equally be conducted by the public administration of a NHS, by private for-profit insurance 
funds or public non-profit funds. It can equally be performed, if the providers are self-
employed and only connected to the administrative organization/purchaser by a contract or if 
the are employed by the purchaser. In any of these cases, the administrative 
organization/purchaser can make the information available to the patients, which in turn can 
use it when making their choices. There are however, two aspects which have to be kept in 
mind. First, as I will show in the next section, the possibilities of an administrative 
organization/purchaser to make actually use of the information gathered differ empirically 
among various organizational forms of the administrative organization/purchaser. Second, as 
 
16 An example of this is the combination of medicines into classes of equivalent products in Germany. The 
insurance funds then only reimburse the cheapest of the equivalent products.  
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Neumann (2004: 127) stated: evidence costs money. The performing of the information 
gathering and analyzing task require resources, which have to be paid for and which increase 
the overall operation costs of an administrative organization/purchaser substantially; see 
Danzon (1992). 
 
c) Incentive Problems and Constraints 
In the ideal case, the administrative organizations and purchasers as the patient’s agent, 
should perform all these tasks and do so at a minimum of operational costs. Two things are 
necessary to ensure that the purchaser to actually perform its various tasks: the possibility to 
do so and the incentive to do so.  
The possibilities to exercise control over the providers are dependent on the legal framework, 
for which the state has the decision competence. The degree to which control can be directly 
exercised by the administrative organization/purchaser vis-à-vis the providers, e.g. the degree 
to which the purchaser can force the providers to use medical guidelines, is dependent on the 
way the purchaser-provider relationship is organized. The leverage the administrative 
organization/purchaser has vis-à-vis the providers varies substantially among countries and 
organizational forms of HCS. The administrative organizations may have hierarchical control 
over the employed providers, or have to negotiate any aspect of the provision with them on 
equal footing; see Ryll (1993) and Barros/Martinez-Giralt (2005a). For instance, in health 
insurance systems like Germany, the physician organizations are autonomous; professional 
independence and the provider’s free choice of a therapy are crucial themes in health policy. 
In other forms of HCS, most prominent the HMO model, the administrative 
organization/purchaser has much more leverage vis-à-vis the providers and can actually force 
them to use only those therapies which are the most cost effective ones.  
The negotiation position of the administrative organizations may be strong, e.g. if the 
administrative organization is the only purchaser of medical services in a region and hence be 
able to enforce its own terms in the contract with the individual provider. It may be weak, e.g. 
in the situation of many competing purchasers, which are confronted with a single 
organization representing all providers in a region. Here, the provider may interfere in the 
competition among administrative organizations for customers, by treating those patients 
better or more customer-oriented manner who are sent to him from insurance funds which 
remunerate him better than other ones.  
 
 69
The possibility to perform any of these tasks alone is not sufficient. The administrative 
organization/purchaser also needs to be motivated to perform these tasks. This is in particular 
the case because the principals, i.e. the citizens, are largely uninformed about what the “black 
box” administrative organization is actually doing, how much money is spent and in particular 
what for. This informational advantage allows the administrative organizations to behave in 
an opportunistic way, maximizing its own utility and not that of the principal. 
Standard bureaucratic theory assumes, that the administrative organization is be interested in 
maximizing its budget. The motive for this, is that a larger budget requires a larger 
bureaucracy and more staff, which increases the chances of persons already working in the 
administrative organization to get promoted to higher ranks; see Niskanen (1971). It can also 
be tempted do increase the budget to hide organizational slack and on the job consumption. If 
the administrative organization is allowed to extract about 10 % of the sum of all 
contributions, it may have an incentive to let the overall volume of contributions and 
expenditure grow, to increase the absolute value of the 10%; see Moe (1997). The study by 
Danzon (1992) on the comparison of public and private health insurers gives a detailed 
overview on the various kinds of costs, which together make up the ‘administrative overhead 
costs’ and how these differ in amount and composition among both types.  
One way to keep the budget growing, is to allow providers to oversupply services respectively 
to extend the catalogue of services covered by the health system. Because in this aspect, the 
interests of providers and the purchasers go hand in hand, the possibility of collusion must be 
taken into account.  
Exercising control requires an effort, and doing so may be an bothersome task, in particular if 
the controlled can create public critique which will fall back on the controller. It might be 
both easier and more lucrative to let things go their way and focus on assuring that sufficient 
funding is available for the internal operation of the administration, i.e. for the “on the job 
consumption”. If the patients criticize the increased contribution level, the administrative 
organization/purchaser can easily blame the providers or other developments – like 
technological development, increased consumption by the patients, or inflation – for this 
development. Since the contribution level depends on many factors, the patient as the original 
principal has massive problems to recognize such a shirking of the administrative 
organization.  
An additional type of opportunistic behavior is the problem of cream skimming. In this 
situation insurance funds/administrative organizations focuses on a task, which is clearly 
objectionable. Instead of focusing on doing their job well in order to decrease the contribution 
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rate, purchasers can try to influence the contribution level by attracting only good risk – 
people who are in good health and will not consume many services, which in turn allows a 
lower contribution level in absolute terms, or, if the contribution is a percentage of income, 
lower rates. Or, the administrative organization/purchaser can renounce its effort dedicated to 
its core tasks altogether in favor of getting money from a central risk-equalization fund; see 
Leber (1992) and Beck/Zweifel (1998). 
 
b) Control Mechanisms 
In theory, a possible mechanism for counteracting the incentives for opportunistic behavior 
and to force administrative organizations and purchasers to do their job, is competition among 
them. If there are several administrative organizations/purchasers competing for clients, the 
client can choose the one which is offering the best combination of costs and services. The 
possibility that customers leave to a degree that endangers the very existence of the 
administrative organization forces for-profit as well as non-profit organizations alike to 
perform their task. In particular Danzon (1992) has argued, that competition among 
purchasers forces them to be very inventive in order to increase the internal, operative 
efficiency. However, such a competition requires several necessities to be effective.  
The first necessity is that patients have free choice of the administrative organization. As for 
the free choice of administrative organization, this varies. If the public administration 
performs the provision of health care, there is only one provider of administrative services, 
and thus, there is no choice. The NHS administration is the only ‘insurance fund’, it has a 
monopoly and can behave like a monopolist. If there are several purchasers or administrative 
organizations, but the assignment of a citizen to them is based on fixed rules, like the 
occupational sector etc., there is also neither choice nor competition.  
Second, there must be a reason for the patient to chose and change the purchaser. Even if 
there are several purchasers among which the patient can chose freely, this might be 
insufficient to create an effective competition. The problem is that the only information the 
patient has to base his choice on is the contribution rate and the catalogue of services covered 
by the purchaser. Often, the catalogue of services covered is fixed by law and only the 
contribution rate differs. In this case the patient’s decision problem is easier since it does not 
require a tradeoff between a contribution rate on the one side and a services of unknown costs 
of which the patient does not know, how probable it is, that he will ever need them. There are 
countries, in which the contribution rate is fixed; independent of how a fund operates, it must 
charge a certain contribution but is also not allowed to charge more. In some NHS-type HCS, 
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there is also a competition based not on the official catalogues, but on the factual availability 
of services and waiting times. Moreover there is, also in some HCS labeled as National(ized) 
Health Systems, a factual competition among the purchasers. For instance in Scandinavia, the 
municipalities and regional governments are often in charge of providing health care, and are 
financing this by levying local taxes. If factual availability is inappropriate, or the local taxes 
are considered too high by citizens, they may vote by feet.   
A third requirement for competition concerns the problems associated with the lack of 
information. The fundamental problem arises from the fact that while the contribution level is 
observable, the contribution level does not contain information on the administrative 
organization’s efficiency. It depends on many factors other than efficiency and there are also 
institutional features which make the contribution level uninformative: 
a) The risk structure among the insured – a low contribution may be due to the fact that the 
insurance focuses on “cream skimming”, i.e. on attracting good risks and getting rid of bad 
risks by treating them in a way that shows them that they should leave17. The contribution rate 
of a health insurance fund may be low. But not, because the insurance fund is operating 
efficiently and does its job well, but only because the insurance fund has specialized on the 
easier task of attracting good risks and actively encourages bad risks, e.g. chronically ill 
people with low income, to leave the fund.  
b) Bad luck and chance – a regional fund, e.g. an AOK in Germany, or a municipality in 
charge of organizing health care may be subject to a locally concentrated epidemic or 
economic crisis involving locally concentrated high unemployment. These factors strain the 
financial situation of a purchaser, e.g. a municipality, independently of its operational 
efficiency. Even if the purchaser is operating efficient, the contribution levels may be higher 
than elsewhere. 
c) The equalization of financial surpluses and deficits by way of risk-equalization among the 
purchasers – a telling example of this is Germany. Given the problem of adverse selection and 
cream skimming as well as the dependence of a sickness fund’s financial situation on the 
economic situation of its clients and their health, the German government introduced a so 
called “Risk-Structure-Equalization-Fund”, RSA. The idea was to make the contributions the 
sickness funds charged – which are a percentage of the wages and salaries – more comparable 
and a more valid indicator of how good a sickness fund is doing its job. This should be 
achieved by making the contribution levels independent of the demographic and economic 
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features of the people enrolled with a sickness fund. Before the introduction of the RSA, a 
sickness fund with many younger people with high income among its insured, could offer a 
lower contribution rate. Not because it was operating more efficient, but because it had lower 
expenditure and even a lower percentage meant on the whole higher cash-flows in absolute 
terms if the insured had a higher average income. After introducing the RSA, such a sickness 
fund has to pay a transfer into RSA-fund, from which sickness funds with a higher percentage 
of chronically ill, more elderly people or people with lower income among their insured 
receive a subsidy. The conception was, that the RSA would equalize the impact of those 
factors influencing a sickness fund’s contribution rate, which are not related to the fund’s 
operational efficiency. But in practice, the design and calculation of the transfers set an 
incentive to select bad risks, since a sickness fund could receive more transfers from the RSA 
than it did actually spend for the medical treatment of the “bad risks”. 
 
A point which is often stressed is the question of the ownership of the administrative 
organization. Looking at its implications, ownership is not so much of interest for the 
performance of a task or the extraction of rents but for the question what is done with them. 
While a privately owned insurance company may use difference between the contributions 
gathered and the expenditure as profit, non-profit funds, public owned funds or a public 
administration do not have the possibility to make profits. Usually they have the constraint to 
guarantee that received contributions and expenditure are, at least in the long run, in balance: 
if the expenditure rises, contributions must rise, if the expenditure sinks, the contribution must 
be reduced. The motive to attract customers, in particular good risks unless bad risks are more 
attractive after risk-equalization, is shared by private and public administrative 
organizations/purchasers alike: private insurance companies are motivated by the possibility 
to make profits, public purchasers are motivated by the fact, that more customers require more 
staff to perform the administration; more staff employed implies more chances for promotion 
since a larger number of personnel allows and even requires a bigger hierarchy. Competition 
works by profits in the case of private insurance companies or by the threat to be dissolved or 
force-merged with another fund in the case of public purchasers. In any case, the purchasers 
have the incentive to increase the number of customers. 
 
17 See Akerlof, (1970) Pauly (1974) and Breyer/Zweifel (1997: 161 and 186ff) for the basic problem of 
insurance markets under adverse selection and the issue of cream skimming; see Beck / Zweifel (1998: 211) as 
well as Leber (1992: 170). 
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Patient-Government-Relationship 
a) Delegated Task and Incentive Problems 
Basically the government can perform two roles in health care: First, it can perform the task 
of the purchaser, as they were described in the section above. This is the case, if the 
government has integrated the provision of health in the public administration, e.g. in NHS 
systems. In this case, the administrative body performing the task can be analyzed just as any 
other purchaser. 
This section will focus on the second role, the role, any government always has, independent 
of whether it performs the task of an administrative organization or not: the government is in 
charge of the HCS; see Saltman (2002). The possibilities and potential of exercising control 
will be the central theme of the next chapter, but a sketch of the delegated task and the 
incentive problems is in order at this step. 
The government is the electorate’s agent to control the aspects of everyday life which are 
perceived to be part of the political domain and thus an issue of political control. The 
government is also in charge of a meta-control over hat HCS – if it doesn‘t work in line with 
the citizens preferences, either by requiring too much resources or by delivering to little 
output, the government must intervene. The HCS and its organization are a societal subsystem 
and the are locally fixed to the realm of the country, i.e. they can not leave the country like a 
firm might do if it thinks a certain regulation is unacceptable. Hence the government as the 
superordinate steward, has much potential leeway vis-à-vis the HCS and can redesign the 
HCS in any way it seems fit, introducing or reducing competition, creating organizations or 
abolishing them, by integrating the whole HCS into the state apparatus or remove it from this 
by outsourcing it.  
So the delegated task is quite clear, viz. a controller of last resort. But problems arise once 
again due to incomplete information and divergent interests. The citizens cannot observe how 
the government exerts its role as a controller. Nor can they attribute the outcome – the overall 
performance of the HCS – to the government’s control over the HCS. In many countries, the 
government is intervening all the time, usually because there is the public demand that 
“something should be done about it”. Whether the government’s interventions have any 
effect, and if so, which one, is often enough unclear even to scholars specializing on the HCS.  
In these circumstances the government may shirk from the task of controlling the HCS, which 
not only requires effort but where both, doing something and doing nothing, can and often 
does incur substantial political costs. The government as the citizens’ agent has not the 
supreme aim to provide the citizens with the best HCS. Its supreme aim is getting reelected. 
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The chances for a government’s reelection depend on the citizens and their satisfaction with 
the HCS, but not only. While citizens might be dissatisfied, and calling for changes, it might 
not be clear, what the problem is and what can be done about it. Organized groups in the HCS 
are more powerful than the latent group of the patients and may create much public opposition 
and protest than the citizens. This is basically Olson’s argument that despite the fact that the 
citizens as patients are a much bigger group of voters, small but well organized interest 
groups can exert much more influence on policy than the large group of citizens; see Olson 
(1965). Indeed, the government, when acting in the interest of the citizens, might be 
confronted with opposition from those very citizens. Further, given that the citizens don‘t 
observe the actual interactions among the government and the other agents in the HCS but 
only political rhetoric, the government can collude with the groups in the HCS and enter into 
an informal exchange relationship, in which abstention from protest or active political support 
by the societal actors in the HCS is exchanged for the granting of autonomy and the 
renouncement of the exercise of substantial control by the government. Indeed, one motive for 
delegation to societal actors is, apart from the better performance hoped for, the chance of 
“blame avoidance”; see Weaver (1986). If the government is not seen as in charge of the 
HCS, the political costs of objectionable developments are lower.  
This collusive exchange is of advantage to both sides, but goes to the expenses of the citizens 
as the original principal. I will elaborate on this point more extensive in chapter 5. 
b) Control Mechanisms 
Control of political actors works by elections and electoral competition: different political 
parties offer different overall-concepts of health policy, are in favor of or opposed to 
introducing a certain kind of structural elements, the usage of existing instruments to 
influence the HCS etc. So in theory governmental control over a HCS embedded in a 
democratic political system is motivated by the current government’s fear that if it does not 
exert control to a sufficient degree and assures that the HCS works well, the opposition might 
offer a version and get elected to do this; see Bartolini (1999, 2000) and Strom/Müller et al. 
(2003), Persson/Roland et al. (1997), Bonoli (2001) and Persson/Tabellini (2000): 70ff). 
While it is clear that political competition might induce the political parties to engage in 
improving the HCS, one has to keep in mind the fact that health policy is but one issue of 
many in the electoral arena, and it might not be the crucial one.  
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Patient-Producer of Medical Devices and Medicines 
The character of the medical devices and medicines makes them more similar to a normal 
market, but still the relationship between the patient and the producer can be conceptualized 
as a delegation relationship. The pharmaceutical industry can be seen as an agent to which the 
principal, i.e. the patient, delegates the task of developing new medical products in exchange 
for a financial remuneration. This remuneration is firstly the price paid for the product, with 
higher prices usually granted to new innovative products, but also various forms of explicit 
subsidization. Despite much variation in the organizational form of HCS, this delegation 
relationship is a constant one; there are no cases, where the state or a purchaser has integrated 
the development or the production of medicines.  
The problems in this delegation relationship arise once more from incomplete, respectively 
asymmetrically distributed information and diverging interests, the combination of which 
allows for opportunistic behavior on the side of the agent.  
 
The information problems are similar to medical services. The problem is not so much the 
question of safety, which has to be answered in any case, but the question whether a product 
is actually worth its price. Ex ante, the customer has no information on the quality or impact 
of a medicine. Similar to the consumption of non-medical products, like food or a car, the 
customer can collect experiences with the medicine or the quality of a medical device, from 
which he can extract some information on its effectiveness. On this information, the consumer 
can base his choice for the next period. However, even this information is incomplete. The 
patient can observe, whether he tolerates the medicine well or suffers from negative side 
effects. But with respect to the effect of medicines on healing, the problem is once again that 
the outcome is dependent not only on the medicine, but on other factors and subject to 
substantial individual variability. A medicine may be effective in the case of one individual, 
but not in the other, despite the fact that both are suffering from the same disease. 
 
What are the preferences and incentives of the pharmaceutical industry? Creating new 
medicines is a time consuming and in particular costly process; see Comanor (1986), Scherer 
(1993), DiMasi et al. (1991) and DiMasi et al. (2003). To stimulate pharmaceutical R&D, the 
pharmaceutical enterprise is granted a period of patent protection during which it enjoys a 
monopoly and can – in theory – charge monopoly prices allowing it to recover the R&D 
investments and to realize a profit. The profits of an pharmaceutical enterprise are dependent 
on the market size, the effective length of the monopoly phase and the R&D costs arising. The 
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incentives of the pharmaceutical industry is to increase profits by reducing the costs of R&D, 
increase the market share and increasing the factual period of patent protection. One strategy 
is to improve existing products, which is less costly than starting from the scratch, in order to 
have a new product for which a new patent and another patent period applies.  
 
The question is, how a HCS copes with the issue that there is an incentive to improve existing 
products marginally, which means that the new, modified versions are much more expensive, 
while it is not clear whether their advantage is worth this mark up.  
Practically, the question is, who is able and has the incentive to gather information on whether 
the new product is worth its price.  
The patient has neither the possibility, nor the knowledge to gather pharmacoeconomic 
information. Nor does the patient has the incentive to consider the potential for savings, 
because often enough, the medicine is paid for by the HCS. The actors able to do this 
evaluation are either the government, when setting the price of a new medicine, or the 
purchasers, who can commission cost-benefit evaluation studies.  
Another issue in this area is the issue of generics. Once the patent protection of a medicine 
has expired, other pharmaceutical enterprises are free to copy the original product and to bring 
it on the market under a different name, as a generic. From the point of the regulator, the 
argument is that the original innovator had its period of monopoly and is appropriately 
remunerated. Indeed the limit to patent periods is the main instrument to incentivize 
enterprises to engage in R&D. Once the patent has expired, the market mechanism applies to 
the product and the competition among the generic producers and the original producer should 
cause the price to drop to the level of production costs, which are usually way below the 
prices charged. There is no medical or economic reason to pay more than the price of a 
generic.  
However, there are some particularities and incentives in the consumption of medicines which 
result in the fact that the generic substitution does not happen automatically. Instead, there is 
the original product, available at a higher price but also generic substitutes, produced either by 
the original producer himself or by firms specialized in the production of generics, available 
at a lower price. One explanation is that patients, in particular patients requiring a certain 
medicine on a regular basis, are used to a certain product, its appearance and the conditions of 
its usage, e.g. how often it has to be taken. If the price is irrelevant patients might for reasons 
of pure convenience continue to take the original product at the higher price. An integral 
function of the patent period is just this: to make patients used to a certain product, its usage 
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and appearance, so that they continue to use this product after the patent has expired, a 
strategy which of course only works if the price is irrelevant for those who decide on the 
consumption segments18. If the physician is also not involved in the payment of the medicine, 
he may do the patient the favor of prescribing the more expensive original instead of a generic 
substitute; see also Hassell et al. (2003).  
In addition, the distribution chain is also relevant. In countries where the decision what 
medicine is used rests exclusively by the physician, pharmacists have no influence in the 
usage of generics. In some countries, the pharmacy has such a role, i.e. it has been assigned 
the task to substitute an original with the generic. The crucial question is, whether the 
pharmacist also has an incentive to do so. If the pharmacy receives a percentage of the retail 
price of the medicine, it has no incentive to substitute, since this reduces its profit. The same 
is true for all mechanisms of remunerating pharmacies which are based on the price of the 
product. If the pharmacy receives a fixed amount per item sold, this incentive is not given and 
substitution may occur more often.  
 
Patient-[Administrative Organization/Provider]-Patient: The Common Pool Problem 
The chain of delegation and control usually extends in one direction only – the citizen as the 
original principal delegates various tasks to other actors, who in turn delegates part of these 
tasks further on to other actors. There is however, one instance, where delegation is not a one 
way street. Albeit the term “delegation” gets somewhat stressed in this relation, there is a 
chain of delegation in which the patient is the first, but also the last link. In this chain of 
delegation, the patient delegates the control over himself, his consumption, to agents.  
 
The core of the issue is that the non-market organization of HCS also creates incentives for 
the individual patient to exploit the common pool, i.e. the collective of patients, of which he is 
a member. The patients as a group lack information on whether the services consumed by an 
 
18 The interests of the generic producers and the pharmaceutical enterprises engaged in R&D differ. The former 
are interested in shorter patent periods and good access to the information necessary to copy the product, later 
want longer periods and as much restraint on the information sharing as possible. The industry structure is also 
different for both: enterprises engaged in R&D require huge financial resources to bear the costs of R&D, they 
are usually bigger. To recover the incurred R&D costs as quick as possible during the patent period, the R&D 
enterprise needs access to as many markets as possible. As a consequence they are often multinational, with 
subsidies acting as distributors in other countries. Producers of generics don’t have to bear long term investments 
in R&D, and are usually smaller and national. However, the R&D oriented enterprises try to capture the potential 
profits associated with generics themselves, by employing a strategy of product differentiation. The original 
producer lets the original under the original name on the market, but also brings in a generic on the market under 
a different name to capture those market segments where the original is substituted by generic alternatives, see 
the Valium Librium example in Breyer/Zweifel (1997) as an instance of the product differentiation strategy.  
 78
individual patient are reasonable and necessary. And, while they can observe how much is 
consumed at the aggregate level by looking at the contribution rates and overall HCE, they 
cannot observe, who consumed how much.  
If the patient has to pay for a service, he will consume only services which are of utility and 
only to a limit where marginal utility of a service is equal to the costs incurred. If the bilateral 
relationship among patient and provider is replaced by a pooling of resources, the patient pays 
a contribution, which is – at least in the short run – independent of the quantity and kind of 
services consumed. Or in the case of taxes pays for the services in a way which not 
identifiably as a contribution at all.  
If the price of an additional medical service is zero, the service will be consumed if it has a 
monetary value above zero. In many HCS, the patient has free access to services. Further, 
nobody apart from the provider has any knowledge about how much the patient consumes. In 
this situation, the individual patient has the opportunity to exploit the collective of patients, 
increase his individual utility at the expenses of the collective. The limit to consumption is not 
set by the price, but by other opportunity costs, like time. Indeed, as Getzen (2000) remarks, 
the decision situation of purchasing health services differs systematically between the 
individual and the societal level.  
The consequence is substantial over-consumption of medical services. In the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ framework of  n  persons pooling their resources to a fund from which the medical 
services provided to each member are paid, this means that the patient receives the full utility 
of a service, but pays only  1/n  of the costs accrued. From the perspective of the individual, 
the personal consumption will have next to no effect on the overall level of expenditure. 
Moreover, independently of what the other members of the pool do, it is rational to consume 
all services which have some utility, i.e. a monetary value which is above the additionally 
incurred costs, which are zero. Hence, every member of the pool will behave this way and in 
the long the overall costs and the contributions to be paid will rise. Despite the fact that this 
problem and its consequences can be seen by everyone it is not realistic to assume that the 
patients see that in over-consuming they are also exploiting themselves and as a consequence, 
limit their consumption voluntary. 
In this situation, it makes sense to delegate control over the patient’s consumption to external 
agents, to explicitly delegate the task of setting a limit for one’s own consumption as well the 
consumption of the other pool members to an agent. The agents in charge of the task can be 
the purchaser and the providers. 
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The purchaser should, for the good of the patients, set incentives for the patients to restrain 
their consumption of medical services, e.g. by introducing deductibles or co-payments as a 
price signal. In the contractual relationship with the providers, the purchaser should set the 
right incentives for the providers, incentives which avoid a willingness to oversupply medical 
services. Further, the purchaser should set incentives for healthy behavior and living, e.g. by 
introducing bonus regulations for people engaging in sports or participating in preventive 
measures etc. 
The provider should, also for the good of the patients, keep the demand for free medical 
services in check. Any provider should deny unfounded demands. A further example for this 
is the gatekeeping role of General Practitioners, a mechanism aiming at avoiding the 
unnecessary usage of expensive specialized services, which can be expected to be used more 
often, if the patient can directly access a specialist; see Blomqvist (1991) for the physician’s 
role as a ‘double agent’.  
However, the problem is how to make these two agents actually perform this task. 
If the purchasers compete for customers, a bundle of higher contributions in combination with 
the free access to whatever necessary or unnecessary medical services the customer wants to 
consume may be more attractive than a bundle of somewhat lower contributions but co-
payments, deductibles and a catalogue of services covered, which is restricted to the most cost 
effective services.  
Providers are even more difficult to use as a controller of demand, since patient and provider 
both share the interest in over-consuming medical services; see Vaithianathan (2003) for the 
problem of collusion among patient and provider leading to over-consumption. However, the 
choice of an remuneration mode may induce the provider, for instance a fundholder, to deny 
services which are unnecessary but are demanded nevertheless. Here, the free choice of the 
provider exerts a negative impact on health system efficiency: the quantity of services 
provided is an important determinant of the patients’ satisfaction with a provider; see 
Carlsen/Grytten (2000), which in turn influences the patient’s choice of a provider. So if the 
patient has a choice, he may change his GP if the latter does deny the provision of services the 
patient wants to consume. 
On the whole, this reasoning illustrates the double edged effects certain regulations may exert. 
Limiting access may lower expenditure and increase efficiency, since services with little or no 
effect are not provided. But, looking at the demands uttered by patients, one can ask, whether 
this is actually what the patients want.  
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4.3. Summary: Delegation and Control  
Delegation is a central feature of health care delivery, as well as the organization of health 
care provision. Each delegation relationship is subject to incentive problems, which, if 
uncontrolled, will lead to lower performance and lower efficiency of the HCS.  
HCS vary with regard to which delegation relationships exit and how they designed and the 
problems inherent to them are controlled. Some delegation relationships are present in all 
HCS, e.g. the delegation of the development of new medicine to the pharmaceutical industry. 
Other delegation relationships are absent in some HCS, e.g. in some countries there are no 
insurance funds or for some sectors the market mechanism is in place which does not require 
additional agents to assure efficiency.  
The health economics has developed several possible control mechanisms for the problems 
inherent to the various delegation relationships. Most of these control mechanisms aim at 
avoiding that type of opportunistic behavior which concerns the extraction financial rents. 
Each of these control mechanism has certain effects which can be derived from the motives of 
the actors and the restrictions and opportunities set for rational and self-interested actors by 
the control mechanisms. The implementation of these control measures can expected to have 
an decreasing or at least limiting effect on HCE. 
However, with regard to HCS efficiency the study of control mechanisms aiming at avoiding 
the extraction of financial rents is insufficient. In particular, because HCS efficiency is a 
combination of output and costs.  
First, the control mechanisms described mainly concern costs and are primarily studied with 
respect to their implications for cost. An institutional mechanism, for instance a remuneration 
mode for a provider, has several consequences and may simultaneously influence a HCS’ 
quality and costs in opposite directions.  
Second, the formal existence of a control mechanism does not say anything about its actual 
usage and impact.  
Third, isolated features may be not effective. For instance the introduction of cost 
reimbursement systems enables the patient to check whether all services billed were actually 
performed. But this task is a bothersome one. So, if the patient has no incentive to, he will not 
do this. Such an incentive is missing, if the fund covers all costs. The patient will not invest 
time in checking whether all services billed were actually delivered. So cost reimbursement 
will remain without any substantial effect, if it not goes together with a co-payment.  
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4.4. Applying New Institutional Economics to Health System Comparison 
Since delegation in the setting of informational asymmetries is conceptually as well as 
empirically a feature all HCS share, it can be used to analyze and compare HCS. Even if a 
HCS is a pure market, the core delegation relationship among patient and provider will occur. 
If in a HCS this core delegation relationship is complemented, even more delegation 
relationships occur. I use this concept to compare HCS, with regard to how the features of 
delegation and opportunistic behavior, are treated in the HCS. The advantage of this 
comparative strategy is threefold: 
First the delegation approach is comprehensible in the sense that it is based on rational 
behavior of self-interested individuals in a situation defined by opportunities and restrictions. 
Second, delegation and control shows itself in the organizational form and the rules of the 
HCS, which are accessible to observation. One can make comprehensible conclusions from 
the institutional setting to the opportunities and restriction which guide individual behavior. 
Third, the delegation approach allows strong statements on HCS expenditure, but also 
statements on productive efficiency as the relation of input to output. The theory makes 
statements about how an institutional feature of the HCS will impact on the resources 
consumed and the quantity as well as the quality of the health care provided.  
 
Networks of Delegation Relationships 
The principal-agent-approach to health care has a long tradition, centrally focusing on the 
relationship among patient and provider, see Mooney/Ryan (1993), Delattre/Dormont (2003) 
and Lien et al. (2004). Apart from looking at isolated relationships, one can also use the 
delegation approach as a framework for comparing complex systems. The idea to look at the 
organizational structure of a HCS under the perspective of agency and delegation when 
explaining the differences in efficiency among HCS is not new, but was largely left unused. 
Meurs (1993) proposed the agency approach as a template with which to structure the 
comparison of economic systems. Starting, in particular in HCS, from the analysis of one 
relationship ( usually the one between the patient as principal and the physician as his agent) 
the idea was soon extended to complex relationships among several actors in very different 
domains; see for instance Dixit (2002) for the public sector, Prendergast (1999) for the 
organization of firms, Persson et al. (1997) for an application to compare the consequences of 
various designs of budget process and Strom et al. (2003) for political systems. 
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From these beginnings, the idea to use the existence and design of delegation relationships as 
a method to compare spread to other tasks and relationships, and today, the delegation of tasks 
is seen as the central feature of a HCS; Breyer/Zweifel (1997: 279) and Smith (2002) states, 
that the principal agent approach is a kind of ‘natural starting point’ to analyze HCS. The 
approach was used to structure HCS under this theoretical perspective; see for instance Smith 
et al (1997), Jones/Zanola (2001) and Cardon/Hendel (2001). However, as was stated in the 
review on the literature, the theoretical treatment, the comparison of organizational models 
and their properties, is the central concern. The empirical application, in particular the 
collection of data on how delegation is actually handled, remained far behind the theoretical 
efforts and insights.  
 
The Logic of an Institutional Economics Explanation of Health System Performance 
The institutional economics approach is following the logic of explaining features of the HCS 
as a macro phenomenon by the aggregation of micro level behavior. This micro level behavior 
is in turn influenced by the opportunities and restriction set by the current design of the HCS.  
 
To illustrate the basic idea of an actor centered explanation, take the relationship among two 
features of the HCS. The first one is the remuneration mode for physicians, the second feature 
is the level of HCE in a country. For the sake of illustration the comparison is restricted to two 
remuneration modes. A physician can be salaried or can be remunerated by a fee-for-service-
remuneration, i.e. he gets an amount of money for every medical service he delivers.  
The general behavioral assumption is that physicians, just as everybody else, are behaving 
rationally and self-interested, striving to maximize their personal utility. A physician’s utility 
is related positively to his income and negatively to his work effort. How does the physician 
behave when confronted the two different institutional settings?  
a) Under fee-for-service-remuneration, his income is directly related to the quantity of 
services he delivers. Since the patient cannot evaluate the appropriateness or necessity of the 
services but is more or less forced to accept the physician’s judgment and recommendation, 
the physician can use the information advantage to increase his income by supplying 
additional services. There will be a trade off, because doing so also increases his workload 
and reduces his utility. For instance, one would expect that the physician oversupply services 
which require little work more often than those require much effort and time.  
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b) If the physicians receives a fixed salary, he has no incentive to supply additional service: 
this increases his workload but does not increase his income. He may have an incentive to 
maximize his net-utility by reducing his dis-utility arising from effort.  
Both predictions of behavior hold true for all individual physicians in a country’s HCS. Every 
single one of them is confronted with basically the same situation, and will make on average 
the same decision: in the one HCS he will increase the number of services, in the other he 
won’t. The macro level consequence of this micro level behavior follows from a simple 
aggregation process. The HCE in a country encompasses, among other items, the sum of the 
costs incurred by all physicians. In the HCS with salaried physicians this is the sum of their 
salaries, while in the HCS with fee for service remuneration it is the sum of the fees for all 
services provided. In the second case, each physician has an incentive to increase his income 
by supplying more services - aggregated, i.e. by counting the costs of each service supplied, 
one ends up at a higher level of HCE in countries with fee for service remuneration.  
 
Connecting institutions to micro level behavior which is then aggregated allows to give an 
actual explanation for effects found on the macro level. For instance, one observes that NHS 
systems require less resources. Why is that? What in the NHS system is it which causes lower 
HCE? Given that in NHS systems most of the providers are salaried, and thus have no 
incentive to increase the quantity of services one has an causal mechanism underlying the 
effects found for NHS dummy variables in regression models for HCE.  
But in addition, one can make the prognosis, that the effect of a NHS dummy is to a certain 
degree spurious, since it is not the NHS type per se, but the fact that the NHS dummy is a 
proxy variable for a certain remuneration mode, namely salary. Further, this explanation also 
provides an explanation for variation within the NHS type – for instance in a NHS, the HCS 
may administered by the state administration, paid out of general taxation and the services 
may be provided by physicians employed by the state. According to the explanation provided, 
none of these features is relevant for HCE. The only relevant question is, how physicians are 
remunerated. If the physicians employed by the state are nevertheless remunerated on a fee 
for service basis, the HCE will also be higher. The same is true for non-NHS systems: if 
physicians, albeit self-employed, are remunerated in a way which makes the income 
independent form the number of services provided, HCE will be lower.  
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The Logic of a Delegation-Based Comparison: The Health Care System Inventory 
The logic of a comparison based on delegation relationships and built-in control in application 
to the HCS is the following: the institutional design of a HCS is analytically divided into 
delegation relationships among various actors. The idea is that it is not actually the “type” of 
the HCS, but a certain feature frequently associated with this “type”, which is the relevant 
variable. The delegation approach restrains the domain of what relevant variables are, to 
delegation relationships and their control.  
 
Despite its intellectual attractiveness, the empirical application of this comparative strategy 
remained scarce and restricted to isolated relationships, for instance among a provider and a 
patient. This limitation to one relationship may result in misleading conclusions.  
For instance, if an incentive has been introduced in a country’s HCS, this happened by way of 
a reform which usually also changed many other aspects – possibly such aspects, which could 
counteract the impact of the incentive introduced, canceling out the effect of the latter. For 
instance, the incentive set by a different remuneration mode lead to a reduction of services 
provided, as was intended. But if the reform failed to create a “safety net” for instance free 
provider choice – the incentive may also decrease output and quality, and there may be no net 
effect of the HCS’ efficiency, because both, input and output decrease. An example from the 
demand side is the introduction of competition among insurance funds. This competition is 
without any effect on the funds’ behavior, as long as the management of the fund can rely on 
the fact that the state or other funds will stand in, if the financial situation of the fund gets 
critical. Similarly, to give the administration of a fund the means and instruments which 
enable them to increase their internal efficiency, is without impact if the citizens have no free 
choice among funds. Last, to introduce co-payments to influence patient’s consumption can 
be expected to be without effect, if the patients can turn the consumption-dependent payments 
into a consumption-independent payment by entering a supplementary insurance which then 
covers the co-payments completely. The overall costs for the citizen is higher, but the 
marginal consumption remains free of costs.  
To capture the existence of delegation relationships, an Health Care System Inventory is 
required – a check list with which to look at a number of HCS and make an inventory of 
which features are present, obtaining a standardized and also encompassing description of a 
HCS in terms of delegation and control. 
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5. External Control of Health Care Systems 
The previous chapter treated the built-in control mechanisms implemented in the current 
design of a HCS which shall avoid the problems inherent to the provision of health care by 
setting the ‘right’ incentives, so that the actors behave in a way that no opportunistic behavior 
occurs in the delegation relationships. If these control mechanisms are functioning, active and 
visible control by an actor outside of the HCS is not necessary, since opportunistic behavior is 
not in the interest of the actor respectively does not pay off.19 Complementary or 
supplementary to these built-in mechanisms, control can be exercised from outside the HCS. 
Concerning the exercise of such control, the questions arising are threefold:  
 
1) Who shall be or is the actor, the steward, exercising control over the HCS? 
2) What instruments for exercising control are available to this actor?    and 
3) What determines, whether the instruments available are used or can be actually used, which 
is a precondition for the effectiveness of control? 
 
In particular the last question is of importance, since the existence of a controller with a large 
range of control instruments available is without impact if the controller is – for reasons 
elaborated later on in more detail – either unable or unwilling to use the instruments available.  
 
ad 1) As for the actor exercising external control, the primary actor is the national 
government. The HCS a societal subsystem is as such in principle under control of the 
government, subject to changes, regulations and intervention. The government is hence the 
primary actor in charge of control, its task being a kind of “meta-control” over the HCS as a 
whole, in particular controlling the control mechanisms and controlling the controllers. The 
argument is that if the electorate – i.e. the citizens in their role as patients – is dissatisfied with 
the way the HCS works, the government as the peoples’ elected agent should take up this 
demand for changes and use its power to intervene in the operating of the HCS in some way.  
 
 
19 For example, there is no need for an external actor to perform a review of whether a supplier of medical 
services has oversupplied unnecessary services in order to increase his income if the income of this supplier is 
not dependent on the quantity of services provided. In this case, the problem of supply-induced demand does not 
exist. The question of whether the supplier did perform the task in an acceptable way, i.e. the quality aspect, is 
another question altogether, which may require review and intervention. 
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ad 2) As for the instruments available, I follow the distinction proposed by McKee/Healy 
(2002b): 10-12) and differentiate the control exercised into control by internal levers vs. 
structural control. Internal levers are policy and regulatory instruments currently available in 
the HCS allowing the government to intervene in the day-to-day operation of the HCS. 
Examples of this are the government’s competence to set budgets or contribution rates. 
Structural control shall be defined as the government’s usage of its superordinate position vis-
à-vis the HCS by changing the institutional design of HCS. An example of this is the creation 
of a purchaser provider split or the shift of competences from one agent to another agent. 
 
ad 3) As for the exercise of control, I see the exercise of internal levers as policy, and the 
structural control as changes, i.e. reforms of the HCS. The capabilities of political systems 
regarding the production of policy and reforms differ largely among countries. I will discuss 
two approaches to explain these variations before presenting an additional approach 
combining both approaches. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter I elaborate on these three points, in particular the question, 
how the observable variation, which is to some degree albeit not completely correlated with 
the type of the HCS and the political system, in control and reformability can be accounted for 
by structural features of the HCS and the political system. The empirical questions, i.e. 
measurement of control and the question of its impact on HCS efficiency and performance, 
will be treated later on. 
 
5.1. Instruments of Control, and the Exercise of Control 
5.1.1. External Controllers: Politically Accountable Actors 
As for the actor who exerts external control, I see the national government as the actor in 
charge of exercising the external control over the HCS as a whole, in particular over the HCS’ 
institutional design. Even though in some countries, the state respectively the national 
government has no actual say in the organization of the HCS and the provision of health, the 
HCS is a societal subsystem under governmental control. The elected government it the 
central instrument by which the electorate influences its conditions of living and makes 
policy, in other policy areas as well as in health care. Political parties competing for votes in 
the electoral arena will offer competing concepts of how health care can be provided and how 
much of it, and the electorate chooses health policy by electing parties. Albeit health is but 
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one of many issues in election campaigns, the question of how the provision of health care 
shall be organized may be a critical question in the competition among the parties.20 So in 
electing a party, a voter states a preference for a certain health policy, a certain organizational 
form of HCS but also on more operative aspects of health care, for instance the size of the 
budget etc21. For this reason, the elected government also has the mandate to create, maintain 
and supervise a HCS. As described in previous chapter, the election mechanism serves as a 
mechanism by which the electorate states preferences and can ensure – at least in principle – 
that the government acts in line with these preferences.  
No matter what role the government currently has, it can in principle redesign the HCS. Even 
a government which has delegated all tasks associated to the provision of health to societal 
actors remains politically responsible. It can in principle change of HCS, e.g. take back all the 
rights and duties granted and delegated to societal actors. As the agent of the majority of the 
electorate, the government is expected to provide what the electorate wants within the limits 
of the objective constraints. 
 
5.1.2. Instruments of External Control  
To classify the levers a government has at hand to exercise control, I use the distinction 
proposed by McKee/Healy (2002b: 10-12). I differentiate the control exercised by the 
government as an actor external and superordinate to the HCS into control by internal 
leverages vs. structural control. The first lever consists of the involvement of the state in the 
day to day operation of the HCS. The second lever is more fundamental in nature: the 
government may change the institutional design of the HCS itself, if the results under the 
existing design are not acceptable.  
The distinction among the usage of an internal lever and the implementation of a structural 
change might become fuzzy, if one looks at the reality of health policy. While the setting of a 
co-payment rate is the usage of an internal lever, the decision on which of several 
remuneration modes possible under the current ‘constitution’ of the HCS is a more structural 
aspect. Even the criterion of a legislative act as a distinction cannot help here. For instance in 
 
20 An example for this were the German elections in 2006. Even though the public was not really in favor of 
reforms, all parties share the perception that the welfare state in general and the HCS in particular is in need of 
changes to secure its long-term survival. The way by which this shall be done, is seen differently.  
21 One illustration is the absence of a national health insurance with universal coverage in the United States. 
According to Rockman (1995) and Hacker (1996), this is due to the fact, that a majority of the electorate has 
coverage, either by private insurance or associated with employment. This majority opposes the introduction of a 
system of universal coverage – also, because this would include groups with low or no income and hence 
increase the redistribution towards these groups. 
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Germany, even some routine administrative decisions by which the ministry of health sets 
parameters over which it has control under the current “constitution of the HCS” may require 
a legislative act, or at least a ministerial directive.  
Both features, internal levers and structural control, define one basic dimension which could 
be called the “autonomy” of the HCS. Autonomy may be high, for instance if the government 
has no levers available or cannot use existing ones for some reason, e.g. because it is 
internally blocked. The other extreme, no autonomy, is the situation in which the HCS is part 
of the state’s administration and under direct governmental control – at least to a degree 
comparable to which a public administration is under political control.  
To be effective, the option of control by institutional reforms does not need to be exercised - it 
is sufficient that the threat to reform the HCS fundamentally is credible. If the HCS is 
‘reformable’, the HCS is under control of the government even if no reforms occur, otherwise 
it is autonomous.  
 
Internal Levers for Control: Government Involvement in the Health System Operation 
The term “internal levers” refers to all instruments and regulations, concerning in particular 
competencies, which are currently existing in a HCS which allow the government to exercise 
control. The border to structural control cannot be drawn clearly, since many instruments also 
have organizational implications.  
Examples of control mechanisms by which the government can intervene in the HCS 
implemented in various countries are the following: 
• Setting limits and restrictions on the access to the medical profession 
• Capacity planning for hospitals and physicians in a region 
• Regulations concerning the usage of technology 
• Price and reimbursement regulations for pharmaceuticals 
• Setting of sectorial or overall budgets for the HCS 
• Setting of the contribution rates and premiums in Health Insurance Systems  
• Deciding how the contributions are calculated, a fixed premium, a share of the wages 
and salaries, a share of the overall income form work but also of other  
• Deciding who has to contribute (only the employed or also the employer, are family 
members of a contribution payer include with or without paying their own 
contribution) 
• Regulating the catalogue of services covered by the HCS 
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• (Dis-)approval of decisions made jointly by societal actors in the HCS 
 
The degree to which these levers exist empirically, i.e. both formally exist as a competence of 
the government and are factually used by the government, shows a wide range. The levers for 
state control range from the integration of the HCS in the state’s bureaucracy with immediate 
administrative control over the operation and the resources of the HCS by the government to 
indirect external control for instance by approving the decisions made by the societal actors in 
the HCS or setting overall restrictions, like overall or sectorial budgets, increase rates for 
budgets or contributions.  
With regard to the empirical application, two things are noteworthy: first the number of 
instruments available is a first indicator of the availability of external control, second the 
various control instruments can be expected to be of unequal effectiveness. 
A further noteworthy point is that the availability of these levers does not tell us something 
about whether they are used or not. If a government is blocked, for instance because the 
parties in government cannot agree on the usage of a control instrument, the lever is 
unavailable and ineffective as a mean for control. If the government is unitary and has a clear 
position on health policy, the actors in the HCS might anticipate this and behave in a way that 
makes it unnecessary for the government to actually use the lever.  
 
Structural Control 
Apart from the usage of existing levers, the government may exert control by changing the 
HCS itself. For instance, the government may increase its possibilities for operative control by 
creating additional internal levers. The strongest measure of external control is the threat of 
the government to change the structures of the HCS fundamentally, if it does not work in 
accordance to the electorate’s preferences. Examples of structural control are: 
The integration of suppliers into the state apparatus, like nationalizing or buying hospitals, 
turning self-employed physicians into state employees. 
The abolishment of insurance funds by replacing them through institutions which are an 
integral part of the state’s bureaucratic apparatus. Or the other way around, i.e. the delegation 
of tasks hitherto conducted by the public administration to societal actors independent from 
the public administration. 
The creation of decision-making bodies and institutions respectively changes in the way they 
work. The latter encompasses their composition, i.e. who participates in them, the question 
how decisions are made and what happens, if the institution it is unable arrive at a decision. 
 90
For instance, a decision may require a consensus of all delegates or a majority; in the case no 
decision can be agreed on, regulations can state that either the status quo can prevail or it is up 
to the government to make a unilateral decision etc.  
Or, as a last example, the creation of internal levers for operative state intervention, such as 
the requirement that outcomes negotiated among societal actors require the approval of the 
state. 
 
5.2. Exercising External Control 
Control is exercised as a mean to bring the HCS back into line with the wishes of the 
electorate. But looking at some examples for the relationship among government and the 
HCS, reveals, that both the government’s involvement in the operation of the HCS and the 
government’s chances to implement structural changes differs substantially among countries.  
• Government control is highest in NHS systems, e.g. in the UK. The government 
controls nearly all major aspects of the HCS and is directly responsible for them. In 
France, the HCS has corporatist elements, but the government has retained several 
levers of control, also a kind of ex post approval of decisions made by societal actors. 
In the American HCS, which can in fact be seen as consisting of several HCS existing 
parallel in the same country and covering particular groups of the population, the 
government directly controls two of the country’s HCS, Medicare and Medicaid. The 
third HCS is under control of the government only to a degree that any other economic 
business is under government control. In Germany the HCS is in effect run by the 
associations of suppliers and the sickness funds, while the government has few levers 
to exercise control. Far from being superordinate to the HCS, the government is one 
actor among others, and not even one of importance.  
• Changes in HCS show similar variation. When looking at the incidence of structural 
control, e.g. reforms of the HCS, the case study literature on health care reform 
showed that there are countries in which reforms are very difficult or impossible to 
achieve. In others, fundamental changes can be observed. Both the British and the 
New Zealandian HCS were changed fundamentally. Other countries show no such 
changes. Health policy is in many countries a typical example of government failure in 
the sense that governments and political actors despite formal power, the explicit 
appointment and legitimacy appear to be helpless in the struggle with the societal 
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actors, see as the most clear example the German case as described in Webber (1988, 
1989), Rosewitz/Webber (1990), and Bandelow (1998). 
 
The actual question is thus, why despite the fact that it is clear who shall exercise control and 
what instruments could achieve what aims, the usage of control differs so much among 
countries.  
There are additional observations which indicate a possible answer. Regarding the usage of 
levers, it is observable that there are certain types of political systems, in which more changes 
are observed, and existing levers are used more often. And there are certain types of HCS, in 
which more change is observed than in other types. Both features however, explain only part 
of the variation. There are HCS of a certain type, which are easy to change, and HCS of the 
same type, which are difficult to change. Similar, there are political systems which bring 
about change in all policy domains, and political systems, which didn’t get changes done in 
any policy domain. 
 
My answer is to combine both features to explain the exercise of external control, be it in the 
form of interventions (usage of levers) or institutional changes. The first step is to answer, 
how the differences among political systems’ capabilities for political action in general and 
the potential for control can be explained. The second step is to explain why some HCS are 
more amenable to intervention than others. To explain the occurrence of policy changes and 
the variation in a country’s capability to bring about policy changes, two general approaches 
were proposed in the comparative politics literature. The first strain, based on the work of 
Tsebelis and Immergut, focuses the political system to explain variation in policy production 
and the occurrence of reforms. The second strain focuses on societal factors and is based on 
Olson’s work on interest groups and the impact they have on policy making.  
I will present both approaches before developing an addition which is a synthesis of both. My 
basic argument is, that the explanation of the variation in the potential control of the HCS is 
clearly dependent on the organization of the HCS and features of the political system, but that 
these two approaches must be complemented by the interaction among these two. 
 
5.2.1. The Comparative Politics of Government Capabilities 
The production of policy, the occurrence of reforms or the lack thereof, or more generally: the 
capability of a state to act is a central theme in comparative politics. This is also an implicit 
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aspect of all studies on HCS reforms22. The exercise of control over the HCS or any other 
societal subsystem in any form is policy making and a government action. To exercise control 
or to keep societal actors in line by credibly threatening with the exercise of control, the 
political system must be capable to act, i.e. to make policy and to bring about policy changes. 
A government is capable for action to the degree it can easily produce policy and to the 
degree that it is free in the range of policy it can make23. Empirically, capability for policy 
making in this sense varies substantially. In some states fundamental policy changes in any 
policy area can be implemented relatively quickly and easily. In other states there seems to be 
what is often called a deadlock: the policy making process itself is cumbersome, time 
consuming and the outputs are only small changes and moreover, even the actual 
implementation of the laws seems questionable; see the overview in Tsebelis (1995) and 
Tsebelis (2002). 
 
What features of the political system determine it’s capability for policy change, in particular 
the policy making capabilities of the government which is usually the initiator of policy 
changes? A priori, the factors relevant for this can be distinguished into actors and the 
institutional setting which the actors are embedded. Two actor-based concepts relevant for the 
explanation of variation in policy production have been proposed in the literature on 
comparative politics. The first one is the determinedly actor centered veto player approach by 
Tsebelis (1995), the second one, more structurally oriented but nevertheless also actor-based, 
is the veto point approach by Immergut (1992). 
 
 
22 The comparative analysis of political systems and the study of HCS are confronted with the same problems. 
Cases sharing one central feature, e.g. responsibility of the government vis-à-vis the parliament, have some other 
features in common as well, enough to classify them into one category, one type. But the same time, there is 
substantial variation in other features, e.g. in policy production and political stability, both within a individual 
political system over time and within the types. This makes theories based on typologies, like ’in parliamentary 
systems, the production of policy is easier than in presidential systems’ subject to ad hoc explanations for the 
exceptions which are inevitable as long as one stuck to fixed types. The same can be found when comparing 
HCS. NHS-type systems share some features, e.g. lower consumption of resources and are more amenable to 
structural reforms than other organizational types of HCS, e.g. corporatist HCS. But at the same time, there is 
variation within an individual HCS over time, e.g. periods of reform deadlock alternating with windows of 
opportunity, and an even larger within-type-variation. 
23 Empirically these dimensions are not independent, unusually one can expect that a government may creates 
small policy changes easily and the degree of difficulty increases as the changes aimed at with a certain policy 
get bigger. 
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Veto players  
The concept of veto players was proposed by Tsebelis (1995), see also Tsebelis (2000), and 
Tsebelis (2002: chap. 3) in order to explain variation in the chances of policy change, the 
occurrence of political reforms and legislative output among political systems.  
Background of his work was the question of similarities in policy production within types of 
political systems but also variation within types of political systems found in comparative 
political studies. Using the methodological strategy proposed for instance by Kieser/Kubicek 
(1992): 53) and Przeworski/Teune (1982), Tsebelis went beyond typologization based on 
fixed and ‘typical’ combination of features.24 Instead Tsebelis searched for the underlying 
variables, dimensions with possible impact on the dependent variable in question. In this 
methodological framework, an explanation is not based on the type, but on variables; see 
Ragin (1989); chap. 4). Political systems are not assigned to types for which a statement is 
made, but evaluated with regard to variables, which can have a range of values. The variation 
in the explanatory variable is then used to explain variation in the dependent variables, usually 
with statistical techniques like regression or Boolean analysis.  
 
The concept of veto players as well as the mechanism by which they influence policy making 
capacity are very straight forward: 
„If different characteristics of political systems are significant it must be because 
of the effects they have on policy outcomes. Every new policy outcome is a 
departure from a previous policy outcome or, as I say in the remainder of this 
article, from a status quo. For the status quo to change, a certain number of 
individual or collective decisionmakers have to agree to this change. For example, 
to change legislation in Greece, the Parliament, which is a collective player, has to 
vote in favor of a new law. In contrast, to change legislation in the United States, 
the House, the Senate, and the president (two collective players and one individual 
player) have to agree. Alternatively, qualified (2/3) majorities in the House and 
Senate can overrule any disagreement with the president“ (Tsebelis 2000: 1/2). 
 
The number of veto players is a quantitative feature of political systems and given the 
definition, the veto players merely have to be counted. Typical veto players for Tsebelis are 
actors whose agreement is required for changing the political status quo, i.e. to do something. 
 
24 Methodologically, this approach is in sharp contrast to the usage of typologies of political systems. 
Methodologically, a ‘type’ is seen here as a fixed combination of features, as a particular constellation of 
underlying variables; see the Przeworski/Teune (1982); Ragin (1989: pp34). What is studied is not the impact of 
the variables, but the impact of a certain constellation of variables. This methodology is problematic for at least 
two reasons. First, as Esser (1993) stated, the assignment of a case to a type is no explanation, albeit often seen 
as one. Second, even if one accepts the approach of ‘explaining by assigning’ to a certain type, the empirical 
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At first glance, theses are institutions whose agreement is necessary for producing a policy 
according to the constitution. For an empirical application to policy making in a certain policy 
area, counting the institutions in a political system who have to agree for a law to become 
enacted, is according to Tsebelis insufficient: The political institutions are not unitary but 
typically consist of political parties. The veto player is thus not the institution, e.g. the 
government, but the parties in government. Similar, a second chamber might be a veto player 
if it is dominated by the party which is in opposition in the first chamber and in opposition to 
the government. This explains for instance, why a political system with a second chamber is 
more often, but not always unable to produce policy than a political system with only one 
chamber. If the second chamber is dominated by the parties in government, it is not actually a 
veto player, any proposal acceptable to the first chamber will also be accepted by the second 
chamber. If the second chamber is controlled by a party, which is in opposition to the majority 
in the first chamber, the second chamber, or rather the party dominating it, is an actual veto 
player. As for purely institutional or rather non-political veto players, examples would be a 
constitutional court or referenda. These exist as a stable feature i.e. as additional veto player 
independent on the outcome of elections. While the number of partisan veto paler may 
fluctuate, countries with referenda an constitutional court always have c.p. two additional veto 
players. 
 
As a theory, the veto player approach has the potential to explain for variation in policy 
production among policy areas within a country as well. But to apply the veto player model to 
its full extent, one needs a wide range of information, position of the veto players and the 
policy proposals in a common policy space, which is seldom available. The currently only 
studies using information on policy positions of the actors and the resulting winsets are Bawn 
(1999) and Tsebelis/Chang (2004). Despite these high demands, empirical applications using 
reduced and simplified versions, like the number of veto players resulting from counting 
relevant political parties and institutional veto players in the simple way described above, can 
already account for much variation in policy production among countries and also over time25.  
 
application of typologies led to the problem of exemptions and special cases, with a low overall explanatory 
power of the types and labels used. 
25 The systematic difference, e.g. in the difference in the average of policy production, between a One-Chamber-
System and a Two-Chamber-Systems is due to the fact that it is possible that different parties have majorities in 
each chamber, which is impossible if no second chamber exists. The variation within the group Two-Chamber-
Systems or within a country of this type can be accounted for by the current majorities in each chamber. 
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Veto points  
The concept of veto points was developed in the studies by Immergut (1990), and Immergut 
(1992) on the historical development of HCS. Even though the concept is more structurally 
oriented than actor-based, it basically captures same idea underlying the veto player approach. 
There are actors and institutions in the political systems – which are actors and institutions 
with veto power and hence veto players – which are potential points of access for societal 
actors: 
’By envisioning political systems as sets of interconnected arenas and examining 
the rules of representation within each, one can predict where such ‘veto points‘ 
are likely to arise. Political decisions require agreement at several points along a 
chain of decisions made in different arenas. The fate of legislative proposals, such 
as those for national health insurance, depends upon the number and location of 
opportunities for veto along this chain. The ability of interest groups to influence 
such legislative outcomes depends upon their access to the political 
representatives situated at the ‘weak links‘ or veto points in this chain’ (Immergut 
1990: 396).  
 
As an exemplification, Immergut studied three HCS, Switzerland, France and Sweden. Up to 
1929, all three were very similar. From this comparable situation, the three systems developed 
in very different ways and in the 90s, the time Immergut conducted her study, the HCS 
differed substantially. Looking at the developments, Immergut finds that in all three countries 
similar proposals were discussed in the political arena and all three governments had similar 
ideas and preferences on how the HCS should develop institutionally. The supreme aim of 
physicians in all three countries was the maintenance of the self-employed status and the 
minimization of control exercised by the government or other institutions on the physicians 
professional independence. What differed between the countries was the political system, in 
particular the number veto points, i.e. points where a societal actor could try to intervene in 
order to stop any change. In Sweden, there were no veto points after the government made its 
decision. As a consequence, once a proposal was decided by the government, there were no 
points of access for the physicians to stop the changes and the government got its way. In 
France under the IV Republic, a large number of potential veto points existed: many quite 
fragmented parties in government but also fractions of these. All the physicians had to do 
were to establish contact to one of these veto points, and to make him cast his veto. In 
Switzerland, governments were more stable, but the option of a referendum gave the 
physicians a mean to block legislation even after the enactment.  
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According to Immergut, these differences among the political systems explains quite well the 
differences in the HCS development which started from a very similar situation and was 
driven by actors which had in all three countries basically the same interests.  
 
5.2.2. The Societal System: Interest Groups and Policy Production 
Complementary to the political system one can also look at the question, what societal factors 
influence a government’s capability to bring about policy change. Using interest groups as an 
explanatory factor for variation in policy production and reforms can explain some variation, 
in particular with regard to the question whose interests are more influential for policy.  
The classical theory for this domain is Olson’s logic of collective action, see Olson (1965, 
1982). His basic idea is that interest groups are created or come into existence over time, but 
that chances for becoming organized differ systematically between groups. There always 
exists a large variety of people with common interests in a policy area, which are in the 
beginning unorganized, latent groups. Groups vary with regard to features necessary for 
becoming an organization which then actively articulates interests vis-à-vis the political 
system and as a consequence, certain groups will become organized more easily and once 
organized be more influential than others. Olson’s argument is basically that the incentives of 
the individual to participate in an organization differ systematically among groups, and that 
smaller groups with higher stakes are more likely to get organized and to exert influence than 
larger groups with lower stakes.  
The model offers an explanation for two empirical findings in health policy. First, Olson’s 
model can account for the dominance of physicians, pharmaceutical industry or insurance 
funds in the process and outcomes of health policy, while the patients remain a latent group. 
The first three groups are small, and their stakes are high. The patients are numerous, and the 
stakes for each patient are quite low.  
Second, because the organizations created by interest groups have, as a organization, a will to 
survive, the number of organized interest groups is usually growing. With regard to 
reformability, the model implies a decrease of a government’s capability for action, i.e. a 
constant trend towards increasing difficulties in policy production, fewer reforms and less 
policy production. The reason for this lies in the fact that once interest groups exist they will 
articulate the interest of their members vis-à-vis the political system and will obstruct 
changes. This explains the ratchet effect and the path dependency observable in many policy 
areas: once organizations of interest groups are created, their primary aim – of course apart 
form obtaining advantages for their clients – is it to survive as an organization. The more of 
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them exist, the higher the chances that a policy change will hurt at least one of them, which 
will provoke actions aiming at blocking the reforms. 
5.2.3. Exercise of Control: Open Questions  
Both explanations for the occurrence of policy changes and reforms presented in the above 
sections use a certain set of explanatory factors located either in the political system or in the 
societal system. These factors vary at one level, e.g. the country, but are constant at another 
one, e.g. the policy area. This sets a limit to the type of variation in control which can be 
accounted for by each approach. 
The disadvantage of the veto player approach is the substantial amount of information 
required for an application of the full model. Applying the model to its full extent requires not 
only the number of veto players but also information on their ideal points and the location of 
the status quo. Only then the full explanatory power of the model arises, allowing for 
prediction of whether and which change will occur using the spatial model as an analytical 
tool; see Bawn (1999) and Merkel (2003).  
Lacking this detailed information, both the veto player and the veto point approach are able to 
explain differences between countries, but not within a country unless the number of veto 
players differs over time. There are however cases of countries with a similar number of veto 
players, which nevertheless differ in regard to the usage of external control. The question is, 
how this can be explained. 
The approaches focusing on societal factors, i.e. the idea, that interest groups get established 
over time, implies that the explanatory variable ‘establishment and power of interest groups’ 
has a more or less constant increasing trend over time. A variable like this can only account 
for a diminishing capability of the political system to implement policy changes or reforms 
over time. The model cannot account for sudden windows of opportunity which can be 
observed. The model as proposed by Olson and as applied by Schmidt, aims at explaining 
variation among countries: albeit not explicitly stated, the approach is also applicable for 
explaining variation among policy areas, since the number the number of interest groups 
varies among policy areas and so does the age of a policy area.26 The other aspect of Olson’s 
work on the economics of group organization, can explain why certain groups are to be 
expected to be much more influential on health policy than others. This however, is 
completely in line with the empirical evidence on the content of reforms, which usually spare 
the providers rather than the patients.  
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Each of the two approaches offers explanations for a part of the variation in the usage of 
control. For instance, it follows from the veto player/veto point approach that the chances to 
exercise control are lower in countries with many potential veto players / veto points. From 
Olson’s work on interest groups it follows, that small groups with high stakes are more likely 
to build organizations able to articulate their interests vis-à-vis the political system and are 
therefore more likely to influence the policy outcomes. The both approaches are in a sense 
complementary.  
 
5.3. Indirect Veto Players: Veto Power of Societal Groups 
In this section, I will propose a model, which bases the exercise of control over the HCS on 
the interaction among the political system and the HCS. Following the approach of Ellen 
Immergut to combine societal and political features, this model shall be able to explain the 
chances for overall control and reformability in a country’s HCS as well as the overall 
direction the development a HCS follows:  
With regard to the empirical measurement of “external control” as a factor influencing HCS 
achievement and efficiency, the central point is to develop a feasible way to answer the 
question, why veto players cast their veto against the exercise of control by the government 
on behalf of the electorate. It shall also be taken into account by what mechanism the 
organizational form of a HCS impacts on the exercise of external control. The answer I 
propose is a conceptualization using comparatively accessible information on the political 
system and the organizational features of the HCS, in particular the organized groups existing 
in the latter. 
 
Using veto player / veto point theory, one can straightforwardly state that the usage of 
existing control instruments or the implementation of structural reforms as means of external 
control by the government in a situation in which changes and interventions are demanded by 
the electorate will occur, if none of the veto players in the political system casts its veto 
respectively no veto point is used. At the conceptual level, getting an answer to the question 
whether a political veto player will exert its veto when the usage of a control instrument or a 
26 Environmental policy is a “younger” policy area than are agricultural, trade or social policy. Thus one would 
expect more changes and reforms in this domain than in established domains.  
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reform is to be decided on, is prima facie equally simple: the veto player will cast its veto, if 
the proposed policy is less preferred than the status quo. But what determines this?   
 
With Tsebelis and Immergut, I start with veto players/points in the political environment, i.e. 
actors whose agreement is necessary of a policy change or the usage of a certain control 
instrument. These institutional or partisan veto players I will call direct veto players. Direct, 
because of their immediate involvement in the policy making process, where it is their 
decision whether to cast a veto or not. Insofar, as health policy is non-constitutional policy 
making, these veto players are first of all the parties in government. Health policy, e.g. setting 
the budget for health care, does not require the agreement of the constitutional court and is not 
subject to referenda.  
 
Without information on the ideal points, the status quo and the location of a policy proposal, 
the number of veto players is merely the potential number of veto players. This does not 
really contribute to predicting the exercise of control over a country’s HCS. Parties, as the 
typical veto players, have a general ideology, which also has certain implications for health 
policy.27 But in the end, these are relatively vague positions and the derivation of a position 
towards a certain control measure or a reform may be possible but surely will be both 
imprecise and difficult unless done in the setting of a case study; see for instance Bawn 
(1999) and Merkel (2003).  
Regarding an empirical application this means that, given only the ideological label of a party 
in government, it is quite difficult to predict, whether this party will cast its veto on a certain 
intervention or reform. Further, direct veto players, like political parties, have no genuine (i.e. 
financial) stake in health policy. Nor do they have sufficient information to evaluate a policy 
in terms of advantages or disadvantages for certain groups, let alone its overall effects.  
To sum up the problem, with regard to the exercise of operative control or the occurrence of 
structural reforms, the mere counting of institutional or direct veto players without 
information on the spatial constellation is insufficient to make any prediction. It remains 
unclear, whether any of them will cast its veto. To make a clearer statement, one would have 
to extract the health policy positions of the parties, a task which is beyond this study.  
 
27 For instance left wing parties are more likely to favor a strengthening of solidarity, i.e. the redistributional 
function of the HCS. One would them expect to be in favor of introducing elements in the HCS which 
redistribute money from high income to low income groups. Liberal parties are more likely to favor personal 
responsibility and prevention, and are often closer to the self-employed, among which the self employed medical 
providers are a large fraction. 
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To get an approximate but feasible solution to this problem, I propose to base the question on 
the interaction among political actors and societal groups by seeing policy making as a 
exchange among both. The notion of policy making as an exchange is based on the 
assumption that parties are motivated by the reelection motive. To get reelected, they need 
votes, i.e., political support. They can obtain this support by offering certain policy. Speaking 
with Downs (1957), parties offer a certain policy in order to get elected and to enjoy the 
‘spoils of office’. As a consequence, the ideal points, their interests and positions to general as 
well as specific questions are derived from the interests of voters or interest groups.  
Usually, parties do not appeal to all voters, but to certain groups. Parties have their traditional 
clientele, for instance the self-employed, the farmers or blue collar workers, but also certain 
interest groups, like the industry, trade unions or professional associations; see the 
“selectorate model” Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999). The party acts as a representative not of 
the whole electorate, but of its clientele. The interaction among a party and its clientele can be 
seen as an exchange: the clientele delivers political support, by votes or other ways like 
campaign contributions, public support or protest. In exchange, the party delivers a certain 
general policy, blocks disadvantageous policies, respectively enforces a specific policy 
advantageous to the supporting groups. The exact way by which this exchange is performed is 
not of particular interest here. 
Applying the idea of policy making as an exchange of policy in return for support to health 
policy, implies that a party’s position in health policy is the product of the interests presented 
to it by it’s voters and supporting interest groups. A certain party will have the support of 
certain groups, will represent primarily their interests and cast a veto on behalf of them. For 
instance, a party may represent the supply side, e.g. the pharmaceutical or medical devices 
industry, the physicians or pharmacies. Other parties may have no such link and will maybe 
more concerned about the patients in their role as the payers of the HCS. Contrary to parties, 
the clients are directly concerned by whatever health policy is made. Societal actors can be 
assumed to be well informed about the consequences of policy interventions and institutional 
changes, i.e. they can translate abstract policy in concrete financial consequences for them. 
 
Based on this conceptualization, I propose to measure indirect veto power and to count 
indirect players as organized societal groups with access to direct veto players.  
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With regard to the question of using a certain control instrument or the enacting of a certain 
structural reform of the HCS, direct veto players will cast their veto when their clients tell 
them to do so. Indirect veto power arises from the following constellation: 
• On the one side, there are institutional and particularly reelection-motivated political 
actors with formal veto power, but usually without substantive interests at stake.  
• On the other side, there are societal actors with no formal veto power, but with 
informal resources (protest or political support), relevant for the political actors and 
most of all with a substantive interests for or against certain policies.  
• Both are connected via exchanges, in which a policy or an intervention is either 
delivered or blocked by the political actors in exchange for political support offered by 
the societal actors. 
The interaction between the societal actors and the political actors will determine, whether 
control in any form is exercised or will be available at all. And if so, at whose advantage or 
disadvantage. The answer to the question, whether a direct veto player will cast a veto, is 
therefore, that it depends on which societal actors have access to him and have enough 
influence on him to make him cast his veto on behalf of a certain societal group. 
 
Summing up the argument, I arrive by the concept of the indirect veto player and indirect 
veto power, as the actual determinant of the possibilities of the external control over and the 
reformability of a HCS. To the degree that a societal group can obtain access to a political 
actor, this societal group will become an indirect veto player vested with indirect veto power.  
With respect to the question of external control the hypothesis is, that it is indirect veto power 
and not the political system nor the organizational form of the HCS per se, which determine 
whether external control over the HCS is or can be exercised respectively structural reforms 
are possible. And, with regard to the achievement and the efficiency of the HCS, the 
hypothesis is, that the more indirect veto power exists, the lower the levels of both 
achievement and efficiency, because it is not possible to intervene from the outside to 
improve the HCS’ performance in both regards. Low levels of both have to be tolerated, 
because the state can neither intervene in the operating of the institutional setting nor can 
change the institutional setting producing these low levels. 
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5.4. Indirect Veto Power: Political Systems and Organizational Forms of Health Systems 
The question is now, What determines how many and which indirect veto players will exist in 
a certain country’s HCS at a given point in time? Given the concept of the indirect veto 
power, the number of indirect veto players and the fact which groups will be an indirect veto 
player is dependent on three aspects:  
a) The political system, i.e. how many direct veto players exist, which can be addressed by 
societal groups as potential addressees?,  
b) How many organized societal groups exist in the HCS? A HCS in its current organizational 
form may (or may not) foster or even require the creation of organized societal groups. 
c) Which societal groups are, given their characteristics, more likely to have resources 
available which can be exchanged in return for access to a direct veto player like a political 
party.  
This section will elaborate the impact features of the political system and the organizational 
form of the HCS have on the number of indirect veto players. This structural perspective will 
be supplemented by a review of how the characteristics of societal groups, which make it 
more or less likely that a particular group becomes an indirect veto player. These elaborations 
also serve as a reconstruction of some observations already existing in the literature. 
 
5.4.1. Impact of the Political Environment  
The number of potential veto players, even without information on their ideal points or the 
position of the status quo, is one component influencing the number of indirect veto players. 
The more direct veto players exist, the higher the chances, that a societal group will establish 
a link to one of them strong enough to obtain indirect veto power. Thus one would expect less 
exercise of external control in political systems with many veto players. The empirical 
question is, whether in HCS embedded in political systems with many veto players, the 
performance of the HCS diverges from the interests of the electorate both longer and to a 
larger degree compared to countries with fewer veto players. Do HCS embedded in a political 
system with more parties in government systematically underperform in terms of achievement 
and efficiency?  
5.4.2. Impact of the Basic Types of Health System  
The basic type of a HCS might affect the number of indirect veto players because certain 
types of HCS affect the number, role and the power of organized societal groups. Indeed, one 
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finds stronger government control and more reforms in HCS, which are not relying on 
organized societal groups to operate the system. What follows is also a reconstruction of the 
between-type variation in reform activity found among basic organizational types of HCS in 
many studies of health system reform.  
The basic types of HCS are market systems, Nationalized Health Services (NHS) and 
corporatist systems, a typologization, which in turn corresponds to the three more basic modes 
of (re-)allocation: market, state hierarchy and negotiation28. The elaboration will, for the sake 
of the argument, abstract from the actual design of “real” HCS belonging to each type and 
focus on the “ideal” type. 
 
Market Health Systems 
The market as the organizational principle of a HCS means in its “ideal” form, that all actors 
in the HCS act just as individuals behave on a normal market for goods and services. Every 
consumer individually decides to consume or offer a certain quantity of goods and services 
respectively to buy an insurance that will cover the costs. The HCE is hence the aggregated 
willingness to pay of all individuals in the country. Every supplier decides individually to 
offer certain medical goods and services, to use certain medical techniques or therapies. The 
interaction among supply and demand leads via the market mechanisms to prices for goods 
and services from which features of the HCS like the quantity of medical services provided or 
the overall expenditure for health follow. So all aspects of the HCS are determined by 
decisions which are essentially of private nature.  
The central organizational feature in a market based health system is that – in the abstract, 
model-like ideal form – all this happens decentralized, without any form of centralized 
decision making or an organized aggregation of demand or supply, for instance by way of 
negotiations among collective actors. The role of the state is limited to the enforcement of 
contracts and so on, and does not differ to its role in other economic sectors.  
What is the effect of this organizational form for the existence of indirect veto players and 
thereby the chances for the exercise of external control and reformability? There is no actual 
process in which the HCS is “governed”, and therefore no regular basis for the societal actors 
to participate and to develop a self-perception of being in charge of the system. Individual 
actors will organize themselves to groups, for economic reasons, like firms do in the normal 
market, to try to influence the market according to their interests. But the mode of interest 
 
28 See Mayntz/Scharpf (1995: pp.62) and Schulenburg/Greiner (2000): 176). 
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intermediation will be pluralistic, and there will be no guaranteed roles for societal actors. The 
question what groups will build organizations and what power resources these organizations 
will have, will be dependent on the features of the groups, i.e. the economics of collective 
action (which will be explored in more detail in the next section). There will be no 
encouragement from side of the state for societal groups to build organizations and there will 
be no activity of the state consciously creating organizations, for instance as countervailing 
power to spontaneously build organizations. 
 
National Health Services 
A National Health Service, NHS, in its “ideal” form means the provision of health care by the 
state. The medical infrastructure is provided by the state, medical services are provided by 
persons employed by the state and the HCS itself is administered by the state, by means of an 
administration which is part of or directly accountable to the government. The state is 
therefore in control of every aspect of the HCS: the way the HCS is financed, the amount of 
financial resources available for medical consumption, the types of services and quantity of 
services provided, the quality, the technologies available and the conditions of their usage and 
so on.  
The central organizational feature is an extremely centralized process of decision making by 
which the government does, by administrative or legislative act, decide on all above 
mentioned aspects the HCS. These decisions are then implemented in a strictly hierarchical 
way. Together with the complete control over the HCS goes consequentially also the 
complete political responsibility.  
Given this admittedly idealized definition, the question of control is prima facie trivial one, 
because the government has all levers available to exercise control. It is then only a question 
of “organizational inertia” and the number of direct veto players at the top of the “chain of 
command”. The HCS does not require groups, and if they exist, they are more like trade 
unions of public employees, with a role in negotiating the wages and working conditions, but 
with no say in how the system is run.  
However, even this organization form has at least one not really societal, but at least “non-
state” actor, viz. the bureaucracy running the HCS. While in theory the HCS administration is 
part of the state administration and subject to hierarchical control, its preferences differ, as 
described above, from those of the electorate. Consequentially, it will try to influence direct 
veto players with the aim of blocking certain interventions. Empirically, the question of how 
much the state, the political hierarchy is actually in control of the lower sections of the public 
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bureaucracy has to be answered differently, and the same is true for HCS. For instance, in 
some HCS of the NHS type, the hierarchy is extending downward from the ministry of health. 
In others, there are structural breaks, e.g. that the actual job is done by regional or local 
bureaucracies, which are organizationally independent from the national bureaucracy.  
 
Corporatist Health Systems 
In a corporatist HCS the state has delegated the task of providing health care in an 
encompassing way to societal actors.  
HCS of this type share with the market mechanism the basic feature, that the system is 
divided in to supply and demand. But contrary to the market system, both sides are aggregated 
and incorporated: the individual suppliers or consumers are by public law organized into 
larger corporative actors. The central parameters of the HCS – prices, quality, 
catalogues/kinds of services, use of technology, investments in infrastructure etc. – are all 
negotiated between the organizations representing both sides. This concerns not only the 
operational parameters like budgets, but organizational questions as well29. The state as an 
external and superior actor, is massively reduced in its capability to intervene. Even if the 
state intervenes, this happens by way of participating in negotiations rather than by way of 
unilateral and authoritative intervention. For instance, if the government participates, it 
participates just as another actor or mediator. However, the only substantial control 
mechanism retained by the state is the power to abolish the corporatist structure as the overall 
governance mechanism, which is itself removed from the negotiation among the corporate 
actors. 
What is the impact of this organizational form on the existence of indirect veto players?  
The first point concerns the existence of organized groups. Since all tasks are delegated all 
societal actors enumerated as agents in chapter 4 can exist, and indeed often do. Due to the 
fact of all decisions being made in negotiations among organized groups of societal actors, the 
HCS forces the actors to organize themselves. Sometimes the state even created the 
organization of actors, if the did not spontaneously built organization on their own and 
transferred substantial rights to them.  
The second point concerns the role of the societal groups. Due to its basic mechanism of 
putting societal actors in charge of the HCS’ day-to-day operation as well as basic 
 
29 For instance in Germany, the amount of remuneration (as a substantial question/decision) but also the 
remuneration mode as a procedural and structural question is negotiated (for instance fee for service or 
capitation) or can be changed, if the actors agree to do so. 
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organizational questions, the organizations developed a self perception of being in charge and 
legitimately so. Autonomy from state intervention is a goal shared by all organized groups in 
a corporatist HCS, often up to the degree that any state intervention is seen as requiring 
legitimization.30 One reason why the state might renounces control over a societal subsystem 
as vital and politically relevant as health, that by delegating, the state realizes several 
advantages. It relieves itself from the cumbersome task of regulating and operating a HCS 
which is a complex system: the solution reached by the societal actors might be better in a 
technical sense, since the societal actors have more information about what might work. It 
also relieves itself from the political responsibility.  
 
Regarding the question of how a health system’s basic organizational form impacts on the 
indirect veto players, the hypothesis would be that the number of societal actor is lowest in 
market systems and NHS systems, but substantially higher in corporatist systems. The 
chances of exercising external control are inversely related to the number of organized 
societal groups. With regard to the variables this study wants to explain, the hypothesis is, that 
the achievement and the efficiency of corporatist HCS is lower than that of either market or 
NHS systems, for the reason that the existence of a multitude of organized groups make 
interventions less likely and thus objectionable developments in the HCS have to be tolerated 
for longer periods of time.  
 
5.4.3. Impact of Group Features and Indirect Veto Potential 
Apart from system level features, there is a systematic variation regarding which societal 
actors will form an organization strong enough to influence political decisions and gain 
indirect veto power. Of all latent groups, only some build organizations and of the organized 
ones only some are really powerful and play an active role in health politics. To explain which 
group will become an actor, one has to look at some of their features.  
As for the features relevant for building an effective interest group, there is an extensive 
literature on interest groups, beginning with Olson (1965, 1985) classical work on the logic of 
collective action.  
 
30 Consequently, the organizations perceive themselves as having the right to be heard and the right to oppose 
what they think is a bad solution (or a solution which is bad, because it would be bad for them). For Germany, a 
HCS closest to the ideal type of a corporatist HCS as described here, a series of research showed, how the 
establishment of corporate actors, sometimes with active intervention of the state, created a HCS, which is 
structurally stable and autonomous to the highest degree. 
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Features listed in the literature as relevant for building an organization and exert influence are 
for instance the size of the group, the homogeneity of interests among the group members as 
well as the intensity of interest (i.e. the size of the stakes), the degree of competition and 
distributional conflict within the group; once the group is organized, features influencing the 
potential for influence are the degree to which the organization includes all potential group 
members and can speak for them, the way the internal decision making is organized, the 
available of resources, which encompass the potential to threaten with certain actions, 
political resources (influence on the public opinion or the electorate, access to political actors) 
but of course also financial resource (for instance to launch publicity campaigns). 
Albeit it is hard to evaluate groups in all HCS with regard to these features, some statements 
are possible because societal groups differ substantially and typically. Factually, the main 
fault line runs between the patients and the other groups. For the patients, the groups size 
problem is largest, and the individual patient’s “stakes” in health policy, both in absolute and 
relative terms, are lowest. For all other actors, the stakes are higher, the number of individual 
actors is lower, and moreover, the problem of building an organization was often solved by 
the state.  
This finding can be differentiated. Within sectors, e.g. the providers, the specialization of the 
medical discipline lead to distributional conflicts and the growing numbers of providers 
increased competition for patients. Consequentially, there are among physicians trends 
towards both taking a unified stance in health policy, but also towards fragmentation. The 
observable trend towards differentiation into specialist and generalist leads to a competition 
among these two groups for the share of HCE that is available for each group. This split is in 
some countries reflected in the existence of separate organizations, for instance for specialists, 
generalists or physicians working in hospitals, which may weaken the position of the 
physicians as a group in the relations and negotiations with other actors in the HCS, in 
particular the purchasers31. This effect is countervailed by other group features which are 
favorable toward organization-building. Because of their small number, physicians are easy to 
organize, the individual stakes are high and interest in particular within subgroups 
homogenous. So, despite competition for patients, the common interest is clear: expansion of 
the ‘cake’ by increasing the quantity of services provided and higher remuneration for these. 
The resources available for the provider organization in order to try to influence the health 
politics are substantial: self-employed doctors as a group can, even if every single one only 
contributes a small share of his income toward the fund of the organization, achieve a high 
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level of financial resources which can be used for campaigning. This is in particular the case 
if the physicians’ organization is involved in distribution the money obtained from the 
administrative organizations to the individual provider. Second, medical providers have 
substantial political leverage by influencing the opinions of their patients, and therefore the 
voters: by conducting ‘politics in the waiting room’, they can influence the voter and the 
public opinion, stimulate protest in the electorate.  
Similar differences in interests can be found among insurance funds (public ones and private, 
for profit ones) or among the producers of pharmaceuticals (research oriented enterprises vs. 
the producers of generics). However, the chances of exercising influence for theses groups 
usually dwarf the chances of patients, and little surprising, the former are dominating the 
health policy processes and outcomes. 
 
5.5. Indirect Veto Players and Health System Development 
The interaction between HCS organization and political environment can illustrate health 
system development in a highly intuitive way.  
Consider for instance a corporatist HCS. The number of organizations is high, because the 
state forces groups to build organizations, and then involves them in operating the HCS. If 
such a HCS is embedded in a political system with many direct veto players, viz. governments 
consisting of a large number of parties, the chances that one societal actor can make one 
political actor cast its veto are high. According to the argument made, one would expect low 
levels of external control, resulting in persistently low performance and few interventions. But 
if the political system has few direct veto players and hence offers few veto points, the level 
of external control may still be high.  
The number of veto players may also change over time, which allows to account for even 
more variation, and also “windows of opportunity”. Combined with the prediction about the 
incentives of latent groups to form organizations and their resources, the model allows for a 
reconstruction of some empirical observations reported in the literature.  
a) Political systems with few direct veto players, like the British system, are more able to 
political reforms. Even a large number of societal actors exists, they have – c.p. – lower 
chances to establish a connection to a direct veto player strong enough to become an indirect 
veto player. Even if there are many organized groups, they still have to address the same veto 
player, the single party in government, and it may well be that the effects offset each other. If 
31 See the study by Behaghel (1994). 
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many direct veto players exist, even few organized societal actors will suffice to increase the 
probability that at least one will manage to make one of the many veto players cast his veto is 
higher. One would also expect that the connections between particular societal groups and 
particular political parties are more stable and more characterized by ideological proximity, 
because there is a overlapping in the composition of the government. Societal groups do not 
have to reallocate their attention and support to the current government party, but there is a 
high chance that certain parties will member of the governing coalition for long time. A case 
in point is the German Liberal Party, FDP, which is close to the “entrepreneurial” side of 
health care, and was member of the governing coalition for decades.  
b) The organizational form of the HCS impacts on the existence of organized societal actors 
and at least part of the variation in external control observable between types of HCS can be 
accounted for in this way. External control will be lower in those HCS which rely on 
organized groups. Because those groups with an interest in a growing “cake” run the system, 
this implies, that the HCS consumes more resources. Whether this actually implies 
underperformance in terms of lower efficiency is however not that clear.  
c) Not all groups of actors in have the same incentives to build organizations, nor do they 
have the same potential power that makes them an attractive partner for a direct veto player. 
As a consequence, some groups are structurally, more likely to become indirect veto players 
than others, which has implications for the direction of reforms. The finding, that changes 
most often go – literally, i.e. in the form of out-of-pocket payments – at the expenses of the 
patients is one of the best supported results. 
c) Another empirical finding is the path dependency of HCS development, see e.g. Wilsford 
(1994), Giaimo/Manow (1999), or Altenstetter/Busse (2005). It is clear that societal 
subsystems and institutional settings will change over time. Changes are inevitable since there 
are always exogenous developments that cannot be handled by the HCS in its present form. 
But the question is, how easy it is to adapt the HCS to these changing circumstance and in 
which way it will develop? The idea of path dependency captures this idea: decisions about 
changes made today will determine which, if any, changes are possible tomorrow: 
• Once organized groups come into existence, spontaneously or by administrative 
decree, they will be part of the future policy process and influence its outcomes. As 
the number of organized groups increases, the chances for external control and 
structural changes generally diminish for the reasons given by Olson and Schmidt.  
• As with regard to the content of policy changes, the creation of a certain group will set 
a limit to the kind of policy changes possible, since it is likely that a policy change 
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disadvantageous to this group will be blocked. As a consequence, most reforms can be 
expected to be at the cost of the least organized groups, usually the patients.  
• As for organizational changes of the HCS, the simplest result is that incorporated 
actors cannot be removed easily. Organizations of interests, just like public agencies, 
have a drive to survive. To put it more simple: the people working in the organization 
have the wish to retain their jobs. So, any organizational change which puts the 
survival of an organization in question will automatically create opposition from this 
organization. 
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Part III: Hypotheses and Methodological Approach 
 
6. Hypotheses: Delegation, Control and Health System Performance 
The explanatory approaches presented conceptualize a) why and how the current institutional 
setting of the HCS impacts on its efficiency and performance; b) why the interplay among 
individual institutional features is important and c) why the HCS’ political environment and 
also the interaction between the political system and the number of organized groups in the 
HCS impact on the “performance” of the HCS.  
Before engaging in the empirical analysis, I want to summarize the hypotheses for 
achievement levels, efficiency, and institutional change of HCS. According to the theoretical 
approach to achievement and efficiency, three factors determining how the incentive 
problems inherent to the delegation relationships in the HCS and the HCS as a societal 
subsystem are controlled: 
Built-in control - As a first aspect of control, there are the built-in mechanisms discussed in 
chapter 4. They aim at setting the “right” incentives; i.e. design the delegation relationship 
between principal and agent in a way which assures that the agent’s behavior does not deviate 
from the principal’s interests. These mechanisms cause actors to behave in a certain way – 
because it’s in the actor’s self interest to do so, without a third party actively exercising 
“visible” control.  
 
Complementary, a second aspect of control is the control exercised by a politically 
accountable actor external to the HCS, as elaborated in chapter 5. External control is 
advantageous for the HCS overall performance because the societal actors running the HCS 
may share interests which diverge from the citizens and may collude at the expenses of the 
citizens. The government is politically accountable to the citizens as the original principals. It 
is in charge to avoid collusion in the HCS the very same way that the government enforces 
anti-trust regulations in the economic sector.  
External operative control – As for the government’s possibilities to exercise control from 
the outside, there are firstly those levers existing currently by which the government can 
interfere into the HCS’ operation from outside. For example by determining the overall 
budget. These levers are operative in the sense, that the HCS under its current design allocates 
these competencies to the government.  
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External structural control – Apart from using existing levers to “operate” the HCS, there is 
the government’s formal power to change the HCS’ institutional setup. If the HCS in its 
current setup – including the built-in control mechanisms and the levers currently available 
for the government – performs poorly, consumes “too much” resource input, producing “too 
little” output and citizens are dissatisfied, the government might change it. It may 
“nationalize” the HCS, by integrating it into the public administration. It may privatize the 
HCS, by selling the infrastructure or by establishing them into autonomous entities. The point 
is that the government, the political system is not using the levers available under the current 
setting, but is changing the institutional setting itself, reassigning competencies, creating or 
abolishing organized actors etc.  
 
The built-in and the external operative control indicators can be operationalized 
comparatively straightforward. One can derive structural features which indicate the degree to 
which the HCS is subject to agency problems. And one can count the parameters of the HCS, 
which are determined by the government as an external actor.  
However, the third type of control is more difficult to measure, both for empirical as well as 
logical reasons.  
(1) The study of health system reform showed, that the production of reform laws is quite a 
different thing from actual changes. For instance, in Germany many things are changed and 
often on paper, but the system operates pretty much along the same lines.  
(2) Even in the absence of visible control activity by the external actor, in particular in the 
absence of institutional reforms but also in the absence observable intervention, external 
control might nevertheless be both present and effective. The very potential to do so, the 
credible threat to intervene, might be sufficient to keep the societal actors in line with public 
preferences.  
 
The empirical question concerning the relationship of control and performance are then, 
whether these features - built-in control and external control - have an effect on HCS 
performance and if so, which of the three is most important to explain variation in 
performance and the reforms of HCS? 
 
General Hypotheses on Delegation, Control and Performance: Institutions matter  
Among most of health policy makers and also among those studying health policy making 
and health system design, the basic assumption is, that institutions matter. Issues like 
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demographics,  life style and technological development may well matter for the achievement 
and the efficiency of the HCS, but there is some variation in both, which is not due to these 
factors, and thus presumably due to the institutional settings and thus subject to change by 
changing institutional settings. Given the institutional features in the focus of this study, the 
basic assumption is that the delegation relationships, the incentives set by the institutional 
design of a HCS, the built-in control mechanisms and the possibilities for external control are 
a relevant and moreover a genuinely institutional source of variation among HCS’ 
achievement and efficiency. The general hypotheses regarding the impact of institutional 
features of the HCS and the political system, concerning achievement and efficiency of a HCS 
are the following: 
1. The more delegation relationships, the more “Agency” exist in a HCS, the higher – 
ceteris paribus – the risk for opportunistic behavior by the agents which are basically 
independent and cannot be controlled, which increases resource consumption and 
presumably decreases the quality of the services provided. 
2. The higher the remuneration-based incentives to provide more services and the fewer 
and the less effective the built-in control mechanisms (e.g. appropriate remuneration 
mechanism, competition) are implemented to avoid opportunistic behavior in 
delegation relationships, the higher the risk of opportunistic behavior and the higher 
the consumption of resources by the HCS 
The general hypotheses concerning external control and reformability of HCS are  
3. The more veto points exist in the political system, the lower its potential to control, 
and the less control is actually exercised. 
4. The more societal actors exist, which are involved in running the HCS or at least have 
a stake in the HCS, the less external control is exercised. Whatever form the external 
control will take, at least some of the societal actors would be affected negatively and 
may try to obstruct the usage of existing instruments of control as well as the 
implementation of structural reforms.  
5. The indirect veto potential, created by the (multiplicative) interaction of political veto 
players and societal actors, will determine the usage of existing instruments and the 
chances for institutional changes. The hypothesis is that the interaction among both 
will be a stronger factor than either one taken alone.  
Given these hypotheses, the empirical questions are then: First, whether the institutional 
economics/delegation approach to HCS “performance” as a whole is empirically relevant or 
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not. Second, whether control mechanisms, be they built-in or external, are relevant for HCS 
performance.  
Regarding the interaction among the political system and the HCS, a question of particular 
interest is, which of these factors is most relevant for the exercise of control: is the structure 
of the policy area, in particular the existence of organized groups, more relevant than the 
political environment or are both in isolation of not much impact, since it is, as I assume it to 
be the case, the interaction among both, which is most important?  
 
Counter Hypotheses: No Genuine Effect of Institutions 
The counter hypothesis is “institutions don’t matter”, at least not in the sense, that they are the 
actual cause of the HCS’ achievement or efficiency.  
The basic argument supporting this hypothesis runs as follows. Institutions and institutional 
settings like a HCS are endogenous, especially in the long run; see Freeman/Moran (2000 : 
45). As such, they will reflect the preferences or restraints of the actors, which are creating 
them and also tolerate them. Certain institutions might be chosen because a society wants not 
or can not chose others. Newhouse (1977) argued that some states chose a NHS, because that 
makes it easier to ration health care. The reasons that health care is rationed might be either 
limited financial resources or a society which thinks that this level of health care is sufficient. 
HCE in such a country is then lower – albeit not because the HCS is more efficient, but 
because the funding allocated to health care is limited.  
A society with a strong preference for much health care and a demand, that all ailments must 
be taken care of will install a HCS in which all incentives are set in a way that makes sure that 
the provider will look for and take care of every ailment.  
The same is true for the development of the HCS. In the long run, a HCS will only oversupply 
services or produce “beyond-health”-services with no impact on health, if citizens are ready to 
accept the costs. A HCS producing only low levels of health status and services of poor 
quality will in the long run only persist, if the citizens are willing to accept this. So in any 
case, it is not actually the HCS which has the effects on the bundle of input and output, but the 
preferences of the citizens, who are willing to accept this bundle and install the HCS which 
produces this bundle.  
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7. Comparing Health Systems: Coping with Institutional Complexity 
 
In my view, the main problem of health system research is that is predominantly case 
oriented, driven by the available data and in particular driven by the motive, to pay the HCS 
and its intricacies studied its “due” attention. While this strategy yields detailed insights in the 
operation of individual HCS and the politics of health in this HCS, the resulting research is 
fragmented and not cumulative. The possibilities of generalizable statements about HCS 
institutions and health care reform are limited32 - often, such statements are not even the aim 
of the study.  
The attempt undertaken in this study, which will be presented in this chapter, is 
complementary to the case study approach in the sense, that it explicitly abstains from going 
into the intricacies of every HCS. Instead, it looks only at certain features, which were 
identified as being relevant from a certain theoretical perspective, viz. the delegation approach 
While a different set of problems arise from this approach, there are, hopefully, also different 
insights to be gained. 
 
Comparing Complex Systems: Plenty Variation, Few Cases 
As is stated in the review on the comparative literature on HCS, the problem of comparing 
HCS is primarily a technical one, arising from high institutional complexity combined with a 
limit of the number of cases which can be handled in a feasible way. The problem is by no 
means specific to the study of HCS, but a general feature of small-n studies, and was most 
clearly stated by Charles Ragin:  
 
‘Although simple and straightforward, this case-oriented research design is far 
from problem free. The most obvious problem is that the investigator’s confidence 
in the causal conditions that he or she has identified increases as the number of 
instances of the outcome increases. The greater the number of cases examined 
(…), the more impressive the fact that they share common antecedent conditions 
(…). But as the number of cases increases, so does the difficulty of knowing cases 
well, making it impossible to become familiar enough with each case to make 
sound judgments about causally relevant features. Besides, as the number of cases 
 
32 Due to the usage of institutional features in quantitative studies by way of dichotomous variables, the situation 
is better for the impact of institutions on various elements of HCS performance. It is much more severe in the 
case of the study of health care reform, where there are no studies of reformability over several years or several 
HCS. 
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increases, the likelihood that they will share causally relevant feature declines. 
“more cases” almost always means “more heterogeneity”.’ Ragin (1999): 1226), 
see also Freeman (2000): 5). 
 
Because HCS vary stronger than most other societal subsystems in their design, the number of 
institutional features and dimensions on which cases differ increases rapidly as more HCS are 
studied. One may look at two HCS which are very similar and differ only in very few 
features, and may try to study the effect of these differences on a certain dependent variable. 
But if really all aspects in which HCS differ are taken into account, the small-n-problem 
makes a statistical treatment, e.g. by regression or factor analysis, technically impossible. 
Moreover, conclusions and the attribution of outcomes to institutions difficult, since there are 
many institutional features which potentially have an causal effect on dependent variables to 
conclude that a change in a particular variable seen as independent causes a change in the 
dependent variable, for instance efficiency of the HCS. 
The problem of high institutional variability persists when the research designs like 
comparable cases, most-similar/most-dissimilar cases, or Boolean algebra are used; see 
Lijphart (1971), King et al. (1994) and Ragin (1989) for the methods and Blake/Adolino 
(2001) for an application to HCS.  
 
Methodological Approach and Implementation 
At the technical level, the problem to be tackled is hence, how to compare relatively few cases 
that differ with regard to many features? To cope with the problem several complementary 
strategies will be used.  
As was said above, a crucial problem is the inclination of health system researchers to start 
from the cases, following an inductive research strategy. Looking at cases as they are, without 
a theory acting as a “filter”, leads to a kind of ‘drowning’ in case-specific facts and 
particularities. I want o go the other way around, starting from a theory and testing the theory, 
by applying it to several HCS. Instead of starting from the cases in their totality, paying 
attention to the specific features of each case that make up a HCS as a “total phenomenon”, I 
will start from a theoretical model, select what features are to be taken into account based on 
this theory and only collect only those features that are relevant according to the chosen 
theory; see for the method of a theory based comparison Kieser/Kubicek (1992: 53), King et 
al. (1994); Bailey (1994)and Landman (2000). The very diversity among HCS makes it 
necessary to select some features, while consciously ignoring others. As a consequence, this 
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comparative study of HCS will necessarily be confirmatory with respect to this theory only. 
Are there indeed systematic differences in HCS achievement and efficiency which correspond 
to differences in delegation and control? 
 
Then, since even this selection yields a large set of institutional information, I will use data 
reducing methods which compress many individual institutional features into few latent 
dimensions. The basic idea is, not to use individual features (such as a certain remuneration 
mode for ambulatory services), but a summary measure, combining the information on how 
services are remunerated in all sectors of the HCS as combined feature. A single feature, e.g. 
the remuneration of ambulatory services, is one aspect of a latent dimensions which is 
capturing a remuneration style used in the HCS. The same is true for competencies. That the 
state has a competence is one piece of information. But I will use the fact that the state has a 
certain competence as an information on this state’s location on a latent scale of state control. 
Furthermore, the HCS will not be analyzed as a whole, but on a sectoral basis, which reduces 
the number of feature to be used in each step of the analysis.  
 
Based on this compressed information, the descriptive questions are, How are certain tasks 
organized in different HCS? Which HCS are similar to each other, and among which are the 
biggest differences? In which aspects is much variation among HCS in the way, a task is 
performed, and which tasks are performed in similar ways in most HCS?  
The more analytical question is, How does the institutional affect efficiency and achievement? 
The analysis will be conducted in three steps:  
First the variables which represent indicators of delegation, but also built-in and external 
control will be analyzed using the factor analytic method. This gives the answers to how 
many latent dimensions are underlying the institutional variability and what their content is.  
Second, using the obtained factor scores, I will present graphical representations of where the 
HCS are located in this latent institutional space. Which HCS are similar to each other, when 
several institutional dimensions are taken into account?  
Third, by correlating the factor scores obtained by compressing the directly observed 
institutional variables, I will look for relationships among latent institutional dimensions, and 
indicators of achievement and efficiency. 
 
Regarding the occurrence of changes, the task is similar: what changes occurred, and do they 
correspond to certain features? The hypothesis is, that HCS which are performing well will be 
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under less pressure to be changed. It also states that HCS which are embedded into political 
systems which are unable to produce change are changed less often.  
The Health Care System Inventory allows to measure change, by looking at how the HCS was 
organized at a certain point in time, the mid 90s, and how it was organized in 2004. 
Given the argument, one has to acknowledge that reforms are conditional both on the need 
and the potential for change. A HCS might remain unchanged, because it is working so well 
that there is no need for changes. It might also remain unchanged, because the indirect veto 
power is to large that the political system cannot exercise control. Hence I will look at change 
and the setting in which change occurs. 
To differentiate both situations, I will use the HCS performance, but also satisfaction, to 
derive the pressure for reform in 1995, then I will use the information on the autonomy of the 
HCS and the political systems capability to implement changes, in order to analyze, whether 
and how the HCS has changed between the two points in time.  
 
Limits of the Approach 
Given the range of problems, this study has its limits, which I want to state here as an explicit 
caveat.  
(1) Limiting the range of selected features makes the study subject to the problem of omitted 
third variables. It may after all be the case that all features included here are actually 
completely irrelevant for the way the HCS works, and that every variation in features I see as 
dependent on the variables I have chosen is actually due to variation in other variables 
unknown, and hence unobserved in the present study.  
(2) The approach used cannot deliver an exclusive proof of causation among one or more 
institutional variables and a variation in a target variable (like efficiency in health care 
provision and reformability). Institutional features and certain levels of performance might go 
together, and the explanation might be convincing, but that is no proof. Does, as Newhouse 
(1977) argued, a state or a society choose a certain institutional setup, because this setup is the 
most effective way to ration health care and to limit HCE, so that both, a HCS’ institutional 
set up and the HCE are actually caused by a third factor?  
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Part IV: Measuring Delegation, Control and Performance 
 
8. An Inventory of Institutional Structures of Health Systems 
Now that the concepts of delegation, built-in and external control are defined, the central task 
is capture how delegation and control are organized in various HCS.  
 
Following the approach outlined in the above chapter, I developed an inventory of 
institutional features, which allows to describe HCS of any type and design in a directly 
comparable way by checking whether a defined institutional feature is present or not. The 
basic idea is to have one inventory applicable to all HCS. And the main task is to select those 
institutional features that make sense even if applied to HCS which are very different. 
By this way, the institutional complexity and particularities of the HCS are translated in a 
standardized description. This description is based on individual features, not on the fixed 
constellations, which make up a “type” of HCS. For instance, a public integrated HCS is in 
this view not a different type “sui generis”, but a case in which certain features are present, 
while others are absent. A public integrated HCS may differ from another pubic HCS or a 
corporatist HCS with regard to any of the variables. The idea of the inventory is it to make 
this differences as well as the similarities quantifiable, to turn the difference into a question of 
degree rather than of assigning the HCS to incommensurable types.  
 
In the first volume of this study, an inventory of delegation relationships, built-in and external 
control mechanisms was developed on the theoretical background presented in the above 
sections. The aim of this "Health Care Systems Inventory", HCSI, is it to describe HCS, 
whatever they may look like, using an identical framework, so that the resulting descriptions 
can be directly compared. Direct comparability refers to the existence or absence of defined 
features like a certain remuneration mode or a certain competence.  
 
In this section, I will briefly describe the basic structure of the HCSI by giving a short 
overview on its content. The detailed template of the HCSI is given in the Appendix of this 
volume. The institutional data gathered using the HCSI can be found in first volume of this 
study; see Kotzian (2007b). The institutional data was gathered for two years, 1995 and 2004, 
by sending out the template, adapted for the country, to national experts from the academia 
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and the health system’s administration, such as persons working in the Ministry of Health, 
Health Authorities, associations of providers, purchasers.  
The data used for the analysis was taken from this database, but it was recoded; see chapter 10 
for the exact content of the variables used in the descriptive and explanatory analysis. 
 
Basically, the HCSI captures the existence and status of actors, the relationships among them, 
and in particular the allocation of tasks, competencies and control rights. The information 
concerns the content of the current settings and regulations, but also by whom and how these 
regulations and settings can be changed. E.g. what remuneration modes are currently in use, 
but also, how are these modes set and by whom? Are they negotiated by the suppliers and the 
purchaser, or set by the government?  
 
Part I: Occupational Status and Incentives of Providers, Consumers of Health Care 
Part I of the HCSI is about the providers and consumers of health services.  
With regard to the providers of medical services, the HCSI captures information on the 
predominant occupational status and the predominant remuneration modes of the providers. 
But it also covers the “incentive at the margin”, e.g. whether there is despite that the GPs get 
most of their income by a capitation or salary nevertheless the possibility - and hence the 
incentive - to increase their income by providing more services. The question, how the 
decision on the remuneration mode (e.g. by a budget or a fee) and remuneration amount (how 
high is the fee for a defined service?) is made is also collected; see also Part IV of this section.  
 
Hospitals are, because of the substantial impact on HCE, treated in a more elaborated way. 
The HCSI asks for the status of hospitals, in particular about their administrative 
independence, e.g. whether it can decide on a potential surplus, e.g. reinvest it, respectively 
whether deficits would covered, whether it has the competence to decide on questions of 
capacity (number of beds, staff employed), more general who decides on the closing or 
opening of hospitals in a region, the decision on investment in high technology, the 
remuneration modes and how the remuneration, mode and amount, is decided on.  
In order to capture the situation of the individual decision maker in the hospital, the HCSI 
asks, whether hospital consultants and surgeons are paid by salary or whether their income 
depends on what and how much they do. There are cases in which, even though the hospital 
receives a case based remuneration, which sets an incentive to limit the expenditure per case, 
the physician deciding on what to do in an actual case may have an incentive to extend the 
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quantity of services provided because his income depends on this. In some cases, the hospitals 
are only the place where self employed providers using the hospital’s equipment in exchange 
for a rent paid, provide services on their own account. 
The exposition of a hospital to competition, the main incentive to provide quality and to 
contain costs, is captured by the question, whether several hospitals, offering the same kind of 
services (e.g. cover the same indications, the same degree of specialization etc.), exist in the 
same region. Quite often there is a layered specialization, but in some cases, there is 
competition, or no competition. The existence of several hospitals to choose from is 
supplemented by the question, whether treatment costs charged by the hospitals, e.g. the per 
diems or the price of a defined treatment episode, differ or are identical for all hospitals in a 
region, respectively the same degree of specialization.  
 
With regard to the patients as the consumers of medical services, it was asked about co-
payments to medical services and medical goods, the contributions to the HCS, the issue of 
covered services, i.e. whether all services are covered either by the HCS or by an 
supplementary/ complementary health insurance schemes or whether there are sectors, e.g. 
dental care, where there is factually a market in the sense that the patients themselves pay for 
a service. I also collected information on choice and access of the patient to In-Patient-Care, 
Hospitals and Specialists: are there alternative places to get treatment and if so, does the 
patient has a choice among them. The idea is that having a choice is a necessary precondition 
for a quality assuring competition among providers.  
The issue of gatekeeping, the formal regulations as well as the factual handling of it, is a 
further element of competition among providers as well as a restriction on the consumption of 
more specialized services, which are usually more expensive than primary care. The HCSI 
asks about the existence of gatekeeping for hospitals and specialized services but also, 
whether it can be skipped and circumvented one way or the other. 
 
One additional aspect of transparency is the question, whether the price of a medical service is 
at least known to the patient, e.g. by giving the patient a bill. The involvement can be even 
higher, by making the patient pay for the service in advance and get reimbursed by the 
purchaser later on. The motivational aspect is further captured by asking, whether the patient 
has to make a co-payment to a service or not. Since co-payments differ with regard to the 
incentive they set, the next aspect relevant to make an informed choice is whether prices are 
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relevant to the patient, e.g. co payments exist, which reflect the differences in prices or 
whether the co-payment is a lump-sum payment independent of the price of a service. 
Last and most important is the question, whether the patient actually has a choice among 
agents in charge of different aspects of health care delivery: is there more than one hospital or 
HIF to choose, or is the citizen assigned to a certain provider or health authority by his place 
of living. Can the patient change the HIF/HA, or is he unable to do so because he is assigned 
by his occupational status to be – by law – member of a certain fund? The latter aspect is 
covered in more detail in Part IV. 
 
With regard to the pharmaceuticals and the pharmaceutical industry as an agent, the HCSI 
collected information on regulation of market authorization, direct price control, positive and 
negative listings and evaluations of a drug’s effectiveness and cost effectiveness as a basis for 
including it into the list of medicines reimbursed by the HCS, which is in turn the 
precondition for a larger market for a drug. The HCSI also covers the practices concerning 
generics – whether generic substitution is possible, who decides and whether the patient has 
an incentive to use a generic, i.e. can reduce a co-payment. Issues like the existence of limits 
for the prescribers, for instance a pharmaceutical budget for each GP or a overall budget of 
pharmaceutical expenditure are also included.  
 
Part II: Quality Assurance in the Health Care System 
Part II is about measures to ensure quality of medical treatment. Usually, there are several 
treatment options for an illness, differing with regard to the cost effectiveness, the risks 
involved etc. The aggregated experiences made by the medical providers about which 
treatment is the best and most effective for a given indication is a valuable resource. This 
resource however can only have an impact, if the gathering and distribution of the information 
is organized. Possible ways to do that is by installing institutions in charge of doing this on a 
regular basis. For instance, there can be national/ regional level institutions, but oftentimes, 
this is done by the medical professional organizations themselves.  
The HCSI asks, if such institutions exist and further, if such guidelines exist, for which 
sectors (pharmaceuticals, specialized care provided in hospitals, ambulatory care, usage of 
technology etc).  
A further aspect of quality assurance is transparency, which is captured in the HCSI by 
asking, whether there is an institution gathering information on the quality of individual 
providers of medical services. An example of this is the star-ranking in the UK, but also 
 123
reports on the occurrence of medical failures, maltreatment in different hospitals. Since the 
information is only relevant if known, for instance for the decision of a gatekeeper or the 
patient himself, where to go for a treatment, it is further asked, whether this information is 
published one way or the other.  
A further issue of quality is also the question how the transfer of newly arisen medical 
knowledge to the providers of medical services is handled. Given that most professional 
associations of physicians provide some kind of voluntary continuing education, the HCSI 
asked whether a provider, the individual GP/Physician has to renew his approbation or licence 
to provide medical services from time to time (recertification) ? 
 
Part III: External control of the Health Care System: Governmental Control 
Part III is about the role of the state, understood as a politically responsible actor in particular 
the central government, for the HCS. As was stated earlier, the government - as an agent of 
the electorate - has the function to exert a kind of meta-control over the HCS.  
The HCSI captures the level of government most important for the HCS, which can be either 
the national, regional or local level. The central government is the politically most visible 
actor and hence the actor primarily in charge of the institutional design of the HCS.  
 
For the exertion of operative external control, i.e. using levers available the HCSI contains a 
list of possible instruments, asking for each sector of the HCS, whether the government can 
control issues like capacity, levels and modes of remuneration. E.g. when looking at the 
provision of ambulatory care, the government might explicitly set the catalogue of services 
covered, questions of capacity (e.g. number of GPs per capita or in an area), the overall 
budget for expenditure for ambulatory care, the way the providers of care are remunerated 
(e.g. fee for service or a per-capita budget etc.), the level of remuneration of medical services, 
e.g. the level of fees or capitation, the way the ambulatory care providers are organized, e.g. 
regional level or national-level organization and the determination of the top-level 
management of the of the organization of ambulatory care providers.  
With regard to the question to which degree societal agents in charge of organizing the HCS 
can be controlled by the government, the HCSI captures by what means the government (i.e. 
the responsible level of government) can exert control and supervision on the activities of the 
purchasers, HA/HIFs. Possible mechanisms are the requirement of the purchaser to produce 
an annual report for the government or a government agency, in which all costs 
(administrative costs, expenditure for health services purchased) are listed. The requirement 
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that budget plans must be endorsed by the Government, the publication of the administrative 
costs of the purchaser, that the purchaser must apply for a formal approval of an increase of 
contribution/premiums and must deliver reasons for this. The control can also be exercised by 
determining the top-level administration of the – formally independent – HA/HIF. In some 
countries, e.g. Germany, the top-level administration in charge of conducting negotiation with 
the suppliers, is formally elected by the employers and the insured. In others, like France the 
state determines the administration or at least part of it.  
 
Part IV: Administration and Decision-Making in the Health Care System 
Part IV of the HCSI is about the administration and operation of the HCS, in particular the 
way decisions are made and the relationship among providers and purchasers of health 
services. 
The "purchaser" is usually either a HIF, or a HA, but sometimes both, e.g. in Greece.  
By Health Insurance Funds, the HCSI refers to for private or public, non-profit or for profit 
organizations which act as an insurance but which are not part of the state administration.  
By Health Authorities the HCSI refers to organizations which are part of the public 
administration. Examples are local or regional Health Boards, local governments, county 
councils, Primary Care Trusts etc.  
The HCSI asks about a factual characterization of the predominant status of the HIF/HA. For 
instance, whether it is really independent or only formally independent from the state and the 
public administration, like the HIFs in Germany, or a part of the public administration, like an 
integral part of the local government as it is the case in many Scandinavian countries.  
Further, information on the situation of the purchaser was collected, the degree to which they 
are dependent on or autonomous form the state administration, whether there is a competition 
among them, i.e. whether the can compete by offering different contribution levels or 
catalogues of covered., how citizens are assigned to them, what possibilities they have to 
exercise control over the providers of medical services, both with regard to economic 
efficiency and quality of treatment.  
 
The issue of the relationship between the purchaser and medical providers also encompasses 
negotiations on remuneration levels and remuneration modes. An important aspect here is the 
distribution of power among purchaser and provider: for instance in Germany, providers have 
local monopolies, in others, e.g. Luxembourg and Poland, there is but one HIF, acting as a 
nationwide monopsonist. One indicator of capturing this, is by looking at the fragmentation of 
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the demand side is capture by asking about how many purchasers there are, whether they can 
provide services themselves, or whether there is a strict purchaser provider split.  
The competition among the purchasers, as the main incentive for them to act in the interest of 
the citizen, is captured by the free choice of the purchaser as opposed to the assignment of 
citizens to certain purchasers for instance by place of living or by occupation. In the case both 
of municipalities as well as insurance funds, voting by feet exerts a basic pressure on the 
provider to behave well. Factual competition is captured by asking whether it is possible that 
the citizen’s contributions, be it premiums, percentage of income, tax rates to the HIFs/HA 
may vary, or whether the contributions are the same for all purchasers in a country. The same 
is asked for the catalogue of covered services. Further, the HCSI asked whether there is a 
financial equalization among purchasers, which limits the necessity to minimize 
administrative costs and allows a lax attitude in negotiations with providers. 
 
With regard to the control exerted by the purchaser over the patients, the HCSI ask, it possible 
that the same purchaser offers different packages of contributions and covered services to the 
insured. Examples are that the patient agrees to go to the general practitioner first, before 
visiting a specialists or accepts that some services, e.g. dental care, are not covered. In return, 
the patient pays a lower contribution. This sets a kind of incentive for the patient to restrain 
the consumption. Further, it was asked whether the citizen can obtain a bonus by the HIF/HA, 
if they participate in preventive health checks on a regular basis. Examples of these are a 
reduced contribution rate, a repayment or lower co-payments.  
 
With regard to the possibilities of control by the purchaser vis-à-vis the providers, the HCSI 
captures, whether the HIF/HA can identify individual providers, e.g. individual GPs or 
Hospitals, who overspend, and if so, whether the HIF/HA have the possibility to exclude these 
from the provision of services, if they significantly oversupply medical services, provide 
insufficient quality or work in an inefficient way. While this is a possibility in HCS with a 
purchaser-provider-split, where providers can be de-contracted, it is usually not possible in 
HCS where the provision of services is integrated. A factor in this aspect is whether the 
HIF/HA usually receive a detailed bill from an individual provider, e.g. a Hospital or a GP, in 
which lists all medical services and medical goods which were provided in an individual 
case? In some HCS, the Purchaser gets such a detailed bill, in others, the payment of 
providers is done by lump-sum payments, with no transparence on what was provided.  
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Finally, a question on the borderline to quality control, is whether the HIF/HA can by one 
way or other force the providers to abide by medical guidelines or standards of good medical 
practice. 
 
In addition to the above information, the HCSI also asked about the existence of societal 
actors and their role for the HCS. HCS differ regarding the existence of societal actors, e.g. 
whether Health Insurance Funds, exist at all and are involved in the day to day operation and 
decision making of the HCS. If they do, the next question is about which issues they are 
involved in. For instance, employer organizations might have an interest and a say in the 
financial developments of the HCS, if employers are involved in financing, for instance in 
Germany, where they pay half of the contribution.  
 
As will be outlined in the empirical chapters, the data gathered in the course of the project 
define the institutional setting of a country as the complete set of information on all the 
variables and features mentioned here. The institutional constellation is then described again 
for the second point in time, to obtain information about the direction and magnitude of 
institutional changes. The data is compressed using data reducing methods, and the 
compressed data will be the basis of the actual analyses of the dependent variables, to which I 
will now turn.  
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9. Evaluating Health System Performance: Achievements and 
Efficiency 
The “performance” of HCS is a central theme in health politics and the main aim of health 
policy. While the notion “performance” is next to omnipresent, the actual content and the 
implications of improving performance are left rather vague, leaving open the door for 
inconsistency in the objectives, see also Oliver (2007). This chapter is about the concept and 
measurement of health system performance.  
As a point of departure, I assume that the central aim and raison d’être of a HCS is the 
production and restoration of health, which reveals itself in a long life, undisturbed by 
ailments and disabilities with a negative impact on the quality of life. The HCS is usually seen 
as an instrument, and its performance as an instrument can be evaluated in several respects:  
First, it should achieve its aim to a sufficient degree. The term “achievement” refers to the 
levels of health system output reached.  
Second, it should do so in an efficient way, since there is no sense in wasting resources which 
could be put in good use elsewhere. The term “efficiency” refers to the question whether the 
HCS reaches the levels at the lowest possible costs respectively reaches the highest levels of 
output given the resources dedicated to health care consumption. Efficiency is inherently 
based on the ratio of input and output.  
These two independent questions will structure this chapter. They are independent, because 1) 
even the most efficient HCS is useless if it is not vested with sufficient resources to operate; 
2) even the highest achieving HCS, reaching the highest levels of outputs, is not “good”, if it 
does so consuming inputs to a degree which is way beyond any appropriate level.  
 
After discussing the various outputs and inputs of HCS in section 9.1, section 9.2. will cover 
the basic indicators of achievement used in this study. Section 9.3. introduces to measurement 
of health system efficiency, and section 9.4. will cover conceptual problems of these 
efficiency measurements and how they could be tackled.  
 
9.1. Input and Output of Health Care Systems 
Any measurement of HCS efficiency requires the definition and the measurement of its input 
and output: what does the HCS produce and what resources does it need to do so? Indicators 
of both features are subject to several problems, which I will discuss in this section. After 
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discussing outputs and inputs in a general way, I will concentrate on the feasible indicators, 
viz.. indicators for which data is available for all countries in this study. While output of the 
HCS has many aspects, some of them are intangible insofar, as there is no indicator which 
could be used, neither on a country basis and much less so for an international comparison. 
The most obvious issue would be the quality of care, in the sense of due diligence and the rate 
of clear cut mistakes made by the medical staff. While of course being an important aspect, 
there is no available data – neither for quality understood as the incidence of non-lethal 
medical maltreatment, nor for other aspects like the frequency of misdiagnosis.  
 
9.1.1. Health System Outputs 
A HCS produces several things. Olsen and Smith (2001: 42/43) enumerate three broader 
categories of what a HCS produces: health outcomes, beyond-health-outcomes, and non-use 
values; see also Mooney (1998). Health outcomes are further differentiated into health state 
improvements, prolongations of the duration of a certain health state (e.g. length of healthy 
life) and increasing probabilities (e.g. of surviving, of recovering from an illness). In 
discussing HCS output with regard to achievement indicators, I will focus on the categories 
health and beyond-health outcomes, leaving aside the provision of an infrastructure 
independent of actual usage. 
 
Hard Performance: Health Outcomes and Health Status 
The production of health is the central aim of the HCS. The usual indicator for this production 
is some measure of outcome in the sense of health status, capturing length of life, quality of 
life, or a mixture of both (the latter measured in QALYs or DALE). Since this aspect of 
output is closely related to “hard”, biological facts, which can be recognized objectively by a 
physician and does not depend on subjective evaluations, I will call the HCS’ achievement in 
this aspect “hard performance”.  
The immediate advantage of the indicator is its “objectivity”, in the sense that the duration of 
life, but also the presence or absence of illness can be recognized independent of the citizen’s 
opinion, expectations and wants.  
The great disadvantage of using this indicator to compare HCS achievement is that the HCS is 
not the only factor relevant for health status. Neither long nor short lives, neither good nor bad 
health status of a population can be attributed to the HCS or health services only. Indeed, if 
the HCS was the only factor for a population’s health, or the providers activities were the only 
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and moreover deterministic factor for the individual’s health, the principal-agent problem 
would not arise at all. The problem in the delegation relationship is the very fact that such a 
deterministic relationship among medical action and health outcomes does not exist and the 
outcome is not only determined by the agent’s activities. This problem is basically the same if 
one looks at an individual patient delegating the task of restoring his health to a physician as it 
is if one looks a the society as a principal delegating the maintenance of the society’s health 
status to the HCS as a complex agency.  
 
The empirical research has shown that health outcomes, be it life expectancy as a general 
proxy or infant mortality as a more specific indicator, are dependent on a range of factors, 
many of them outside of the HCS:  
The environment, in particular the air quality, water pollution, but also the climate in which 
the country is located; Filmer/Pritchett (1999).  
Cultural traditions, like smoking and drinking habits - but also the famous “Mediterranean 
diet”; Newhouse/Friedlander (1980), Nordhaus (2002), Nixon/Ulmann (2006) or Cutler et al. 
(2006). 
Education, since well educated people are more aware of their health and more informed and 
aware of the impact their behavior and diet has on their health and quality of life; see Leigh 
(1983) and Elo/Preston (1996). 
Economic situation – richer people get less often ill, also because of the better access to food, 
living conditions etc.; see Feinstein (1993), Pritchett/Summers (1996), Meer et al. (2003) and 
Frijters et al. (2005). 
 
Indicators of life expectancy are also influenced by factors, which would not immediately 
come into mind when thinking about health systems. Relevant are factors like regulations on 
vehicle safety, regulations on safety at the work place, politics concerning mass immunization 
etc.; see Nolte/McKee (2003). In some countries, the biggest health problems are civil war, 
terror or criminality, which are causing the biggest losses in life years. Indeed, both the study 
of Tengs/al. (1995) and Tengs (1997), who compares the costs of life years gained using 
health services to the costs of using alternative, also non-health policy, measures and the 
study of Filmer/Pritchett (1999) who find only little impact of health expenditure on health 
outcomes when other factors are controlled for, indicate that the HCS might not be the 
optimal instrument to achieve high levels of health outcome; see Navarro (2001) and 
Navarro/Shi (2001) for a comprehensive overview on the evidently small role of the HCS for 
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health status, or the study by Simonato et al. (1998) for the importance of preventive medical 
services and measures – as the complement to healing measures which come into play after 
the illness occurred – in reducing avoidable mortality.  
Further, as a society develops over time, the factors influential for differences in health status 
among countries change. In an overall comparison of health outcomes, measured as infant 
mortality or life expectancy using all WHO member states, GDP and education are crucial. 
But once societies reached a certain level of development, these factors become almost 
irrelevant and other factors like life style gain more importance; see Le Grand (1987), Cutler 
et al. (2006) and the literature reviewed in Berger/Messer (2002).  
Table 9.1 below illustrates the relative impact of several socioeconomic background variables 
on “hard” HCS outputs: infant mortality, life expectancy, and DALEs, the WHO’s measure of 
disability adjusted life expectancy, as health outcome measures, combining data from the 
World Bank and the WHO.  
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Table 9.1: Factors influencing health outcomes: life expectancy, infant mortality and DALE 
a) All WHO countries 
         Infant Mortality             Life Expectancy           DALE (WHO)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Log-Model Model 1 Model 2 Log-Model     Model 1 Model 2 Log-Model 
GDP -0.001 -0.003 -0.339 0.001 0.001 0.109 0.001 0.001 0.133
 -7.14 -5.28 -2.91 8.64 4.79 3.9 9.48 4.9 3.36
Literacy -117.629 -118.065 -0.637 30.00 30.10 0.208 33.14 33.21 0.27
 -12.46 -12.49 -4.02 13.65 13.74 6.63 12.7 12.71 6.8
HCE  0.016 -0.317  -0.004 -0.019  -0.003 -0.01
  3.49 -3.37  -2.3 -0.91  -1.72 -0.33
constant 143.62 145.63 7.563 38.73 38.30 3.427 26.35 26.00 3.039
 17.99 18.05 13.56 20.57 20.3 24.72 12.28 12.04 15.45
R2 0.73 0.74 0.81 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.68 0.68 0.68
N 158          
 
b) OECD30 sub-sample 
                          Infant Mortality            Life Expectancy              DALE (WHO) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Log-Model Model 1 Model 2 Log-Model Model 1 Model 2 Log-Model
GDP 0 0 -0.194 0 0 0.032  0 0 0.041
 -2.73 -1.8 -0.5 3.89 1.88 1.03 4.16 2.26 1.14
Literacy -174.06 -174.22 -7.266 19.10 19.24 0.147 17.35 17.59 0.138
 -4.33 -4.24 -3.28 2.23 2.21 1.67 1.9 1.89 1.26
HCE  0 -0.266  0 0.022  -0.001 0.023
  0.29 -0.77  -0.29 0.86  -0.46 0.78
constant 182.20 182.53 5.478 52.57 52.26 3.873 47.66 47.17 3.687
 4.62 4.51 4.02 6.88 6.68 28.33 5.78 5.56 23.81
R2 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.64 0.64 0.74  0.60 0.60 0.69
N=30            
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Remarks to table 9.1  
Entries are b- and t-Values, the latter based on robust Standard Errors  
Dependent Variables 
Infant Mortality:  Infant deaths within one year after birth, per 1000 live births 1997 World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (1999; Table: 2.18) 
Life Expectancy: Life expectancy of person 1997 World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (1999; Tables: 2.18).  
DALE (WHO):  Disability Adjusted Life Expectancy; total population at birth WHO (2000 
Annex Table 5) 
Independent Variables 
GDP: GDP per capita, 1995,1996, or 1997 in $ 
Literacy: Estimated literacy rate, data from Evans et al. (2000) 
HCE: Total per capita expenditure in international dollars: WHO (2000) 
 
 
The functional forms (linear vs. logarithmic) used for the regression equations represent 
different assumptions about the production process of health: the linear form assumes health 
to be an additive product, where more of a certain factor, e.g. a better access to clean drinking 
water, has an additional effect per se. The logarithmic form assumes health to be the result of 
a multiplicative production process: if citizens are well supplied with health relevant factors 
but one factor is missing, the overall outcome will still be zero, just like a firm cannot produce 
anything with only labor or only capital input. 
Looking at table 9.1 above, the finding is that - independent of the functional model form 
(linear or a log-model) chosen - income, proxied by GDP, and education, measured as the 
literacy rate, are much more important for health status than HCE. The effect is particularly 
strong if one looks at all WHO members.  
Looking only at the OECD sub-sample, differences in health status do not correspond to 
differences in HCE, a fact already stated by Newhouse (1977). While GDP and literacy as a 
measure of basic education are of no impact for health status in the log-model, they are 
important in the model which is based on a linear-additive production function for health.  
 
One argument often stated with regard to the small impact of HCE is, that while HCE and 
GDP are closely correlated, it is still HCE which is the driving factor in health improvement; 
 133
see also Cutler et al. (2006) for the problem. Indeed, the causality among GDP and HCE may 
work in both ways. I would suggest that it is more likely that GDP is created first, which is 
then available to be spend, for health or other things; see Sachs (2001), Suhrcke et al. (2005) 
for a review of the literature on the effects of health status on economic performance, 
Bhargava/Jamison et al. (2001) and the contributions in López-Casasnovas et al. (2005) for a 
discussion of the mechanisms and issues of causality.  
 
As a consequence of the results presented here, one important caveat arises: when looking for 
instance at the development of life expectancy over time, the observable health status level 
and also the improvement in the observable health status is not only due to the increased 
investments in the HCS. It is much more due to the improvement in the overall living 
conditions: access to food, clear drinking water, education, safety at the work place etc. 
Consequentially, one has to be very careful when attributing differences in health status 
among countries to the differences in the HCS and the level of HCE. In particular, when the 
countries differ substantially in socioeconomic development status. The same is true when 
looking at the development of health status over time. This is particularly true for the 
differences among developing and industrialized countries if these are seen as stages of a 
basically uniform development trajectory.  
 
Given the impact of various factors not related to the health system, the health outcome 
indicators used for performance evaluations in various studies were refined in several ways, in 
order to obtain indicators which more validly capture the outcomes attributable to the HCS. 
Some of these measures aim at distinguish between what the HCS can achieve and what it 
cannot, looking at how good the HCS is in tasks which it could and thus should perform. 
Other approaches try to distinguish the overall health-achievement into those parts attributable 
to the HCS and those attributable to other factors outside of the HCS.  
a) The concept of ‘mortality amenable too health care’, was developed in the 1970s and 
practically applied to HCS performance comparisons for instance by Nolte/McKee (2003); 
also Nolte/McKee (2004) for an extensive overview on the empirical literature on 
measurement and estimation of avoidable mortality; Newey et al. (2004) for a comparison of 
the EU countries. The idea underlying the approach is that a HCS should avoid those 
premature deaths which could be avoided given the state of medical knowledge, the 
technological and medical possibilities given at the current state of overall development. 
While a HCS cannot avoid deaths due to traffic accidents, it can avoid deaths due to certain 
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illnesses. The first step in an empirical application of the “avoidable mortality”-idea consist 
consequently in defining those illnesses which are currently treatable. Mortality due to these 
illnesses in then avoidable. This categorization depends not only of the kind of illness, but 
also on the age of the people suffering from it. While a death in course of a certain illness may 
be seen as avoidable in a given age-range, it may be unavoidable for older people. The idea is, 
that a person of a certain age should, if the HCS does its job properly, not die of a certain 
illness, since this death is avoidable; see Nolte/McKee (2003: 1130) for a list of illnesses seen 
as avoidable. The next step is the assignment of occurring mortality to either the unavoidable 
or the avoidable causes and to create a numerical measure of mortality, which could be 
avoided. A practical problem in using this indicator to evaluate HCS arises form having to 
define, what is an “illness amenable to health care”, a task which requires substantial medical 
knowledge on the side of the researcher. The task is aggravated by the fact that what is a 
curable illness and an avoidable death, in particular in relation to the age of the patient 
concerned, is also subject to debate in the medical community. The study of Nolte and McKee 
gives different results, if e.g. ischaemic heart disease is treated as an avoidable death or not. 
Second, mortality amenable to health care differs over time. An illness which was not curable 
ten years ago may today be curable. The same is true for the impact of the age structure, 
which is in a way an interaction effect among technological and demographic development. 
The death of a 70 year old person due to a certain disease may have been unavoidable ten 
years ago. Today, it is not acceptable but represents a clear cut failure for the HCS. To 
compare HCS efficiency over longer periods of time, an be it only a decade as in the present 
study, this indicator is thus problematic.  
 
b) A second approach to correct health status indicators for the effect non-HCS factors is the 
‘Minimum Possible Health Outcome’ approach. The basic idea of this approach is to use 
several of the determinants, which have proved to be important for health status, to predict 
health status, ignoring the effect of the HCS for the moment. Then one subtracts from the 
actual health outcome in a country the health outcome one would expect for this country 
given its development status in the absence of a HCS. For instance, one can predict life 
expectancy based on a regression model using GDP, HCE and educational levels as 
predictors. The margin of error is acceptable, so it is not just guesswork. The minimum life 
expectancy in a country can then be proxied by the predicted value for this country as 
obtained when inserting the country’s values for GDP and education in the regression 
equation, but setting the value of HCE equal to zero. The difference between the actual and 
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the predicted life expectancy is then not due to GDP and education, but can be attributed to 
other reasons, e.g. the HCS. It can be argued that this difference is a more valid indicator of 
health status attributable to the HCS than the overall health status. Because the regression line 
is, by definition, in the middle of the scatter plot of cases, there are cases with actual values 
above the regression line, but also cases below it. In later cases, actual life expectancy is 
lower than what one would expect for a country of this development level. The role of the 
HCS consists then in regaining the life years lost for unknown reasons. By shifting the 
regression line, one can correct for this, creating a kind of minimum health level for given 
values of GDP and education. A prominent example, the Minimum Health Outcome, was 
proposed by Evans/al. (2000a) and Evans et al. (2000b). It is used in the efficiency 
estimations in the 2000 World Health Report, which I will discuss later on in more detail. 
While the idea is attractive, the application requires certain assumptions, which may render 
the results questionable.  
 
 
Soft Performance: Beyond-Health-Outcomes, Process Utility and Satisfaction  
An implicit idea underlying the analysis of health production, beginning with Grossman 
(1972), is that health has not really a value per se but is a good which value is derived from 
being a necessary condition to enjoy other things. Hence, people should be expected to spend 
only what is necessary on restoring and maintaining health, and to spend the rest of their 
income for other utility generating activities and goods; see also Donaldson/Shackley (1997): 
700). In this conception of health care, even when only little improvements of health status 
are purchased, every health service is nevertheless aiming at improving biological health. This 
perception resulted in health policy making being focused on the maximization of QALYs, 
i.e. quality adjusted life years, as the dominating criterion. When health programs or 
interventions are evaluated, the number of QALYs created is put in relation to the costs. The 
basic calculus is to choose of two measures the one with a lower price per QALY. In this 
framework, there is no place for criteria that are not based on changes in objective, 
physiological health33. However even if one agrees on using only QALYs as a criterion for 
deciding on behalf of the public, the QALY concept is based on certain assumptions about the 
nature of the public’s preferences on health states, the discounting of future health states, the 
 
33 Using the QALY criterion as the only basis for political decisions in health care might systematically bias the 
decisions made and diverge form the public’s preferences. The willingness-to-pay approach is more appropriate 
to include also aspects like process-utility in the decision calculus; see Olsen/Smith (2001): 45).  
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valuation of how much less a certain illness makes a life year etc. Bryan et al. (2002) found 
that these assumption are met, but only to some degree. It is hence not granted that the 
political decision makers in orienting themselves at QALYs are in line with what the public 
wants. There are reasons to put into question, whether the public actually wants just QALYs 
at the lowest possible price in order to spend remaining resources elsewhere.  
The degree to which the demand for and the production of beyond-health matters for citizens 
can be inferred from several findings. There is a very strong impact of these “soft 
performance” factors on the citizens’ satisfaction with the HCS, see Mossialos (1997), 
Murray et al. (2001) and Blendon et al. (2001). Kotzian (2003) found, that a HCS’ 
responsiveness, measured by the WHO’s indicator as a proxy of the actual production of 
various beyond-health outputs by a HCS, is much more relevant for citizens’ satisfaction with 
the HCS in advanced societies than the HCS' ability to restore biological health, the level of 
resource consumption or its productive efficiency34. The public is definitely not satisfied by 
cheaply produced QALYs.  
These findings strongly indicate that apart from biological health output, there is an additional 
output produced by HCS, which will be labeled ‘soft performance’. The production of these 
“beyond-health-outputs” requires resources, but has no effect on standard health status 
measures. How much of these outputs is produced is a question of preferences and these 
preferences may well differ among countries. As I will elaborate in section 9.4. below, this 
type of output rises a conceptual problem when measuring HCS efficiency. In studying what 
the HCS produces and in evaluating its achievements, this study will also include aspects and 
indicators of the ‘soft performance’ of the HCS, which will be discussed in more detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
The idea that the HCS in not only about physiological health goes originally back to 
Newhouse (1977), who argued that advanced societies invest a large share of their higher 
health care spending in buying more ‘caring’. The idea was elaborated by Mooney (1998), 
who argued that a HCS produces health outcomes, but also ‘beyond-health outcomes’. 
Outputs which, while being produced by the HCS are not actually health services, and, while 
having no impact on health status, have an utility for which people are willing to pay for.  
 
34 As people get richer, there is change in what they expect from the HCS and whether a HCS which is 
delivering efficient restoration of biological health is sufficient to make people satisfied. As for the reasons of 
this value change, i.e. the increasing relevance of soft performance aspects of the HCS, I would argue that the 
basic psychological mechanism is identical to the change in political values, where Inglehart (1977) found an 
equivalent shift from materialist (physical security and wellbeing) to post-materialist values (self-expression and 
political involvement). For the very reason that a high health status and the restoration of biological health are 
achieved by the HCS (or by other means) to a high degree, this is taken for granted and no longer relevant for the 
evaluation of the HCS. 
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Examples of such beyond-health outputs are for instance information, e.g. diagnostics, the 
definite knowledge that one is ill or healthy, even independent of whether something can be 
done about it; anxiety reduction, e.g. the assurance that the embryo is definitely well even 
though there was no indication of problems in the first place; communication, e.g. the 
elaborated explanation of the reasons and mechanisms underlying an illness, which also has 
the effect that the patient can change his behavior to ameliorate his condition. The border to 
health output is blurred since there are whole sectors of the HCS, e.g. dental care, which do 
not influence life expectancy.  
Further, Mooney emphasizes that utility arises also from the process by which health is 
created. This process utility is independent from the outcome of a medical treatment. 
Biological health can be restored by medical personnel which is rude, does not pay any 
respect to the patient, his wishes and dignity, treating him more or less like mechanical object 
that is damaged in a certain way and in need of repair. While this might not affect the 
biological outcome of the treatment, people might be nevertheless be willing to pay for being 
treated in a respectful way. Another aspect of beyond-health output is responsiveness, e.g. the 
responsiveness of the HCS to the patient’s wishes and the role the patient has in the medical 
decision making process. The patient can be treated like an object – or be involved in the 
decision making process by providing information for an informed choice. The implication of 
responsiveness for costs and outcomes become very obvious if one looks at the patients’ 
wishes for the type of therapy and intervention used. The medical personnel might confront 
the patient with the most (cost-)efficient therapy on a “take it or leave it”-basis. The patient 
however might prefer a more convenient, albeit more expensive and/or less effective therapy. 
As Donaldson and Shackley (1997) argue, patients might be willing to pay for the usage of 
less invasive surgery methods or pharmaceuticals as an alternative. To be customer oriented 
and responsive to the patient’s wishes might easily increase the costs substantially without 
increasing health outcome.  
 
The reason to include soft performance in the analysis of HCS performance is that substantial 
resources are devoted to it, because citizens demand these outputs from the HCS. While the 
production of beyond-health sometimes seen as a questionable task of a HCS, it is, as 
Donaldson/Shackley (1997: 700) put it, ‘not for health care analysts to place restrictions on 
what enters people’s utility functions’. If people want more of a different kind of services and 
are also willing to pay for this – and some of the willingness to pay studies reviewed by 
 138
Olsen/Smith (2001) indicate that they are35 – the HCS should and will deliver this. Elections 
or competition will ensure that the HCS will do so, at least in the long run: In a state-operated 
HCS the electoral competition will serve as a instrument to adapt the HCS to the citizens’ 
preferences. If the HCS has market elements, such as competition among insurance funds or 
suppliers of medical service, this competition will equally lead to an adaptation of the HCS. 
 
Table 9.2: Determinants of Health System Responsiveness  
 
 All WHO members OECD countries only   
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4  
GDP 1.134 1.115 0.99 1.001  
 29.51 25.9 14.57 16.41  
PublicHCE  0.002  -0.004  
  1.11  -1.68  
constant 4.523 4.423 4.788 5.09  
 96.38 41.96 41.82 25.54  
N 158 158 30 30  
R2 0.81 0.82 0.93 0.94  
 
Remark 
Entries are b and t-values 
Dependent Variable 
Health System Responsiveness WHO (2000 Annex 6; Estimates for 1999) 
Independent Variables  
GDP GDP per capita, value of 1995, 1996, or 1997 in 10000 $  
HCE Public expenditure as % of total health expenditure, WHO (2000) 
 
The left section of table 9.2 gives a short analysis of what determines the level of HCS 
responsiveness among all WHO member states. Just like it was argued by Newhouse (1977) 
“caring”, or in other words, responsiveness of the HCS is largely a luxury phenomenon. As 
societies get richer, more resources are invested in the responsiveness: GDP is by far the 
strongest determinant. Another hypothesis would be that in particular for “luxury elements of 
                                                 
35 Olsen and Smith (2001) differentiate three kinds of benefits produced by the HCS: health outcomes, beyond-
health outcomes and non-use values, i.e. the provision of health care infrastructure. In their extensive review on 
the literature on the willingness to pay for various services and products provided by the HCS, they find 
evidence of willingness to pay for each of these categories. 
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health care” it matters, to what degree health care is paid for from the “common pool”. The 
hypothesis would be that if the costs of medical consumption and consumption of beyond 
health outputs are spread among all members of society, the consumption of the good, in 
particular of an immaterial and arguably “unnecessary” product as responsiveness, is higher. 
Each individual consumer receives the full benefit of the consumption while having to pay 
only a fraction of the costs, respectively the consumption is not reflected in the contributions 
the consumer has to bear. However, including the share of public expenditure indicates that 
the “dissipation effect” does not matter in terms of explanatory power.  
There is no difference in the mechanisms between the overall WHO sample and the OECD 
sample, albeit of course the levels of responsiveness are much higher among the latter cases. 
As I will argue later on in the section on HCS change and reform, satisfaction is supposedly a 
crucial indicator also for the pressure for reforms. Given the strong impact of soft 
performance on satisfaction, one has to include the production of this type of output as well, 
in order to make a statement why citizens are dissatisfied or satisfied.  
 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction with the HCS is an important output, because the HCS in a democratic society – 
and all countries in the present study are democracies – will in the long run reflect the 
preferences of the citizens. A central reason why HCS are reformed is that given that the 
production of health alone is not sufficient to satisfy people, I will also include measures of 
satisfaction as an soft performance indicator; see Sitzia/Wood (1997), Mossialos (1997) and 
Kohl/Wendt (2004) for the determinants and the relevance of satisfaction with health care. 
The standard indicator is the percentage of people satisfied with the HCS, see Blendon et al. 
(1990) and Blendon/Kim et al. (2001) for international comparison of these values. 
 
Coverage 
An output of the HCS, which is but seldom included into the output measurement of a HCS is 
coverage. Ceteris paribus, a HCS, which provides health services for all citizens is more 
achieving than a HCS which only supplies services to a limited number of citizens. A HCS 
can increase the average life expectancy or health status of the population in two ways. First, 
by intensifying the treatment of those with access to health care. Second by extending the 
coverage to groups having currently no access. Like the production of beyond-health outputs, 
the extension of coverage creates costs, and the decision to engage in extension of coverage is 
primarily a political one. Coverage has two aspects: who is covered, and what services are 
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covered. Historically, there was a strong trend to increase coverage in both regards, first by 
extending the coverage of citizens, later by extending the coverage of services. Now, there 
seems to be a reverse trend, viz. to transfer services from public coverage to private coverage, 
reducing coverage of services. The typical example is dental care, which is in many countries 
in the study now a private affair: in many countries, citizens have to buy a supplementary 
insurance, to cover the complete dental care or at least the substantial co-payments arising 
from dentures. Among the industrialized countries, the coverage is uniformly high, the only 
exemption is the US, which are not covered in the present study.  
Coverage has also an impact on efficiency, when the latter is measured as an input/output-
ratio. Assume that there are two groups in the country, one with access, the other without 
access to the HCS. Intensifying the treatment given to the first will at one point in time reach 
diminishing returns, lowering the efficiency of the HCS; see section 9.4. below. Extending 
coverage to the second group will yield larger returns in terms of health status, and the 
efficiency of the HCS will be higher.  
 
Quality of Health Care 
Another element of “hard performance” is quality of health care. There are many definitions 
of quality in health care, see e.g. the review in Harteloh (2003). Interestingly, many of them 
concern the question of the overall achievement of the HCS, i.e. whether it achieves the 
maximum of what medically possible. I would argue, that quality is something different than 
the quantity of what is produced and rather concerns how care is delivered. In particular, 
quality concerns aspects such as the diligence with which the services are provided: whether 
the physician invests much or little time in the analysis and interpretation of a diagnostic test 
to avoid mistakes and does a good job in this; whether the surgeon makes avoidable mistakes; 
whether a laboratory conducts tests in way that mistakes like false-negative of false-positive 
results occur only to the degree that is technically unavoidable. Albeit quality and differences 
in quality are an objective, hard fact with relevance for an international comparison, there is 
no available international level data on this question. There is neither an ascertained set of 
indicators for quality, no data on these indicators. Up to now, there are only efforts; see 
Mattke (2004) and Mattke et al. (2006) for efforts at OECD level. Even with regard to the 
most immediate quality indicator, medical maltreatment, some countries report medical 
failures and maltreatment, others don’t. 
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A further and general problem of outcome measurement, in particular quality but also more 
obvious outcome indicators, like the number of services performed, arises from the 
availability of data. As Smith (2002) argues, the researcher is to a high degree dependent on 
data delivered by the actors in the HCS – and there is no guarantee, that this data is correct. 
For this rather pragmatic reason, the present study has to renounce on using quality indicators 
as aspects of output. 
 
 
9.1.2. Health System Inputs 
The complementary aspect of HCS efficiency is the input used to produce the output. Just as 
in any other production, the two production factors are capital and labor.  
Money 
As an introductory remark, it hat to be acknowledged that despite the slightly negative 
connotations of “expenditure” and “consumption”, one has to see health care expenditure also 
as an investment, which yields returns; see Sachs (2001), Aaron (2003) and Kotzian (2006). 
The issue is not the level of investment, but what the HCS achieves in exchange.  
One of the simplest measure of input is HCE per capita. However, also here several problems 
arise, associated with measurement and also with the meaning of the level of consumption, 
two of which I will treat in some more detail.  
Health care has to some degree economies of scale, which lowers the costs per capita if there 
are more citizens in the country. Take for instance a laboratory employing a device which has 
the capacity to conduct the number of tests which occur on average for a population of two 
million citizens. However, if the country, like Luxembourg, has less than that number of 
citizens, a share of the capacity kept available permanently will be unused, and the price per 
usage episode is higher. A country with more citizens will use the scale economies to its full 
extent. A country may for the reason of its size be more efficient than a smaller country. 
Albeit in most studies on health system efficiency the size of countries included varies from 
Luxembourg to the US, this factor is almost never taken into account. 
Another problematic aspect of cost measurement are relative prices, in particular wages. 
Usually expenditure for health care, HCE, is standardized using purchasing power parities; 
typically the PPP$ provided by the OECD Health Data. But, as Anderson et al. (2003) argue, 
the wage levels in the medical sector may be comparatively higher in one country compared 
to another one: people working in the health sector of country A may, for whatever reason, 
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simply earn higher wages relative to employees in other sectors of the economy than in 
country B. Since health care provision is labor intensive, this makes health care more 
expensive. So while more HCE is spent in country A, this does not mean that more resources 
(manpower, medicines) are consumed. The higher HCE may result from the fact that these 
resources are more expensive. Indeed Bhat (2005: 216) found just this for the US: the 
American HCS is not using higher quantities of input – technology or manpower – to produce 
it’s health level. But the prices for medical products and in particular the costs of medical staff 
are highest in his sample of OECD countries. Just correcting for the PPP as calculated for the 
whole economy of a country might not compensate for this effect of higher price levels in the 
health sector; see Gerdtham/Jönsson (1991), Berndt et al. (1998), Newhouse (2001) and 
Anderson et al. (2003), for a discussion of the problem of measuring prices over time and 
across countries.  
 
Manpower 
In some countries, the HCS is employing a substantial share of the country’s labor force. The 
share of employment in the health sector varies substantially, and so does the composition of 
the medical labor force. Some countries make extensive use of trained nurses, who can do a 
substantial share of the work arising during medical treatment at lower wages than fully 
trained doctors without loss of quality. While data on the usage of overall manpower 
employed in the HCS would constitute a second input factor, the statistical data is available 
for few countries only and much more heterogeneous in compilation than HCE.  
 
9.2. Indicators of Health System “Performance”: Input and Achievement Levels 
Based on the classes of outputs and inputs of HCS, the empirical indicators discussed in the 
previous section, this section will describe the indicators actually used in the empirical 
application to capture current levels of HCS performance: the inputs consumed, and the 
achievement in various health outputs.  
a) Input to the Health System: Expenditure for Health Care  
The typical measure of input is health care expenditure, HCE, since in the end, everything, 
from manpower to medical devices, has to be paid for. Overall HCE is an indicator with clear 
advantages, but also with problems. 
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The first advantage is the availability of the information in a directly comparable form (PPP 
adjusted US$). Second, HCE is also a highly relevant information which guides and 
stimulates health policy. Comparisons of institutional settings look for effects on resource 
consumption and institutional changes are motivated by the same criterion.  
The problems begin when HCE is interpreted per se and in isolation of output. HCE is often 
seen as an indicator of how the HCS works in terms of efficiency. But HCE as it is cannot be 
interpreted in these terms. For instance, the HCS uses resources productive (to generate 
outputs) but also for its own operation, i.e. basically unproductive. The issue of resources 
consumed by the HCS for its own operation is relevant from the perspective of efficiency 
improvements, while the level of output produced is not actually a question of efficiency; see 
section 9.4. below.  
From the viewpoint of the theoretical approach used, HCE levels are of interest because they 
are affected by the organizational design in many ways. Most statements and predictions of 
the delegation approach refer to HCE: how much resources are likely to be extracted by the 
actors in the HCS as a “rent”, i.e. by definition without effect on the health status. The typical 
examples are administrative costs and organizational slack. The figure capturing this aspect in 
an immediate way is however not HCE, but the level of administrative expenditure in the 
HCS, a figure which is available for only a small minority of cases. The delegation approach 
also makes statements about how many services are provided as a response to the incentive to 
oversupply services. But to cover this aspect, one would also need information on whether the 
service was necessary or not, an information which is also not available. Nevertheless, all 
these mechanisms affect to some degree the overall level of HCE.  
 
In addition to the level of overall HCE, the study will look at the dynamics and the 
composition of HCE, because this captures another, complementary information.  
A HCS might currently consume only few resource, which is acceptable, but still the 
dynamics of expenditure growth might be already out of hand. It might also be the case, that 
while the public expenditure for the HCS, in absolute figures, is under control, the resource 
consumption of the HCS as a whole is not, and as a result, the share of private funding for 
health care increases substantially, covering the additional demand of financial input; see 
Scheil-Adlung (1998). Regarding the composition of HCE, the share of private funding and 
the development of the share of private funding were included. 
From the perspective of “practical” health policy and health policy makers, the absolute level 
of HCE as well as the increase of HCE in percent are the most visible figures, and indeed they 
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are the figures most often heard in the political debate about health care financing. But they 
may not actually capture whether the financial development of the HCS is a problem or not. 
To cover this, I included the change in the HCE relative to the overall economic development, 
i.e. the change in HCE relative to the change in GDP. The argument is that a constant share of 
GDP spent for the consumption of health care is justifiable, also because the level of wages in 
the health sector is coupled to the overall economic development. If the growth of HCE is out 
of proportion, the pressure to bring it back in line are higher because less income is available 
for other political aims. 
 
b) Hard Performance of the HCS: Gross Health Outcomes 
The HCS is primarily about the production of health. To measure hard performance, i.e. 
health outcomes of a HCS, I use the two complementary aspects: first, what the HCS is 
actively producing, second, what the HCS is avoiding or rather is failing to avoid.  
 
Life expectancy - either in its pure form or adjusted for quality and disabilities, life 
expectancy is the standard indicator of health status. As stated above, it is heavily influenced 
by life style and the overall living conditions in a country, and has to be seen as a gross 
indicator: influenced by the HCS, but not reflecting the achievement of the HCS in a 
deterministic way. I used life expectancy at birth for both sexes.   
Infant mortality - the choice this indicator is based on the idea, that it closer to the concept of 
mortality amenable to health care as used by Nolte/McKee (2003), than the life expectancy. It 
might also be influenced by the parents life style, but less so than the life expectancy of a 
person. Life style will exercise its influence in the long run, while the infant mortality is more 
based on the crucial after birth period, i.e. it counts the number of infants dying in the first 
year after birth per 1000 of life births. The baseline prediction is, that while child deaths occur 
for unknown reasons, like the phenomena of the ‘instant child death’, a newborn which is 
born alive, is to be expected to survive.  
Potential Years of Life Lost - the number of life years lost is another indicator of health 
output provided by the HCS. The basic argument of this indicator takes into account the 
problem that life expectancy is not attributable to the HCS in a deterministic way, but is 
influenced by many other factors outside of the HCS. While the HCS is not the only reason 
why people live as long as they do, it is responsible to avoid that people die of certain 
illnesses. If such a death occurs, the HCS has failed. But just as with life expectancy, life 
years lost is too broad a measure to capture the HCS’ achievement; see the description of 
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health output given above and in particular the arguments underlying the mortality amenable 
to health care argument in Nolte/McKee (2003) and Newey et al. (2004). Furthermore, there 
is a serious shortage of comparable data. Prepared data is available, e.g. in Nolte/McKee 
(2003, 2004) or Newey et al. (2004), but not for all cases included in this study. While it is in 
principle possible to calculate the measures based on classified mortality data provided by the 
WHO’s Health For All database, this would require medical knowledge. For pragmatic 
reasons, I have constructed a similar indicator using OECD data on life years lost. The 
OECD’s definition of this indicator as given in the OECD Health Database is conceptually 
close to the idea of avoidable mortality: ‘Potential Years of Life Lost is a summary measure 
of premature mortality which provides an explicit way of weighting deaths occurring at 
younger ages, which are, a priori, preventable. The calculation of PYLL involves summing up 
deaths occurring at each age and multiplying this with the number of remaining years to live 
up to a selected age limit’; OECD (2005). In the OECD Health Data, this age limit is 70 years 
of age. For instance, if a citizen aged 65 dies due to a preventable cause, five years of life are 
counted as lost. With the age limit of 70 years, the calculation is on the conservative side, 
because the average life expectancy in the OECD countries is actually above that. In its raw 
form, the indicator is problematic because it also contains all years of life lost due to factors 
which are beyond the reach of even the best HCS. These “external causes” encompass things 
like suicide, murder or traffic accidents. So, the total number of life years lost was adjusted by 
subtracting from it the number of life years lost due to external causes. The adjusted indicator, 
net number of life years lost, LifeLostNet, is a more valid indicator of the achievements the 
HCS fails to deliver. 
 
 
c) Soft performance of the HCS: production of beyond-health-outcomes 
As argued above, citizens expect and demand services from the HCS in addition to those 
services aiming at restoring health in a biological sense. I use the responsiveness indicator 
provided by the WHO as a proxy of the explicit production of beyond-health outcomes and 
process utility. The indicator, calculated for the year 1997, captures the degree to which a 
HCS actually provides beyond-health output and process utility. These outputs are 
operationalized by elements like patient autonomy, prompt attention, access to societal 
support networks for patients but also explicitly ‘client orientation’ and the quality of the 
amenities, e.g. the accommodation standard in hospitals. The indicator is a weighted index, 
encompassing seven dimensions, each in turn covered by several questionnaire-items, which 
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where evaluated based on a survey of country experts; see Annex 6 in WHO (2000) and De 
Silva/Valentine (2000) and Valentine et al. (2000) for a detailed description of the survey and 
index construction.  
Apart from the fact that this approach of evaluating HCS responsiveness was highly criticized 
for its subjectivity and other reasons – see e.g. Blendon/Kim et al. (2001) and Williams 
(2001) – the main problem associated with application is, that the responsiveness 
measurement is based on a one-time survey, with no comparable follow up survey. Given that 
HCS change over time, also with regard to the responsiveness, the measure cannot be 
extrapolated. Extrapolation would mean to extrapolate under the assumption that the current 
structure of the HCS was unchanged, which is not the case. The analysis of the effects of 
institutional features on responsiveness will be constrained to the first point in time.  
 
 
d) Further Performance Indicators: Quality 
In addition to the indicators discussed above, there are further achievement indicators of the 
HCS which could be used. A first one would be quality. Quality shall refer to the question, 
whether the HCS does its job diligent or sloppy. Quality is not about the question of whether 
the HCS does everything that is possible. Whether everything what is theoretically possible is 
done is a question of the funds available, which is something beyond the control of the 
persons working in the HCS. But whether the staff in the HCS does its job careful or not 
within the limits set by the budget, that is something that the staff can control: while the 
question, whether a certain diagnostic test is available or can be paid for or not is beyond the 
control of the physician, a physician may invest much or little effort in analyzing the results of 
a diagnostic test. Potential indicators for quality defined in this way would be the frequency of 
errors in medical and diagnostic tests. For instance, a certain diagnostic test is conducted, e.g. 
by a free lance laboratory, and is later on interpreted by the doctor. Both, the laboratory by 
conducting the test and the doctor interpreting the test’s results can make mistakes, 
interpreting the result in the wrong way, etc. Quality in my definition concerns the avoidance 
of such failures and mistakes. While it would be of interest, because it covers an aspect which 
is conceptually and empirically independent of “quantity”, there is no comprehensive 
information on the occurrence o this type of mistakes.  
Consequentially, I focus on another, albeit related issue. A quality indicator is the occurrence 
of medical maltreatment and the life years lost due to this: if the medical provider conducts 
his job in a sufficiently careful way, failures should not occur. If they do, something went 
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wrong which could have been avoided if due care was applied. In particular the issue of 
providers increasing their income by providing more service in the same period of time, i.e. 
with less time invested in each service episode, will have an impact on quality. And quality in 
turn will impact on the occurrence and frequency of fatal mistakes during medical 
maltreatment, for which there is data in the OECD Health Data. The empirical indicator used 
is mortality due to ‘Misadventure to patients during surgical/medical care’ measured 
standardized as deaths per 100,000 of overall population; see OECD (2005). The indicator, 
labeled further on as medical fatalities, MedFatalities, in particular refers to the quality of 
hospital care, because it measures deaths which are occurring most often during in patient 
care.  
 
Table 9.3 below gives a short definition and the sources of the achievement indicators used in 
the empirical section.  
 
Table 9.3: Indicators of Health System Performance 
 
Variable Label Variable Content, Measurement Unit and Source 
Input of the Health System 
HCE 
Total expenditure on health per capita in 1995 and 2004, in US$ PPP; 
OECD Health Data; OECD (2005) 
dTHCE_abs 
Change in Total HCE per capita 93/97 and 02/05; absolute in $PPP; 
OECD Health Data; OECD (2005) 
dTHCE_per 
Percentage Change in Total HCE per capita 93/97 and 02/05; OECD 
Health Data; OECD (2005) 
dTHCE_rel 
Change in Total HCE relative to change in GDP for 93/97 and 02/05; 
OECD Health Data; OECD (2005) 
PrivateHCE 
Private Expenditure on health in percent of Total Expenditure for 
Health; OECD (2005) 
dPrivHCE_per 
Growth of Private HCE during the years 1990/5 and 2000/4 in 
Percent; OECD (2005)  
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Table 9.3: Indicators of Health System Performance (continued) 
 
Variable Label Variable Content, Measurement Unit and Source 
  
Health Outputs 
LifeExpTotal 
LifeExpectancy of the total population at birth - in Years; OECD 
Health Data; OECD (2005) 
InfMortality 
Infant mortality - Deaths per 1000 live births; OECD Health Data; 
OECD (2005) 
LifeLostNet  
LifeYearsLost defined as Potential years of life lost (All Causes - 
External Causes); based on OECD Health Data; OECD (2005) 
MedFatalities 
 
Potential Years of Life lost due Misadventures of Patients during 
medical care per 100000 pop., years <70; OECD Health Data; OECD 
(2005) 
  
Beyond Health Outputs (for 1995 only) 
RespIndex 
Responsiveness of the HCS; World Health Report, Range from 0 to 
10; 10 indicates maximum Responsiveness; (WHO 2000) 
Satis 
Percent Citizens satisfied with HCS  ( as % of all Citizens ); Data from 
Blendon et al. (2001: table 1) 
  
Efficiency of the Health System (for 1995 only) 
WHO 
 
“Health System Efficiency and Performance” Index based on DALE 
production; WHO (2000); values are for 1997. The scale ranges from 
0 to 1; where 1 indicates maximum efficiency of DALE production 
Remark  
If not stated otherwise, the data covers the years 1995 and 2004 
 
 
9.3. Health System Efficiency and Efficiency Measurement  
While the above indicators cover the levels of health system achievement, the next question 
is, how efficient these levels are reached. To measure efficiency of a productive system, 
several approaches exist. All of them share the basic concept of efficiency as a relationship 
among input invested and output achieved, but differ with regard to how the construct this 
relationship.  
For the reason of presentation I distinguish among approaches measuring the efficiency of 
medical measures, and those measuring the overall efficiency of HCS in various countries. 
The approaches to measure cost-benefit-efficiency of several medical interventions are a 
typical application of efficiency measurement in health care. Cross country comparisons of 
efficiency often use statistical methods developed in econometrics, in order to measure the 
productive efficiency of firms or economic sectors etc. 
 
 149
a) Efficiency of Medical Interventions 
A HCS may become efficient, either by producing all of its interventions at lower costs, or by 
producing only those interventions which have the largest impact at the lowest costs.  
A prominent example of a study analyzing “efficiency” this way, in particular the question of 
health outcome achievable by investing a fixed budget in a defined medical intervention in 
one country, are the studies by Tengs et al. (1995) and Tengs (1997). Tengs et al. focus on the 
question of how much life years are gained by a certain medical intervention and at what 
costs. Combined, the efficiency indicator for a medical intervention is the cost per life year 
gained by this intervention. This measure varies substantially among medical (but also 
political) interventions, ranging from rather cheap, political measures with a price of one $ per 
life year gained to 158.000$, for heart transplants. Tengs et al argue that health policy should 
be more oriented on this measure, since it gains more life years than any other criterion. The 
idea of using costs per life year gained was also underlying the Oregon rationing approach; 
see Brown (1991) and Fox/Leichter (1991) and is a decision criterion in several European 
HCS, see Garber (2004) and Buxton (2005).  
The relationship of this micro level efficiency to overall HCS efficiency is quite obvious: if 
the HCS produces only those measures, which are efficient in the “cost per life year gained” 
sense, overall efficiency will be high. If the HCS produces many services which have, for 
biological reasons, only a limited impact on health status, overall efficiency will be quite low.  
The costs of a defined medical service or a kind of average cost of services would be 
interesting data for international efficiency comparisons: how expensive is a defined medical 
services, e.g. a standard intervention, in one country as compared to another one? However, 
these approaches are requiring very detailed information, making them not usable for a cross-
country comparison.  
 
b) Efficiency of the Overall Health System 
looking at the efficiency at the system level, one has to use other strategies. While yielding an 
estimate of efficiency, these techniques do not pin down what exactly causes this efficiency. 
The basic idea of HCS efficiency measurement on a cross-country basis goes back to Farrell 
(1957), and was most clearly proposed by Grubaugh/Santerre (1994). It proceeds as follows: 
one chooses one indicator of HCS performance, either output related, input related or both, as 
a dependent variable. For a sample of countries, usually at various points in time, this 
outcome variable is regressed on factors which are of potential relevance for the outcome 
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variable, but not related to the HCS structure36. For instance Grubaugh/Santerre regress infant 
mortality on various socioeconomic (income and education), and general environmental 
factors such as population density, female labor force participation, time as a proxy for 
technological development and life style (tobacco and alcohol consumption). But they also 
use country dummies as overall proxies for the non-observable features of the country, but 
also, and this is the actually interesting component, features of the HCS in this particular 
country. The resulting coefficients and regression equations can be used in several ways. In 
their original study, Grubaugh and Santerre use the resulting regression equations without the 
country dummies as a proxy for the ‘average’ OECD country – viz. the country which is the 
reference category. By inserting the values of the US in the regression equation and 
comparing the predicted value of the dependent variable with the actual value of the US, they 
obtain an estimate of what outcome level the US would have, if it had the HCS of the average 
OECD country. In a second comparison, they also use the country dummy obtained for a 
certain country but in combination with the values of the US for the other independent 
variables to obtain the estimated value of the dependent variable the US would have, if it had 
the HCS of this particular country. Both results are then compared to what the US is currently 
achieving.  
Another use of the obtained regression equation is to take the case which is the best for a 
constellation of variables, i.e. has the best health outcome, as a benchmark, and compare, 
where other countries are positioned relative to this benchmark. This is the basic idea 
underlying the two following approaches. 
 
Productivity Frontier Approaches 
This approach of efficiency measurement analyses the productive efficiency by estimating 
productivity frontiers: given the input, a perfectly efficient system – like a firm or a HCS – 
can produce a certain outcome level, which is more or less what is currently possible. In firms 
but also in health care, this level is determined by the available knowledge and technology. As 
systems differ with regard to their efficiency, they differ with regard to what they actually 
achieve with the input they use: an inefficient system will with equal input produce less 
output than an efficient one. The efficient one is on or close to the productivity frontier, while 
the inefficient one is below, i.e. efficiency is defined as closeness to the productivity frontier. 
 
36 This is to take into account the substantial effect of factors outside of the HCS, see the above section on 
determinants of health status. 
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Figure 9.1 below illustrates the idea of the productivity frontier by plotting life expectancy on 
HCE, both taken from the 2000 edition of the World Health Report. The included smoother 
line indicates the productivity frontier. The distances of the cases to the frontier are assumed 
to be a mixture of systematic inefficiency and random factors. Cases might for random 
reasons scatter around the productivity frontier. For instance, a country’s HCE might be 
higher and its outcome lower in one year due to a local epidemic. But there is also a 
systematic component in the distance, e.g. cases very far below the frontier are inefficient, in 
the sense that they are significantly underachieving given their input consumption, compared 
to the “average” respectively the “benchmark”. Assume for instance, that in one HCS, the 
purchasers can extract a substantial share of the health budget for internal “on the job 
consumption”. In a productivity analysis, like the one illustrated in figure 9.1., the overall 
HCE determines the country’s position on the horizontal axis. But since not all money 
counted as HCE is actually spend to produce health, the output level will be lower, and thus 
the country will be below the productivity frontier. 
While it is clear how certain problems in the HCS will show up in an analysis like figure 9.1, 
the inverse inference from the position to the problems is not possible. The focus of the 
productivity frontier analysis is, just as in the model of Grubaugh/Santerre (1994), on the 
distance to the production frontier. If the country is below the frontier, it is inefficient, but one 
cannot tell why.  
 Figure 9.1: Life expectancy and the diminishing returns of health care expenditure 
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The technical implementation of the approach is quite straightforward. While 
Grubaugh/Santerre use a country dummy to capture the country specific contribution to the 
output level, the productivity frontier approach estimates a country specific intercept. In the 
end, both attribute the output level to country specific features.  
The statistical methods to estimate efficiency based on productivity frontiers are manifold, 
each approach has its advantages and disadvantages; see Farrell (1957), Schmidt/Sickles 
(1984), Cornwell et al. (1990) and Dorfman/Koop (2005) for the underlying statistical 
methods, and Evans et al. (2000b), Hollingsworth/Wildman (2003) and Greene (2004) for a 
more detailed discussion of several methods in their application to HCS efficiency 
measurement. For instance, one can draw a productivity frontier in a way that all cases are 
either on or below the frontier, i.e. one chooses a deterministic approach. Or one can draw the 
frontier in a way that the expected value for the output variable given the input is on the 
frontier, while the actual output value of a case might, for random reasons, be above or below 
this stochastic frontier. By imposing assumptions on the ratio of the systematic and the 
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random component of the distance to the frontier, one can estimate the systematic component 
of the distance. 
As for the estimation of the productivity frontier, one can use OLS based regressions, panel 
regressions or cross-sectional regressions. The WHO efficiency estimation, see Evans et al. 
(2000b) for a detailed presentation, uses a fixed-effect panel approach. By using – where 
available – information on several points in time for a set of countries it is possible to 
distinguish the real inefficiency, i.e. the country specific intercept, from random fluctuations, 
which occur, but tend to offset each other if one has several points in time; see the argument 
in Schmidt/Sickles (1984). The obtained estimate will be the less influenced by random 
effects the higher the number of points in time. As an additional modification, Hollingsworth 
and Wildman (2003), following the approach by Cornwell, allow the intercept to vary over 
time, a method which is able to capture changes in efficiency. Statistical implementations of 
this approach, like the frontier routine in STATA, estimate the weights of different production 
factors in a production function, which describes the productivity frontier, in particular its 
shape. They also estimate the inefficiency of each case, i.e. the distance to the productivity 
frontier. 
 
Data Envelop Analysis Approaches 
The principle of Data Envelop Analysis, DEA, is also based on the productivity frontier 
approach. The idea is to set what a certain country can achieve with the inputs as a benchmark 
for the other countries. One can use two equivalent approaches.  
The input-oriented approach minimizes the inputs holding the output constant, and the 
resulting score is a measure of how much the input could be reduced while achieving the 
same outcome level. The complementary output-oriented approach estimates, how much more 
output could be produced, given the input level. For health policy the implications are 
twofold, depending on the political decisions made: either keeping the output level, but 
reducing the resources required to produce it, or to abide by the chosen input level (e.g. HCE), 
and to increase what the HCS achieved with this; see Charnes et al. (1994) for the method, 
Retzlaff-Roberts et al. (2004) and Bhat (2005) for illustrative applications to OECD countries.  
The advantage of the DEA is, that one can use several outcomes simultaneously, and can take 
into account environmental restrictions which are not under political control, e.g. health 
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related behavior37. A practical problem of the DEA method is, that in a setting of only few 
cases, many countries are efficient, differing simultaneously in input and output. For instance 
a country produces little outcome with little input, while another one produces much output 
with much input. Both are efficient and obtain the same DEA score of 1.  
 
9.4. Problems of Health System Efficiency Measurement 
In this section I will elaborate on several conceptual problems associated with these 
approaches to the measurement of health system efficiency.  
 
9.4.1. Types of Outputs and Types of Health System Efficiency  
The list of health system outputs enumerated in section 9.1. shows that the HCS produces 
quite a variety of outputs. Producing any of these outcomes creates costs and hence the degree 
to which the HCS is efficient has to be evaluated with regard to what the HCS is actually 
producing.  
Acknowledging that money is spend for other things than biological health, it is quite clear 
that using only “hard” performance, i.e. biological indicators, as indicators of outcome may 
bias the evaluation substantially. But oftentimes, studies estimating HCS efficiency as an 
input/output-ratio do not take into account all outputs a HCS produces. While the HCS uses 
part of the resources to produce immaterial outputs like patient dignity or process utility, the 
approaches assume that all resources are used to produce health outcomes. While the former 
strongly influence the input/output-ratio, they have nothing to do with the efficiency of the 
HCS because they are the result of certain preferences. It is clear that if citizens want the HCS 
to produce these outputs and are moreover willing to devote money for the production, the 
HCS is not inefficient because it is producing this. To elaborate this problem, I will discuss 
the three types of efficiency, which are mixed up in the overall efficiency of a HCS. 
a) Technical Efficiency 
Technical efficiency refers to the question whether the given inputs – the combination of 
work force, medical equipment and funds – are used by the HCS to produce the maximum 
outcome possible with this input, see Retzlaff-Roberts et al. (2004), Evans et al. (2000b) for 
 
37 Factually, applications of the DEA approach like Retzlaff-Roberts et al. (2004) use only one output at a time, 
e.g. infant mortality or life expectancy. Both belong to the same type of output, namely health outcome. A 
different one, representing a beyond-health outcome would be responsiveness. 
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the concept of technical efficiency in its application to health. This efficiency is basically 
what the approaches presented earlier want to measure: is the HCS producing as much health 
as it could, given the resources allocated to the HCS? Organizational slack, the extraction of 
rents by actors who engage in opportunistic behavior, all this will reduce technical efficiency. 
Money is spent, but not for producing something. Instead, it is extracted by actors in the HCS 
as rents (usually in the form of income) or is required to operate and administrate the HCS as 
such. Looking at this type of efficiency from the perspective of the institutional economics, 
reducing the rents the agents can extract either as profit or as on the job consumption 
increases technical efficiency. Either less money is needed to produce the same output, or 
more output can be achieved using the same level of input. At the level of the individual 
medical service, the service is produced efficiently, if it is produced at the least possible costs.  
 
b) Allocative Efficiency: Choosing the Optimal Mix of Production Factors  
Apart from technical efficiency, there are other notions and concepts of efficiency circulating 
in the literature on health system efficiency. Allocative efficiency is used in two slightly 
different variants. I will discuss the first here, the next in the following paragraph.  
While technical efficiency estimation takes the currents combination of input factors as given, 
allocative efficiency evaluates whether it would make sense to substitute one production 
factor for another one, e.g. substitute one treatment by another one even if both treatments are 
produced perfectly efficient for a technical point of view; see Evans et al. (2000b: 4) for this 
definition of allocative efficiency. It might for instance be better to rely on more ambulatory 
care then in-patient care, even where both is possible and equally effective from the pure 
medical point of view. It might be better to employ more nurses than fully educated 
physicians, and to assign all jobs the nurses can do to the nurses and to avoid that the 
physicians have to do jobs for which they are overqualified and also overpaid. This aspect of 
allocative efficiency concerns whether the HCS uses the HCE available to purchase the best 
mix of production factors.  
 
c) Allocative Efficiency: Preferences for Types of Health Output 
Efficiency of a HCS understood as the ratio of costs and health output has an additional 
aspect: a HCS might provide a defined service efficient and at the least possible costs, but the 
service as such might be completely or mostly useless for creating biological health for one of 
the following three reasons: 1) It might not be the right therapy for the illness at hand. 2) Its 
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impact might be so marginal that there is no or almost no measurable effect on any health 
status indicator; see Skinner/Wennberg (1998).  3) It might be useless for health outcome, 
because the service does not at all aim at improving health but is by nature a beyond-health-
output.  
Allocative efficiency in this sense refers to what services are purchased: 1) Are resources 
allocated to services which have a very limited impact on health status? 2) Are resources 
allocated to services which do not even aim at having an impact on health status? 3) Are 
resources allocated to services, which have an impact on health but for biological reasons can 
improve the health status of the patient receiving the service only to a minimal degree? 
 
The answers to the three questions are determined by preferences, but will affect as how 
efficient or inefficient the HCS appears in an evaluation. The following three examples shall 
illustrate the meaning of the three questions.  
1) A first example is the usage of technology in particular of usage of technology without 
impact on health. A pronounced example for this are diagnostics. Some diagnostics are highly 
sophisticated and aim at increasing the security of a certain diagnosis, sometimes only 
marginally, like from being 90% secure to being 99% secure, but do so at very high costs. 
Another point is the diagnosis of illnesses that are currently non-treatable. Investing money in 
the diagnosis of such an illness will not have any immediate impact on health status38. 
Deciding to purchase a medical service which may have no secure effect on health is also a 
preference based decision which affects the efficiency of the HCS. Societies may differ 
regarding their attitude: some may decide to purchaser only medical services with a proven 
effect. Other societies might decide to purchase also those services, which might have a 
positive effect, but have no proven record of showing a defined effect. An example is, 
whether the society decides to have homeopathy covered by the HCS.  
2) The second example concerns the production of outputs which do not aim at improving 
health. A society’s preference for beyond-health-outputs influences the costs of the HCS. 
Producing beyond-health-outputs requires resources but does, by definition, not influence the 
biological health status. Looking at the ratio of resource input to health status-output of a 
HCS, a preference for beyond-health-outputs and a large production of these seemingly 
decreases the efficiency of the HCS measured as a HCE/health-status-ratio. Nevertheless, the 
HCS is not producing health inefficient nor is it as a whole inefficient. Instead it is producing 
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a type of output without impact on health measures. The HCS might appear to be inefficient, 
but it is nevertheless in accordance with the demands of the citizens. Thus, a comparison of 
HCS efficiency must pay attention to the question, how much and what health services are 
bought39.  
3) The third aspect of allocative efficiency concerns the diminishing returns of investments in 
health. In the public discussion, there exists the idea of a perfect health, see e.g. the definition 
of health in the WHO preamble. There is also the idea and the demand, that virtually 
everything that is medically possible must be done, independent from whether the effect is in 
any relation to its costs. It is also argued that costs may, for ethical reasons, not be a criterion 
in health care and medical ethics; see Mooney (1992: chap. 7) on efficiency problems in 
medical ethics. The core of the decision problem is whether the production of the additional 
live year is worth its price. The fact of the diminishing returns of investing additional 
financial resources in health care is well established. It can be illustrated best by plotting HCE 
per head by life expectancy, as was done in figure 9.1 above, and is reported in the literature; 
see Newhouse (1977), Newhouse (1992), Newhouse/Friedlander (1980), Pritchett/Summers 
(1996); WHO (2000: 43) or Self/Grabowski (2003): 844). At the level of the overall health 
expenditure, preferences and their impact on efficiency concern the question, whether and if 
so, where a society ‘draws the line’ beyond which the costs of the additionally produced 
health outweighs the benefits of the health produced. The decision can also take the form of 
setting a limit for the costs per life year for a certain medical intervention, however efficient 
produced, i.e. exclude medical interventions which costs per life year gained by this 
intervention is above a certain level. 
 
Many studies and debates in practical health policy on rationing and coverage of services 
implicitly are about this aspect of allocative efficiency. Is it an integral part of the HCS’ task 
to provide high accommodation standards in hospitals? Should the HCS’ catalogue cover 
medical treatments which have no established record of effectiveness? Given that health 
services differ substantially with regard to what they can achieve for medical and biological 
reasons and at what price, should the HCS, which is always operating under budget 
constraints cover them all, regardless? The problem becomes very obvious if the costs and 
38 But since the techniques for diagnosis and those for treatment usually arise from the same research, the 
payment for a diagnosis for an yet untreatable illness can be seen as subsidization of research, which may 
eventually lead to a cure and health outcome in the long run. 
39 This concept is related to some concepts of allocative efficiency, which focus on the question of whether the 
right amount of money is allocated to the HCS, but also on whether the benefit returned by a health service is 
higher than the costs. 
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benefits of different treatments are standardized like “costs of a life year gained”40; see the 
study by Tengs (1997). Should health services addressing health problems which are basically 
under the control of the individual in the sense that they result from individual behavior be 
covered from the “common pool”? In particular dental care, with a lower incidence of medical 
problems due to better oral hygiene, the fluoridation of tooth paste and drinking water, and 
factually no impact on life expectancy, confronts societies and governments with the question, 
whether organizing dental care shouldn’t be left to the individual and the market. Rationing is 
virulent, and from a cross national perspective, the definition of what constitutes an 
acceptable health state or what requires treatment may differ substantially. Both, the overall 
rationing and the decision what services to cover, are not abstract questions, but urgent issues, 
and the choices are an integral part of health policy making.  
 
9.4.2. The Conceptual Problem of Overall Efficiency 
To summarize, one can say that the society makes decisions, which seemingly affect the 
efficiency. To evaluate the HCS’ efficiency per se and independent from the preferences it has 
to serve, one must think about how to isolate the effect of the HCS’ actual efficiency from the 
effect of preferences.  
To do so, one would have to include preferences and all produced outputs in the analysis of 
the input/output ratio. A possible approach is illustrated in figure 9.2. 
 
40 A consequence of this is an efficiency bias in simple cost / life year based international efficiency comparisons 
in favor of developing countries: to cure someone suffering from a uncomplicated illness in a developing country 
so that this person will be able to work again and live on its own, is much cheaper than to make a citizen living 
in an industrialized country who is already in good health perfectly healthy, by identifying and healing the last 
ailment. 
 
Figure 9.2: Efficiency and the Effect of Preferences 
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The location of a HCS relative to the productivity frontier is influenced by three aspects:  
1) Technical efficiency, under which I for the sake of simplicity subsume also allocative 
efficiency as the choice of a certain combination of input factors in accordance to their 
productivity, is indicated by the vertical distance to the productivity frontier. An increase in 
technical efficiency is a movement towards the productivity frontier, i.e. upwards. Most 
clearly this is the case in which more health outcome is achieved using the same resources. 
Situations in which small increases in HCE correspond to large increases in outcome are 
equivalent. 
2) Societal preferences in the sense of how much health is bought in the setting of diminishing 
returns of health investment influence the HCS’ positioning along the productivity frontier, 
i.e. how much to the left or to the right a country positions itself: countries may for political 
reasons decide to produce much or little health. To accept that a life year is produced at a 
price which is high or low is also a political decision. In either way, HCS can produce health 
care in a technical efficient or inefficient way.  
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3) The production of beyond-health-output also concerns the vertical position of a country 
relative to the production frontier. If the society decides to invest additional resources in the 
production of beyond-health-output, it will move to the right but not upwards. It will appear 
as inefficient because its distance to the production frontier increases.  
Thus the actual measurement problem that would have to be solved is to distinguish a HCS 
which is truly inefficient from a HCS, which seems to be inefficient because it produces 
services irrelevant for health status, but are nevertheless expected and demanded by the 
population. If the evaluation is based on the  assumption that the HCS is only producing 
health, any production of beyond-health will be interpreted as inefficiency. Because wealthier 
countries are more likely to produce beyond-health outputs, they are also more likely to 
classify as inefficient.  
The WHO’s approach using a composite index as output, which captures production of life 
years (in DALE) and also the production of beyond-health outputs (such as responsiveness, 
fairness) is despite several shortcomings in the implementation a more valid approach than 
taking only one output, and will thus be used here as an efficiency indicator.  
Excursus: Implications for Health Policy 
Regarding the implications of this conceptual discussion for of health policy, the problem of 
identifying a truly efficient or a truly inefficient health system is a direct reflection of the 
antagonism between overall efficiency and responsiveness of HCS embedded in the setting of 
democratic political systems which are responsive to the citizens’ wishes. To express it in a 
more provocative way, a crucial problem in health politics arises from the contradictory 
preferences of the citizens who want at the same time perfect health, little spending, and a 
responsive HCS; see Weisbrod (1991) and Oliver (2007). As Dowie (2001): 247) argues, the 
production of one output, like process utility or other beyond-health outputs, goes necessarily 
at the expenses of another one, like health output. Resources used for one service or treatment 
cannot be used for another one. The reduction in the other output may remain unnoticed, but 
exists. However, citizens as patients nevertheless want both, a responsive HCS which 
effectively restores their health, and all that at low costs. Since they are also voters, the 
political system will create a HCS which is in line with their preferences in the long run. The 
same is also true in HCS which are more market based: they too will be oriented at the wishes 
of the customers. That is to say, a HCS might be an inconsistent thing, because the 
preferences of those who design it or whose preferences influence the HCS’ structure, are 
inconsistent. 
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Part V: Analysis 
 
The data collected in the course of this project is detailed, making it hard to get a concise 
overview of the complexity involved. The first step of the analysis is to reduce this 
complexity. This data reduction is done in order to describe the HCS in a more concise way, 
but also as a preparation of the causal analysis.  
When analyzing which of the independent institutional variables affect which dependent 
variable, the analysis is limited with regards to the number of independent variables which 
can be used. Given that the dataset covers only 22 countries and two points in time, an overall 
of 44 data points, this also constrains the number of independent variables to explain e.g. 
levels of HCE, even if no statistical inference is intended.  
When analyzing changes – occurrence, magnitude and direction – in the HCS’ institutional 
setting between the two points in time, the data availability limits the number of cases to the 
22 countries.  
Hence, I must combine numerous original variables to few latent dimensions, which will 
combine the information contained in several original variables. This will be done using 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as one of the most robust methods for data reduction. 
This description section will also look for similarities among HCS and for types of HCS by 
comparing where the HCS are located on the latent dimensions.  
 
The second, analytical step will then use this condensed information to look at relationships 
between independent institutional features of the HCS but also of the political environment, 
and the dependent variables, i.e. measures of achievement and efficiency. With regard to this 
causal analysis, it must be remarked that the cases analyzed are not a random sample drawn 
from a larger population on which an probabilistic inference is to be made. Instead, the cases 
are the population for which the data is given and for which I want to make statements. 
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10. Institutional Settings in Health Systems: Descriptive Analysis 
 
10.1. Latent Dimensions of Health Care Systems  
In this step I will look at sectors, issues and functions of the HCS, which are described in the 
dataset, e.g. the occupational status of different providers, the issue of choice, pharmaceutical 
sector etc. Using factor analysis /PCA, I will get a first description of the HCS, but also the 
condensed information which can be used in later on in a causal analysis of how the 
institutional setting affects the health system’s performance.  
 
Methodological Note: Data Reduction using Factor Analysis/Principal Component Analysis  
Factor analysis as well as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) are similar statistical 
procedures to compress the information contained in larger sets of directly observed variables; 
see Child (2006). Both use the correlation among many directly measured variables to extract 
few underlying “latent” dimensions, denoted factors or principal components, and to locate 
the cases on these latent dimensions. Throughout the remainder of the study, the term 
“factor/component” respectively “dimensions” will refer to the latent dimensions, while the 
term “variable” or “indicator” will refer to directly observable features.  
a) The number of extracted factors/components indicates how many latent dimensions are 
underlying a certain institutional aspect or sector of the HCS. For instance the provision of 
services has many different elements and aspects, e.g. how (by self-employed providers or 
employed staff) primary care, dental care, outpatient secondary care, inpatient secondary care 
and medicines are provided. But it might be that despite these many features, there is basically 
only one dimension underlying the way the provision of services is organized. This is the case 
if features are correlated, i.e. if one feature most often goes together with other features. 
Assume for the sake of illustration that there are only two basic types of HCS. In the first one, 
the provision of services is predominantly done by independent, self-employed providers. In 
the second one, it is predominantly done by providers who are employed and organizationally 
integrated into the public administration. There might be services in both types, which are not 
provided the way the majority of services is provided in this type of HCS (dental care is the 
typical example), but most services are provided the same way in each of both types. In such a 
situation, there is only one dimension underlying all the individual features describing how 
care is provided. Individual features are systematically correlated, and one can infer from how 
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one feature is organized on how other features are organized: If one knows that GPs are self-
employed, one can infer that so are dentists, pharmacists and providers of outpatient 
secondary care.  
If individual features occur independent from each other, they represent different latent 
dimensions. In this situation, one cannot infer from the occupational status of GPs on the 
occupational status of out-patients specialists and the like. The technical criterion for deciding 
on how many factors to include is the Eigenvalue of a factor/dimension, which should be 
larger than 1. Using the Eigenvalues one can also calculate the fraction of variance in the 
observed variables explained by the factor/dimension. But apart from this technical aspect, the 
loading pattern is of interest for the decision. If some variables are loading high on a 
dimension, which is by its content not of interest for the present study (e.g. quality of 
pharmaceuticals) it will be excluded from the analysis. The primary aim of this step in the 
analysis is to compress the information contained in the individual variables, in order obtain a 
number of latent dimensions which is as small as possible but yet appropriate.  
b) Once the number of latent dimensions is defined, the next task is to determine the content 
of the latent dimensions. Assigning a content, a substantive meaning to a latent dimension, is 
an interpretative step. The interpretation is based on the assignment of variables to the 
dimensions. The degree to which a certain variable is determined by a certain latent 
dimension is denoted as the loading of a variable on the factor. Technically, the loading is the 
correlation of a directly measured variable with a latent dimension. For interpreting the results 
and for assigning a content to a latent dimension, the loading pattern and the magnitude of the 
loadings are decisive. If a variable is loading with a high magnitude on a factor, irrespective 
of whether the loading is positive or negative, this variable is strongly determined by this 
latent factor. A variable is assigned to the factor on which the loading has the highest 
magnitude. The loading pattern shows which variables are going together, in the sense that 
they all are loading on a common latent dimension. The content of the various variables 
which are loading together on one factor, will indicate the content and the meaning of the 
latent dimension.   
c) Based on the loadings of the variables on the factors/principal components and the values a 
case has for a certain variable, the PCA yields the PCA scores. These scores are the value a 
case has on the latent dimension – i.e. it the score obtained for a case will show, where this 
case is located on that latent dimension. If the latent dimension captures “control of the 
purchaser over the provider”, the score of a case on this latent will indicate, whether the 
control of a purchaser in a given country is high or low. 
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Input Data and Implementation of the Data Reduction 
The factor analysis as well as PCA use the correlation matrix of the observed variables as 
input data. Pearson’s correlation, the standard method to generate the correlation matrices, 
assumes all variables to be metric. Given that the data used here is dichotomous, capturing the 
presence or absence of an institutional feature, the usage of Pearson’s correlation is 
problematic. While very robust in many situations of categorized data, see Bollen/Barb 
(1981), and also often used in empirical research, there is the problem of a potential bias 
arising from the categorization, discussed for instance by Kolenikov/Angeles (2004). To 
avoid this potential bias, the correlation matrix underlying the PCA used here is the 
tetrachoric correlation as the technically appropriate; see Carroll (1961), and Flora/Curran 
(2004). It might however be remarked that the results differ in detail, but not substantially. 
Given that the set of items by which the HCS are described and compared is identical for both 
points in time, the PCA will be done for using both points in time simultaneously. A case in 
the PCA is one country in a year. The main advantage is that the latent dimensions constitute 
a “common space” in the sense that the content, meaning as well as the scaling of the latent 
dimensions remain identical for both points in time. Thus, changes in the location of a country 
on the latent dimensions between 1995 and 2004 can be directly observed and evaluated with 
regard to the direction and the magnitude of the change.  
 
The PCA was implemented using the  polychoricpca  procedure written for STATA by 
Kolenikov41. Table 10.1. below gives the Eigenvalues and the Eigenvectors, i.e. the loading 
patterns of the observed variables on the obtained factors/latent dimensions. The observed 
variables are grouped on a sectorial basis. 
 
41 See the documentation at : http://www.unc.edu/~skolenik/stata/ 
 Table 10.1: Latent Dimensions in the Institutional Setting of Health Systems 
 
a) Agency and Delegation to Independent Actors
Content of the Variable component1 component2
OS1: GP Primary Care Provider -selfemployed? os1 0.475 0.022
OS2: Specialized Care Provider -selfemployed? os2 0.416 -0.673
OS3: Dental Care Provider - self employed? os3 0.476 0.049
OS4: Pharmacies - private/selfemployed? os4 0.468 -0.091
H0: Hospitals formally in Non-Public Ownership? h0 0.394 0.732
Eigenvalue 4.61 0.76
Variance Explained 92%
b) Remuneration Modes and Incentives of Agents
component1 component2
R1A: FFS Remueration Mode Primary Care / GPs r1a 0.297 -0.350
R1B: GP Incentive to Increase Quantity of Services? r1b 0.337 -0.429
R2A: FFS Remuneration Mode Specialists r2a 0.346 0.039
R2B: SPs Incentive to Increase Quantity of Services? r2b 0.383 0.191
R4: FFS Remuneration Mode Surgeons in Hospitals r4 0.351 -0.381
R5: Remueration Mode Pharmacies retail margin? r5 0.471 0.041
H9: Hospital Remuneration based on quantity/length of stay? h9 0.347 0.328
H10: Hospital Incentive to Intensify treatment? h10 0.257 0.633
Eigenvalue 5.86 1.93
Variance Explained 73%
c) Hospital Status
component1 component2
H1: Hospitals Deficit Covered? h1 -0.377 0.119
H2: Hospitals decides on Surplus h2 0.324 0.496
H3: Hospitals (co)decides on Capacity/beds h3 0.580 -0.196
H4: Hospitals (co)decides on TechnologyInvestment h4 0.478 0.149
H7: Hospital choice: Several Hospitals (in the same region) to 
choose from? h7 -0.355 0.600
H8: Hospital Treatment costs differ among hospitals? h8 0.248 0.564
Eigenvalue 3.25 1.52
Variance Explained 54% 25%
d) Purchaser Status
component1 component2
hif1: Purchaser status HIF/HA - independent from government hif1 0.484 -0.272
hif4: Free choice of Purchaser hif4 0.431 -0.353
hif5: Contributions differ among Purchasers (HIF/HA)? hif5 0.395 0.379
hif6: Catalogue of services differ among Purchasers (HIF/HA) hif6 -0.031 0.500
hif10: Purchaser has control over own Surplus? hif10 0.270 0.401
hif11: Purchaser's Deficit covered? hif11 -0.301 -0.459
hif12: Determination of Top Level Administration of Purchaser hif12 0.509 -0.190
Eigenvalue 3.47 2.74
Variance Explained 50% 40%  
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Table 10.1 (continued) 
 
e) Patient Involvement in Payment of Medical Providers and Services
component1 component2
CP1: CoPayment: GP cp1 0.285 0.034
CP2: CoPayment: Specialists cp2 0.283 0.004
CP3: CoPayment: LabServices cp3 0.208 -0.132
CP4: CoPayment: Dentists cp4 0.250 0.009
CP5: CoPayment: Dentures cp5 0.283 -0.096
CP6: CoPayment: Hospital cp6 0.232 -0.167
CP7: CoPayment: Medicines cp7 0.225 -0.583
CP8: CoPayment: MedDevices cp8 0.163 -0.228
CR1: Payment/CostReimbursement: GPs cr1 0.295 -0.039
CR2: Payment/CostReimbursement: Specialists cr2 0.296 -0.006
CR3: Payment/CostReimbursement: Lab Services cr3 0.302 -0.073
CR4: Payment/CostReimbursement: Dentists cr4 0.224 0.430
CR5: Payment/CostReimbursement: Dentures cr5 0.225 0.392
CR6: Payment/CostReimbursement: Hospital cr6 0.313 0.071
CR7: Payment/CostReimbursement: Medicines cr7 0.217 0.150
CR8: Payment/CostReimbursement: Medical Devices cr8 0.105 0.424
Eigenvalue 12.18 3.80
Variance Explained 76% 24%
f) Control of Pharmaceutical Markets and Consumption 
component1 component2
PH1a: Pharmaceutical Price Control ph1a 0.595 0.109
PH1e: Budgets for PharmaExpenditure? (Overall/Prescriber) ph1e 0.425 -0.517
PH2a: Inclusion of Pharmaceuticals: Price granted based on 
medical Evaluation? ph2a 0.487 0.523
PH2b: Inclusion of Pharmaceuticals: Coverage based on medical 
Evaluation? ph2b -0.011 0.640
PH5: Generic Subsitution: Reduction of Co-Payments by chosing 
generics? ph5 0.477 -0.194
Eigenvalue 1.91 1.52
Variance Explained 38%
g) Government Control over Parameters of the Health Systems
component1 component2
N1: Setting the Catalogue of Medical Services n1 0.396 -0.085
N2: Setting the Levels of Remunertion / Budgets n2 0.256 -0.400
N3: Setting the Remuneration Modes for Providers n3 0.360 -0.363
CG involved/decides Hospital bed-capacity H3 cghosp 0.391 0.031
CG involved/decides Investment Hospital Technology H4 cghosp 0.398 0.378
CG involved/decides Building New Hospitals H5 cghosp 0.379 -0.142
CG involved/decides Closing Down Hospitals H6 cghosp 0.382 -0.004
CG6 CGov sets/negotiates prices for Pharmaceuticals cg6pha 0.218 0.732
Eigenvalue 6.47 1.18
Variance Explained 81%
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Table 10.1 (continued) 
 
h) Access to Secondary Medical Care
e1 e2
GK1a: Gatekeeping Specialists gk1a -0.514 0.458
GK1b: Gatekeeping Hospitals gk1b -0.486 0.539
GK4a: Factual Choice after Gatekeeping: among Specialists gk4a 0.513 0.460
GK4b: Factual Choice after Gatekeeping: among Hospitals gk4b 0.487 0.537
Eigenvalue 2.98 1.03
Variance Explained 74%
i) Quality Assurance and Enforcement
component1 component2
q1: Institution setting medical guidelines? q1 0.409 0.069
q3: Institution evaluating Medical Efficacy of treatment options? q3 0.413 0.076
q4: Institution evaluating CostEffectiveness of treatment options? q4 0.330 -0.397
q5: Institution evaluating Quality of Medical Providers? q5 0.351 -0.240
q6: Quality Evaluations published? q6 0.348 -0.272
q7: Recertification of Physicians? q7 0.328 -0.302
Purchaser can enforce med guidelines vis-a-vis: Hospital co4a 0.325 0.518
Purchaser can enforce med guidelines vis-a-vis: GP co4b 0.309 0.584
Eigenvalue 6.48 1.27
Variance Explained 81%
j) Purchaser Control over the Providers of Medical Services
component1 component2
Purchaser can identify overspending Provider: Hospital co1a 0.443 -0.150
Purchaser can identify overspending Provider: GP co1b 0.410 0.422
Purchaser can exclude overspending Provider: Hospital co2a 0.468 -0.468
Purchaser can exclude overspending Provider: GP co2b 0.340 -0.470
Purchaser gets detailled bill from: Hospital co3a 0.413 0.153
Purchaser gets detailled bill from: GP co3b 0.361 0.579
Eigenvalue 3.52 1.66
Variance Explained 59% 28%
Remark
Loading obtained by a Principal Component Analysis based on polychoric correlations  
 
a) Agency: Delegation to Independent Actors 
The first aspect analyzed here is the issue of “agency”, the delegation of tasks to independent 
providers. According to the delegation / institutional economics approach, incentive problems 
are more severe in settings in which agents are formally independent and have more leeway 
for unobserved action. They may oversupply services for the reason of increasing their 
income. The delegation approach predicts that the level of HCE is higher in countries with 
high levels of agency. If the providers are independent agents, there is of course still no 
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guarantee that the services are delivered in high quality and sufficient effort. Independent 
providers equally can maximize their utility by reducing the effort. And the countermeasure is 
not the employment status but the degree of choice the patients have. 
In the case of employed providers, i.e. low levels of agency, the incentives are slightly 
different. Usually, employment goes together with a remuneration by salary, and thus, instead 
of increasing income, which is not feasible in the setting of a fixed income, they may 
maximize utility by minimizing effort. While this does not increase HCE, it might affect the 
HCS’ output negatively - either because there is too little of it or because there are quality 
problems due to lack of effort.  
As for the operation of the HCS, high levels of agency imply that the system is more 
autonomous, because self-employed providers usually have a say in what is covered by the 
HCS and at what prices they are remunerated. They are also under a weaker control (or none 
at all) regarding what they are doing in a certain case. On the other hand, employed providers 
have a stake in organizational issues only as far as their salary is concerned, but oftentimes 
they are not involved in decisions about what health services are covered by the HCS, and 
what these services shall cost. 
As defined above, delegation and “agency” is defined as existent to the degree that there are 
independent, usually self-employed providers, “agents”, from which services are contracted or 
purchased. Agency is defined as absent, if the providers are part of the formal hierarchy of the 
public administration, i.e. employed.   
 
The observed variables included in the PCA are the occupational, respectively the institutional 
status of providers of the following standard services: GPs / primary care providers, providers 
of specialized care (gynecologists, orthopedics and the like), providers of dental care, 
pharmacists and hospitals. All variables are coded alike, the value 1 stands for a self-
employed/ independent whereas the value of zero stands for employed/ part of the public 
administration. 
In each of these dichotomous variables, the original question was if the providers are 
predominantly employed, i.e. part of the hierarchical control extending from the state into the 
public health system. Or whether they are predominantly self-employed, i.e. private providers 
working on their own account. In the latter case, they are not subject to hierarchical control 
but are contracted. They voluntary entered a contract in which both sides are at least formally 
equal and both sides have a say on the terms of the contract. With regard to hospitals, 
“independence” means that hospitals are predominantly independent, owned and operated by 
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an entity which is not part of the public administration. An example of this are hospitals 
operated by private enterprises on a for profit basis, hospitals owned and operated by charities 
or religious orders on a non-profit basis. The alternative, the most frequent setting in the 
sample of HCS analyzed here, is that the hospitals are owned and operated by a public entity. 
This entity can be the government (national, regional or local layer) or the Public Health 
Service, which is in turn owned and operated by the government.  
 
The PCA yields a one dimensional solution: the Eigenvalue of the first component is 4.61, 
and it explains almost the complete – 92% – variation in the five variables. All five variables 
are loading positively on the extracted dimension thus the latent dimension will be labeled 
“Agency”. High scores on the latent dimension imply high levels of delegation, i.e. that the 
providers of services are more often self-employed and formally independent. In terms of the 
coding of the variables, a higher score indicates that in this country more variables have a 1. A 
low score indicates little delegation to independent agents respectively much integration of 
the provision of health into the public administration.  
 
b) Remuneration Modes and Factual Incentives  
This analysis concerns the institutional patterns in the predominant remuneration mode of 
providers and their incentive at the margin. The incentives set by the remuneration system are 
twofold, and conceptually independent from the provider’s occupational status.  
The first aspect is how providers are predominantly remunerated. The predominant mode of 
remuneration might be a salary or some version of the fee-for-service mode. The coding is 
based on the distinction between modes, in which income depends on the quantity of services 
provided and hence set an incentive to extend this quantity. The alternative are all 
remuneration modes, which do not set this incentive. The value 1 is assigned to a case, if the 
predominant remuneration mode is based on the quantity of services provided, for which fee-
for-service is the prototypical example. The coding is zero otherwise, e.g. if the provider 
obtains a capitation or is salaried.  
But there is also a second aspect. The predominant remuneration mode may not capture the 
incentives fully, in particular not the incentive at the margin. In many HCS the providers 
receive mixed forms of remuneration. A provider might receive a basic salary making up the 
major share of income, but there may or may not be the opportunity to increase the income 
further by supplying more services. In this case, the incentive at the margin is to increase the 
quantity of services provided. Thus the HCSI also covered, whether the provider can increase 
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his income by increasing the quantity of services provided in a case. A possible option to do 
so is to provide services on private terms, a situation labeled as “revolving door effect”. It 
shall be noted that the provider’s motive to attract patients as customers is not per se a 
problem for HCS efficiency, since it may stimulate provider’s effort and quality. Gaining 
more clients goes at the expenses of other providers. The incentive to provide more services 
in a given case is a larger problem for efficiency, since here the issue of supply induced 
demand comes into play.  
Regarding the variation of the input variables, there is no variation in the dental care: all 
dentists everywhere and anytime have the incentive to increase the quantity of services 
provided to the consumers. For this reason, the variable is excluded from the analysis. 
The variables included in the PCA are the following: 
Is there quantity-based/ fee-for-service based remuneration mode for Primary Care Providers/ 
GPs? And: Do GPs/Primary Care providers have an incentive to increase quantity of services? 
Is there a quantity-based/ fee-for-service based remuneration mode for specialists? And: Do 
specialists have an incentive to increase quantity of services? 
Is there a quantity-based/ fee-for-service based remuneration mode for surgeons in hospitals? 
In many countries, surgeons are employed by the hospital and receive a salary. In some cases, 
the salary is supplemented by an activity based component. But in some countries, the 
surgeons working in the hospital, making the decisions and conducting the surgery, are paid 
directly by the purchaser or the health administration, while the hospitals receives payment 
for providing and operating the infrastructure necessary for treatment. So even if the hospital 
receives a budget, and hence has no incentive to increase the intensity of treatment, the actors 
actually deciding on treatment in a given case may nevertheless have such an incentive.  
Is the remuneration mode for pharmacies a retail margin? Apart from Sweden, pharmacies are 
privately owned businesses, and thus turnover matters for the pharmacist’s income. The 
argument why the remuneration mode matters for HCE efficiency and costs is that 
pharmacists are relevant for the usage of generics, which in turn is relevant for pharmaceutical 
expenditure in the HCS. If the pharmacy receives a retail margin, i.e. a percentage of the price 
of the medicine, turnover and income increase if more expensive medicines are sold. This sets 
at the margin the incentive to recommend branded, original products, which are usually more 
expensive, and not to recommend generic substitution. If on the other hand, the pharmacist is 
a public employee receiving a salary which is independent from the turnover generated, or 
receives only a dispensing fee independent of the price, the pharmacists may be more open to 
recommend generic substitution because substitution has no financial implications.  
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Is the hospital’s remuneration based on quantity of services or the length of stay? In many 
countries, a substantial share of the hospital’s funding comes from allocated budgets. But 
there is usually a flexible component which is activity based. This component introduces an 
“incentive at the margin”, which is different from the incentives set by an exclusively budget 
based remuneration. Thus, there is also the question, whether the hospital has an incentive to 
increase the quantity of services or to extend the length of stay. If the hospital is remunerated 
predominantly on a fee-for-service basis, the incentives are equivalent to those of individual 
providers. The quantity of services provided during the stay may be increased. If the hospital 
can increase the payment for the case by keeping patients longer, the average length of stay 
might be longer. Germany’s per diem based funding of hospitals was a good example for this, 
and also for the over-capacity resulting from this type of funding in the long run.  
In all variables, the value of 1 is assigned if the answer to the item is “yes”, i.e. there is an 
incentive to increase the quantity of services for the provider, and zero, if there is no such 
incentive.  
 
The PCA of the variables yields an one-dimensional solution; see table 10.1b. The first 
component has an Eigenvalue of 5.86, and reproduces 73 % of the total variance in the eight 
variables. All variables are loading positively on the extracted dimension, and thus the content 
of the latent dimension is the degree to which the remuneration modes implemented in the 
HCS set an incentive for the providers to increase the quantity of services provided. Higher 
scores for a case on this dimension indicate that the providers of medical services and 
products have an incentive to increase the costs of treatment, because their income depends on 
the costs.  
 
c) Hospital Status  
Hospitals are the place where a substantial share of HCE arises. For this reason, controlling 
the hospital sector is of crucial importance for the overall expenditure, and it is worthwhile to 
study this sector in more detail. Looking at the hospital sector in the countries included in this 
study shows that ownership of hospitals is relatively homogeneous. They are, apart from 
Belgium, usually in public ownership, owned by counties, health authorities, municipalities or 
governments. But how and to what degree hospitals are factually controlled by their owner, 
respectively how autonomous they are in making decisions, and whether they are to some 
degree competing among each other for patients, differs largely among countries. 
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The hospital sector is described by six items of the HCSI. Again each variable is coded 
binary, with the value 1 standing for a “yes” to the answer respectively the existence of the 
feature. The items are the following:  
Would the hospital have to bear potential deficits? In some countries, this is indeed the case, 
in others, the deficit is covered from other sources, e.g. the state or the owner step in. Given 
the rather probable occurrence of a deficit, it is an important feature whether the hospital is 
not only kept operative if the case arises but has to cover the deficits at some time in the 
future, or whether bailouts are done on a regular basis. It is in particular important, whether 
the hospital knows full well that the deficit will be covered anyway and immediately. If 
overran budgets and permanent discrepancies between allocated budgets and actual costs only 
mean that more funds are allocated in the next accounting period, the incentive intended by 
budgeting or any similar cost containment measures is completely eliminated. If on the other 
hand, the deficit is not covered, but has to borne by the hospital, there is a considerable 
pressure to engage in cost control.  
Can the hospital decide on the usage of a surplus, if this case arises? If the hospital has to give 
away its surplus by default, the incentive to achieve a surplus is eliminated. In some countries, 
running a surplus implies less funding in the next accounting period, which sets the pervert 
incentive to spend all funds. If on the other hand the hospital is allowed to use the surplus, e.g. 
for hiring additional staff or investing in equipment, this sets an incentive for the hospital and 
its administration to actually create a surplus. While the hospital usually cannot realize profit 
in the economic sense, spending money for improving the hospital’s equipment is an equally 
strong motive.  
Both items, deficits and surplus, cover the financial autonomy of the hospital. The variation in 
the way a deficit is handled is limited - usually, the deficit is covered one way or other, at 
least to the degree of keeping the hospital operative. The role of the hospital in deciding on 
how a surplus is used differs substantially among countries.  
Apart from the financing, two items cover the hospital’s role in decision making:  
Does the hospital has a say in the question of capacity (whether the number of beds will be 
increased or decreased)? 
Does the hospital has a say in the question of investments in the medical high technology 
available in the hospital?  
Hospitals have, as institutions, a self interest to grow, to become bigger (have more beds, 
more departments) and better equipped (with more and better technology). In some countries, 
the hospital factually decides on capacity issues, e.g. the creation of a new department for 
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treating a certain types of conditions, or the procurement of sophisticated equipment. In 
others, the owner or the government (the Ministry of Health), determines all those issues, 
maybe giving the administration of the hospital the possibility to state its opinion, but not 
necessarily giving them any say.  
Finally, two items concern the hospital’s role as a supplier of services, which is competing 
with others suppliers for clients. As stated above, competition is the main incentive to provide 
quality, effort and to work efficient in the provision of services but also in administrating the 
hospital. While hospitals are usually non-profit and are factually not threatened with “going 
out of business” for mere financial reasons, reputation, size and equipment are strong motives, 
which affect and drive competition. Two items cover the competition among hospitals:  
Is there usually only one hospital in a region or several, which are offering the same services? 
In some countries, there is only hospital in a defined region, e.g. a hospital district, which 
provided services. Often there is a layered pattern, in which basic care hospitals cover the 
provision of basic services (like appendectomy and basic surgery) in a small area, while more 
specialized hospitals cover the provision of specialized services (like cardiac surgery) for a 
larger area. But on each level of specialization, the hospital is the sole provider of the service 
for a defined region, and all patients living in the catchment area are referred to the hospital. 
On the other hand, there are countries, where several hospitals cover identical or overlapping 
regions, all of which cover the same indications. If there is choice, at least in the sense of 
several possibilities to obtain treatment, there is also an at least rudimentary competition 
based on reputation.  
Do the costs of treatments differ among hospitals? Competition may work by quality, but 
competition may also work by the prices for treatment charged by the hospitals for a defined 
treatment (e.g. the per diem, the cost per case etc.). In some countries, hospitals set and offer 
their own price for a certain treatment, in others, all hospitals in the country negotiate together 
the payment (national DRGs or a per diem) which is then identical for all. 
 
The PCA yields a two-dimensional solution, see table 10.1c. The Eigenvalues are 
comparatively close in magnitude, 3.2 to 1.5, capturing 54% respectively 25% of the variance. 
But more important is the result that the two competition indicators are loading on a different 
dimension than the four indicator variables of hospital involvement in decision-making. The 
gap between the first and the second Eigenvalue is due to the fact that there are four variables 
covering basically the same thing, while there are only two covering a different dimension. 
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Based on the loading pattern, the first latent dimension of hospital will be labeled 
“HospitalAutonomy”. High scores on the this dimension imply that the hospital has a high 
degree of decision autonomy and has a say in issues which concern its size, equipment and 
also financial autonomy. The second dimension, defined basically by the two competition 
variables will be labeled “HospitalCompetition”. High scores of a case on this dimension 
imply that there is some competition among the hospitals.  
 
d) Purchaser Autonomy and Competition  
Even in public-integrated HCS, there is usually one designated actor in charge of purchasing 
of health services either by contracting or organizing their provision. These “purchasers” can 
be Health Insurance Funds (HIFs), public Health Authorities (HA), local governments, 
provincial government or authorities which are formally part of – and hence under the direct 
control of – the national Ministry of Health. Even in the latter case, there is usually a 
regionally-based organizational structure, with health authorities in charge of a certain region.  
Irrespective of the formal status or “label”, the interesting question is, how autonomous these 
purchasers actually are in setting parameters like prices, catalogues of services covered and 
whether there is any competition among them. Case studies showed that this autonomy is 
quite independent from the formal status or “label” of the purchaser. For instance, regional 
health authorities can be very autonomous, irrespective of the fact that they are formally part 
of the government hierarchy. At the same time, HIFs, while being formally independent, can 
be under strict control of the government, which determines the top-level administration, sets 
the contributions rates and the defines catalogues of services covered.  
Purchasers – be they HIFs, HA or whatever organizational form – are crucial to the operation 
of the HCS and the exercise of control over the providers of medical services. Looking at 
them from the perspective that an effective competition among them might improve their 
operative efficiency, the question is, whether they are actually independent (i.e. able to act 
competitively) and whether they are under competition from other purchasers (i.e. motivated 
to act competitively). For instance, in Luxembourg, there are formally several HIFs, but 
basically they are all merged at the national level, acting vis-à-vis the providers as one entity, 
the UCM. Hence there is no competition among the different HIFs. In other countries, several 
HIFs exist, but are neither allowed to charge different contribution rates nor allowed to offer 
differing catalogues of services. Thus, they cannot compete for clients by offering “better” 
packages of contributions and services, nor do they have the motivation to do so. 
Consequentially, they have no incentive to minimize administrative costs or to hold a tough 
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bargaining stance with the providers. Both of which would enable them to offer more services 
/ lower contributions as a mean to attract more clients.  
The institutional status of the purchaser is covered by three items: 
Is the purchaser organizationally independent from state administration? At the most basic 
level, the purchaser can be a formally independent entity, but it can also be an institution 
which is an integral part of the public administration and thus an element in the political 
“chain of command”. As argued above this is just one aspect, and often a rather formal one at 
that.  
Does the purchaser has the control over the operational surplus? In some countries the 
purchaser can use a surplus to lower the contributions charged, or to increase its reserves. 
Even if the purchaser has some constraints on the usage, e.g. has to put it into reserves or has 
to lower the contribution levels, the purchaser has some advantage of running a surplus. In 
other countries, any surplus is automatically expropriated, and this implies that there is no 
incentive to run a surplus. The same is true for Health Authorities in particular in the case of 
regional or municipal governments acting as purchasers. Running a surplus may even imply 
lower allocations in future.  
Is the purchaser’s deficit covered? In the case of independent HIFs, the possibility of going 
out of business, e.g. by being formally dissolved or taken over by a more successful HIF, is a 
powerful incentive given that HIFs – like all bureaucracies, or rather the staff working in them 
– have to a certain degree a “will to survive” as independent entities. The incentive to avoid 
deficits if they are not covered “by default”, is also present in the case of health authorities. In 
municipalities which are purchasing or providing health care, running a deficit which 
accumulates over time also creates pressure – not economic by nature and not in the form of 
going out of business, but political, and expressed by votes. 
Is the top-level administration of the purchaser determined internally by the purchaser? In 
many social insurance systems the HIF’s top level administration is formally elected by the 
HIF’s members, usually by the employers and the trade unions, with a strong role for the top-
level administration currently in place. In others, the top-level is determined or rather imposed 
by the national government, and can be removed by the government at will. In the case of 
HAs, the political determination of the top level administration is the typical case. If 
municipalities or counties are organizing the provision of health, the municipal council or the 
county council determines the administration of the authority in charge of health care 
provision. But here too there variation is observable. The national government might be in 
control of the topmost level of the health service administration, while the lower levels of 
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administration in charge of a regional HA are then installed and removed by the health service 
administration without intervention of the government.  
But the institutional status per se is not sufficient to say something about the purchaser’s 
behavior. For instance, Scandinavian municipalities are under more competitive pressure for 
citizens and inhabitants, who can “vote by feet”, than are formally independent HIFs which 
neither need to nor can compete for clients.  
The HCSI contains some items on the possibility of competition, which is crucial for the 
behavior of the purchaser. The purchaser is usually non-profit – and hence has no motive to 
produce a surplus in the sense of an enterprise’ profit. But bureaucracy theory would still 
predict that it is interested in attracting clients, in order to grow and to have more resources 
available for on the job consumption. To compete, the purchasers must have several features, 
covered by the following variables: 
Are citizens free to choose among HIF/HA? An instance of free purchaser choice is Germany, 
where now all “public” (i.e. non-profit) HIFs are open to each citizen. In other countries, the 
citizens are assigned by occupation to a HIF (e.g. Luxembourg) or by place of living to the 
HA acting as purchaser for them. If citizens cannot choose, they cannot leave either and thus 
the purchaser has neither the chance to attract clients by performing well, nor is it subject to 
the pressure arising from losing clients to other purchasers.  
While the legal possibility to change a provider is a precondition, it is not sufficient to create 
competitive pressure. The option to change the purchaser must be supplemented by a motive 
to change. As for these motives, there might be some others too, like customer orientation, but 
the most basic parameters defining the attractiveness of a purchaser from the perspective of a 
client are the services offered and the contribution charged. Two additional features required 
for competition are thus the following: 
Can the contribution of the citizens to the HIF/HA differ between them or not? And: Can the 
services covered by HIF/HA differ among them or not?  
In some countries the HIF/HA charge different rates, incentivizing citizens, if possible, to 
change to the HIF/HA with lower contribution rates. This puts purchasers with higher 
operational costs under pressure to contain the costs, e.g. by increasing internal efficiency. In 
other countries the contribution to a HIF/HA must by law be the same, but the services 
offered may differ to some degree. While this is usually not the case for the basic care, it often 
concerns optional services, like dental care, spa treatments or coverage of “alternative 
treatments” like homeopathy. In the case of a HA, e.g. where municipalities are organizing 
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health care, the difference may take the form that, while there is a uniform official catalogue 
of covered services, factual access, availability and in particular waiting times differ. 
 
The PCA yields a two-dimensional solution, in which two components of almost equal 
explanatory power (50% and 40% respectively) are extracted. The loading pattern obtained is 
not completely in line with what one would expect, but reflects some institutional 
inconsistency. 
As one would expect, if purchasers are formally independent from the government, it is more 
likely (but not determined!) that there is also free choice. Independent purchasers are also 
more likely to determine their top-level administration. 
But furthermore, one would expect that if a country gives citizens “free choice” of purchasers, 
it would also give the purchasers the means to engage in a competition, i.e. allow them to 
differ in both contributions and catalogues. But the first dimension, i.e. formal independence 
does not imply either of this. But it is actually less likely that purchasers differ in 
contributions or catalogues, in countries where citizens have free choice of the purchaser.  
 
Assigning a clear cut content to the dimensions is difficult in these circumstances. Given the 
loading pattern obtained, see table 10.1d, and orienting myself on the variables loading 
strongest on each of the dimensions, the first dimension will be denoted as 
"PurchaserAutonomy", the second as "PurchaserCompetition". 
“PurchaserAutonomy” covers the purchaser’s formal status and the government’s control over 
the purchaser’s administration. Both variables are loading strongly on this dimension. High 
scores on this dimension indicate that the purchaser is organizationally independent from the 
state administration and separated from direct hierarchical control by a political actor.  
“PurchaserCompetition” captures whether purchasers have the necessary features and 
decision competencies to compete among each other for clients: may they differ in the 
catalogues of services covered, differ in the contributions charged, do they have to bear a 
potential deficit (note the negative loading!) and can they decide on the usage of the surplus. 
High scores on the second dimension imply that elements of competition are installed.  
Both dimensions are independent, which is to say that the formal status of a provider does not 
determine whether there is a competition among providers. Neither does a system of HIFs 
guarantee competition, nor does a system of regional or local HA preclude competition.  
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e) Patient’s Involvement in Payment of Providers and Medical Services 
HCS differ with regard to the role the patient has in the payment of the providers. As was 
argued in the section on patients as consumers, consumption of medical services differs from 
the consumption of other goods and services by the almost complete exclusion of patients 
from the payment. Patients are ignorant of the costs their consumption incurs, and more over 
costs do not matter for them, because they are paid from by a common pool. The possible and 
even likely result is individual over-consumption, and consequentially, introducing 
transparency of costs and making them relevant might contain this problem and thus increase 
efficiency at the macro level. 
A first aspect of this is the involvement of patients in the payment of providers. For a range of 
services the HCSI captures, whether these services / goods are provided “in kind” or whether 
there is some version of cost-reimbursement. In the “service in kind” setting, there is no 
involvement of the patient. The payment only takes place between the purchaser and the 
provider. In the case of cost-reimbursement the patient is given a bill for the services received, 
which lists the services provided. In some countries, the service is paid first by the patient 
who then passes the bill on to the purchaser for reimbursement (full or partial). This provides 
the patient on the one hand with a knowledge about the costs arising. On the other hand, it 
allows also a basic control of whether the services billed were actually provided. The 
incentive to check the bill even in a superficial way is much stronger, if the patient has to pay 
the bill first and is reimbursed later. This possibility, but also the awareness of the costs 
incurred, is completely absent in systems where services are predominantly provided in kind. 
Here, the patient never becomes aware of the financial aspect of getting treatment, and has no 
notion of the costs of even the most basic services. Thus, involving the patient in the payment 
might increase transparency and preclude fraud, a problem reported for some HCS.  
A second aspect of patient involvement concerns the financial incentives set for the patient. A 
clear cut case are co-payments: if the patient has to make no co-payment, s/he is isolated from 
the costs of treatment. Even if the bill is transmitted via the patient, s/he does not necessarily 
has to care about it if s/he’s not paying any of it. If medical services are factually free at the 
point of usage, there is no financial limit to individual consumption. If there is a co-payment 
the patient might consider the costs and benefits and may ask the provider, whether the 
service is actually necessary in the present situation. The effect is even stronger, if the co-
payment varies with the price of the services, e.g. co-payments are percentages. This can be 
expected to make the patient sensitive to price differences of possible treatment options. A 
typical example are pharmaceuticals, where the patient often has the choice among a branded 
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original and a generic alternative. If there are no co-payments, the patient might habitually 
prefer the branded original. If there is a co-payment, in particular a flexible one, the patient 
might think about asking and shifting to a generic alternative where the co-payment is lower. 
At the same time, co-payments, as argued above, are an ambiguous instrument: often they are 
seen as just an additional source of funding, see Scheil-Adlung (1998), or to deter patients 
from obtaining necessary care now, at the price of even higher costs later on; see Newhouse 
(2004). The net effect of cost sharing on health system on expenditure but in particular on 
input/output-efficiency is thus not that straightforward. 
The questions covering the involvement of patients are thus: Is there cost reimbursement for a 
service/product? And: Is there a co-payment for a service/product? The indicator variables 
cover the services of GPs, specialists, dentists, and hospitals, but also medicines and medical 
devices.  
For the cost-reimbursement variables, the value of 0 is assigned, if the service is provided in 
kind, the value of 1 is assigned in the variable, where the patient first pays the bill, then gets 
reimbursed later. For the co-payment variables, the value of 0 is assigned, if there are no co-
payments for this service or product. The value of 1 is assigned, if the price of getting services 
is relevant – i.e. either because there is a co-payment (fixed or varying with price) or the 
service not covered by the HCS and paid privately.  
 
The PCA results given in table 10.1f, indicate that there are two independent latent 
dimensions. The loading pattern moreover shows that the involvement of the patient in the 
provider payment (service in kind vs. some form of cost reimbursement) and the usage of co-
payments (the incidence, not the magnitude) show a similar same pattern.  
Most of the variables are loading on the first component, which explains 73% of the variation 
in the original variables. It covers in particular the variation in all variables concerning 
“standard” services, i.e. the most basic services which are the core of health provision: GPs, 
specialists/specialized care, hospital treatment and the like. The dimension will used, and 
based on the content of the variables, will be labeled as “PatientInvolvement”. If the HCS has 
co-payments for GPs, it is very likely that there are co-payments for almost all other services 
as well. The same is true for the mode of payment: if services by GPs are provided in kind, 
most other services are usually also provided in kind.  
High scores of a case imply that the patients are involved in the payment of providers and 
services. Involved in the sense that they are made aware of the prices (by a cost-
reimbursement) and that prices are relevant for them (by co-payments).  
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f) Control of Pharmaceutical Markets and Consumption  
Regulations on pharmaceuticals, in particular regulations of prices, are a common tool to 
contain pharmaceutical expenditure, and thereby overall HCE. Partly because it is possible to 
realize substantial savings without significant loss of quality, partly because it can be done 
without creating substantial unrest among the patients. In particular the usage of generics 
might reduce costs substantially, and moreover without loss of quality. Price regulations and 
other measures of cost containment might take a wide range of forms. The inventory items on 
which the analysis of this sector will be based are the following: 
Are prices of medicines controlled? This control may come in many variants. It occurs in the 
form of a direct price setting by a national regulatory agency. The price may also be 
negotiated between a national institution and the producers. In some countries, prices are not 
controlled at all. Apart from the outcome (i.e. the price), the mode in use depends to some 
degree on the relative bargaining power of each side. In some countries, in particular where 
the pharmaceutical industry is in a weak position (few enterprises, little employment, small 
contribution to the economy), prices are set unilaterally, and usually on a low level by the 
government. In others, the pharmaceutical industry is free to charge whatever price it sees as 
appropriate.  
Is there budget for pharmaceutical expenditure? Prescriber budgets as well as overall budgets 
directly limit consumption to a certain levels. It may not factually achieve this aim, but at 
least creates the awareness that the available means are limited. Frequently, prescribers are 
not involved in payment of medicines, and hence are indifferent to the usage of generics 
because the costs involved by their prescriptions are of no concern to them; see Hellerstein 
(1998) and Hassell et al. (2003) on this issue. The usage of generics is a convenient mean to 
limit the pharmaceutical expenditure, leaving resources for medical treatment in cases, where 
no generic alternatives exist.  
A crucial point is the decision of giving the medicine factual access to the market. Factual 
market access means not only that the product has a market authorization. Authorization alone 
does not imply a large turnover, if patients have to buy the medicine out of pocket. 
Confronted with the often substantial price of innovative medicines, a medicine which is not 
covered by the HCS, i.e. where the HCS does not pay the major share of the price, will not 
actually have a market. Because, when confronted with the full costs of medicines, which are 
often substantial, most patients will shift to medicines which are covered. Factual market 
access refers to the fact that the medicine both available and paid for by the HCS. Market 
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authorization can be based on product safety only. But the institution granting factual market 
access can also require information on the medicine’s effectiveness from the producer and 
evaluate this information: both, a new medicine’s price and the coverage can be based on such 
an cost-benefit-evaluation. The evaluation can also take into account the value-added of this 
medicine compared to existing alternatives, filtering out “pseudo-generics”; see Hollis (2003) 
and Kong/Seldon (2004). As outlined above, the main incentive problem regarding the 
pharmaceutical industry is its incentive to introduce marginal modifications of existing drugs 
in order to prolong the factual length of the monopoly position and the associated profits. The 
industry is much better informed on the product’s value added, but has the incentive to 
present it as a real innovation regardless of its value. Its up to the consumers, to close this 
informational gap. The systematic evaluation of a new product at the step of granting factual 
market access can be an instrument to control this problem. Either by identifying mere 
modifications and granting them no higher price. Or by signaling to the producers that mere 
modifications will not be treated as “innovative products”. Two items of the HCSI cover this 
issue: 
Is the price granted for a new medicine based on a medical evaluation of the product? And: Is 
the coverage of a new medicine by the HCS based on a medical evaluation of the product?  
Using generics is a possible way to contain costs while maintaining the same level of 
treatment quality. Generics are allowed and available in most countries, and their usage is 
usually encouraged. However the actual motivation for the patients to decide to switch to a 
generic depends on, whether generic substitution is actively encouraged by setting of financial 
incentives. If the costs for a branded original is the same as for a generic, e.g. because there is 
a fixed fee per prescription, there is no incentive to use the generic. Potential savings for the 
HCS, arising from the possibility to obtain equivalent supply with pharmaceuticals at lower 
costs, remain unrealized. The item covering this issue is: Can co-payment for respectively 
costs of medicines be reduced if the patient decides for generic substitution.  
In all five items underlying the analysis the value 1 is assigned to cases in which the feature is 
present (i.e. “yes” for the questions), and 0 if the feature is absent (i.e. “no”).  
 
The PCA results given in table 10.1f show the resulting loading pattern. Two dimensions are 
obtained, the first one with an Eigenvalue of 1.91, reproducing 38% of the variation in the 
variables. The second one with an Eigenvalue of 1.52, reproducing 30% of the variation. The 
variables concerning the control of prices and sales (viz. price control, budgeting, generics 
and to some degree evaluation of cost benefit in setting the price) are predominantly loading 
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on the first dimension. The second dimension is covering the issue of market access, viz. the 
items on whether price or coverage decision for new medicines are based on a medical 
evaluation. As was argued in the section on the incentives of the pharmaceutical industry, 
getting coverage by the HCS at an attractive price is the most important factor to reach a 
country’s market and to achieve profits. The incentive is, bluntly put, to introduce a product 
which is formally “new”, while being basically the same thing as existing ones. The challenge 
for the authorization authority is to identify such attempts and either to refuse coverage by the 
HCS altogether or to deny the price level which is granted for real innovations.  
The first dimension will be labeled “PharmaControl1”. High scores on the factor imply that 
the market for pharmaceuticals, in particular the financial aspects are under control of the 
government (which is usually the actor in charge of setting prices and budgets). High scores 
indicate the usage of price controls, budgets, a pricing based on quality and in particular that 
there are financial incentives addressing the patients to use generic substitutes where possible.  
The second dimension will be labeled “PharmaControl2”. High scores on the factor imply that 
the prices granted and the coverage decision are based on an evaluation of the product in 
terms of efficacy. Low values indicate that to gain coverage by the HCS, the product just 
needs to be “new”.  
 
g) Government Control over Parameters of the Health Systems 
The HCSI covers the involvement of the central government as a politically accountable actor 
in setting some of the most basic parameters of the HCS. With regard to the theoretical 
framework, the governmental control concerns the external control, i.e. the control exercised 
by an outside actor over the HCS and in particular over the decisions made by the actors 
directly operating the HCS. The focus is put on the central government, because it has the 
formal competence to implement large scale institutional changes. Lower levels of 
government may negotiate certain aspects, but they do so in a frame set by the central 
government. As elaborated in chapter 5 when discussing external control, the central 
government can be seen as a steward, representing the citizen’s interest in the HCS and in 
particular vis-à-vis the actors in (and living of!) the HCS. This outside-control is particular 
important because both the supply-side and the demand-side share an interest in an ever 
increasing health budget, to keep the “cake” to be divided among them constantly growing. 
The interest in ever higher expenditure is obvious for the providers, for whom income is 
proportional to HCE. But the argument is equally true for purchasers, HIFs as well as HAs: 
As bureaucracies, both organizational forms share an interest in administrating ever larger 
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budgets, which allow larger bureaucracies, more staff and higher levels of “on the job 
consumption” in absolute terms.  
To achieve larger overall budgets and higher expenditure levels, the two immediate strategies 
are a) to increase the prices for services and b) to increase the quantities of services. The 
former can be done by agreeing on higher prices for medical services, the latter by either 
providing more services or by covering more and also new services, like so called 
“alternative” or “unconventional” treatment methods. A constant increase may be 
“institutionalized” by setting a certain remuneration mode, like fee-for-service. Both sides, 
demand and supply, can collude to install an automatic growth of HCE by agreeing on certain 
remuneration modes. Remuneration modes, as outlined above, are important because they set 
incentives for the providers. Coupling income to the quantity or the costs of services provided 
creates a constant trend towards an extension of the quantity of services and thus a constant 
growth of expenditure. For instance, the HIF should - in the interest of its clients - insist on a 
remuneration mode which eliminates incentives for over-supply. However, setting a quantity 
based remuneration mode establishes a permanent trend towards higher expenditure levels, 
which is in turn in the interest of the HIF as a bureaucracy. Again, the state as an outsider to 
the system can represent the interests of the patients as a group and by enforcing a 
remuneration mode which removes the problem. 
 
The original variables on which the analysis is based are covering the central government’s 
say in the following aspects:  
Does the central government has a say in setting the catalogue of medical services? 
Does the central government has a say in setting the levels of remuneration / budgets? 
Does the central government has a say in setting the remuneration modes for providers? 
Because of the significance of the in-patient sector for overall HCE, the central government’s 
role in this sector was covered in more detail by including the following items of the HCSI:  
Is the central government involved, or does it decide on hospital’s bed-capacity? 
Is the central government involved, or does it decide on the investment in hospital 
technology? 
Is the central government involved, or does it decide on building new hospitals? 
Is the central government involved, or does it decide on closing down hospitals? 
The central government’s role in the hospital sector is covered in more detail for two reasons. 
Firstly, because the hospital sector is an expensive sector of the HCE, where a substantial 
share of the overall HCE is consumed. Second, because of the larger economies of scale 
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possible in the hospital sector. If the hospital is in the ownership of a regional government, 
this level of government will not have the national level picture in mind when deciding on 
investments in hospitals or even closing down a hospital. If two neighboring cities or regions 
have the same hospital capacity offering the same services, neither will be willing to close 
down its own and be responsible for the fact that citizens now have to travel to obtain 
treatment. Especially in the setting of a municipal ownership, running a hospital is a question 
of prestige, and closing down a hospital is politically costly. Thus, lower levels of government 
are often prone to retain hospital capacities, even if they are not used to their full extent. In the 
long run, the costs of the in-patient sector are higher. The central government is more likely to 
have the national level situation in mind, and may be more likely to enforce economies of 
scale, by bundling hospital capacities in one place – if it has the competence to do so. 
As a last issue the central government’s role for the pharmaceutical sector was included. 
Again, the central government is the crucial actor, because the approval of a new medicine is 
predominantly decided on the national level: 
Does the central government has a say in setting or negotiating the prices for 
pharmaceuticals? Price setting is the most frequent and also by the magnitude of its impact on 
expenditure the most important instrument of government control in this domain 
In all of these questions, the central government’s role can range from being an outsider, to an 
actor which might approve or disapprove the terms negotiated between purchasers and 
providers, up to being able to decide all the issues unilaterally. The coding of the variables is 
1, if the government has a say, i.e. it’s approval is required or the government can decide 
unilaterally on the issue concerned. It is coded zero, if the government has no say in the issue. 
 
As the PCA results given in table 10.1g show, there is basically only one dimension of 
governmental involvement underlying the items, reproducing 81% of the variation in the 8 
variables, with an Eigenvalue of 6.47. High scores indicate that the central government in the 
country has much control over these aspects. The dimension is labeled “GovernmentControl”. 
However, given the arguments made on the indirect veto power and the government’s factual 
capability to act, the latent dimension of governmental control must be combined with an 
indicator of the political system’s capability to control the HCS. 
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h) Access to Medical Services 
The access of patients to health care is major issue in health politics, and it is also a crucial 
issue because of its effects on satisfaction with the HCS. As argued in the section on 
competition among providers, it is furthermore a possible method to contain costs and to 
assure quality via the competition mechanism.  
In some HCS, formal gatekeeping rules are in place: the patient cannot access a specialist or 
any secondary care without a referral of the first contact GP. The same is usually true for 
hospitals. The idea underlying the usage of gatekeeping as an instrument of cost control is to 
ensure that patients consume care at a the lowest (and usually least costly) level of 
specialization. Services by specialists and hospitals are usually more expensive than services 
provided by GPs, also because of the increased usage of advanced technology and advanced 
diagnostics. By forcing the patient to consult first a GP, who has more expertise to evaluate 
whether there is the necessity of treatment in more specialized and more expensive settings, 
costs might be limited, without loss of quality. While many countries have formal rules on 
gatekeeping, the actual handling of these rules may differ. Access to hospitals in the case of 
an emergency usually doesn’t require a referral by a GP, but even when this case is excluded, 
one can ask, whether gatekeeping is factually relevant or can be skipped easily.  
Choice among providers is the main instrument to incentivize the providers to perform well. 
Even when not being an expert, a patient might still get an idea about how well and with how 
much effort a certain provider performs a task. If the patient has the feeling that a certain 
provider does a poor job, s/he might be inclined switch to another one. A question is hence, 
whether there is choice in the sense that there are usually several providers for a service to 
choose from. This is by no means identical to formal rules on gatekeeping. The GP might 
have a gatekeeping role, but after the GP has agreed to a referral to a higher level of care, 
there may or may not be a choice. In some HCS, the geographical situation – thinly populated 
rural areas with little medical infrastructure – or the exclusive provision of services by the 
health authorities, may substantially limit the choice. If there is only one hospital or health 
center, people will end up there to receive whatever treatment they need, unless they are either 
ready to travel a long distance or to purchase the services on private terms.  
The HCSI contains four variables which concerning the existence of formal gatekeeping for 
specialized care and hospitals, but also the factual choice among providers of specialized 
medical services and hospitals. The coding of the variables is 1, if the feature is present 
(absence of gatekeeping, presence of factual choice), and zero otherwise.  
 186
The latent pattern obtained by the PCA that there is basically one latent dimension underlying 
the four variables, see table 10.1h. Formal gatekeeping and factual choice are basically one 
common dimension, which is labeled “Access” to medical care, in particular to secondary 
care. The loading patterns indicate, that gatekeeping to secondary (both specialized services 
and hospital services) usually goes together with limited factual choice of providers and vice 
versa (note the positive loading of the choice variables and the negative loading of the 
gatekeeping variables). HCS where patients have no choice, mostly because of the availability 
of providers, are typically also the ones in which there is gatekeeping. High scores on the 
dimension indicate free and unconstrained access to secondary care.  
 
i) Quality Assurance and Enforcement 
Health care delivery is plagued by the problem of unrecognizable quality; Weisbrod (1991) 
and Sari (2002). In particular the patient as the actual consumer has very limited chances to 
recognize good or poor quality. The patient might recognizes whether the GP cares, listens 
and spends time with the patient – but this is not identical with quality. Nor is the usage of 
high-end technology a valid indicator. A further problem is that medical knowledge evolves 
constantly. Providers might be out of touch with the recent developments in their field, and 
continue to provide services based on the knowledge as it was at the time they obtained their 
medical degree. Many HCS have installed some kind of continual education, which is 
however usually voluntary and organized by the professional associations. Other HCS have 
formal recertification rules in place. Quality concerns also the provision of information to 
both, patients and providers. There are also systematic efforts to collect information on what 
therapy is best in what circumstances, subsumed under the heading of evidence based 
medicine. And there are systematic efforts to fill in the patient’s gap regarding the quality of 
potential providers.  
The variables used in this section cover, how quality of medical care is assured in a HCS.  
A first aspect is, how information is handled in a HCS. During the many individual treatment 
episodes a large amount of information arises decentrally, e.g. about what treatments are best 
in what circumstances, or which methods are worth their price and which aren’t. Quality and 
efficiency can be substantially improved, if this information is collected, evaluated and issued 
to the providers of care.  
Regarding the establishment of a “best practice” for treating “standard cases”, there are in 
some countries institutions issuing guidelines. These are understood here as standard routines 
of how to treat certain medical conditions, when to use which procedure, which medicine to 
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prescribe, because it is the most cost effective, in short standard ways to act unless there are 
particular reasons in the case demanding a different approach.  
A second aspect is the evaluation of the pure medical efficacy of different treatment options. 
Which one is “best”, when looking only at the physiological output achievable?  
A third aspect is the evaluation of the cost effectiveness of different treatments. What is the 
costs of this treatment compared to similar treatments? Often, the costs of the usage of 
equipment are not calculated, and there is no information on the costs per application. The 
same is true for pharmaceuticals, where the different products for the same indication can be 
compared with regard to the costs per daily defined dose.   
A different issue is how information on the quality of providers is handled in order to allow 
the patients an informed choice about where to obtain treatment. The idea is, that the quality 
is increased, if patients have information on quality and chose their provider based on this 
information. Patients are in a weak position regarding their chances to distinguish a good from 
a bad provider. First, because they lack medical knowledge, second, because they do not have 
experience with many providers to develop an idea of what high or low quality actually is. An 
institution, which systematically collects information on quality (e.g. re-admission rates, cases 
of malpractice, complaints by patients etc.) can close this gap. To achieve this, the 
information must be collected, but to stimulate competition it must also be distributed to the 
public. In some countries, quality information is gathered by “official agencies”, but only 
used internally, e.g. to inform providers. In others, quality is evaluated and made public, the 
typical example is the star ranking in the UK. Recently, the media in several countries 
engaged in filling the information gap, by conducting its own research and doing its on 
evaluation. This ad hoc provision was however not included.  
An additional aspect of quality assurance is, whether the purchaser can enforce the usage of 
guidelines in the hospitals or by the providers. In some countries the contracting between the 
purchaser and the hospitals / providers contains an explicit section on quality assurance, 
where the providers are committed to abide to certain standards of treatment.   
The last item on quality assurance used, is recertification: are individual medical providers, 
e.g. GPs or specialists, forced to keep up to date with the recent developments in their fields 
by being required to undergo a formal recertification? In most countries, there is some kind of 
continuing education, organized by the professional organizations. Often, this is done in a 
very informal way, e.g. on an attendance basis, where the provider has to prove, that s/he 
attended a certain number of hours in “educational events” organized by the professional 
organization.  
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The HCSI items included in the analysis of quality-related institutions are the following 
Is there an institution setting medical guidelines? 
Is there an institution evaluating medical efficacy of treatment options? 
Is there an institution evaluating cost effectiveness of treatment options? 
Is there an institution systematically evaluating quality of medical providers? 
Are these quality evaluations of medical providers published? 
Is there a recertification of physicians? 
Can the purchaser enforce the application of medical guidelines vis-à-vis the Hospital? 
Can the purchaser enforce the application of medical guidelines vis-à-vis the GP? 
 
The PCA results indicate that there are two dimensions underlying the variables. The first 
dimension is clearly dominating, with an Eigenvalue of 6.48, reproducing 81% of the 
variation in the variables. However, based on the factor loadings given in table 10.1i, it 
suggests itself to include also the second dimension. While the variables loading on the first 
dimension all concern the collection and provision of information, the second dimension 
covers the two questions of whether the purchaser can actually enforce the usage of medical 
guidelines vis-à-vis the providers (GPs and Hospitals). 
As for the content, the first dimension is denoted “Provision of Information"; the second 
dimension is denoted as “Enforcement of Quality Standards”. On the first dimension, high 
scores imply that information is collected and distributed in a systematic way. On the second 
dimension, high scores imply that the purchaser or some other institution can enforce the 
usage of this information.  
 
j) Purchaser Control over the Providers of Medical Services 
The purchaser is the intermediate agent in the chain of delegation extending from the citizens 
to the providers. While the issue of quality was covered in section i) above, this section will 
cover issues of financial control. As was argued in the section on the tasks and functions 
delegated to the purchaser, the purchaser is also acting on behalf of the citizens as a controller 
of the providers. While exercising a control over the provider might be impossible for the 
patients (they neither have sufficient information, nor can they invest the effort to do so) the 
purchaser is in a position to engage in control. In the course of its work (administering the 
provision/procurement and in particular the payment of health services) the purchaser can 
acquire a lot of information: what is done in a case, what is charged for treatment of a certain 
condition on average and by a certain provider, what providers do in a typical case, if certain 
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providers constantly overspend, e.g. tend to use sophisticated and expensive procedures too 
often, even if there is no necessity etc. Regarding the efficiency of the HCS, the question is, 
what possibilities a purchaser has at hand, to exercise this control on behalf of it’s clients.  
A purchaser’s control can address individual providers, e.g. GPs or specialists, and also 
institutional providers, i.e. hospitals. It is in the interest of the patient that the purchaser 
precludes both over-supply of services and plain fraud by providers. To do this, the purchaser 
needs information and the formal right to act on this information.  
Financial control was captured in the HCSI by three broad aspects:  
The first aspect is, whether the purchaser can identify providers, who are systematically 
overspending. For instance, in Germany the GPs as a group receive a lump sum payment by 
the HIFs, and divide up the money internally. The billing and payment of services provided – 
as well as the control – takes place within the physicians’ association. The HIFs have no 
chance to identify GPs who oversupply services.  
A second, closely related aspect is whether the purchaser receives a detailed bill, in which the 
providers list all medical services provided during a certain treatment episode. This may take 
place directly between provider and purchaser. Or indirectly, with the provider handing the 
bill to the patient, who in turn hands in the bill at his purchaser.  
A third complementary aspect is, whether the purchasers can exclude a certain provider, e.g. a 
hospital, for the explicit reason that this particular provider is constantly oversupplying 
services. 
The HCSI covers financial control by the following items, which are also used in the analysis: 
Can the purchaser identify overspending hospitals? 
Can the purchaser identify overspending GPs? 
Can the purchaser exclude overspending hospitals? 
Can the purchaser exclude overspending GPs? 
Does the purchaser get a detailed bill from hospitals? 
Does the purchaser get a detailed bill from GPs? 
In each of the variables, a “yes” is coded 1, a “no” – the absence of the feature - is coded as 
zero.  
 
The analysis given in table 10.1j yields two latent dimensions. The first, with an Eigenvalue 
of 3.52, reproduces 59% of the variation, the second one, with an Eigenvalue of 1.66 accounts 
for another 28% of the variation in the indicator variables. Despite the dominance of the first 
dimension, both dimensions will be retained, because their contents are complementary.  
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The variables concerning the information the purchaser receives from the providers are 
strongly loading on the first dimension, which is thus denoted as “Purchaser can identify 
overspending Providers". The second dimension is the possibility to “Sanction overspending 
Providers", in the most extreme case, by the exclusion of providers. Given that information 
alone might not be sufficient to exercise control, it makes sense to capture this feature as well.  
High scores on the first dimension imply that the purchaser can identify overspending 
providers. This very fact may incentivize providers to abstain from opportunistic behavior, in 
particular the extraction of rents, and might work as a mean to control costs.  
High scores on the second factor imply that the purchaser can not sanction overspending 
providers by excluding them from providing services to clients of the purchaser. Note the 
negative loading of the variables covering the possibility to exclude the provider.  
Again, it is interesting to see that the variables constitute two independent dimensions. A 
purchaser might have information about which providers are systematically overspending, but 
this does not automatically go together with the possibility to do something about it.  
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10.2. Locating Health Systems on the Institutional Dimensions 
To complement the analysis of which institutional dimensions are underlying the manifold 
organizational features of the 22 health systems, the descriptive analysis will be illustrated by 
discussing the location and the clustering of the HCS on the institutional dimensions. The 
figures presented in the following are based on scores obtained for each country by the PCA 
analysis. The situation presented and discussed is the setting in 1995. Changes will be 
described and analyzed later on in chapter 12. The descriptive analysis will cover the 
following aspects. 
(1) The description will first look for a confirmation of presumed clusterings of HCS. 
Clustering refers to similarities in organization in the sense of HCS being similar in many 
aspects. One would expect – because HCS usually represent a certain, ideologically 
underpinned model of how health care should be provided, such as Bismarckian or Beveridge 
model – that the types and models to which HCS are usually assigned should also be easily 
observable when looking at the actual institutional settings. For instance, those HCS which 
are commonly assigned to a common type, e.g. public integrated, should be closer to each 
other than to HCS of the corporatist type. Some HCS are seen in the literature as being a very 
special case, and one would also expect them to stand out when locating them in the 
“institutional space”. Closely related to this is the question of whether the group of the public-
integrated systems or the group of the purchaser-provider-split systems varies more? And, 
does that hold true for all aspects of the HCS? Or are all public integrated systems quite 
similar in only one regard, but differ substantially in many others? 
(2) The description will also look for similarities in the sense of features typically going 
together. For example, the institutional economics approach would forecast that to achieve a 
certain effect, the feature A must be complemented with feature B. So, if one is for instance 
aiming at putting purchasers under competitive pressure, it necessary to enable them to differ 
in terms of what they charge and what they offer. It is also necessary to allow citizens to 
chose freely among purchasers. Allowing only one of both features is insufficient to achieve 
the intermediate aim of competition and thus the actual aim of increasing HCS 
“performance”. 
(3) The description of what features are going together empirically will be followed by an 
analysis of how the institutional features should together in the sense of forming an efficient 
institutional syndrome. An institutional syndrome was defined in chapter 6 as the co-
occurrence of features, which in combination have a stronger impact on HCS performance 
than each of the features taken alone. An efficient institutional syndrome is a combination of 
features which – at least according to the theoretical basis of the institutional economics 
approach - increases the efficiency, because the features complement each other, rather than 
cancel each other’s effect. For instance, if purchasers are allowed to differ in what they charge 
and what they offer, but citizens are not free to change the purchaser, the net-effect is non-
existent. Purchasers could perform well, could operate more efficient, but why would they put 
in this effort if they cannot attract more clients and their clients may not leave? 
Looking at the constellations presented in the following, the question is: What constellations 
and combinations of features affect HCS efficiency? For instance, by disarming agency 
problems, by removing incentives for opportunistic behavior or by setting incentives for 
performing well.  
 
Similarities and Differences among Health Systems 
 
Figure 10.1  Agency and Incentive Problems 
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Locating the countries on the dimensions of agency and incentive problems, as given in figure 
10.1, shows that the degree to which the HCS use delegation and agency as an organizational 
mechanism varies substantially. Delegation is more or less omnipresent, some tasks are 
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typically delegated, like the sale of pharmaceuticals or dental care. Sweden is the only case in 
which even the pharmacies are state-owned. It is also the case in which a large share of dental 
care is provided by employed dentists. The other extreme are the cases of Belgium and 
Luxembourg, in which all tasks related to providing medical services or products are 
delegated to independent agents. Irrespective of the degree to which the hospitals are 
autonomous, ownership is usually retained by some public body, and only in the case of 
Belgium even the ownership of hospitals is private, i.e. they are predominantly not in 
ownership of public entities like municipalities or local governments. 
Contrary to what one would expect, there is no clear clustering observable. It is not the case 
that one has a cluster of public integrated HCS, in which most services are provided by 
medical staff which employed by the level of government in charge of providing health care. 
Neither is there a cluster of HCS in which a clear provider-purchaser split is implemented and 
all services are contracted from independent providers. Instead, the cases are spread along the 
main diagonal of figure 10.1. indicating that delegation is a matter of degree. The only case 
which is “a cluster of its own” is Sweden, for the reason mentioned above.  
While there is no clustering of HCS which are similar to members of their own cluster but 
different to the members of the other cluster, it is even at this step interesting to see that both 
institutional dimensions are highly correlated. If the tasks are delegated to independent agents, 
it is likely that remuneration modes are in place, in which the providers can increase their 
income by providing more services. The underlying mechanisms is presumably, that when 
agents are independent, the remuneration level but also the remuneration mode is part of the 
negotiations with the purchaser (be they insurance funds or the public administrations). If 
agents are independent, they develop a higher professional autonomy and gain more influence 
on the HCS, also because they have a substantial potential to threaten by refusing to enter 
unfavorable contracts; see for instance the analyses of the behavior of professional 
associations in negotiations in Ryll (1993), Brooks et al. (1999) and Barros/Martinez-Giralt 
(2005). Under these conditions it is likely that they will insist in the negotiations on a quantity 
based remuneration mode which is in the interest of the providers because it more or less 
guarantees a constant growth of health expenditure. If the agents are “incorporated” by 
turning them into a organization, it is likely that they will use their influence in negotiations 
on the institutional aspects to introduce remuneration modes which are advantageous for 
them. 
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Looking at the above figure in terms of the interactive effect of both dimensions: what would 
be an efficiency increasing “institutional syndrome”?  
The advantage of agency is that providers are independent and have to compete for the clients 
as customers by offering good treatment and showing effort. It is at times argued that in HCS 
which rely on employed providers, these incentives are absent, resulting in health care and a 
mode of delivering it which is neither qualitatively acceptable nor customer friendly. So 
agency per se is not the main problem. It becomes a disadvantage when combined with a 
remuneration based on the quantity of services respectively the intensity of treatment. Under 
these conditions, providers will engage in inducing demand to increase their income. As was 
argued in the chapter on agency in the patient provider relationship, remunerating on a fee for 
service basis does not guarantee quality. On the contrary, the incentive to produce more 
services might go at the expenses of the quality and the effort invested in each treatment 
episode. The incentives work equally on employed and self-employed providers.  
The incentive problem induced by a quantity based remuneration is worse in the case of 
independent providers than it is in the case of employed providers, because the former have 
much more leeway to engage in extending the quantity of services and are much less under 
control than an employed provider who is member of a hierarchy. The incentive problem is 
ceteris paribus lower, where more providers are employed, and vice versa.  
To capture this argument, the institutional syndrome “IncentiveProblem” was created by 
combining the dimensions “Agency” and “RemunerationIncentives” in a way that the score of 
IncentiveProblem increases if there is more delegation in the HCS, but decreases, if there is 
less quantity based remuneration in the HCS. High scores indicate a stronger incentive 
problems.  
 Figure 10.2 Purchaser Autonomy and Purchaser Status 
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Figure 10.2 shows the countries’ location with regard to the dimensions of purchaser 
autonomy and institutional status. The observed clustering is again weak, there are roughly 
four clusters identifiable. A cluster of three countries standing out with both high levels of 
institutional autonomy and high levels of competition, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. 
These are the corporatist systems, where the health insurance funds are most autonomous and 
have the largest role for operating the HCS.   
A cluster of countries with high levels of purchaser autonomy but low levels of competition, 
the top-left group, ranging from France to the Netherlands. In France, the national 
government’s influence (factual as well as formal) is highest, while in the Netherlands it is 
lowest.   
A group of four countries with strong competition, but low autonomy of the purchasers, 
encompassing Canada, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, make up another cluster. While all 
four countries have high levels of state involvement (health care provision is organized by the 
provincial, regional, local or municipal government) there is nevertheless a strong competition 
among the purchasers in these countries. The purchasers are not independent, because they are 
more or less integrated into the respective level of government, which bears the political 
responsibility for the purchasing. But they compete for clients, because they may differ both 
 195
 196
in terms of what they charge for providing health care (by way of local taxes) and what they 
offer, in particular in terms of factual access to services.  
The last cluster consists of a fourth group of countries in which the autonomy of the purchaser 
is generally low, but the degree of competition among them differs between countries. Greece 
and Hungary have the lowest, Italy, Norway, Ireland and New Zealand have the highest levels 
of competition among purchasers in this group.  
The clustering is only to some degree in accordance with the standard types of HCS. For 
instance, Switzerland, Germany and Austria are health systems with strong corporatist 
elements, where the purchasers, denominated “sickness funds”, are formally independent and 
can to some degree control features relevant for gaining or losing clients, in particular the 
contribution rate but to some degree also the catalogue of services covered. On the other hand, 
public HCS share a low level of purchaser autonomy, because purchasers are usually under 
formal control of the government. But within the latter group, there are also substantial 
differences regarding the degree to which the purchasers are under a competitive pressure. 
This pressure is absent in Greece and Hungary, but strong in Canada, and the Scandinavian 
countries apart from Norway.  
 
Given the functions and the incentives of the purchasers – what would be an efficient 
institutional syndrome? The argument is, that if purchasers are autonomous, in particular in 
the sense that a deficit would not be covered, they are under more pressure to control costs. 
The argument is, that a deficit might endanger the institutional existence of the purchaser, 
which might be forced to merge with another, better performing purchaser or go out of 
business. But autonomy and even the pressure for cost-control does not necessarily lead to 
efficiency. To be effective and of impact for the internal operating of the purchaser, these 
features must go together with a functioning competition. This in turn requires that the 
purchasers can control the parameters which allow them to compete, e.g. contribution levels 
and the catalogues of services covered respectively factually offered. Given the inconsistent 
design in many HCS, the first dimension covers free choice as one necessary conditions, 
while the second dimension covers the purchaser’s control over parameters on which 
competition is based. 
 
The efficient syndrome would be that both scores are high. The purchasers have to increase 
operative and administrative efficiency, where citizens have free choice and the purchasers 
can differ in contributions and / or services offered respectively covered. Only if both features 
are given, there is the pressure and the incentive to perform well. If the HIF is efficient, it may 
offer a more attractive bundle of contributions and services. But this only matters for the 
number of clients, if the clients may change to this HIF. 
To capture this combination, an interaction variable was generated “PurchaserSyndrome”. In 
this variable, the dimensions PurchaserAutonomy and PurchaserCompetiton were combined 
so that higher values on both institutional variables result in higher values of the 
PurchaserSyndrome variable. For instance, Greece and Hungary have low scores in this 
syndrome variable, because purchasers in both countries are neither autonomous nor have the 
means to engage in competition, because the branches of the NHS may not differ in terms of 
contributions and services offered. In other countries with a public integrated health system, 
the regional or local branches of the public health service may well differ, both in the 
contributions charged and in the services covered. Switzerland, Germany and Austria have 
high scores in the interaction variable, because the HIFs in this country are both autonomous, 
and to some degree have the possibility to differ in the packages of services and contributions 
offered to clients. Sweden, where the competition among the local purchasers of health is very 
strong, does not have high values in the interaction variable, because the autonomy of the is 
quite low.  
 
Figure 10.3: Hospital Status and Competition 
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Figure 10.3 gives the location of the countries regarding the degree to which the hospitals are 
autonomous in terms of making relevant decisions and can compete among each other for 
patients. Localizing the organization of the hospital sector indicates two loose clusters: Four 
countries – the UK, New Zealand, Poland and Finland – have made their hospitals 
autonomous, basically by having them operated along the lines of an (semipublic) enterprise. 
The degree of autonomy is however quite continuous, with Ireland, Hungary , Italy and Spain 
constituting the lower end of the range and the UK’s Hospital Trust model at the top of the 
scale. There is however a clustering observable, in the sense that the four countries which 
made their hospitals autonomous abstained from exposing them to strong competitive 
pressure. The level of competitive pressure is actually slightly below the average of all 22 
countries. In Germany and in the Netherlands, the competitive pressure is higher, at least in 
terms of the institutional preconditions for it. Competition among hospitals is lowest in 
Austria, Portugal and Greece, where the institutional preconditions are not met. 
 
What would be an “efficient institutional syndrome” in the hospital sector? Thinking only 
about the implications for expenditure the institutional syndrome is defined equivalent to the 
purchasers: the efficiency argument is based on competitive pressure which induces efforts to 
increase internal efficiency of operation, leading to lower costs. This pressure in turn requires 
autonomy – the hospital must be in charge of its own affairs, to tackle the pressure and to 
improve its performance. But competitive pressure also requires that there are several 
hospitals offering the same services and that the treatment costs may differ between them. If 
the purchaser sent its clients to the less costly hospitals, this put the more expensive hospitals 
under pressure to contain their costs. If the hospital is not autonomous in the financial sense, 
neither running a surplus nor running a deficit will matter. Neither can the hospital, which 
might be best informed about what efficiency improvements might be achieved, actually do 
something to realize these improvements if all decisions – from what investments are made, 
what staff is hired, and what services are outsourced – are made by the public administration 
and only executed by the hospital.  
But there is also a second aspect of competition, which may counteract the intended 
consequences for differences in treatment costs. Hospitals may compete not on the basis of 
costs, but on the basis of quality and reputation. A hospital might try to attract clients by 
offering the best service, irrespective of the costs efficiency aspects. It may for instance invest 
heavily in equipment and quality, even if this is no longer in an reasonable relation to the 
costs incurred.  
But in both cases, if the hospitals cannot or need not compete for clients, e.g. because they 
basically have regional monopolies, they do not need to engage in increasing operative 
efficiency or quality.  
The indicator variable “HospitalSyndrome” was generated by combining both institutional 
dimensions in a way that the resulting interaction variable has the highest scores for those 
countries in which hospitals are both autonomous and competition among them is installed. 
High scores of the HospitalSyndrome variable indicate that the hospitals are under pressure to 
work efficiently. Low scores indicate a situation, in which they are insulated from competition 
and have neither pressure nor incentive to increase internal efficiency.  
 
Figure 10.4 Financial Control and Sanctioning of Providers 
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The locations of the countries on the two dimensions of financial control of the purchasers 
over the providers given in figure 10.4 show no clear clustering. The countries cover the 
institutional space completely, all combinations occur. Moreover, the absence of countries 
being close, which might be expected to be similar is a finding, which in itself indicates that 
this issue does not correspond to the classical types of HCS.  
Note that low scores on the horizontal dimension imply that the purchaser can sanction the 
provider by excluding them. So this kind of sanctioning is strongest in Ireland, and lowest in 
Switzerland. 
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What combinations of these two variables are of a particular impact on efficiency? It is part of 
the task delegated to the purchaser to exercise control over the providers of services, in 
particular regarding the financial side of health procurement. As was elaborated in chapter 4, 
the patient is neither in the position, nor actually motivated to engage in an auditing of what 
the providers charge. In many countries, the patients are completely ignorant of the financial 
side of the health care consumption. To engage in control, the purchaser must obtain 
information about what was done in a case. The purchaser must be able to identify providers 
who are overspending. But information alone is not enough, to be able to exert a control, the 
purchaser should be able to sanction the provider. In the extreme case by excluding the 
provider from selective contracting. For instance, in Germany, the HIFs have contracts with 
the regional associations of the GPs. Each HIF pays a lump sum for its clients living in the 
catchment area of the GP association and the GP’s association distributes the payment 
internally according to certain schedules. The HIF never receives a billing by a provider, nor 
does it control the providers billing, and thus cannot identify providers who are billing more 
and/or more expensive services on a regular basis. So if there is some kind of control, it is 
only exercised among the providers themselves. In this setting of collective contracting, the 
HIF can factually not threaten the individual provider, because the HIF does not formally 
have a contract with the individual provider. In other countries, the HIF contracts individual 
providers (e.g. by putting defined contracts out for tender) and can engage in selective 
contracting, also based on past experiences with individual providers. In other systems, there 
is a detailed billing, often involving the patient as an intermediary in a setting of cost-
reimbursement.  
The efficient syndrome in the issue of financial control over the providers is defined by the 
combination of high scores on both dimensions; i.e. effective control is given, when the 
purchaser can identify and sanction providers which are systematically overspending. Given 
the scaling of the dimensions, the “ControlSyndrome” variable was generated by combining 
both dimensions in a way that higher values of the first dimension imply higher values for the 
ControlSyndrome score, while lower values on the second dimension imply higher values of 
the ControlSyndrome score. 
 For the remaining institutional dimensions, the following figures serve illustrative purposes.  
 
Figure 10.5 Patient Involvement and Composition of Health Funding 
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With regard to the degree of patient involvement and the composition of health funding, one 
would expect, that a HCS, which involve patients in the payment of providers, also has higher 
levels of private funding of health care. The above figure 10.5 plots the share of private 
funding for health care (data from the OECD Health Database) by the level of patient 
involvement in health care, i.e. the incidence (not the magnitude) of co-payments and the 
degree to which the patients directly pay for services and are reimbursed later on.  
There is no relationship between the two features. There are countries, in which the 
involvement is high, e.g. France, but the share of financing borne by the patient is only 
moderate. There are also countries, in which the involvement is low, but the actual share of 
the costs borne by the patients is quite high.  
There is no clustering of countries being similar to each other regarding these features nor is 
there an association between a “type” of HCS and the level patient involvement, be it in terms 
of the magnitude or the incidence of involvement. Private funding is highest in Switzerland 
and in Greece, and lowest in Luxembourg and the Czech Republic.  
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 Figure 10.6 Regulations on the Pharmaceutical Market. 
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Figure 10.6 above shows the location of the 22 cases in the space defined by the two 
dimensions concerning the control of the prices and the sales of pharmaceuticals respectively 
the control of coverage of pharmaceuticals, i.e. whether either the price or the coverage 
decision (reimbursement by the HCS as a precondition to a larger market) are based on a 
evaluation of the medicines the quality and effectiveness, in particular to existing alternatives.  
The first dimension concerned the degree to which the state exerts control over prices and 
sales, by regulating prices of medicines or by setting a budget for pharmaceutical expenditure. 
The second dimension concerns the question whether the state does evaluate a medicine 
before granting coverage by the HCS. High scores on this dimension indicate that the price 
and the coverage is based on an evaluation of the product. This is indirectly relevant for 
pharmaceutical expenditure, because by excluding marginally improved medicines from 
coverage, the state may avoid unjustified grants of patent periods and thus paying patent 
period prices to the manufacturer.  
Again, there is neither a clustering nor a clear assignment of HCS of a certain “standard type” 
to a certain location in the figure. The HCS are dispersed almost over the complete space, 
which indicates that things are handled differently in most of the HCS. As for the hypothesis 
that HCS which are seen as being similar in their basic features, the figure does not show 
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HCS of similar types as being close to each other. For instance, both Spain and Switzerland 
renounce direct price control but engage in a different degree on evaluation of medicine 
before the coverage by the HCS is granted. France, a corporatist HCS with substantial powers 
retained by the state, engages in evaluation as a precondition to the granting coverage, as well 
as price controls.  
On the other hand, Germany, Greece and Poland do not evaluate new medicines as a 
precondition to granting them coverage by the HCS. The HCS with the strongest influence of 
the government on prices and sales are Belgium, New Zealand and Canada, where at least 
Belgium is usually not seen as a HCS in which the state heavily intervenes.  
 
Figure 10.7 Provision of Information and Enforcement of Quality Standards 
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Regarding the provision of information and the enforcement of available information and 
quality standards, figure 10.7 above the countries show no clear clustering. If any clustering 
occurs at all, one could at most say that two countries stand out. Sweden, because of its 
system of quality registries and the Netherlands, because of the recertification system for GPs 
which is a singular feature among the cases included in the study. Both are also strongly 
engaged in providing information to the patients.  
If theses two countries are ignored for the moment, the picture observable is surprisingly that 
of a negative relationship between both features: countries which provide information and 
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counteract the patients’ lack of knowledge by gathering and providing information, e.g. on the 
quality of providers, are usually less engaged in enforcing quality vis-à-vis the providers and 
vice versa.  
What we see that apart from the two cases which take quality assurance seriously enough to 
create institutional settings, the countries either rely on informing the patients, enabling them 
to chose providers based on the improved knowledge they have. Or rely on enforcing the 
quality standards vis-à-vis the providers of services, leaving the patient out of the picture.  
Interestingly, the countries relying more on the provision of information are the HCS in which 
many of the providers are employed by the state, i.e. the very systems in which the internal 
enforcement of quality standards by hierarchical control might be the method of choice. And, 
on the other hand, those systems in which the providers are agents independent from the 
public hierarchy rely on enforcing quality standards.  
 
Efficiency in economic terms or cost control is not the predominant theme in the domain of 
quality. Rather, the issue and the problem is on the one hand, how to organize the collection, 
evaluation, and dissemination of quality relevant data on “best medical treatment”. And, on 
the other hand, the problem is the enforcement of quality in an effective way. So, given the 
two dimensions, what is the effective syndrome, i.e. which combination of both dimensions is 
supportive for the assurance of quality? 
Collecting and providing information alone is necessary, but not sufficient for an effective 
quality assurance. The providers, in particular self employed providers, value their 
professional autonomy highly and are not per se ready to be told what to do in certain 
conditions, see Moran (2004) and Larkin (1995). Providing guidelines and advice alone will 
not make them change their ways. So the effectiveness of control is increased, if the provision 
is supplemented with a regulation which makes abidance to quality standards binding. While 
the professional organizations also engage in an internal quality control, its effect is often seen 
as questionable, also because their neutrality is questioned. So effectiveness of quality control 
can be presumed to be much higher, if it is done from the outside, e.g. the purchaser, and also 
if it is linked to the possibility of excluding the provider from delivering services to the 
customer so the purchaser. In terms of the two dimensions identified, , the effectiveness of 
quality control increase, if both feature are present. The variable QualitySyndrome is a 
multiplicative combination of both dimension (which were adjusted, to compensate for the 
incidence of negative values on the scales). The value of the combined variable increases with 
both institutional dimensions. High values of the QualitySyndrome variable indicate that the 
provision of quality relevant information is organized and that the lack of quality can be 
sanctioned by an actor external to the medical profession. 
 
Figure 10.8 Governmental Control and Financing of the Health Care System 
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One would expect that if the government is highly involved in the HCS financing, it will also 
assure that it has control over what happens in the systems. Which is to say that one would 
expect the government to retain control over what happens with its money. But as figure 10.8. 
above shows, this is not the case. It plots the level of government control over the parameters 
of the HCS by the level of government expenditure for health care in percent of the total 
expenditure for Health; the data is from the OECD Health Database. Government expenditure 
refers to expenditure which is raised in the form of taxes. The figure excludes social security 
i.e. contributions which are levied by non-governmental actors, like social health insurance 
funds and the like.  
 
There is a clustering observable, but not the expected relationship between both features. 
The observable clustering basically follows the standard categorization of social health 
insurance systems vs. public health systems. In the former most funding is raised by Health 
Insurance Funds, which are independent from the public administration and raise 
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contributions directly from the insured. The state is only subsidizing the HCS on an ad hoc 
basis, for instance by standing in for deficits of HIFs, funding hospital investments or 
subsidizing certain social groups unable to pay their own HIF contributions. Systems of this 
type constitute the first cluster, located to the left of figure 10.8. 
The second cluster is made of those HCS in which the state – either the national or a lower 
level of government (regional or local) raises the majority of funds by taxation. The split 
between both clusters is quite pronounced: the social health insurance systems have on 
average a level of government funding of about 20% while the state-operated HCS are 
predominantly financed by the state.  
Within each cluster, the range of central government involvement in the HCS covers the full 
scale. A noteworthy finding is a certain dichotomy in the social health insurance cluster, 
arising from the fact that seemingly, the state either assumes substantial control, up to the 
level comparable to a public-integrated type or almost no control, rather than having a control 
in the middle range. In Austria, Germany and Switzerland, the state has delegated the decision 
making to the societal actors and retained almost no control. In France, the Czech Republic, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Hungary, the state has acquired (or retained) substantial 
control rights. The way this is done differs, in France the insurance funds are formally 
independent, but the state has many options and levers to intervene, contributions for instance 
are set by parliamentary decision. In the Czech Republic and Luxembourg, the largest fund is 
basically controlled by the government, which is determining the top-level administration of 
the fund. 
 
Summary: Institutional Syndromes and Types of Health Systems 
Looking at the figures presented above, two observations have to be stated 
(1) Looking at similarities and clustering of HCS as they actually come up from the figures, 
the main finding is that there are surprisingly little “typical syndromes”, but instead there is 
high variability and little co-occurrences of features. The institutional variation, which was 
covered in this study in a very detailed way, also reveals that the HCS, even on a sectorial 
basis, vary substantially. Functions are organized differently in different HCS and there are no 
striking models or templates which would be consistently recognizable by HCS clustering in 
all of the above figures. 
(2) Closely related is the finding that if one looks at the HCS in a detailed way, labels like 
“NHS”, “public-integrated” or “corporatist”, become next to meaningless. Irrespective of 
running in the public debate under labels, HCS might be very similar, at least in some sectors, 
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and vice versa. Regarding competition, as a “system feature”, which is because of its 
presumed advantages for health care a focus of the present study, public integrated systems 
might have many elements of competition, regardless of the status of many actors in the 
system. Systems which have installed both independent providers and autonomous purchasers 
which in turn are presumed to compete among each other may have next to no elements 
required for an effective competition. Moreover, a certain inconsistency of the designs is 
observable: to be working, competition needs several elements – but often, one element of 
competition is present, but not the complementary one, which would be needed to make the 
former effective. Or, the first element of competition is compensated by another element, 
which removes the competition from the picture. 
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10.3. The Political Environment and Indirect Veto Power 
Apart from the institutional structure of the HCS itself, two additional features are of 
importance for the HCS’ achievement and efficiency, both concerning the potential for 
external control as a counter measure to efficiency-decreasing tendencies to the HCS. 
According to the argument in developed in chapter 5, the availability of levers for external 
control, i.e. the Governmental Control as measured in the above section, is insufficient for the 
effective exercise of control. Nor is the possibility that the government implements reforms 
sufficient to hold these inherent tendencies in check.  
The argument of the indirect veto power which might arise in the HCS, making it reform 
resistant, rests in turn on the number of veto players in the political system and the number of 
societal actors which might access the veto players to make at least one of them cast a veto 
against an intervention.  
 
a) The Political System 
The data on the political environment shall basically capture the capability of the political 
system to produce policy and institutional changes in a societal subsystem, like the economy 
or the HCS. As argued in chapter 5, the conceptual dimension of external control is itself 
constituted by two dimensions. First, the levers available to the government for directly 
influence the HCS, e.g. the formal authority to set an overall budget for health expenditure. 
This is captured by the “GovernmentControl” dimension described above. Second, external 
control is constituted by the government’s capacity to act. This can be proxied by its internal 
composition: more parties in government make it increasingly likely that they cannot agree on 
implementing a certain policy or on the usage of a certain instrument of external control, with 
the result that nothing happens. Neither are existing levers used nor are reforms implemented 
and the HCS can go on as before. And moreover, it is also less likely that the actors in the 
HCS “behave well” in order to avoid an intervention. On the other hand, a government which 
is capable to act might not be required to act, because the actors anticipate government action 
and, fearing that it might be worse than self restraint, behave well to avoid government action. 
The indicator of the political system’s capacity for action used is the number of “Parties in 
Government”; PiG. While there are more refined versions of the veto player concepts, the 
actual measurement for all cases would be another task, which is not the actual aim of the 
study. The argument is, that the parties in government are most important for deciding on the 
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policy and the usage of levers available. In particular for the usage of existing levers, 
institutional veto players like constitutional courts and referenda are of no concern. If the 
coalition members cannot agree, there will be no intervention in the HCS. According to the 
concept of indirect veto power outlined in chapter 5, few parties in government mean fewer 
points of access for societal actors and thus fewer indirect veto players. To capture the 
number of the latter, the number of PiG as points of access must be complemented by the 
number of actors interested in gaining and using access: the more organized actors exist in the 
HCS, the higher the chances that at least one of them will try to exert influence to block 
government action. 
 
b) Existence of Societal Actors 
The HCSI also gathered data on the existence of societal actors with a say respectively a stake 
in HCS and its operation. The argument is, that any government intervention will go at the 
expense of some actor in the HCS. HCE is cost to the patient, but income for the providers. 
Because the interest of the individual actors in the HCS are so opposed to each other, external 
interventions likely to create opposition from at least some groups – that is, if the respective 
group is organized and able to formulate and express the opposition. Groups in the HCS differ 
with regard to the degree to which they can be organized into an effective interest 
representation. For instance, if the government uses its power to limit pharmaceutical prices, 
the pharmaceutical industry is concerned, because its profit will be limited and most likely 
lower. The same is true if certain medical services (like acupuncture or homeopathy) are no 
longer covered by the HCS. In this case, the providers of these services are confronted with a 
drop in demand for their services, because patients have to bear the costs fully out of pocket 
or at least have to pay for a supplementary insurance.  
The HCSI asked for a set of actors, whether they exist as organized entities. The term 
“organized entities” refers to professional associations who are also representing the interests 
of their members, trade unions of the medical professionals, or to associations of institutional 
actors (like hospitals) formally in charge of regulating issues of concern for these groups. The 
set of actors covered is the following: GPs, specialists, dentists, providers of laboratory 
services, patients, Health Insurance Funds or Health Authorities, hospital associations, 
pharmacists, employers and other actors. 
The term “other actors” concerns a range of actors, such as organizations running hospitals, 
like the public charities or the church (a major actor in Ireland). It also covers trade unions 
(not the trade unions of the medical professionals, but the trade unions of professionals 
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outside the health system), who are in some countries, like Germany, involved in running the 
HIFs and have a substantial influence in governmental decisions on health policy.  
The employers are counted as a societal actor in this regard, if the employer pays a share of 
contribution to the health system. In some countries, the contribution is fully paid by the 
employed, and the costs of the HCS are of no concern for the employers. But for instance in 
Germany, the employer pays half of the contribution going to the Social Health Insurance. If 
the contributions soar, non-wage labor costs soar too, and the employer has to bear higher 
costs. Consequentially, the associations of the employers (or more general, the associations of 
the industry) has a stake in health policy and is interested in exerting influence.  
Given that the argument underlying the usage of this information rests on the number of 
societal groups involved, the resulting variable is an additive index running from 0 to nine. 
Low scores of the index represent low chances that some interested societal actor exists, 
which might be motivated enough to lobby an political actor in order to make the latter cast a 
veto or to water down the intervention.  
 
c) Indicators of Indirect Veto Power 
Both, the number of Parties in Government (PiG) and the number of organized societal actors, 
SocActors, with a say and a stake in operating the HCS are preconditions for indirect veto 
power, but are – according to the hypothesis - not per se decisive for what actually happens. 
The PiG is the number of access points, which may or may not be used by one of the societal 
actors, to gain access in order to avoid certain policy measures.  
In the absence of concrete information on particular connections between a party in 
government and a societal group, the indicator to capture the interaction is the chance – which 
in turn will be operationalized as the multiplicative interaction. The variable “IndirectVeto”, 
which will be used in the analysis, is calculated as the product of the number of societal actors 
and the number of parties in government; PiG.  
High values indicate a high probability that a veto will be cast, because a connection was 
established between at least one societal actor and at least one party in government, which 
blocked the policy making process.  
Figure 10.9 Potential Indirect Veto Power in the Health System 
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Figure 10.9. above plots the number of parties in government (PiG) and the organized societal 
actors involved in the operation of the HCS (SocActors). The lowest number of societal actors 
can be found in Norway and Greece, both public-integrated systems. The highest number of 
societal actors are found in the corporatist HCS, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. This 
is basically in line with the argument made in chapter 5, that by deciding for a corporatists 
HCS, implies the creation of incorporated actors, which then obtain a say, sometimes even 
factual control over the HCS. Interestingly there is a slight correlation between both, in the 
sense, that more organized societal actors occur in political systems in which the party system 
is prone to government coalitions. The two countries not fitting into this picture are Italy and 
Finland. The finding might imply a tendency of fragmented party systems to delegate the 
provision of health care to societal actors, which is equivalent with removing the policy area, 
or at least the day to day operation, from the political arena and thus to remove a source of 
potential conflict in the political negotiations. In countries, in which single party governments 
are the rule, e.g. the UK or Greece, and governance power is concentrated in the hands of the 
government, is more likely that the government will also take charge of the HCS. While this 
interpretation is to some degree in line with the findings of Lijphart (1999), there is not 
enough data to make a definite statement.  
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11. Institutions and Health System Achievement: Causal Analysis 
The causal analysis will be based on looking at the relationships between institutional 
features, in particular delegation problems and implemented control mechanisms on the one 
hand and the indicators of health system “performance” on the other hand. The indicators of 
achievement and efficiency, as constituting elements of performance, are the following:  
(1) Health outputs, such as life expectancy, mortality, life years lost, and medical fatalities, 
(2) beyond-health outputs, such as satisfaction and responsiveness,  
(3) health expenditure levels, composition (public vs. private) and dynamics (absolute vs. 
relative) 
(4) the productive efficiency, based on the ratio of outputs to inputs. 
The selection covers the two dependent variables of the study: the achievement levels, and 
efficiency in the sense of whether the achievement levels are reached at low or high costs. The 
indicators, both often used synonymously for “performance”, are the most prominent and are, 
so to speak, the parameters on which most of the public and political attention is focused.  
 
The causal analysis will guided by two questions: 
(1) What is the impact of the individual underlying institutional dimensions found in chapter 
10 above? The factor scores obtained in section 10.1 will be correlated with the input, output 
and efficiency indicators. Do for instance, as institutional economics would suggest, higher 
levels of “Agency” actually go together with higher levels of health expenditure? Does, while 
it may have adverse effects on some input indicators, agency affect other indicators, in 
particular output, in a positive way, so that the overall effect of this institutional feature is 
positive?  
(2) Is there a particular effect of institutional syndromes, i.e. combinations of the institutional 
dimensions, which are supposed to be performance and efficiency increasing? For instance, 
“Agency” per se might not be so problematic, but it might be so if it is combined with 
remuneration incentives which set an incentive to oversupply health services. So if there are 
independent agents which are remunerated by modes which set at least a the margin, an 
incentive to supply more services, this together might have a stronger effect on efficiency or 
expenditure levels than each of the institutional dimensions taken alone.  
 
The dataset encompasses at maximum 44 data points, defined by 22 countries and two points 
in time. For several analyses the actual number is somewhat below that, because data because 
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the dependent variables are available for only one point in time or are missing for some of the 
cases. Thus, given the small number of cases the chances to find statistically significant 
correlations are small. 
 
However, what I am is interested in here is whether there are actually institutional properties 
going systematically together with output and performance features. So, I will look at sets of 
indicators, which capture the HCS’ performance and achievement in certain aspects, and 
study if they correlate with certain institutional features (section 11.1) and then, whether this 
correlation is stable if other institutional features are taken into account, (section 11.2).  
The bivariate correlation reflects the certainly naïve perspective of a health-policy maker who 
is asking: Is there, when looking only at one institutional dimension, and a certain outcome-
variable a stable relationship between both in the sense that if one changes the former one, 
one achieves a certain effect in the latter one? The multivariate regression analysis reflects the 
more sophisticated view of the health system researcher, asking are there – ceteris paribus – 
certain effects, which are stable, independent from the institutional setting in other sectors of 
the HCS?  
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Table 11.1. Overview on the Expected Effects of Institutional Variables
Institutional Dimensions
High values indicate Expected Effects on HCE
pAgency
high levels of Delegation to independent 
agents who are providing services
higher HCE, because a higher 
quantiy of services is provided 
and agents have more leeway 
to extract rents
pRemuneration 
Incentives     High incentives to increase the quantity 
of services provided
higher HCE, because a higher 
quantiy of services is provided
pHospital_Autonomy
Autonomous Hospitals, which have 
control over decisions about investment 
in equipment and capacities
higher HCE, because a higher 
quantiy of services is provided
pHospital 
_Competition Hospitals, which are competing among 
each other, based either on prices
higher HCE, because of a 
doubling of hospital 
infrastructure
pPurchaser 
_Autonomy
Purchasers which are autonomous (in 
particular from government), can decide 
on parameters defining the relationships 
with the clients and are responsible for 
deficits
higher HCE, because 
purchasers can pursue their 
own agenda, also increase on 
the job consumption
pPurchaser 
_Competition Purchasers, which are competing for 
clients by offering different packages of 
contributions and 
lower HCE, because 
purchasers have to increase 
internale efficiency to be 
competitive
pPatient_Involvement
patients are involved in payment of 
providers, either by having to pay for the 
services and getting reimbursement later 
on, or by having to make co-payments
lower HCE, because the price 
mechanims matters for 
consumption
pPharma 
Access&Sales
Control over Access and Sales of 
pharmaceuticals, high scores indicate 
the usage of price controls, budgets, and 
incentives to use generics
lower HCE, because the 
usage of generics is increased
pGovernmental 
_Control
the Central Govenrment's control over 
parameters of the HCS, prices, 
coverages, overall budgets, and in 
particular the hospital sector
lower HCE, because the 
interests of the public are 
represented by the 
government
pAccess
free access of the patients to secondary 
care, in out-patient as well as in-patient 
settings, also factual choice among 
several providers of secondary care
pQuality_Information indicate the organized collection, 
evaluation and provision of qualtiy 
relevant information to the providers of 
medical care
pQuality_Enforcement imply that the purchaser or some other 
institution can enforce the usage of this 
information by the providers of medical 
services 
pFinControl_Identify
purchaser which can identify providers 
which are overspending and 
oversupplying medical services
lower HCE, because providers 
may restrain themselves from 
overspending
pFinControl_ 
NoSanctioning
purchasers, which can sanction 
providers which are overspending and 
oversupplying services, e.g. by excluding 
them from providing services to the 
purchaser's clients
lower HCE, because providers 
can be sanctioned for 
overspending  
 Table 11.1 (continued)
Institutional 
Dimensions High values indicate Expected Effects on HCE
Institutional Syndromes
IncentiveProblem providers who have the incentive to and 
the possibiltiy to increase their income by 
providing more services to patients higher HCE, more growth
HospitalSyndrome hospitals, which are autonomous (can 
control parameters relevant for 
competition) and are under competitive 
pressure to use the autonomy 
lower HCE, slower growth of 
HCE
PurchaserSyndrome purchaser which are autonomous (can 
control parameters relevant for 
competition) and are under competitive 
pressure to use the autonomy 
lower HCE, slower growth of 
HCE
QualitySyndrome providers obtain information aiming at 
increasing the quality of care, and can be 
forced to use this information 
lower HCE, slower growth of 
HCE
FinControlSyndrome
purchasers which can both identify and 
sanction providers who are overspending
lower HCE, slower growth of 
HCE  
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Table 11.1 (continued) Expected Effects ….
Institutional 
Dimensions
… on quality / 
health output
output / 
Satisfaction … on HCS efficiency
pAgency lower Efficiency
pRemuneration 
Incentives     
more 
responsiveness, 
because there is an 
incentive to react to 
any demand and 
wish of the patient
lower efficiency, 
because more services 
than actually indicated 
are supplied
pHospital_Autonomy lower efficiency, 
because hospitals tend 
to overinvest in medical 
equipment for reasons 
of status
pHospital_Competition
higher quality, 
because of a 
reputation based 
competition
higher satisfaction, 
because the citizens 
have a choice on 
where to obtain 
treatment
higher efficiency, 
because hospitals also 
compete by prices 
offered for treatments
pPurchaser_Autonomy
pPurchaser_Competition higher efficiency, 
because competitive 
pressure lowers the 
administrative costs of 
the purchasers
pPatient_Involvement
lower satisfaction, 
because the direct 
costs for the patients 
are higher 
higher efficiency, 
because predominantly 
only cost-effective 
services are consumed
pPharma 
Access&Sales
lower satisfaction, 
because the 
patient's choice 
among medicines is 
limited 
higher efficiency, 
because the usage of 
pharmaceuticals is 
more oriented on the 
cost-effectiveness
pGovernmental_Control higher efficiency, 
because the tendency 
of the "insiders" to 
increase the HCE is 
held in check
pAccess higher 
responsiveness and 
higher satisfaction, 
because choice is an 
important demand of 
pQuality_Information higher quality, 
because new 
information is 
distributed rapidly 
among the providers 
of medical care
higher efficiency, 
because predominantly 
only cost-effective 
services are consumed
pQuality_Enforcement higher quality, 
because quality 
standards are made 
binding for the 
providers of medical 
care
higher efficiency, 
because predominantly 
only cost-effective 
services are consumed
pFinControl_Identify higher efficiency, 
because oversupply of 
services of uncertain 
medical necessity is 
avoided
pFinControl_ 
NoSanctioning
higher efficiency, 
because oversupply of 
services of uncertain 
medical necessity is 
avoided  
 
Table 11.1 (continued) Expected Effects ….
Institutional 
Dimensions
… on quality / 
health output
...on beyond health 
output / 
Satisfaction … on HCS efficiency
Institutional Syndromes
IncentiveProblem more 
responsiveness, 
because intensity of 
care is higher, and 
the providers react 
to all demands of the 
patients lower Efficiency
HospitalSyndrome higher quality, 
because of a 
reputation based 
competition  higher Efficiency
PurchaserSyndrome higher satisfaction, 
because the citizens 
have a choice 
among different 
purchasers  higher Efficiency
QualitySyndrome higher quality, 
because quality 
standards are 
available and are 
enforced  higher Efficiency
FinControlSyndrome  higher Efficiency  
 
Table 11.1 gives an overview on the institutional variables used and the hypotheses following 
from the institutional economics / delegation approach for various indicators of health system 
achievement and efficiency.  
The assumption underlying the following analyses is, that if the institutional setting as a 
whole, respectively certain elements of the setting actually matter for performance and 
achievement, the relationships will show up and will also be quite stable, despite the small 
number of cases. Consequentially, the following analysis of associations will not so much 
look for a single correlation, but whether there are consistently correlations between features 
and properties, which confirm what one would expect given the underlying theory or 
contradict the theory, either by having no or by having an opposed effect. A single bivariate 
correlation as well as a single coefficient in the regression analysis is insufficient to make a 
statement, in particular if one has relatively few cases. But a systematical pattern in which 
institutional factors are correlated with HCS achievements the way one would assume them to 
be given the underlying theory, is a stronger support for the theory.  
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11.1. Correlates of Health System “Performance” 
Table 11.2 gives the bivariate correlations between the institutional dimensions, i.e. the factor 
scores obtained for a country at each of the two points in time, calculated as described in 
chapter 10 and the chosen indicators of health system performance. The idea at this step is to 
look at whether individual institutional features, e.g. a high level of agency, goes together 
with certain levels of HCS achievement or efficiency. I am fully aware, that the results are 
bivariate association only, without statistical inference nor the clear cut proof, that the 
correlation between the institutional feature and the achievement/efficiency indicator is valid 
or only spurious and actually caused by a third variable.  
 
Table 11.2 Correlations among Institutional Features and Indicators of HCS Performance 
 
 218
22 16
Output side of the Health System
                      "Health"   "Beyond Health"
 
Total Life 
Expectancy
Infant 
Mortality
Life Years 
Lost (Net)
Medical 
Fatalities Resp. Index    Satisf.
Institutional Dimensions
pAgency -0,17 0,17 0,14 0,03 0,23 0,25
pRemuneration_Incentives 0,03 0,02 -0,07 0,16 0,30 0,05
pHospital_Autonomy -0,14 0,17 0,06 -0,16 -0,03 0,40
pHospital_Competition 0,25 -0,30 -0,26 -0,31 0,52 0,40
pPurchaser_Autonomy 0,20 -0,28 -0,32 0,08 0,59 0,63
pPurchaser_Competition 0,29 -0,28 -0,33 -0,07 0,47 0,26
pPatient_Involvement 0,31 -0,34 -0,27 0,12 0,41 0,09
pPharma_Access&Sales 0,01 0,10 0,08 0,31 -0,24 -0,32
pPharma_Coverage 0,21 -0,28 -0,11 0,27 0,11 0,08
pGovernmental_Control -0,24 0,28 0,27 -0,05 -0,54 -0,41
pAccess 0,05 -0,17 -0,17 0,34 0,37 0,12
pQuality_Information 0,06 -0,21 0,00 -0,29 -0,08 0,20
pQuality_Enforcement 0,19 -0,11 -0,34 0,31 0,35 0,19
pFinControl_Identify 0,03 -0,18 -0,15 -0,10 0,08 0,45
pFinControl_NoSanctioning 0,31 -0,30 -0,26 0,34 0,43 0,23
Institutional Syndromes
IncentiveProblem 0,18 -0,15 -0,28 0,09 0,46 0,13
HospitalSyndrome 0,09 -0,10 -0,15 -0,27 0,29 0,44
PurchaserSyndrome 0,28 -0,33 -0,36 0,13 0,63 0,50
QualitySyndrome 0,24 -0,31 -0,27 -0,10 0,16 0,25
FinControlSyndrome -0,19 0,19 0,10 -0,36 -0,30 -0,16
Political Features
PiG  Parties in Government -0,07 -0,10 0,00 -0,11 0,15 0,29
Societal Actors -0,31 0,18 0,26 -0,07 0,05 0,45
Indirect Veto-Power -0,26 0,11 0,19 -0,07 0,08 0,39
Economic Environment
GDP 0,65 -0,62 -0,67 -0,19 0,95 0,58
N 44 44 44 44  
 Table 11.2 (continued) 
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2
Input side of the Health System
Health Expenditure Levels and Dynamics Effciency
HCE  
dTHCE
_abs
dTHCE
_per 
dTHCE
_rel
Private 
HCE
dPrivate 
HCE WHO1
Institutional Dimensions
pAgency 0,22 0,32 0,21 -0,10 -0,03 0,11 -0,21
pRemuneration_Incentives 0,28 0,29 0,13 0,01 0,21 0,00 0,00
pHospital_Autonomy -0,21 -0,17 -0,05 -0,12 -0,21 0,16 -0,35
pHospital_Competition 0,48 0,21 -0,17 -0,24 -0,41 -0,08 -0,02
pPurchaser_Autonomy 0,46 0,18 -0,11 -0,15 -0,01 -0,06 -0,01
pPurchaser_Competition 0,16 -0,09 -0,18 -0,04 -0,05 -0,29 -0,01
pPatient_Involvement 0,43 0,32 0,07 0,13 0,04 -0,29 0,28
pPharma_Access&Sales -0,05 -0,13 -0,01 0,15 0,26 0,07 -0,10
pPharma_Coverage 0,17 0,23 0,15 0,23 0,07 -0,15 0,27
pGovernmental_Control -0,24 0,11 0,28 0,16 0,01 0,29 0,06
pAccess 0,38 0,38 0,18 0,06 0,06 0,03 0,22
pQuality_Information 0,05 -0,28 -0,43 0,08 -0,29 -0,23 -0,04
pQuality_Enforcement 0,06 0,03 0,00 -0,19 0,16 0,07 0,20
pFinControl_Identify 0,08 -0,15 -0,17 -0,12 -0,16 0,11 0,03
pFinControl_NoSanctioning 0,44 0,30 0,07 0,10 0,07 -0,09 0,29
Institutional Syndromes
IncentiveProblem 0,38 0,31 0,06 -0,03 0,07 -0,04 0,05
HospitalSyndrome 0,17 0,01 -0,14 -0,19 -0,36 -0,27 -0,20
PurchaserSyndrome 0,37 0,05 -0,18 -0,11 0,04 0,00 -0,02
QualitySyndrome 0,11 -0,22 -0,39 -0,05 -0,16 0,07 0,12
FinControlSyndrome -0,37 -0,25 -0,06 -0,08 -0,03 -0,18 -0,20
Political Features
PiG  Parties in Government 0,09 -0,09 -0,24 -0,03 0,03 0,10 -0,08
Societal Actors -0,02 0,05 0,01 -0,15 -0,20 0,19 -0,30
Indirect Veto-Power 0,01 -0,01 -0,06 -0,11 -0,07 0,27 -0,23
Economic Environment
GDP 0,87 0,76 0,12 -0,02 -0,15 -0,40 0,38
N 44 44 44 44 42 42 2  
 
The analysis will first look at the correlations between the individual institutional dimensions 
and then carry on for the institutional syndromes. A supplementary section will consider the 
impact of the political and economic environment of the HCS. The content and description of 
the dependent variables is given in table 9.3 above.  
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11.1.1. Institutional Dimensions and Health System Achievement 
 
Agency  
Regarding the health outputs of the HCS, Life expectancy, Infant mortality and Years of life 
lost, high levels of agency in the HCS are associated with underperformance; lower life 
expectancy, higher infant mortality and more years of life lost. There is no association with 
the number of medical fatalities, probably because these mostly occur in hospitals, which are 
more or less public respectively at least in public ownership in all systems. Regarding the 
expenditure levels and dynamics, agency increases the level and the growth of overall 
expenditure in absolute terms, albeit not in relative terms. It is not related to the level or the 
increase in Private HCE. Agency correlates with lower levels of efficiency of the production 
of DALE, as measured in the WHO1 efficiency indicator, but it strongly increases the 
responsiveness and the satisfaction with the HCS. So, while agency is either not at all or even 
negatively impacting on the health output production and makes the production of health 
more expensive, it strongly increases the production of beyond-health outputs of HCS. Which 
would suggest that independent agents produce responsiveness, an output which was found to 
be of substantial relevance for the satisfaction of citizens with their health system; see 
Mossialos (1997).  
 
Remuneration Incentives 
The picture obtained for this institutional feature is ambiguous: the expectations regarding the 
effect of this institutional dimension concern in particular the levels of HCE, because the 
dimension captures the incentive to oversupply services. Whether these services (which are 
presumed to be unnecessary from a medical viewpoint and primarily provided for the sake of 
increasing the provider’s income), have an impact on a health output, is unclear. And indeed, 
when looking at the second row of table 11.2, the only clear cut effect actually found concerns 
the level of HCE. This is higher in absolute terms and it also growths faster, again only in 
absolute terms, but neither in relative nor in percentage terms. It is also associated with higher 
levels of private expenditure, albeit not with higher growth rates of private HCE.  
Regarding the health outputs, the presumption that the incentive to provide more services 
does not increase the health status, seems also to hold, because neither of the health output 
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indicators is affected in a positive way. It has to be remarked, that no indicator of the actual 
quantity of services is available, which is to say that HCE proxies also the quantity. 
But, despite the increased input and the unchanged output, the institutional dimension is 
virtually unrelated to the overall efficiency of the system (as measured by the WHO1 
indicator).  
Looking at the composition of the financial input, quantity based remuneration modes 
increase the share of private expenditure, a finding which could indicate that at least part of 
the services supplied by the providers are directly paid for by the patients or their private / 
supplementary insurance. On the beyond-health output side, remuneration incentives do 
strongly increase the HCS’ responsiveness but this does not go together with higher levels of 
satisfaction.  
 
Taking both institutional dimensions, Agency and Remuneration, together suggests, that if 
there is a difference between systems, which rely on employed providers, and systems, which 
rely on self-employed providers, it is that independent providers tend to produce more 
responsiveness, at least more so than employed providers. The higher costs they cause are not 
actually due to lower efficiency, but due to the increased production of a different output, 
namely responsiveness. 
 
Hospital Autonomy and Competition 
The institutional dimensions underlying the hospital sector have quite opposing effects, and it 
has to be recalled, that both dimensions are, by construction, statistically independent from 
each other. Regarding health output, autonomy of the hospital decreases health output, while 
the competition among hospitals increases it. Both however decrease the number of medical 
fatalities, but competition much more so than autonomy. Again it has to be remarked that this 
indicator might be the one with the highest relevance as an evaluation criterion for the 
hospital sector, because medical fatalities occur most often during a medical intervention 
which requires a stay in the hospital. With this in mind, both institutional dimensions indicate 
that giving hospitals some leeway, but also giving citizens a choice among competing 
hospitals, is a possible way to increase quality of hospital treatment.  
The both dimensions exert on resource consumption is also inconsistent: competition 
increases, autonomy decreases overall expenditure for health. From the standpoint of cost 
containment, reducing hospital’s say in issues of financial relevance, such as investment in 
medical equipment, is a probate mean to control the costs. The overall efficiency indicator 
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used yields the same message: while the WHO1 indicator is uncorrelated with competition, it 
decreases substantially with higher levels of autonomy, indicating that hospitals tend to either 
oversupply services or to invest in (and to use much more) equipment than would be efficient.  
Responsiveness as the typical beyond health output is increased in particular by the 
competition among hospitals, most likely because competition implies the existence of several 
hospitals offering the same services and thus that patients can chose where to obtain 
treatment. Whether the hospital is autonomous or not, seems not to matter for the 
responsiveness. However, satisfaction with the HCS is increased by both institutional 
dimensions alike. The policy recommendation, if is willing to infer one, would be that it is the 
patient’s choice among hospitals, which fuels a quality increasing competition. 
 
Purchaser Autonomy and Competition 
The hypotheses would be that purchaser competition decreases the costs, because competition 
force them to operate more efficient. To some degree this might be countervailed because 
several competing purchasers imply a doubling of certain administrative tasks and that 
administrative economies of scare remain unrealized. Contrary to the expectation, making 
purchasers autonomous and putting them into competition does not decrease the HCE. A 
setting of many competing and autonomous purchasers actually increases the level of HCE, 
probably because the redundancy in the administration dominates the savings by competition. 
Every purchaser has a administration and this too require resources. So the level of fixed 
administrative costs is higher when there are several competing purchasers. This is more a 
question of the level, because the growth of HCE is less affected. This higher level of 
expenditure, which is likely to be due to operation costs of the purchaser’s administration, 
does however not affect the HCS’ overall efficiency as measured by the WHO1 indicator. 
Regarding the health output, both institutional dimensions are almost identical in the direction 
and magnitude of their impact. Both have positive effects on health output indicators, and 
moreover installing autonomous and competing purchasers also increases the responsiveness 
of the HCS and the satisfaction citizens express vis-à-vis their HCS. 
 
Patient Involvement 
The analysis focuses on the first dimension extracted from the original indicators of patient 
involvement, with the most explanatory power regarding the institutional particularities of 
patient involvement in payment of health services.  
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With regard to what “involvement of patient” implies for health system achievement and 
efficiency, one would expect that this dimension affects in particular financing and 
consumption and thereby the overall efficiency of the HCS. The argument is firstly, that 
involving patients makes them aware of the prices, which to some degree limits their 
consumption to what is justifiable from a cost benefit evaluation. Services with a poor cost 
benefit ratio are not or at least less often consumed, so the average cost-benefit ratio for all 
services provided in the HCS improves. The argument is secondly, that by giving patient a 
bill, the temptation for the provider to cheat are limited, because the patient is able to 
recognize incidences of unjustified billing, i.e. the billing of services which were not actually 
provided. 
Contrary to this expectation is the finding that higher patient involvement goes together with 
higher levels of overall HCE and also with higher levels of growth in HCE. Given the 
background information about why and when patient involvement was introduced, the 
explanation is thus that patient involvement works not actually as a cost control but rather that 
patient involvement opens up an addition source of funding which is needed to cover the 
higher costs and the higher levels of growth. Regarding the magnitude of the involvement in 
financial terms, the finding is that the level of patient involvement – which is qualitatively 
measured – does not actually go together with higher levels of private funding. Patients may 
be involved in the form of paying providers first and get reimbursement later or in the form of 
having to make a co-payment, but that does not say anything about the magnitude of what 
they actually have to pay for the services.  
While patient involvement does not make explicit statements about the health outputs, there 
are some interesting findings, which do not offer a clear cut or easy explanation: Higher 
patient involvement goes also together with both higher levels of health and beyond health 
output, but has no effect on the citizens’ satisfaction with the HCS. One could argue that the 
additional funding coming from private sources is used to pay for the higher level of 
responsiveness, which increases the satisfaction, but that the very fact of having to pay an 
contribution in addition to what is already going into the HCS by way of taxes or pay-roll-
based contributions lowers the satisfaction, so that the net effect is zero. Why additional 
private funding is increasing health output, is however not amenable to an easy explanation.  
Overall, involving patients in the financing of health care has a positive effect on the HCS’ 
efficiency as measured by the WHO indicator.  
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Pharmaceutical Control 
Pharmaceutical control has two independent dimensions, first the control of market access and 
the issue of how sales are controlled and how much the usage of generics is enforced. Second, 
the issue of whether the coverage of a medicine by the HCS, or the price by which this is 
done, is based on a medical evaluation of the new product. 
The first dimension is basically uncorrelated with all performance indicators, the only 
noteworthy correlations are with responsiveness and satisfaction. Given that high scores on 
the first dimension imply that patients are involved in the payment of medicine and that they 
are encouraged, also by financial incentives, to use generics more often instead of the branded 
original they might be used to, this is little surprising. Introducing sales control does however 
nothing to improve the efficiency of the HCS.  
The second dimension, control over the coverage by the HCS, differs in its impact, because it 
exerts its impact in a much less visible way and moreover before the patient gets involved. 
Introducing such measures does not affect the citizens evaluation with the HCS. The 
institutional dimension concerns the evaluation of the product before it is actually available to 
the patients. Basing coverage and prices on a medical evaluation of the value added has 
positive effects: it goes together with a higher health output and also increases the efficiency 
of the health system. Supposedly, because some medicines are weeded out earlier and also 
marginal improvements are identifies as such and do not obtain the price granted for an actual 
innovation. So while there is an effect on quality, the actual aim which is most often 
underlying the introduction of such evaluations, viz. the control of pharmaceutical 
expenditure, is not achieved, as the slightly higher levels of HCE indicate. But still, the 
overall effect on the HCS’ efficiency is, at least when regarded based on the bivariate 
relationship, positive. 
 
Governmental Control 
Regarding the role of the central government as the “superordinate steward” which is 
representing the preferences of the electorate, the presumption is that more government 
control, which was operationalized here as more control by the central government in the 
form of say or unilateral control over HCS parameters, has positive effects on the efficiency 
of the HCS. First, external control sets limits for the agents operating the HCS, both on the 
supply and the demand side, and holds them and their shared interest in an ever increasing 
health budget in check. The government as an outsider may enforce regulations and rules, 
which are neither in the interest of the purchasers nor of the providers of services.  
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The correlations found contradict this view. The level of resource consumption is only 
slightly reduced by higher levels of governmental control, and indeed the growth of HCE is 
higher in systems which feature more governmental control. What is affected, and negatively 
so, is the output of the HCS, both the health and the beyond-health output. HCS with high 
levels of government control underperform in three out of four health output indicators and 
produce significantly less of both-beyond health outputs: Life expectancy is lower, while the 
infant mortality and the loss of life years is higher. Moreover in particular the responsiveness 
of the system and the citizen’s satisfaction with the system is lower. The latter observation 
might be due to the strong relationship between responsiveness and satisfaction, because state 
operated HCS are typically less responsive.  
The countervailing effects found for health outputs and input consumption are reflected in the 
finding that HCS efficiency as measured by the WHO indicator is not improved by 
governmental control.  
 
Access and Choice in Secondary Care 
Regarding the regulations on access and choice to secondary care, the predominant element of 
the regulation is gatekeeping: Is the access to secondary care channeled by the gatekeeper or 
not. The existence of gatekeeping usually goes with the absence of factual choice after 
gatekeeping. By design, this implies a certain degree of redundancy, because access is limited 
where patients don’t have a choice. In the alternative design, there is no gatekeeping, but the 
patient can go directly to a secondary care provider (apart from hospitals) and furthermore can 
also chose freely and in particular factually among several providers of secondary care.  
Looking at the health outputs, granting access and choice does not affect the indicators, the 
only exemption being medical fatalities. As was argued above when discussing the hospital 
sector, this finding indicates that competition and choice among hospitals has a positive effect 
on the quality of hospital care, which is presumably the most important factor for the number 
of medical fatalities.  
Granting choice among secondary care providers goes together with higher levels of 
expenditure, presumably because choice is usually only possible in health systems in which 
many providers of secondary care (in-patient as well as out-patient) exist, and thus also a 
certain redundancy is present: the availability of are several providers to chose from, implies 
in practice that not all of them are strictly necessary, and economies of scale remain 
unrealized. Forced to attract patients in a situation, where there are “not enough” patients to 
grant a living for all providers, the latter are subject to the incentive to supply more services, 
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engage in a more intense treatment and to recur to more sophisticate forms of treatment, 
including the more intense usage of technology. On the upside, it also means that the 
providers are incentivized to compete for clients by showing effort and by delivering quality. 
A possible hypothesis about the correlation between access and the composition of health care 
financing would be that limiting access officially leads to a higher share of private funding, 
because the patients have to pay an additional fee to skip the gatekeeping or to purchase 
“choice” understood as the option to obtain treatment elsewhere, not in the region or county 
they are living in. The latter phenomenon occurs in countries with strong regional differences 
in availability and quality of care, like Italy. However, granting access is not financed from 
private funding, because there is neither a correlation between access and the level of private 
HCE nor a correlation between access and the dynamics of private HCE.  
The strongest effect of choice and access concerns the responsiveness of the HCS. Granting 
choice and access makes the HCS more responsive, indicating that having choice is an 
important issue for the patients. But interestingly it does not increase the satisfaction with the 
system to a substantial degree. Noteworthy is also the fact that while choice and access have a 
clearly increasing effect on expenditure, while leaving most health output indicators 
unchanged, it nevertheless increases on the whole the efficiency of the HCS as measured by 
the WHO1 indicator.  
 
Managing Quality: Providing and Enforcing Information 
The analysis of the institutional regulations on quality management yielded two latent 
dimensions. First, the organized collection respectively provision of information to the 
providers. Second, the enforcement of quality standards, i.e. whether the providers can be 
forced, in the extreme case by excluding them from providing services to the patients, to abide 
to quality standards. Correlating them with indicators of HCS achievement and efficiency, 
both dimensions show very different effects, and it has to be recalled that both are, by 
construction, statistically uncorrelated.  
Both dimensions affect health outputs in an inconsistent way. Quality management has not 
significant effect on overall life expectancy, a finding which can possibly be attributed to the 
fact that the overall life expectancy is influenced by many factors outside of the HCS. The 
outputs which are more attributable to the HCS do react to quality management, however in 
an inconsistent way. On the one hand, providing information in an organized way goes 
together with a decrease in medical fatalities and also a decrease in infant mortality. But on 
the other hand, having installed the possibility of enforcing quality standards, has an adverse 
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effect on medical fatalities: there are actually more medical fatalities in systems where such a 
binding quality enforcement is installed. This effect is surprising and hard to explain.  
Both institutional dimensions are neither associated in a noteworthy way with overall health 
expenditure nor with the dynamics of HCE growth. Only for the level private expenditure an 
effect can be found. The level of private funding is lower in countries with organized 
provision of information and while it is slightly higher in countries with quality enforcement. 
Regarding the overall health expenditure this implies that installing quality management does 
not come at a substantially higher price per se. Installing quality control might cause costs in 
the first place, but in the end the savings realized, e.g. by abstaining from providing 
unnecessary or inappropriate services, does equalize these costs.  
Despite the adverse effects on medical fatalities, quality enforcement goes together with 
higher levels of efficiency, while providing information in a noncommittal way does nothing 
to improve efficiency of the HCS. The evidence for the effects on the beyond-health outputs 
is mixed: both quality dimensions increase satisfaction, while, on the whole, lowering the 
responsiveness of the HCS. 
 
Financial Control: Identifying and Sanctioning Providers 
The first dimension of financial control concerns the possibility of the purchasers, whatever 
their organizational status or character, to identify providers which are systematically 
overspending, i.e. are supplying more or more expensive services. This dimension does not 
affect any of the performance indicators in a substantial way. The only exemption is 
satisfaction, which is significantly higher in systems where such regulations are in place. As 
for the reasons of the absence of the presumed effects on expenditure, it can be argued that the 
knowledge that a certain provider is overspending alone does not matter. As for the effects on 
satisfaction, an underlying mechanism is not obvious.  
The interpretation that knowledge alone, without the possibility to act on this knowledge is, is 
meaningless is substantiated by the finding that the possibility of a sanctioning the providers 
has strong effects on many performance indicators. Note once again, that the orientation of 
the scale is such that high values indicate the absence of the possibility to sanction the 
provider. 
Regarding health output, the effect of installing sanctioning power is adverse. It is the absence 
of binding control which goes together with higher life expectancy, lower mortality, but then 
again with higher incidence of medical fatalities.  
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The expenditure side of the health production is influenced in line with the expectation; the 
absence of effective financial control goes together with higher levels of expenditure. 
Affected is however only the overall level, because the institutional dimension does neither 
matter for the share of private expenditure nor the dynamics of expenditure growth.  
Despite the mixed evidence, the overall efficiency of the health system is higher – by the 
WHO measurement – in cases where financial controls are implemented. Regarding the 
beyond-health-outputs, satisfaction and responsiveness, the establishment of an effective 
control goes together with lower responsiveness, and also lower satisfaction. The causal 
connection might again work intermediated by the pressure exercised on the providers, which 
react by acting less responsive to their “customers”, who in turn are less satisfied with the care 
they receive and in particular the way it is provided to them.  
 
11.1.2. Institutional Syndromes as Correlates of Health System Achievement 
 
Institutional Syndromes: Concept and Operationalization 
As argued in the first volume of this study and in section 4.4. of the present volume, the 
conditionality of institutional effects is a potentially relevant factor for HCS achievement and 
efficiency. For this reason the compilation of the institutional data covers more issues than 
just the delegation relation ships and the control mechanisms in these relationships. The 
underlying argument is that the effectiveness of the control mechanisms is conditional on the 
wider environment in which the delegation relationship is embedded. Two examples may 
show why.  
Self employed providers are working autonomous, by themselves and for themselves, and are 
under little control regarding what they do in their practice. They have the potential to 
increase their income, because they have leeway to do so. But do they have the incentive? 
According to the agency theory, there are only problems to be expected, if the remuneration is 
based on the quantity of services provided. But even then: does the combination of possibility 
and motive, the incentive problem actually decrease the efficiency of the HCS? Or is it rather 
the case that output increases in proportion to the input consumed, and thus the overall 
efficiency remains the same? In this case, the incentive is no problem in terms of efficiency, 
only a problem in terms of higher costs, which are however justified.  
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Underlying the analysis of the effects of institutional syndromes was the question, whether 
certain combinations of institutional dimensions, certain constellations going together, exert a 
stronger, weaker or altogether different impact on HCS’ performance than the individual 
dimensions. The lower sections of table 11.2 give the bivariate correlations between the 
institutional syndromes and the indicators of health system achievement and efficiency.  
 
Incentive Problem 
The syndrome capturing the presence of an incentive problem – in the sense of independent, 
self employed and thus: uncontrolled in their behavior, providers whose income depends on 
the quantity of medical services they provide – shows effect which are similar to the 
underlying features, but also effects which were not to be expected given the impact of both 
the status as well as the remuneration of providers. 
Installing an incentive problem actually has positive effects on health output; it increases life 
expectancy, decreases both the loss of life years and the infant mortality. It is however 
irrelevant for the incidence of medical fatalities. One could argue, that the reason for this is 
that the incentive problem-variable is dominated by the organization and remuneration of 
outpatient care, while medical fatalities occur most often in the inpatient setting.  
On the downside, the presence of incentive problems goes together with exactly what the 
delegation approach predicts: HCE is higher in systems which are characterized by a strong 
incentive problem, and lower in systems which have removed the problem – either by 
removing the incentive (by changing the remuneration mode) or by putting providers under 
hierarchical control ( e.g. by employing them or integrating them into the public 
administration). The financial consequences are a question of the level, not of the dynamics of 
HCE: while the level of HCE per capita is significantly higher it is a structural difference, not 
something which is getting more problematic over time. While HCE growth is stronger in 
absolute terms, this implies neither a stronger dynamic (in % ) nor that the HCS is 
progressively consuming more resources (growth of HCE in relation to growth of GDP). 
The positive effects (on output) and the negative effect (on input consumption) seem to cancel 
each other out, because the incentive problem does not affect the efficiency as measured by 
the WHO’s indicator,  
With regard to the beyond-health outputs, installing (or tolerating) an incentive problem 
increases the HCS’ responsiveness significantly. This however does despite the strong 
correlation between responsiveness and satisfaction, not increase overall satisfaction with the 
HCS. The absence of this correlation might be the consequence of another equalizing effect. 
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The HCS is more respondent, which is something citizens like, but it is also more expensive, 
which is something citizens dislike. 
Finally, with respect to the value added of combining both institutional dimensions, it has to 
be remarked, that at least in the bivariate analysis, the effect of the combination, the incentive 
problem syndrome, is usually stronger than the effect of either of the individual dimensions.   
 
 
Hospital Syndrome 
The indicator variable “HospitalSyndrome” was generated by combining both institutional 
dimensions found to be underlying the hospital sector in a way that the resulting interaction 
variable has the highest scores for those countries in which hospitals are both autonomous and 
competition among them is installed. High scores of the HospitalSyndrome variable indicate 
that the hospitals are – from a delegation perspective – under pressure to work efficiently, by 
providing quality and by engaging in cost control. Low scores indicate a situation, in which 
hospitals are insulated from competition and have neither pressure nor incentive to increase 
internal efficiency or the quality of treatment. They will get their share of “customers” 
because these have no choice, and they will get reimbursed for whatever they consumed.  
While the syndrome-variable does not increase the standard health outputs (life years and 
infant mortality) it decrease the number of medical fatalities – an event which is most often 
happening in the setting of a hospital. This finding indicates that this syndrome, in particular 
competition among the hospitals, is appropriate to improve the quality of in-patient treatment 
and increase the health output of the hospital sector by reducing the “life years lost” in this 
particular sector, which are lost mainly due to medical fatalities. Moreover, in the issue of 
what kind of health outputs are actually attributable to the HCS (avoidable mortality vs. gross 
life expectancy) this finding indicates, that the hospital sector contributes, not by producing 
something, but by avoiding something, especially medical fatalities. 
Installing the efficient hospital syndrome does not come at a significantly higher costs for the 
HCS. It also increases the responsiveness of the HCS, most likely intermediated by the choice 
patients have about where to obtain treatment in systems where there is competition among 
hospitals. And thereby, it also increases overall satisfaction with the HCS. However, despite 
the positive effects on output and the absence of negative effects on resources consumption, 
the syndrome actually decreases the overall efficiency as measured by the WHO.  
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Purchaser Syndrome 
The two institutional dimensions underlying the “PurchaserSyndrome” concern the degree to 
which the purchasers are autonomous from the political control exercised by the central 
government, able to decide on the parameters defining their relationship with the clients, and 
are under competition from other purchasers.  
Purchasers – irrespective of their organizational form and formal status – which are 
autonomous can make their own decisions, which are relevant for their attractiveness from the 
viewpoint of potential clients and also influence how the HCS works. In particular they have 
some control about how efficiently they operate internally. But to steer their behavior in the 
right, which is to say: the efficient direction, these decision making capacities must be used in 
a certain way and the idea is that putting purchasers under competitive pressure will make 
them use their competencies to increase their efficiency.  
The efficient syndrome would be that both scores are high. In this constellation of autonomy 
and competition, the purchasers have to increase operative and administrative efficiency to 
remain or become attractive for citizens, who in turn have free choice among the purchasers, 
and can leave expensive ones or those who cannot cover certain services. The competitive 
pressure is particularly high in a situation, where purchasers can differ in packages offered to 
the clients, viz. the contributions charged and / or services covered.  
Only if both features – autonomy in determining the packages offered to the clients and free 
choice for the clients – are given, there is the possibility, the pressure and the incentive for the 
purchaser to perform well. If for instance a HIF is efficient, it may offer a more attractive 
package of contributions and services covered. Even if the catalogue of services is defined by 
law, the HIF may offer some extras, or offer the package at lower contributions rates. But this 
only matters for the number of clients, if the clients may change to this HIF. If each HIF has a 
fixed pool of clients assigned to it by law, it may of course still operate efficient, limit the 
number of people working in its administration to what is necessary and hold a hard 
bargaining stance with the providers – but there is no incentive to do so. The same is basically 
true for public purchasers, which are an immediate part of the government’s administration or 
by character a public administration, like municipalities, counties or Regional Health 
Administrations. The idea, as outlined in the methodological section, was to differentiate the 
agent “purchaser” into a set of features which can be used to describe purchasers which are 
not part of the public administration but just as well purchasers, which are part of the public 
administration. The idea is it, to turn the qualitative, dichotomous distinction in the “type” – 
public vs. non-public-purchaser – into a more gradual difference which can be expressed as 
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the absence or presence of some predefined features, such as competition, decision making 
competence over the package of services offered and the contributions charged.  
 
How does the institutional syndrome of competing and autonomous purchasers affect the 
outputs, inputs and the efficiency of the HCS? 
With regard to health output, the evaluation of the “PurchaserSyndrome” is positive. Making 
purchasers autonomous and putting them under competitive pressure by clients voting by feet 
goes together with higher life expectancy and lower mortality, both in terms of life years lost 
and in terms of infant mortality. There is only a weak adverse, i.e. increasing, effect on the 
incidence of medical fatalities. In the case of formally independent purchasers, HIFs, the 
mechanisms is, arguably, that the purchasers use their bargaining power to assure that the 
providers abide to quality standards, by making for instance the applicability of medical 
guidelines part of the contract. In the case of public purchasers, which employ the medical 
providers, the control is hierarchical. But in both cases, the competition induces the 
motivation to exercise control.  
On the input side, the existence of an efficient purchaser syndrome increases the level of 
HCE, albeit only structurally: the difference between systems with and systems without 
purchaser syndromes is static and does not affect the dynamics of HCE growth. A possible 
reason is that, similar to the hospital sector, competition requires redundancy on the side of 
the purchasers. In the case of independent HIFs, competition necessitates several HIFs, each 
with its own administration, which leaves (administrative) economies of scale unrealized. But 
the same is true for “public” purchasers. Where municipalities are in charge of organizing 
health care, a doubling of functions is inevitable, and this is costly. Locating the public 
purchasers at a higher level, for instance on the regional instead of the local level, would 
reduce some administrative doubling of functions, but would also reduce or completely 
remove the competitive pressure. People may move to a neighboring municipality, but 
moving to a different region poses a higher threshold. 
Regarding the production of beyond-health outputs, the purchaser syndrome not only 
increases the responsiveness of the system, presumably again by giving people a choice, this 
time on the demand side, but also increases the citizens’ satisfaction with the system, 
probably for the same reasons.  
The overall efficiency of the HCS is, just like in the case of installing redundancy, 
competition and choice on the supply side, unaffected: the higher output – in terms of health 
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and beyond-health output – is obtained at higher costs. There is not actually a waste in the 
system.  
 
Quality Syndrome  
As outlined in chapter 10, the problem in terms of quality is how to organize the aggregation 
and evaluation of quality relevant information which arises at the level of the individual 
providers and how to disseminate the essence of this information back to the providers of 
medical services. The first dimension of quality also covers the creation and factual usage of 
guidelines which concern cost effectiveness, e.g. recommend a certain treatment as standard, 
because it has proved itself to be the most cost effective treatment in the standard situation. 
This informational problem is accompanied of how to induce the providers, all of which 
highly value their professional autonomy, to abide by the quality standards and to take into 
account aspects like cost effectiveness in their decision making.  
It was argued that providing information, e.g. issuing guidelines and the like, alone is 
necessary, but not sufficient for an effective quality assurance. To achieve effectiveness of 
quality control, the provision of information must be supplemented by mechanisms which 
make abidance to quality standards binding for the providers. The variable QualitySyndrome 
was constructed as a multiplicative combination of both dimension (provision of information 
and the possibility of the provider to enforce abidance to quality standards by excluding the 
provider). High values of the QualitySyndrome indicate that the provision of quality relevant 
information and guidelines is organized and that the lack of quality on the provider’s side can 
be sanctioned by an actor external to the medical profession, usually the purchaser.   
 
The quality syndrome has effects, which are different in some regards from the effects of the 
individual institutional dimensions constituting the syndrome. 
Looking at the health output side, the effects are positively throughout. Installing quality 
increasing measures and regulations goes together with higher life expectance, lower losses of 
life years, lower infant mortality and also fewer medical fatalities.  
Assuring quality does not increase the costs of the system, i.e. has only little impact on the 
input side. On the contrary, some indicators of the expenditure dynamics are lower in systems 
in which quality control is organized in a sensible way. A possible mechanism underlying this 
finding is that the usage of sophisticated procedures with a relatively low value added when 
compared to cheaper alternatives is more restrained.  
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On the beyond health output side, the health system’s responsiveness level is basically 
unaffected and maybe this is the reason why the – objectively – better performance in health 
production is not appreciated by the citizens: their satisfaction is not higher in systems which 
implement quality assurance. Nor does an effort to organize quality go together with higher 
efficiency of the HCS. 
 
Financial Control Syndrome 
Financial control as defined here is a control exercised by the institutions financing the 
services over those actors who are providing medical services. Again the control relationship 
is not bound to a purchaser-provider-spilt with contracting and a formal billing taking place 
between purchaser and providers. Indeed in some “public integrated” HCS, the financial 
control may be higher than in systems in which the purchasers and the providers are different 
organizations and negotiate a contract. But there are also the opposite cases, where the 
contracting specifies prices and an explicit billing takes place, at times even combined with 
auditioning and the like.  
Two institutional dimension were found to be underlying the financial control of the HCS: 
First, the chances of the purchasers to identify providers which are overspending.  
Second, the possibilities of the purchaser to sanction the provider for reasons of overspending, 
which is something different than the sanctioning because of quality concerns discussed 
above.  
The efficient syndrome in the organization of financial control over the providers is defined 
by the combination of high scores on both dimensions; i.e. effective control is given, when the 
purchaser can identify and sanction providers which are systematically overspending. Given 
the scaling of the second dimension, which indicates the absence of sanctioning, the 
“Financial Control Syndrome” variable was generated by combining both dimensions in a 
way that higher scores on the first dimension imply higher values for the Financial Control 
Syndrome variable, while lower scores on the second dimension imply higher values of the 
syndrome. 
As for the effects, installing “optimal” financial control is presumed to contain expenditure 
and the negative correlation among the syndrome and the HCE levels indicates, that at least 
this effect is achieved. Just as it is the case for many of the other institutional variables, it is a 
static feature insofar, as it affects the levels, not the dynamics of expenditure. The HCE levels 
are lower, but the growth of the expenditure does not differ from systems without that type of 
control. But, in a nice illustration of the double-edged relationship between cost containment, 
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inputs and outputs of the HCS, cost-containment comes at a price: the syndrome has to some 
degree adverse effects on the health output, with the exemption of medical fatalities.  
With regard to the level of beyond-health outputs, effective financial control reduces the 
responsiveness of and thereby also the satisfaction with the HCS. A finding, which indicates 
that providers tend to use leeway to be responsive to patients. Maybe not for purely altruistic 
reasons, but because “costumer orientation” (caring about the patient) and self-interest match 
each other. Interestingly, it also reduces the overall efficiency of the health system to a degree 
which is comparable to the magnitude of the agency dimension.  
 
In principle, one could refine this approach of combining specific institutional information, 
e.g. by deriving certain conditions and constellations of the original variables, which should 
go together on very different institutional dimensions, and by going together, indicate an 
“efficient system”. For instance one could argue that purchasing in a HCS is organized 
efficiently, if each and every of the following conditions are met: the purchaser are 
autonomous, there is no financial equalization among the purchasers, the purchasers can differ 
in both contributions and catalogues, and the citizen have free choice of the purchaser. But 
doing so would be equivalent to classify the overall institutional setting in one HCS, at least 
of a sector, as being efficient while the overall institutional setting in another HCS is no 
efficient. Looking at the underlying information, it also becomes quite clear, that there are no 
HCS, in which all these conditions are met, and all HCS in the study would classify as 
inefficient. While this strategy could be justified, it would no longer be possible to make a 
statement about individual features. It would also run into technical difficulties because of the 
small number of cases.  
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11.1.3. The Health System’s Political and Economic Environment 
While the interaction between the political system and the health system is most relevant for 
the occurrence of institutional change in the latter, one can also derive some hypotheses on 
the effects of the political environment on the HCS’ current efficiency and achievement. 
Based on some of the arguments made in chapter 9 on the outputs produced by the HCS, on 
can make statements about the effect of the country’s economic situation on the HCS. 
 
The Political Environment 
According the argument made in chapter 5, the central government as an external actor, which 
is accountable to the electorate and responding to the electorates preferences and demands, 
can act as a superordinate steward in charge of exercising a “control of the controllers”. As 
was argued in chapter 4, the preferences of the actors inside the HCS systematically diverge 
from the preferences of the electorate, because the supply side (individual providers and 
Hospitals) and the demand side (purchasers such as HIFs or bureaucracies) are both making 
their living from the system’s financial input. The government can exert a disciplining effect 
vis-à-vis these actors, it can hold both sides in line with the electorate’s preferences and it can 
also balance the dynamics and developments in the HCS with the necessities and the 
dynamics in other societal sectors. To be able to do all this, the government must have levers 
at hand, e.g. formal competencies to intervene by setting unilateral decisions or changing 
negotiated agreements between the demand and the supply side ex post, if the implications of 
the agreement are objectionable from an overall view of the state of affairs in the country. 
This point, i.e. the levers, was discussed when looking at the government’s control in section 
11.1.1 above.  
 
But in addition to the formal rights and the potential levers given by the HCS’ constitution, 
the government must be able to act, to use the levers, to create operative health policy, able to 
arrive at and able to implement decisions - even against the opposition of the well organized 
groups in the HCS. This opposition and resistance to intervention originates from two 
sources: 
First, it has to be remembered that the professional organizations value their autonomy highly, 
both in issues like pricing and even more so in issues of medical decision making; see Larkin 
(1995), Hassenteufel (1996) and Gray/Harrison (2004). The same is true for purchaser, be 
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they independent organizations or part of the public administration. Both organizational forms 
are bureaucracies and as such value autonomy, influence in many issues, and in particular 
factual control over many issues. So irrespective of the content of the intervention, the actors 
currently running the HCS have an institutional interest in retaining their autonomy, their 
control over the system; see Glaser (1991) and Greß (2002).  
Second, purchasers and providers, despite all distributional conflicts, share an interest in 
increasing the “cake” which is their income, respectively from which they can extract rents. In 
particular the extraction of rents, either in the form of oversupplying services or in the form of 
“on the job consumption” or “administrative slack”, diminishes the cost/benefit-ratio and 
thereby the efficiency of the health system.  
Consequentially, if the government perceives the necessity for an intervention, it is because 
these rents are to high respectively the health system’s efficiency is too low. It follows 
implicitly, that increasing efficiency by intervening either ad hoc or by reassigning decision 
competencies, goes directly against the material as well as the institutional interests of the 
actors in the health system, which will oppose the intervention.  
 
I have argued, that the impact of the opposition by the societal actors depends on the 
relationships and the interactions between the government and the societal actors, in particular 
the societal actors involved in operating the HCS. The theoretical framework underlying this 
interaction is the indirect veto player concept: the idea that an organized group will strive to 
get access to a formal veto player, in particular a political party in government, to make this 
veto player cast its veto on behalf of the group.  
So the prediction is, that if the HCS has many organized actors, and many points of access in 
the government, which is the origin of institutional and operative health policy as well as of 
ad hoc interventions by way of using existing levers, the probability of an indirect veto player 
will increase, and this will block efficiency-increasing interventions, resulting in a HCS, 
which is achieving less in terms of outputs and also less efficient in the production of these 
outputs. The empirical implication is, that three factors matter for the HCS “performance”: the 
number of access points in the political system, the number of societal stake holders, who 
might strive for access to the veto players, and the interaction among both as a indicator of 
indirect veto power in the HCS. 
 
Does the mechanism underlying this hypothesis actually matter for the performance and 
achievement of the HCS? The bivariate correlations among indicators of HCS 
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achievement/efficiency and the environment variables given in table 11.2 above support the 
hypothesis only to some degree. 
 
With regard to the political environment as the addressee of societal stakeholders, the number 
of parties in government does not matter for any of the achievement indicators. In the 
framework of the above explanatory approach, this finding indicates that the mere number of 
access points does not matter for operative health policy. It indicates further, that the number 
of parties in government, the number of actors who would have to agree on a efficiency 
increasing intervention or policy change matters neither for the individual components of 
achievement (input, outputs) nor for the efficiency of the HCS as a whole.  
If there is an effect, it is originating from the number of stakeholders. While the number of 
stakeholders is closely related to the number of agents which directly received tasks, it differs 
from the latter in that it contains also stakeholders which are not making a living from the 
HCS, but like the associations of employers, have to bear a share of the financial burden.  
Looking at the impact of stakeholders, which to some degree also reflects the degree of 
societal involvement in the operating of the HCS, the effects are not positive. In particular for 
the health output, more societal involvement goes together with lower achievement: lower life 
expectancy, higher infant mortality and more years of life lost. The number of medical 
fatalities is once more less affected, because it is an output attributable not to the overall 
organization of the HCS, but to the organization of the hospital sector. This 
“underachievement” on the output side affects the overall efficiency of the HCS, which is also 
substantially lower. The number of stakeholders does on the whole not matter for the input 
side, i.e. the level and dynamics of expenditure for health. The only effect noteworthy is a 
lower share of private funding in HCS where societal involvement is higher, this effect is 
however offset by higher rates of increase of this source of funding during the period under 
observation.  
Interestingly, more stakeholders and more societal involvement in the HCS does not go 
together with increased responsiveness, but yields nevertheless a higher level of satisfaction. 
Taken together, one could conclude, that having a say is per se an aspect valued by the 
citizens, irrespective of the positive or negative effects of this. Because, more societal actors 
with a stake do not make the HCS any better, on the contrary.  
Coming to the “indirect veto power”, as the combination of both environment variables, its 
effect on achievement and efficiency reflects mostly the difference on the societal side of the 
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HCS, and has very similar effects as the number of societal actors. There is no genuine value 
added in terms of explanatory power.  
Summing up the evidence of the role of the political environment for the HCS, the three 
findings indicates, that if indirect veto power is actually used, it works by the mechanism that 
groups have established contacts to specific political veto players and use this contacts. The 
sheer number of formal veto players as potential points of access does not matter. It is 
sufficient for the societal actors to gain access to only one of the formal veto players to 
obstruct external interventions.  
 
The Economic Environment 
Given the strong theoretical arguments about the role of wealth for the types of health outputs 
and the quantity of health services demanded by the public, it is of interest to look at how the 
HCS differ in their “performance” by levels of GDP. The starting point of this short excursus 
is the established finding, that GDP is the best and most stable predictor of health expenditure, 
see the review of the quantitative studies in section 2.2.1 above.  
The mechanisms underlying this statistical relationship are however not that clear. There is a 
range of mechanisms presented, often with different consequences for different aspects of 
HCS achievement and efficiency, by which GDP affects the operation, the outputs and the 
efficiency of the health system.  
For instance, richer countries may have better access to advanced technology and medication, 
which may, for technical reasons, be more efficient in producing health. In particular, because 
once the technology is available, the costs of each additional usage episode may be quite low.  
But apart from such technical issues, I would argue, that wealth changes the preferences of the 
citizens. Health production has diminishing returns, i.e. the production of an additional life 
year comes at higher prices if the level of life expectancy is already high. So, in terms of an 
input/output-based efficiency measure, HCS become ever more inefficient over time. More 
money is spent in addition to what is already spent, but that additional amount buys only little 
additional health. I have argued elsewhere, that in wealthy societies paying an ever higher 
price for the additional life years, makes still sense, because the GDP generated per capita in 
this country, as a rough indicator of the financial value of a life year in this country, is also 
high; see Kotzian (2006). 
There is also a change in the expectations citizens hold with regard to the health system and 
its outputs. First, wealthier citizens are not willing to accept certain ailments and are willing to 
pay for the cure of conditions, which - while not critical - are an inconvenience. Second, 
 240
wealthier citizens demand other things, in addition to the health output, from the HCS, which 
also come at a price, namely responsiveness. More money is spent - not for producing 
“biological health”, but for producing responsiveness; see Kotzian (2003).  
 
Looking at the health system’s economic environment, proxied by GDP per capita, and its 
effects on the performance indicators used in the present study reveals that this factor is 
clearly the most important for all aspects of the health system: 
GDP has the strongest positive effect on health levels, not only on life expectancy, but on the 
other more refined health output indicators like medical fatalities. The mechanism may be that 
people in wealthier societies live longer anyway for reasons outside the HCS, but also that 
more resources are available to cure illnesses, if they occur.  
GDP has the strongest effect of all explanatory factors used on the level of health expenditure, 
albeit not on the dynamics and not on the increase of HCE in relation to the GDP itself. With 
regard to the composition of health financing, wealthier societies spend more funds on health 
systems but tend to see the financing of health as a public task. The share of private funding 
decreases at higher levels of GDP According to the findings, one can say that in the wake of 
economic development, health care is not privatized but on the contrary socialized, the share 
of private funding is lower and grows slower in wealthier societies.  
GDP explains almost all variation in responsiveness, i.e. the more wealthy a country, the more 
responsiveness is produced by the country’s HCS. I would argue, that the underlying 
mechanisms is the change in the preferences: citizens demand this output, it is produced, and 
money is spent for it. This interpretation is supported by the finding that GDP and in 
particular responsiveness go together with higher levels of satisfaction, an effect which can 
also be supported using micro level data; see Kotzian (2003). 
GDP, while increasing the output of a product which has nothing to do with health, actually 
increases the overall efficiency of the HCS, measured by the WHO1 indicator. Even if health 
care is bought at an ever higher price, this does not go together with lower productive 
efficiency. The WHO’s efficiency indicator used here is adapted for the increasing technical 
and medical difficulty of producing health in a situation where the health level is already high. 
So while it may seem that “health” is getting expensive, this is not actually the case, when the 
conditions under which it is produced are considered.  
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The finding is also interesting because the countries include in the study are all industrialized, 
with high levels of wealth. And even among this quite homogenous group, GDP explains 
much of the variation in the health system’s input, output and the system’s efficiency.  
Moreover, the fact that GDP is trended indicates that certain developments are to be expected, 
in particular a change towards more production of beyond-health outputs.  
 242
11.2. Factors for Health System Achievement: Institutional Interplay 
A critical question is, whether the associations found when analyzing the bivariate 
correlations also hold, when the institutional variables are taken into account jointly, i.e. the 
overall institutional setting and with this, also the institutional interplay is included in the 
analyses. The effects found in the bivariate analyses might change because – while the 
institutional variables describing individual sectors are statistically independent by 
construction – there is a co-occurrence of certain combinations across sectors. 
 
To compare the degree to which the individual institutional dimensions, respectively the 
institutional syndromes explain the differences in the levels of HCS achievement and 
efficiency, the empirical indicators of HCS output, input, as well as the efficiency were 
regressed on the sets of institutional variables. Wherever possible, all institutional variable 
were included, to avoid spurious effects due to omitted variables.  
For each of the dependent variables, two regressions were conducted:  
The first variant used as explanatory variables the individual institutional dimensions. The 
second variant used the institutional syndromes, as described in chapter 10 above, instead of 
the two institutional dimensions, on which each of the syndromes is based. Those institutional 
variables which are not combined into syndromes were also included. The specific question 
is, whether combining the institutional dimension in a way that is – according to the theory - 
more influential for the variable actually more influential.  
 
The variables on the political environment (Parties in Government, PiG), the number of 
societal actors (SocActors), and the interaction effect among both, operationalized by the 
indirect veto power; IndVetoPower, were excluded in the regression for two reasons:  
Firstly, because of the high correlation between the Agency, Societal Actors and the Indirect 
Veto Power variables. In a situation of a limited data base, 44 cases defined by country-year, a 
high correlation between several independent variable makes regression estimates instable. 
For instance, the effect of each of the three political environment variables may be small, 
while from the explained variance it is clear that there is an effect.  
Secondly, neither of the three environment variables correlated to a noteworthy degree with 
any of the efficiency or achievement indicators in the bivariate analyses conducted in section 
11.1.1 above. Regarding the influence of the political environment on the operation of the 
HCS, the evidence obtained so far indicates, that this influence is weak at best, and what 
influence is observed, is due to the number of independent actors, agents, in the HCS, which 
is covered by the agency variable.  
They will be included when the institutional change is analyzed, because they are, according 
to the model of institutional changes developed in this study, relevant as intervening variables 
for the occurrence of changes. 
 
In the framework of the study, the effects are a preparation for the following chapter M, 
which will analyze the institutional changes. In order to derive the expected impact of a 
certain change on an institutional dimension, it is necessary to know, how a institutional 
dimension affects the levels of outputs, the consumption of inputs or system’s efficiency, 
respectively, how the various achievement indicators are affected by the institutional 
variables.  
 
Table 11.3a Institutional Determinants of Expenditure Levels and Dynamics 
 
Variable HCELevel HCEAbsChange HCE%Change HCERelChange
zpAgency1 0.118 0.327 0.444 -0.107
zpRemIncentives 0.113 -0.140 -0.498 -0.146
zpHospitalStatus1 -0.175 0.076 0.223 0.105
zpHospitalStatus2 0.277 0.058 -0.274 -0.283
zpPurchaser1 0.119 -0.160 -0.113 0.017
zpPurchaser2 0.175 0.233 0.239 0.092
zpPatInvolvement1 0.255 0.353 0.207 0.196 0.154 0.032 0.123 0.163
zpPharma1 -0.091 -0.068 -0.193 -0.243 -0.003 -0.085 0.106 0.130
zpGovControl1 -0.092 -0.009 0.173 0.292 0.352 0.439 0.228 0.264
zpAccess1 -0.151 0.142 0.321 0.194 0.532 0.248 0.286 0.157
zpFinControl1 0.076 -0.150 -0.204 -0.093
zpFinControl2 0.203 0.139 -0.023 0.073
zIncentiveProblem -0.018 0.043 -0.154 -0.272
zPurchaserSyndrome 0.314 0.209 0.188 0.188
zHospitalSyndrome 0.168 -0.026 -0.129 -0.129
zFinControlSyndrome -0.166 -0.092 0.051 0.042
N 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 4
R2 0.485 0.408 0.308 0.244 0.271 0.143 0.162 0.098
4
 
 
Remark:  
Coefficients are beta-coefficients 
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Table 11.3a to 11.3c give the findings of the regression analyses, regressing the dependent 
variables covering the various types of HCS input, output, but also the efficiency of the HCS 
on the institutional dimensions as well as the institutional syndromes. The description of the 
findings will be based on the dependent variables, asking, which of the institutional 
dimensions respectively the syndromes has – ceteris paribus – the strongest effect on each of 
the achievement indicators, respectively the strongest effect on the consumption of inputs or 
the overall efficiency of the system. The analysis will refer to the beta coefficients listed in the 
following table, and focus on the stable ones with the highest magnitude. As in the case of the 
bivariate correlations presented earlier on, there are on the whole next to no statistically 
significant effects, which is to be expected given the small number of cases. 
 
Table 11.3a (continued)  
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PrivateLevel PrivateDynamics
zpAgency1 -0.320 0.017
zpRemIncentives 0.787 -0.322
zpHospitalStatus1 -0.280 0.184
zpHospitalStatus2 -0.634 -0.036
zpPurchaser1 0.546 0.071
zpPurchaser2 -0.498 0.035
zpPatInvolvement1 0.132 -0.011 -0.286 -0.363
zpPharma1 0.061 0.182 0.120 0.021
zpGovControl1 -0.148 0.150 0.384 0.252
zpAccess1 -0.857 0.003 0.404 0.132
zpFinControl1 0.037 -0.009
zpFinControl2 0.266 -0.064
zIncentiveProblem 0.005 0.011
zPurchaserSyndrome 0.236 -0.060
zHospitalSyndrome -0.348 -0.007
zFinControlSyndrome 0.099 0.029
N 42 42 42 4
R2 0.487 0.179 0.237 0.196
 
Remark:  
Coefficients are beta-coefficients 
 
Table 11.3b Impact of Institutional Factors on Health-Outputs 
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Variable LifeExpectancy InfantMortality LifeYearsLost MedFatalities
zpAgency1 -0.617 0.594 0.758 0.085
zpRemIncentives 0.892 -0.362 -0.772 -0.458
zpHospitalStatus1 -0.035 0.005 -0.128 -0.014
zpHospitalStatus2 0.340 -0.215 -0.316 -0.537
zpPurchaser1 -0.234 0.038 0.256 0.228
zpPurchaser2 0.159 -0.193 -0.314 -0.467
zpPatInvolvment1 -0.002 0.297 -0.098 -0.417 0.062 -0.254 0.392 0.123
zpPharma1 -0.222 -0.032 0.236 0.067 0.309 0.071 0.329 0.229
zpGovControl1 -0.082 -0.089 0.066 0.043 -0.019 0.039 -0.476 -0.052
zpAccess1 -0.374 -0.228 -0.242 -0.222 -0.133 -0.036 0.367 0.574
zpQuality1 0.041 -0.141 0.042 -0.225
zpQuality2 0.148 0.102 -0.171 0.114
zpFinControl1 0.104 -0.207 -0.239 0.017
zpFinControl2 0.442 -0.218 -0.264 0.002
zIncentiveProblem 0.209 0.166 -0.183 -0.516
zPurchaserSyndrome 0.111 -0.204 -0.152 0.233
zHospitalSyndrome 0.016 -0.059 -0.057 -0.124
zFinControlSyndrome -0.142 -0.022 -0.029 -0.087
zQualitySyndrome 0.214 -0.304 -0.283 -0.124
N 44 44 44 44 41 41 38 3
R2 0.386 0.248 0.439 0.336 0.444 0.278 0.536 0.335
 
Remark: Coefficients are beta-coefficients 
 
Table 11.3c Impact of Institutional Factors on Beyond-Health-Outputs and Efficiency 
 
Variable ResponIndex Satisfaction Efficiency
zpAgency1 0.100 -0.112 -0.948
zpRemIncentives 0.835 -0.226 1.240
zpHospitalStatus1 0.138 -0.062
zpHospitalStatus2 0.440 0.145 0.281
zpPurchaser1 -0.784 -1.230
zpPurchaser2 0.277 0.134 -0.383
zpPatInvolvment1 0.329 0.357 0.212 0.417 -0.053 0.285
zpPharma1 -0.482 -0.187 -0.760 -0.390 -0.574 -0.129
zpGovControl1 -0.457 -0.077 -0.291 0.886 -0.409 0.234
zpAccess1 -0.286 0.013 0.591 -0.042 -0.067 0.316
zpQuality1 0.066 -0.528 -0.085
zpQuality2 0.585 0.110 0.371
zpFinControl1 0.101 0.950 0.367
zpFinControl2 0.353 0.608
zIncentiveProblem 0.175 -0.081 -0.156
zPurchaserSyndrome 0.405 1.376 0.105
zHospitalSyndrome 0.238 0.332 -0.209
zFinControlSyndrome -0.147 -0.132 0.017
zQualitySyndrome 0.157 0.134 0.345
N 22 22 16 16 22 2
R2 0.894 0.723 0.807 0.7 0.469 0.244
2
 
Remark: Coefficients are beta-coefficients 
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Level of Health Expenditure 
The level of HCE, see the leftmost column of table 11.3a, is strongest affected by the 
competition among hospitals, and the absence of the possibility of a sanctioning of providers 
by the purchasers.  
Agency and remuneration incentives, which would be the factors the delegation approach 
would see as most relevant, are not among the major determinants of the HCE levels.  
Putting hospitals under external control and limiting their autonomy reduces expenditure, 
while introducing competition among them goes together with higher costs. As was argued 
above, a requirement for competition in the hospital sector is that there are several hospitals 
for the patients to chose from which implies that there is a certain – costly – redundancy in the 
system. Looking at the coefficients, it seems, that the redundancy effect dominates the effect 
of competition.  
HCE is also strongly influenced by patient involvement, albeit the causality most likely works 
the other way around: higher levels of expenditure lead to a higher involvement of patients as 
an additional source of funding.  
Governmental control, i.e. the control of the HCS by an outside actor, who has the preferences 
of the electorate in mind, is of no effect on the level of HCE.  
Access, the content of which encompasses both unrestrained access to secondary care and 
choice among several providers of secondary care, which is usually thought to be limiting the 
costs by assuring that care is obtained on the level where it can be produced at least costs, has 
no stable effect on the expenditure variable.  
Financial control in the sense that the purchaser obtains information about what the provider 
has been doing in a certain case has no effect on the level of HCE. Information alone is not 
effective, if not combined with the power to sanction. In this regard, FinancialControl2 refers 
to a situation where high values indicate the absence of the possibility to sanction providers in 
the case of overspending, and has a strong effect on HCE, i.e. where the providers can be 
sanctioned in the case of overspending, the HCE tends to be lower.  
Of the syndromes, only the purchaser syndrome, i.e. purchasers which can compete and are 
under competitive pressure, has an effect on HCE. The effect is an increasing one, which is 
straight against the prediction. One would have expected that a working competition among 
purchasers lowers HCE, but this is not the case.  
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Health Expenditure Development 
Apart from the level of HCE, its development – factually: its growth rate – is of interest to 
policy makers. Conceptually, the expenditure level might reflect a one-time decision, e.g. 
about the coverage of services, the financial consequences of which are a one-time increase of 
the HCE. Dynamics is a different aspect, because of its consequences for the future. From a 
fiscal politics viewpoint, a one time increase, coupled with a lower rate increase is more 
“controllable” and preferable to a low level of HCE associated with a high rate of growth.  
Expenditure dynamics was captured using three related indicators, all of which use the growth 
of HCE in the years surrounding the point in time for which the institutional structure was 
surveyed: the change in HCE between the years 1993 to 1997 for the 1995 survey, and the 
change between 2002 to 2005 for the second survey in 2004. The implicit assumption is, that 
the institutional structure is associated or rather causally connected with the growth rate not 
only for the actual survey date but also for the period immediately around that date. Given the 
occurrence of changes, this is basically true. The HCS in the survey did not change, 
respectively not change fundamentally directly at the point of the survey time. Thus, the 
assumption is both justifiable and reasonable that the dynamics of expenditure increase for the 
period around the point in time is affected by the institutional setting at this point in time.  
 
The growth of total health expenditure in absolute terms, dTHCE_abs, gives an illustrative 
hint about the amount of money which is going into the health system, i.e. the money which is 
available in addition to what was available a few years before. It has to be kept in mind, that 
the indicator “absolute change” is biased in the sense that a HCS, in which the level of HCE is 
already very high, the absolute changes tend to be higher too, while they won’t necessarily be 
perceived as a problem by the public or health policy makers. 
The dynamics of health expenditure in absolute terms is primarily affected by two of the 
institutional variables: the degree of agency and the degree of access granted in the HCS, both 
of which increase the absolute growth. 
The effect of agency is in line with the argument of the delegation approach: independent 
providers tend to cause higher costs. However, the negative coefficient found for the 
remuneration incentives clearly contradicts this argument.  
For access, the argument would be that the overall technological development, in particular 
the trend towards more sophisticated and more expensive treatments and diagnostics – which 
is a major driver of HCE, see Newhouse (1992), Okunade/Murthy (2002) and Moise (2003) – 
has a larger impact on the costs and the dynamics of costs, if the access to these treatments is 
 248
more freely granted. Limiting access to sophisticated care by installing a gatekeeper who 
decides about the necessity of a certain advanced treatment in any given case may hold the 
costs in check. The coefficient found seems to confirm the mechanisms.  
The degree of control exercised over pharmaceutical sales slows down the growth of HCE. 
The underlying argument may be similar to the role of innovation in medical technology 
which is arguably underlying the effect of “Access”. New medicines are usually significantly 
more expensive, but the improvement compared to existing ones is not always of a magnitude 
which justifies this mark up. Thus, limiting the usage of new medicines may have a stabilizing 
effect on HCE, i.e. lowers the rate of expenditure growth.  
Contrary to the argument about the role of the government as an actor from the outside who 
holds the actors running the HCS, all of which share the interest in a constant growth of HCE, 
in check, high levels of governmental control actually increases HCE growth. The argument 
may be that in many of the transformation countries, e.g. the Czech Republic, Hungary or 
Poland, governmental control was (and often still is) high but the HCS was vested with more 
resources during the post-transformation period. 
Patient involvement has a stable and increasing effect on HCE. But again, the effect of patient 
involvement raises the question about the direction of causality: higher levels of patient 
involvement may allow higher levels of HCE and higher growth rates, but the levels of HCE 
and the growth rates are not actually caused by the patient involvement. Rather, and this is in 
line with the circumstance under which patient involvement is introduced, it is the other way 
around: the patients are involved, because more funding is needed.  
Of the institutional syndromes, only the purchaser syndrome has a noteworthy effect, but as 
with the level of HCE in the previous paragraph, the direction is contrary to the expectation. 
As already the coefficients found for the two underlying dimensions indicated, installing the 
preconditions for an effective competition on the demand side does not slow down the growth 
rate of HCE. An argument may be that competition requires several purchasers, which implies 
that functions are doubled and administrative economies of scale remain unrealized. If in this 
situation, the multiplicity of purchasers is not supplemented by a incentive for them to 
actually engage in competition, the net effect will be that the redundancy will predominate.  
 
 
The percentage change of HCE, dTHCE_per, indicates the magnitude of the growth of 
resources consumed in a more comparable way. The results obtained are roughly comparable 
to those obtained the absolute change and there are four effects of substantial magnitude.  
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Agency increases the rate of expenditure growth, while the prevalence of remuneration 
incentives decreases it. Both observations taken together casts serious doubt about the 
mechanism which is presumed to be underlying the relationship between the provision and 
remuneration of services on the one hand and health expenditure on the other. The absence of 
a stable coefficient for the IncentiveProblem casts further doubt. Again, access has an 
increasing effect on the dynamics, and the same is true for governmental control. HCS, in 
which the government has substantial influence, tend to show higher growth rates than HCS 
which are more autonomous from outside, or rather: political influence.  
Introducing elements of competition among purchasers does not contain the growth of 
expenditure, but on the contrary rather tends to increase it. Granting hospitals autonomy also 
increases expenditure dynamics, while competition among hospitals decreases it – the hospital 
syndrome as the “optimal” combination has only a rather weak effect. Similar to the results 
obtained for the absolute change in HCE, institutional syndromes are only of minor relevance 
for the dynamics of HCE, apart from the purchaser syndrome, which just as was the case for 
absolute growth, tends to induce higher percentual growth rates of HCE.  
 
 
The indicator of relative growth of total expenditure for health – proxied by the development 
of HCE in relation to GDP, dTHCE_rel – was included in order to get an impression whether 
the financial development of the HCS got out of hand or not. In most countries, the 
development of HCE – that is to say: the universal and one-way trend towards more 
expenditure – is tolerated, if the increase in HCE is proportional to the development of GDP. 
There is not actually a stringent argument why more money should be spend just because 
more money is available for spending - the very finding that this obviously happens indicates 
that health is a luxury rather than a necessity. However, even if quantities and types of 
services are left out, the public and the political debates about health expenditure argue for 
instance, that because incomes of the persons working in the HCS are roughly related to the 
GDP, an increase of HCE in the magnitude of the increase of GDP is to be expected and also 
tolerable. If the share of HCE relative to the GDP increases disproportional, this tolerance 
comes to an end. Indeed, looking at the context of health reforms, one can say that as long as 
the rates of economic growth were quite high and stable, the development of HCE was 
perceived as a minor concern. HCE growth came into focus, and was seen as a problem, as 
the rates of economic growth decreases and became much less stable.  
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Compared to the analyses of indicators of expenditure dynamics, there are fewer noteworthy 
effects. Or rather, the institutional variables on the whole exert a weaker effect. A finding 
which is also due to the fact that the dependent variable is a mix of two factors, namely the 
development of the HCE and the development of the economy, i.e. of GDP. As for the 
findings, they are comparable to the findings regarding the other two dynamic indicators: 
Granting free access to secondary care accelerates the relative dynamics of HCE growth, 
hospital autonomy does so too, while hospital competition slows it down. Governmental 
control increases it, and of the syndromes, only the incentive problem matters, albeit here too, 
in an unexpected way, because it decreases the relative growth rate.  
 
Private Expenditure for Health Care 
Just as total HCE, private funding for health care has two aspects, a static one, i.e. the level of 
private funding, and a dynamic one, i.e. the development of private funding over time.  
The static aspect results from a one-time decision about what shall be funded by private 
contributions, e.g. by supplementary insurance or out-of-pocket payments. The decision is 
also a very basic political or rather ideological one in that it determines the border between 
solidarity and personal responsibility in the country’s HCS. Some countries have traditionally 
a smaller catalogue of services covered from the “common pool”. Indeed, some, as the US, 
seemingly have no common pool at all. As chapter 12 will show, the decision is a stable one: 
many countries have not altered the basic decision, what is to be paid for “from the common 
pool” and what is paid for privately. But many countries have increased the level of private 
contributions within the basic decision made earlier on. An instance of this are cases where 
there were always co-payments, but the level of each co-payment is now higher than it was 
earlier on. A possible exemption is the handling of so called “alternative treatments” like 
homeopathy, which are not covered in this study.  
The dynamic aspect reflects, at least to some degree, the tendency of health policy makers to 
pass on the burden of growing HCE to the patients, by either extending or intensifying the 
latter’s involvement.  
The questions underlying the two regression analyses discussed in this section are: are there 
institutional settings which induce higher shares of private HCE? And, are there institutional 
settings which induce higher rates of growth of the private HCE? A hypothesis implicit to 
many studies on private funding is that private funding is introduced respectively increased as 
an additional source of funding. If the state, confronted with the problem of raising costs, is 
not (or no longer) willing to pay for certain services, be it because the service in question is 
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seen as a luxury or is of uncertain effectiveness, the services are excluded from public 
coverage and are left to be purchased and paid for by the patients themselves. Looking at the 
practice of how private funding is organized, one sees that the funding is done most often via 
a supplementary insurance rather than out-of-pocket. This again separates payment from 
consumption. At least in the short run, because the patients pay not the price of each service, 
but pay a premium, which is independent from the short term consumption. So, while the 
argument is that involving patients in payment introduces the price mechanism and limits 
consumption to what is cost effective, the way this strategy is implemented is a mere opening 
up new sources of funding. Involving patients is thus, in practice, not as a measure of overall 
cost containment, but as a measure to contain the public share of the costs.  
 
With regard to the share of private funding (measured as the percentage share of private 
funding of the total expenditure for health on a $PPP per capita basis), there are a number of 
strong institutional effects: 
First of all, agency does in fact reduce the level of private funding. On the other hand, the 
prevalence of remuneration incentives which increasing the quantity of care are a very strong 
factor for the private share of HCE, increasing it substantially. Probably indicating that a part 
of the increase in the quantity of services - which are provided because of the incentive 
arising from quantity based remuneration modes - is financed by private payments. And, 
because agency does matter much less, this mechanism is seemingly independent of the status 
of the providers.  
Installing competition between autonomous hospitals decreases private funding substantially, 
and the same is true for the hospital syndrome.  
Autonomous purchasers go together with higher levels of private funding, while competition 
among them reduces this kind of financing. A possible interpretation is, that the purchasers 
compete by including services into their coverage which would otherwise be covered by 
private funding. The effect for the purchaser syndrome is weak when compared to the two 
institutional dimensions on which it its based.  
Interestingly, patient involvement is of little relevance for the level of private funding. This 
feature does, as was found in chapter 10 above, not primarily concern elements of the HCS’ 
service catalogue which are excluded in almost all countries, such as dental care and 
medicines. Instead, it concerns how the patients are involved in the payment and the funding 
of basic care, e.g. visits to GPs or specialists. It is also more of a qualitative measure, 
indicating in which sectors the patients are involved, either by co-payments or by cost-
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reimbursement. It is not a quantitative measure indicating the magnitude of the co-payments. 
A consequence is that knowing in how many domains the patients has to make co-payments 
does not tell us something about how large an amount of the funding is raised by this mean. 
There are systems, in which there are few sectors with patient-involvement, and high levels of 
private funding, but also systems with similar involvement, where the level of private funding 
is low.  
Interestingly, the control exerted over pharmaceutical sales does not matter for the level of 
private funding, a finding which may indicate that the savings realized by this form of 
regulatory intervention relieves the public sources of financing and are not realized as savings 
by the patients.  
Freedom of access to secondary care is not financed from private funding. On the contrary, 
systems in which access to specialized care is granted freely are also systems, in which the 
level of private funding is comparatively low. This is contrary to the expectation, because 
access is most often controlled for in public integrated systems, for which the basic 
assumption is that they are funded from public sources, e.g. general taxation. Governmental 
control has no substantial effect on the share of private health funding.  
 
The dynamics of private funding is operationalized by the percentage increase of the private 
financing (measured in $PPP per Capita) during the years 1990 to 1995 and 2000 to 2004. 
Again, the assumption is that the institutional setting, which was more or less stable during 
these 5-year intervals, affects the dynamics by which the patients are burdened with the costs 
of health care consumption. The set of factors relevant for the development of private funding 
are different from the factors relevant for the level of private funding. And, basically, only 
two factors matter.  
Remuneration incentives for increasing the quantity of care have a negative coefficient, i.e. in 
systems where such incentives are in place, the level of private funding grows slower. In 
systems, where patient involvement is high, the growth of the private share tends to be lower . 
the effect might be an artifact, due to the effect that the growth measured in percentages is 
smaller if the level of private funding is already high in absolute terms.  
Governmental control increases the rate by which the HCS is funded from private 
contributions. According to this finding, HCS characterized by more governmental control are 
also relying progressively on private funding as an additional source of funding. This effect 
may however be due to lower levels of private involvement in public integrated systems at the 
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time of the first survey, where even small increases in the absolute magnitude of private 
funding are a significant share on a percentage basis.  
None of the institutional syndromes matters for the development of private funding. Overall, 
the explanatory power of the institutional variables used is very low, accounting only for 
about 20 % of the variation.  
 
Health Outputs 
Regarding the health outputs, the quality syndrome was included as an additional factor of 
potential relevance. Because the hypotheses of the delegation approach for the health outputs 
are not as strong, as for the expenditure, the findings presented in the following do not suggest 
an incentive based causal mechanism which is as clear cut as for the expenditure related 
performance indicators. The delegation based explanations of the findings is thus weaker than 
above. As for the validity, it has to be remarked once more that of the four indicators of health 
output used, life expectancy is the least valid one. As was elaborated in chapter 9 above, life 
expectancy is an often used, but questionable indicator of health system “performance”. Even 
in industrialized countries levels of life expectancy are influenced by range of factors outside 
of the HCS, such as life style, road safety or the incidence of suicide.  
 
Life expectancy is strongly affected by four institutional factors: the first and strongest one 
the level of remuneration incentives, which goes together with higher levels of life 
expectancy. Agency, lowers life expectancy, and the access to secondary care also diminishes 
life expectancy. Competition among hospitals on the other hand increases life expectancy. Of 
the organizational features the possibility of the purchaser to sanction overspending providers 
of services reduces life expectancy. Taken together one could surmise that the higher quantity 
of services, which is provided for the reason that it is also a mean of the providers to increase 
their income, is not completely wasted, but increases life expectancy. The positive effect of 
competition among hospitals indicates that hospitals which have to compete for clients 
increases the quality of the services provided, which is beneficial for life expectancy. As the 
following paragraphs will show, this mechanism holds true for all four health output 
indicators.  
Of the institutional syndromes, the incentive problem shows a weakly increasing effect, a 
possible indication that providing many services might have an effect on health status. The 
quality syndrome also increases this health output, while the individual quality dimensions do 
not.  
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In the case of infant mortality, as well as the other two mortality based indicators, negative 
coefficients indicate a beneficial effect of an institutional variable on the health output 
(defined as avoided loss of life and health). 
Infant mortality is seen in the methodical debate on health system outputs as a more valid 
indicator, because it is, in principle, avoidable if the medical care before, during and after 
birth is appropriate.  
As was found in the case of life expectancy, the degree of agency has an adverse effect on this 
health output. More agency strongly increases infant mortality. On the other hand, the 
presence of remuneration incentives which stimulate an increased supply of services reduces 
infant mortality, albeit the effect is less strong than that of agency. The direction of the effect 
is in line with the incentive based reasoning: if there is in general an incentive to provide more 
services respectively more consultations the providers will respond with providing more and 
also more sophisticated services and diagnostics. A pregnancy is – in this perspective – an 
opportunity to provide intensive care, which also will be demanded by the mother-to-be. All 
of this, more diagnostics, more services, and more consultations, presumably have a positive 
effect on this particular health output. 
Just as one would expect, granting access to specialized care affects infant mortality 
beneficial, i.e. less constrained access to specialized care leads to lower rates of infant 
mortality. The mechanism suggesting itself is that granting access to specialized care, in this 
case to gynaecologists, is an important factor for infant mortality. If this mechanism holds 
true, it would put cost saving efforts based on a shift of medical care during pregnancy from 
the specialists to GPs, in a critical light. 
However, strong effects are also found for pharmaceutical control, which increases infant 
mortality, and both indicators of financial control, both decreasing infant mortality. Again the 
mechanisms underlying both relationships are unclear.  
Of the syndromes, the purchaser syndrome has to some degree a positive effect, but the 
quality syndrome has the only noteworthy effect on this health system output, which is higher, 
it quality is organized in a stricter way. Given the coefficients found for remuneration 
incentives, one would have expected a stronger effect for the incentive problem.  
 
The net number of potential life years lost in a country is an indicator of the health output the 
HCS fails to produce. By construction, the indicator is the number of those years of life lost 
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for people with less than 70 years of age, which are not lost due to “external” reasons such as 
accidents and suicide. The figure is standardized per 100.000 citizens. While the figure still 
contains losses of life years which are unrelated to the HCS, the correction for external causes 
leaves within the residual number of life years lost a higher share of life years which are lost 
due to illnesses and medical reasons, i.e. factors the HCS could tackle, if it works properly.  
The indicator is affected by the institutional variables in a similar way as the infant mortality 
and the life expectancy. Agency increases the figure substantially, while the incentives to 
provide more medical services decreases the figure, also substantially. Competition among 
purchasers as well as among hospitals reduces the loss of life years.  
Further noteworthy effects are found for pharmaceutical controls. The more pharmaceutical 
consumption is constrained, i.e. by limiting consumption and by fostering the usage of 
generics, the more years of life are lost. Given that in particular the usage of generics has no 
reputation for adverse effects, this finding is surprising.  
Of the institutional syndromes, the incentive problem affects this output positively, but only 
slightly, while the quality syndrome again has a strong and positive effect on this output.  
 
The incidence of medical fatalities during medical treatment, again measured in life years lost 
due to this specific reason and standardized per 100.000 citizens, shows a slightly different 
pattern. The difference in the pattern is likely due to the fact that such fatalities are more 
likely to occur in hospitals than outside, because the interventions conducted in hospitals are 
more severe.  
This particularity might be the reason that the degree of agency, which reflects the 
organization of out-patient care, does not affect this output. Hospitals are in public ownership 
in all countries (apart from Belgium), and thus this feature does not vary over the countries 
and does not induce variation in the level of agency.  
Competition among hospitals substantially lowers the incidence of such fatalities, and the 
mechanism might work as follows: existence of competition in the in-patient sector implies 
that citizens can chose among hospitals to some degree. If there is choice, the patients 
themselves or the GPs advising them, are likely to base the decision on the hospital’s 
reputation. Thus, the reputation of a hospital has an effect on the number of patients treated 
and thus also on the institutional survival of the hospital. This may create an incentive to 
engage in assuring quality, which lowers the incidence of medical fatalities. While this sounds 
convincing, the finding that giving patients free access and also choice in consuming 
secondary care increases the number of medical fatalities clearly contradicts this mechanism.  
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Higher incentives to provide more services decrease the incidence of medical fatalities, and 
the same is true for a stronger role of the government in the HCS. Given that the remuneration 
incentives also mostly refer to out-patient care, this effect is to some degree contradictory 
with the finding that agency has no effect. With respect to the organization of the demand 
side, the beneficial effect of competing purchasers has to be noted.  
Of the institutional syndromes, the incentive problem and the quality syndrome are both 
influential, both with a positive effect on the health output. The purchaser syndrome however 
has, according to the data, an adverse effect on this output. 
 
To summarize the stable effects of institutional structures on health outputs, agency per se 
usually lowers health output, while remuneration-based incentives to provide more services, 
competition respectively patient’s choice among hospitals and the quality syndrome increase 
the levels of health outputs produced by the HCS.  
 
Beyond Health Outputs 
The indicators of beyond health outputs are first the responsiveness of the HCS (measured by 
the WHO’s score of responsiveness, which is in turn based on aspects such as access, support, 
information and also amenabilities while receiving health care) and second, the satisfaction of 
citizens with their HCS (measured directly in public-opinion surveys). 
 
The variation in the levels of responsiveness can be explained very well by the different 
institutional settings of the HCS.  
On the supply side of health care, agency per se does not matter for responsiveness, i.e. there 
is no evidence that employed providers are less responsive to the patients than are self-
employed providers. However, the difference between public-integrated type systems and 
other types of health systems comes into play when the remuneration incentives are 
considered: these are to some degree, albeit not perfectly, correlated with the occupational 
status, which is one of the defining criteria for a public-integrated system. Self-employed 
providers are remunerated by a quantity-base remuneration mode more often, and this, not 
their employment status, is the actual reason why they are more responsive. So, irrespective of 
the occupational status, a remuneration mode which sets an incentive to provide more services 
increases the responsiveness of the HCS. Possibly indicating that responsiveness also means 
to show some effort, to do something in response to the patient’s complaints about her state of 
health.  
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Hospital competition, which implies the possibility of choice among hospitals, also increases 
the responsiveness. The prediction on the relationship between access and responsiveness 
clearly would have been that having free access and choice is one of the main components of 
responsiveness. But, as can be seen from the weak and negative coefficient of access, the data 
is contradicting this interpretation.  
On the demand side, autonomous purchasers reduce the responsiveness and the magnitude of 
this effect is not compensated for by the competition among purchasers, which makes the 
system slightly more responsive. However, taken together, the effective competition defined 
by autonomous purchasers which are under competitive pressure, increases the responsiveness 
of the system, see the beta-coefficient for the PurchaserSyndrome. It has to be remarked that 
the responsiveness of the health system, as measured by the WHO’s indicator, is not directly 
under the control of the purchasers. It covers issues as diverse as prompt attention, 
amenabilities during the treatment etc, which are properties of the supply-side of health care. 
If the purchasers want to increase the responsiveness, they must address the providers 
themselves, who in turn are in direct contact with the patients.  
Governmental control as well as the constraints on pharmaceutical consumption are lowering 
the responsiveness. An interesting point is that measures to enforce quality, proxied by the 
Quality2 indicator, also lead to higher responsiveness, while they factually aim at constraining 
what the provider of medical services can do, and how the provider can respond to the 
patient’s wishes about therapy. The patient might wish to obtain certain treatments, which are 
no longer “allowed” under the current quality regime. The provider would then have to deny 
these services to the patients, which is a clear-cut case of being un-responsive. The effect of 
the quality control is thus difficult to explain.  
 
Satisfaction is the second and much more “subjective” beyond-health output of a HCS. 
Because of the limited availability of data for this variable, which is compiled from surveys 
(see in particular Blendon et al. 1990), the number of explanatory variable had to be reduced, 
using only those variables which yielded the strongest effects.  
Neither the basic organizational form of the supply side (agency and remuneration incentives) 
nor the basic organizational form of the demand side (purchaser autonomy and competition) 
seem to matter for satisfaction.  
Instead, satisfaction is strongly decreased by a comparatively peripheral feature, namely the 
intensity of pharmaceutical regulations, a finding which is likely to be due to the fact that it is 
a regulation which immediately concerns the citizens in the form of medicines which are no 
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longer funded (in the case of measures promoting the usage of generics) or no longer provided 
free of charge (in the case of cost control by co-payments or exclusion from coverage). 
Granting free access and choice of secondary care is a strong factor which increases 
satisfaction, a finding which is in line with the strong preference of citizens for having a 
choice in health care consumption.  
The quality dimension which covers the creation and propagation of guidelines, which in turn 
factually aim at influencing what medical services the provider can offer to the patients, 
reduce the satisfaction. The effect may be due to the mechanism, that the provider cannot 
deliver certain services, which the patient would like to obtain, because the guidelines 
preclude this service as inappropriate or not cost-effective. This finding is in clear 
contradiction to the finding made in the above analysis of responsiveness, where quality 
enforcement was found to increase the responsiveness, while the existence and propagation of 
guidelines alone had no effect.  
Of the syndromes, only the “PurchaserSyndrome” has an effect, and a substantial one at that. 
An effective competition among autonomous purchasers, with the free choice of the 
purchasers, strongly increases satisfaction of the citizens. This is also a rather counter-
intuitive result, because one would assume that the satisfaction with the HCS is primarily 
defined by the patient’s contact with the supply side, not by the administrative side of the 
HCS.  
All results for this output have to be seen subject to the caveat that the number of countries 
covered by surveys on satisfaction with health care is rather small.  
 
Health System Efficiency 
The “WHO1” efficiency score used as an efficiency measure indicates whether the HCS 
produces to the fullest possible extent the life years which can possibly produced by the input 
consumed; see WHO (2000) and chapter 9. The score reflects, whether the health output level 
is as high, as it could be, given the input levels used. The health output level is corrected for 
the Minimum Health Outcome, i.e. the level of life expectancy one would observe in the 
country even in the absence of a HCS and which is thus considered to be attributable to 
factors like living standards and the like. The study by the WHO describes the situation in the 
year 1997, so the data is available for only the first wave of the survey. High values indicate 
high levels of productive efficiency, i.e. that the HCS is very close to what can be achieved 
with the input available.  
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Two institutional variables stand out as the main determinants of efficiency. Interestingly they 
represent the supply and the demand side of the HCS.  
The incentive to oversupply services, RemunerationIncentives, does not reduce the efficiency 
of the HCS, while the autonomy of purchasers does. Just as it was the case with many other 
outputs analyzed in this chapter, the effect of agency is opposed to the effect of the 
remuneration incentives, and in this case, agency per se reduces the efficiency. None of the 
syndromes, not even the IncentiveProblem, has an effect of comparable magnitude. Only the 
QualitySyndrome exerts a positive effect on efficiency, albeit weak.  
 
 
Comparing Explanatory Power  
How well do the different versions (institutional dimensions vs. institutional syndromes) 
explain the variation in the achievement and efficiency variables? The bottommost rows in 
tables 11.3a  to 11.3c  give the R2, the share of variation in the dependent variable explained 
by the different regressions. The resulting overall picture shows consistently certain features: 
1) The individual institutional dimensions explain variation much better than the institutional 
syndromes. Using fewer variables, i.e. the combined syndromes, might be a more 
parsimonious explanation, and the values for the adjusted R2 (not reported in the table) are 
supporting this. But using the institutional syndromes is clearly not sufficient to account for 
the variation in the dependent variables on health system “performance”. The explained 
variation is only of about half the magnitude for the individual dimensions.  
2) The degree to which variation in the different dependent variables can be explained differs 
substantially: It ranges from 10% in the case of the increase of HCE relative to the 
development of GDP; dTHCE_rel, as the least explained variable to 90% in the case of 
responsiveness, as the best explained variable. Differences in the health outputs can explained 
quite well: for all four output indicators, about half or more of the variation can be accounted 
for by including the institutional setting. Differences in the level of responsiveness as the 
primary beyond-health output can be explained almost completely by the institutional stetting 
of the HCS. The explanation of the levels of satisfaction has to be considered with care, 
because of the few cases for which data on the dependent variable is available. Efficiency can 
also be explained quite well, more than half of the variation can be accounted for by 
institutional dimensions.  
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12. Direction, Magnitude and Causes of Institutional Changes  
 
The analysis of institutional changes in HCS will proceed analogous to the previous two 
chapters. First, the institutional setting in the 22 HCS included in the study will be compared 
descriptively between 1995 and 2004, commenting on the changes observable. The 
descriptive section will also cover the measurement of changes, their direction and magnitude. 
The analytical section will be looking into the reasons of the overall institutional change.  
 
12.1. Description of Institutional Changes 
The first task consists of measuring institutional change. As described in chapter K, the latent 
dimensions were obtained using the institutional setting of the 22 HCS in both years as input 
data in the data reduction procedure. Thus for each case - which is the institutional setting of a 
country in a year - a position in the latent institutional space was obtained. This approach has 
the advantage of allowing direct comparisons between countries and also of both points in 
time. Looking at the coordinates of a country, one can immediately answer the two 
descriptive questions: Did one country introduce more substantial change than another 
country? And: In what direction did the HCS change? Did all countries change in the same 
direction, so one could say there is an uniform trend in health reforms? Looking at the cases 
studies on reforms, one might expect that more elements of competition were introduced.  
So the description of the changes uses the latent institutional dimensions and their content, as 
these were derived in chapter 10 above.  
With regard to the interpretation of the changes, it must be remarked that because the 
institutional dimensions were calculated on a sectorial basis, one cannot compare the degree 
of changes between the dimensions in the sense of “The change on the Agency dimension is 
more important than the change on the Hospital Status dimension”. Nor can one say that a 
change of 0.5 on the “RemunerationIncentives” dimension is a more substantial change than a 
change of .25 on the “FinancialControl” dimension. What one can say is that for instance the 
Netherlands has increased the involvement of patients in the payment of provider four times 
as much as Switzerland; see table 12.1 below. 
To evaluate the impact of the institutional change occurring in a country, the direction and the 
magnitude of the change on a certain dimension must be combined with the effect of the 
dimension as given in chapter 11.  
 
 Change on Institutional Dimensions 
Institutional changes are illustrated in the following figures by giving the location of the HCS 
in the institutional space for both, 1995 and 2004. It is noteworthy that throughout the sample 
and the sectors covered, the institutional stability is relatively high. There are some sectors, 
where many things, many individual institutional regulations changed, and moreover did so in 
many countries. Consequentially, some countries moved quite a distance in the institutional 
space. In other sectors, there are no changes at all. For the sake of clarity, the following 
figures only include those countries, where changes occurred.  
 
Figure 12.1 Changes in Agency and Incentives 
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Figure 12.1 above plots the changes on the agency dimensions by changes in the remuneration 
modes. The first observation is, that there are no changes in the agency. In none of the 22 
countries, a task which was previously predominantly integrated in the public administration 
was delegated to independent, self-employed actors. There are however cases, in which the 
predominance of a certain mode of provision increased, because the remaining employed 
providers opted for self-employment, e.g. in some of the transformation countries. Nor were 
tasks integrated in the public administration, which were up to then delegated. This is in itself 
an important point, because agency is one of the most crucial and defining factors for the 
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classification of the HCS. So at the most basic level, the organization of the HCS studied 
remained stable during the observation period. Apart from the organizational principle, it also 
implies that the number of system internal stakeholders, understood as the number of societal 
actors involved in running the HCS, remained stable. The changes observable in the following 
are thus more like changes within structures than changes of structures.  
What is observable in figure 12.1 is a change in the remuneration modes and thereby in the 
incentives set by the remuneration modes. All the changes in this sector, the connection 
between the quantity of services and the income, and thus the incentive to increase the former 
for the sake of the latter, was reduced. The magnitude of all changes is also similar, indicating 
that usually, only one incentive was removed, or in other cases like Luxembourg introduced. 
Often, the change concerned the introduction of DRG and other case-based remuneration 
modes in the hospital sector.  
 
 
Figure 12.2 Changes in Purchaser Autonomy and Competition 
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Regarding the role of the purchasers, the two latent institutional dimensions as identified in 
chapter 10 above are autonomy of and competition between the purchases. Can the 
purchasers, whatever their organizational character (in particular regarding formal 
independence and formal status) autonomously make decisions relevant for their relationship 
with the citizens and are the purchasers in a situation, in which they have to compete among 
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each other for clients (citizens insured with them or citizens living in the purchaser’s 
catchment area). Figure 12.2 gives the changes in both institutional dimensions. 
In France, the formally independent mandatory Health Insurance Funds are under close 
supervision of the state, and many decisions concerning the relationship between the HIF and 
the insured are made by political actors. The HIF can neither decide on the usage of a surplus, 
nor decide on the contribution rates. These are formally set by act of parliament and it is also 
the state which decides on the usage of surpluses, while also standing in for deficits. Further, 
the citizens were and still are assigned to the HIFs based on their occupation, having only 
little choice. The lack of choice among HIFs is complemented by a lack of reasons for a 
choice: Medical catalogues are not allowed to differ in terms of the core services but they may 
differ in respect to “optional” services, like coverage of homeopathy or spa treatments. The 
main change is that the contributions to the HIF differed among HIFs in 1995, but are no 
longer allowed to do so in 2004. So even if in 1995 there was at least an incentive to change 
the HIF, this incentive was removed by now. HIF autonomy and the level of competition 
between HIFs are and were low.   
In Germany, the levels of autonomy and competition among the HIF, the “sickness funds”, 
was and still is very high. The members of the HIFs decide on the top-level administration by 
elections, the HIF can single-handedly decide, with reference to the economic situation of the 
fund, on the level of contributions, and also decide on the usage of the surplus. The latter can, 
within limits set by the law, be used to bolster the reserves, to lower the contribution rates, or 
to equalize deficits. The state has little say in what the HIFs do. The German Social Insurance 
Law as it is, leaves many options for the HIFs. There is no defined catalogue in the sense of 
an enumeration of services, and the degree to which the HIFs are differing in coverage, for 
instance by excluding some of the more “optional” treatments (e.g. spa treatments, 
“alternative” treatments) is increasing. The main change in the demand side of the German 
HCS was the introduction of free choice among the HIFs. Up to 1996, only the white-collar 
employees were allowed to change the HIF; usually by leaving the regional branch of the 
General Sickness Fund, AOK, and becoming member with the General Employees Fund.  
In Norway, the purchasers were and still are the county councils and the municipalities. 
However, the role of the central government increased, reducing both the leeway of the local 
purchasers to make autonomous decisions and the degree to which they differ in what they 
can offer to clients, and thus the degree to which they differ in attractiveness from the 
perspective of the clients. Because the assignment to a purchaser is based on the place of 
living, changing the purchaser can only be done by moving into another area. A fact, which in 
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itself limits the competition the purchasers are confronted with, because it is a step which 
forces the citizen to consider many aspects and consequences (working place, access to 
schools, etc), not only the health care.  
In New Zealand, the purchasers are the Regional respectively District Health Boards, which 
were and still are under close control of the central government – a fact, which shows up in 
the low level of purchaser autonomy. Citizens are “assigned” to the DHB of the district they 
are living in, a fact which makes it costly to change the purchaser. Purchasers are now 
somewhat more autonomous, for instance they have to bear and equalize deficits, which were 
formerly covered by the central government. But even back in 1995, the purchasers differed 
substantially in what services they factually offered, in particular in terms of availability and 
waiting times.  
Poland also reduced the autonomy and the competition among purchasers. As a residual of 
communist times, the municipalities and regions were still in charge of providing health care 
in 1995, and they differed somewhat in how well they managed to do the job, also because of 
local situation (urban vs. rural areas). In 2004, a single National Health Insurance Fund was 
created, which on the one side has a monopoly, but on the other side is under governmental 
control.  
In Switzerland, the citizens have more choice now, but the reasons to change the HIF were 
removed too. By 2004, HIFs no longer differed in the contribution levels or the catalogues, as 
it was the case back in 1995. Regarding the autonomy, this was and still is high. The HIFs can 
decide on the top-level administration, the usage of the surplus (usually by putting it into the 
reserves), but are also forced to cope with deficits (usually by covering it with reserves).  
 Figure 12.3 Changes in Hospital Status and Competition 
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Figure 12.3 illustrates the institutional changes in the hospital sector for the observation 
period and the variables which were used in this study to describe the organization of the 
hospital sector. Only in two of twenty two countries, there were changes regarding the 
hospital status and the degree to which the hospitals can compete for clients, namely in New 
Zealand and in Luxembourg. It has to be kept in mind, that this is not to say that there was no 
change in the other twenty country, it only means, that there were no changes in terms of the 
organization of delegation.  
In Luxembourg the national government has gained more influence on investments in medical 
technology and equipment. In 1995 only major investments in medical equipment required the 
government’s approval, and the hospital had substantial leeway regarding what it could 
purchase.    
Regarding the competition among hospitals, Luxembourg was characterized by factually free 
choice among hospitals already back in 1995. But the competition was stimulated by the 
Ministry of Health, which is now issuing lists of what services can be obtained where. But of 
more importance is that the hospital treatment costs differ now, at least from the perspective 
of the purchaser. In 1995, the main source of hospital financing was a per diem, which was 
identical for all hospitals. While the per diems were complemented by extra charges for 
services, the major share of hospital funding came in the form of per diems. Now, in 2004, the 
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remuneration has the form of a prospective budget, negotiated between the individual hospital 
and the Association of Health Insurance Funds, UCM. Because the budget is of different size 
for each hospital, the hospitals are more or less expensive from the perspective of the UCM, 
and it matters at least for the UCM, where treatment is obtained.  
New Zealand also changed its hospital system, and quite strongly so. Deficits are no longer 
covered by default but are loans, which have to be repaid in the future. In 1995, hospitals 
could invest surpluses in medical equipment without having to obtain outside approval. In 
2004, this was no longer possible. Instead, the central government has acquired substantial 
influence on what equipment is available and where: Now, the government controlled District 
Health Board operating the hospital, decides in agreement with the central government about 
investment decisions, in order to avoid expensive redundancies. Regarding competition, the 
choice between different hospitals was and still is, limited. Hospitals are factually not 
competing, but have their assigned catchment areas. Patients are referred to the hospital which 
is in charge of the region they are living in. The costs of hospital treatment differed in 1995 
and still do so. However, because these differences in treatment costs are not relevant for the 
patients and because of the allocated catchment areas, there is no competition.  
 
 
Figure 12.4 Changes in the Financial Control and Sanctioning of Providers 
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There are only three countries with changes in the way the control over the provider of 
medical services changed in the observation period.  
The largest change regarding the control occurred in Poland. In 1995, the purchasers, 
municipalities, could already identify hospitals which were more expensive than others. Now 
that GPs are almost completely independent and contracted, they too can be identified if they 
constantly cause higher costs for the National Health Insurance Fund. Regarding the 
possibilities of sanctioning providers for overspending, both, in-patient as well as out-patient 
providers, are now contracted and can in principle be de-contracted. Control was also 
extended by changing the way the remuneration is paid: GPs were and still are predominantly 
remunerated on a capitation basis, which makes it difficult to control what was done in any 
given case. For hospitals, the remuneration by a budget was replaced by the remuneration by 
way of billing.  
In Norway overspending GPs and overspending hospitals could and still can be identified. As 
far as the GPs are contracted, they can be de-contracted or at least be threatened with de-
contracting. Hospitals are basically owned by the Regional Health Authorities. These may try 
to exert some cost-containment, but they factually cannot exclude their own hospitals from 
providing services. Nevertheless, the Regional Health Authorities get the information about 
what was done by the hospital in a case. 
Luxembourg on the other hand, reduced the possibilities to exercise financial control over 
providers of medical services. While the country created the possibility to identify GPs which 
overspend, this was not accompanied by any mechanism to sanction them for doing so. 
Furthermore, in 1995, the hospitals had to hand in a bill to obtain reimbursement from the 
HIF for extra services which supplemented the per diem. This is no longer the case, because 
the remuneration mode was changed from a basic per diem combined with a billing of extra 
services to a fixed prospective budgeting.  
 Figure 12.5 Changes in Patient Involvement and Composition of Health Funding 
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While the private share of HCE was increased in many HCS, only two of the twenty-two 
countries increased the involvement of the patients in the payment of the services, i.e. either 
by introducing (as opposed to merely increasing) co-payments or by shifting from service-in-
kind to cost-reimbursement.  
Switzerland, which already had a very high level of patient involvement in 1995, has 
introduced cost-reimbursement for medicines, which were at least to some degree provided in 
kind in 1995. 
The strongest change occurred in the Netherlands. While there is no shift from service-in-kind 
provision of medical products and services to the cost-reimbursement mode, the incidence and 
magnitude of co-payments was greatly increased. While formally, co-payments were already 
in place back in 1995, they were not factually used, because of encompassing exemptions. 
The significantly increases share of private funding in the Netherlands’ HCS reflects this.  
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 Figure 12.6 Changes in Regulation of the Pharmaceutical Market 
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Figure 12.6 above illustrates the changes in the regulations of the pharmaceutical markets, i.e. 
the control exercised over the sales and the coverage of pharmaceuticals by the HCS.  
Looking at pharmaceutical policy in the OECD countries, the picture is a quite consistent one. 
The movement is quite uniformly one towards more control over pharmaceutical sales and 
more control over the coverage of new medicines by the HCS. 
Roughly half of the cases show changes in the regulations on pharmaceuticals during in the 
observation period. In many cases, price controls were introduced, the usage of generics was 
allowed in the first place, respectively if existent, the factual usage of generics was increased 
by setting financial incentives, i.e. by making the price difference between the branded 
original and the generic substitute relevant for the patient.  
This observation also shows up in the above figure. Many countries have introduced an 
evaluative step in the market authorization, which connects the price and/ or the coverage of 
the new product to its medical efficacy.  
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 Figure 12.7 Changes in Provision of Information and Enforcement of Quality Standards 
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Figure 12.7 above shows the changes in the handling of quality-related information and 
quality assurance. It reveals first that quality has become an issue in health care, and secondly 
that the problem of lacking information on the side of the patient was tackled. As was said 
earlier on, the crux of the delegation problem is the lack of information on the patient’s side: 
the patient does not know what is appropriate in his condition, does not know how to 
recognize a competent provider, has no information about what risks are to be considered etc. 
At the same time, a lot of information arises all the time decentrally: Doctors learn (by doing) 
what treatments work but this information is not spread in an organized way. The purchasers 
can aggregate this information from analyzing the incoming bills, which are documenting 
what was done to treat what conditions, whether what was done solved the problem or 
whether there were follow-up treatments and so on. Information is there, and one challenge is 
to gather this information, to analyze it and to hand it back to the providers. The next issue is 
then, whether the providers accept using this information, e.g. by abiding to guidelines 
imposed on them from “outsiders”.  
As figure 12.7 indicates, much has happened in this regard. In many countries, the collection 
and dissemination of information was introduced or at least systematically organized. This is 
confirmed if one looks at what happened in this regard in more detail, for instance in the 
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extensive case study literature on quality assurance efforts involving the providers; see Davis 
et al. (1995) and Patridge (2003). Concerned are basically all kinds of information: 
information arising during the treatment was collected in order to identify effective and also 
cost-effective treatments, medical guidelines were compiled by medical experts, which 
condense the “state of the art”, but it the issue also concerns the gathering and publication of 
quality related information allowing the “customer” an informed choice where to get 
treatment. The information is also published much more widely than in the past, when it was, 
if published at all, only circulated in internal publications of the providers. 
The second, complementary theme is the enforcement of quality standards. While providing 
information and guidelines about how to treat certain conditions is already an encroachment 
into professional autonomy, enforcement is much more so. And thus it is not that astonishing 
that here has been less change, presumably due to the stronger opposition of the providers. 
Nevertheless, the concern with quality assurance is reflected in the fact that quality is now 
frequently at least mentioned in the contracts between the purchasers and the providers.  
 
 
Figure 12.8 Changes in Governmental Control and Public Financing of the Health Care 
System 
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Looking at the evolution of governmental control, i.e. the external control over the HCS by an 
actor which has both the formal stewardship role and also the role of having the common 
good in mind, figure 12.8. above plots the changes in the governmental control by changes in 
the share of financing which is coming from general taxation.  
There are no changes in the most basic features: who determines the catalogue of medical 
services covered by the HCS, who sets budgets and remuneration levels, and who determines 
the remuneration modes. So the changes which can be observed are again changes within 
structures rather than changes of structures. Competencies were gradually extended or limited, 
but not fundamentally changed.  
In some cases, the control of the central government was reduced and there are several 
“devolution” effects showing up. For instance, in Spain, which has the most pronounced 
change, the competencies held formerly by the central government were now shifted to the 
governments of the “autonomous communities”. 
Norway has the most significant change in the opposite direction, with the central government 
acquiring substantial competencies from the regional and local health authorities, in particular 
the hospital sector, see also figure 12.3 above. 
In the other countries, the changes in the role of the central government are comparatively 
small in magnitude. Often, competencies for specific issues in the hospital sectors or in the 
pharmaceutical sector were acquired by the central government. Looking at the direction of 
the changes, the extension of central government control clearly dominates. The state 
extended its control, while the share of financing raised by taxation remained constant. 
 
Regarding the issue of access, there are no changes observable apart from France, where the 
access to secondary and specialized out patient care was limited by introducing gate-keeping.  
 
 
Changes in Countries and Changes in Sectors of the Health System 
What is the magnitude of institutional change which can be observed, in what countries, in 
what issues is change more pronounces and what can explain the magnitude of change 
observable? Regarding the first two questions, table 12.1 below gives an overview about the 
changes occurring during the observation period in the 22 countries included in the study, for 
the individual institutional dimensions and as well as summarized.  
The changes are calculated as the Euclidian distance between a country’s location for the two 
points in time in the institutional space defined by the institutional dimensions presented in 
the above section. The values were then rescaled to a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 stands for no 
change and 1 for the maximum change occurring on this dimension.  
The TotalChangeN variable, given in the right most column, which is used in the analysis of 
change was obtained by rescaling the amount of change to a scale from 0 to 1, to allow adding 
up the individual changes. The Total Change is now equivalent to a movement in a space 
defined by all individual dimensions obtained in the PCA analyses earlier on.  
 
Table 12.1 Institutional Changes in 22 Health Systems 1995 / 2004: An Overview 
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Austria             0 1,000 0 0 0 0,197 0 0 0,810 0 2,007
Belgium            0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,731 0 0,731
Canada            0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,502 0 0,502
Czech Rep.     0 0 0 0 0 0,505 0 0 0,977 0 1,482
Denmark          0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,502 0 0,502
Finland             0 0 0 0 0 1,000 0 0 0,759 0 1,759
France              0 0,716 0 0,427 0 0 0 1,000 0 0 2,144
Germany          0 1,000 0 0,434 0 0 0 0 0,721 0 2,155
Greece             0 0 0 0 0 0,684 0 0 0 0 0,684
Hungary           0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,000
Ireland             0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,252 0 0,252
Italy               0 0 0 0 0 0,197 0 0 0 0 0,197
Luxembourg     0 1,000 0,662 0 0 0,684 0,258 0 0 0,300 2,904
Netherlands     0 0 0 0 1,000 0,505 0,160 0 0,502 0 2,167
New Zealand    0 0,716 1,000 0,520 0 0 0,258 0 1,000 0 3,494
Norway             0 0,716 0 0,457 0 0 1,000 0 0,502 0,461 3,136
Portugal           0 0,716 0 0 0 0,197 0 0 0,977 0 1,890
Poland              0 0 0 0,457 0 0 0,414 0 0 1,000 1,871
Spain               0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000 0 0 0 1,000
Sweden            0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,000
Switzerland      0 0 0 1,000 0,188 0,197 0 0 0 0 1,385
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,246 0 0 0 0,246
Sector Change 0 5,864 1,662 3,294 1,188 4,166 3,337 1,000 8,236 1,761 30,509  
 
Remark: Entries are Normalized Change 
 
Changes in Countries 
On the whole the amount of institutional change is substantial, only two countries, Hungary 
and Sweden show no change in the institutional aspects which were covered in the study. The 
change with the highest magnitude is found in Norway and in New Zealand, in both systems 
substantial transfers of competencies occurred. The directions in both countries are very 
different, albeit not directly opposed.  
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In Norway, the central government increased its say in many aspects of the HCS, in particular 
in the hospital sector. The hospitals per se have neither gained nor lost competencies, which 
were in the hand of the counties and municipalities before, but the central government took 
the competencies from the municipalities.  
Contrary to this, New Zealand substantially reduced the - up to then - substantial autonomy of 
hospitals. In 1995, most hospitals were publicly owned but operated by one of the 23 formally 
independent “Crown Health Enterprises”. In particular, hospitals were independent from the 
then four Regional Health Boards, which contracted the hospitals. This gave the hospitals and 
the Crown Health Enterprises substantial say on the internal operation of the hospitals. While 
deficits are no longer covered by default but are loans, the hospitals have lost the control over 
the usage of surpluses and the purchase of medical equipment. Factually, the hospitals are 
now owned and operated by the government controlled District Health Boards. 
Another institutional dimension, which contributes substantially to the change in both 
countries is the role of the purchasers. In Norway the central government reduced competition 
among purchasers, the counties and municipalities by extending its influence, while in New 
Zealand the central government increased it. In both cases, the purchaser are public entities, 
which are tax funded and in charge of regions: the counties and municipalities in the case of 
Norway and the District Health Boards in the case of New Zealand. In New Zealand, the 
District Health Boards now have to bear and cover equalize deficits, which are no longer born 
by the central government as they were in 1995. The number of boards was increased 
substantially, and they boards can differ substantially in what services they factually offer, 
now even more so because the financial pressure is higher.  
Norway also increased the financial control the local purchaser can exert over the providers.  
 
Changes in Issues 
Looking at the themes of institutional change, i.e. what issues were changed, three themes 
stand out. 
The control over pharmaceutical sales and consumption was increased in many countries. It 
has to be remarked, that the degree of intervention was already high in 1995. Many countries 
have introduced measures to increase the usage of generics and have resorted to price 
regulations. The finding reflects what many observes on pharmaceutical politics remark: it is 
a sector where, without public protest, substantial savings can be realized without an 
associated loss in quality of care.   
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The degree of central governmental control changed in only few countries, but where it did, it 
did substantially. The biggest changes occurred in Norway and Spain: in the case of Norway, 
the central government has acquired competencies from the lower levels of government, as 
was discussed already above. In Spain, the development is the opposite: the central 
government handed over competencies to the regions, the autonomous communities, in the 
overall process of regionalization.  
The third, and by far most important theme in change is the issue of quality, i.e. the collection, 
evaluation and provision of treatment related information, e.g. medical guidelines, the 
provision of information to the patients to enable them to make an informed choice, and also, 
at least in some countries, supplementary efforts to enforce quality guidelines. Almost all 
countries have introduced such regulations, addressing the quality aspect of the delegation 
relationship. The magnitude of change observable reflects the dominance of the issue in the 
public debates an in health politics.  
 
Changes: Winners and Losers? 
One hypothesis is, that certain groups are more likely than others to obstruct changes. The 
argument is basically Olson’s theory of interest groups, which in application to the HCS 
implies the following: 
Providers, such as GPs, are much more likely to build an organization and are also much more 
likely to obstruct changes they perceive as disadvantageous. The group is quite small, the 
stakes are high, the interests basically congruent, aiming at a bigger “cake” to be divided 
among them. The patients on the other hand, are the prototypical latent group: the group is too 
large and the stakes to low. If there is pressure to do something, the providers will resist and 
noticeably so, the patients will be discontent, but unable to organize an effective opposition to 
the plan. Thus, the development of the HCS will more likely respect the interests of the 
organized groups ( in particular the providers) than the interests of the un-organized groups, 
such as the patients.  
Looking at the changes, can this be confirmed? Are the changes going (literally) at the 
expenses of the patients?  
A case in point is surely the increase of the involvement of patients in financing. While the 
structural component ( in what sectors are patients involved in payment?) underestimates this, 
the magnitude of involvement ( the amount of money coming from private sources such as out 
of pocket payments) is a clear indicator that the financial burden is not limited (by controlling 
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prices demanded from or quantities supplied by the medical providers) but shifted, and shifted 
to some degree to the patients.  
A clear counterexample is pharmaceutical regulation. Many countries have introduced or 
intensified pharmaceutical regulations all of which are basically aiming at cost control. Cost 
control implies losses for the pharmaceutical industry. While some practitioners argue, that 
the pharmaceutical industry is, because of its rather bad image and little support in the public, 
a good target when aiming at realizing savings, the fact that this is happening is a refutation of 
Olson. The group is small, the stakes are high, and the resources available to exert influence 
are substantial, not only in terms of money for “campaigning”, but also in terms of 
employment and tax payments.  
Looking at the changes depicted in the above figures, there is no consistent support for the 
conjecture that changes occur against the interests of the patients as the weakest group. Nor is 
there a uniform trend in the changes.  
 
 
12.2. Factors for Institutional Changes 
Having described the content and the magnitude of the institutional changes, the follow up 
question is: What determines the occurrence and the magnitude of institutional change? While 
the explanatory model presented in chapter 5 makes statements about the likelihood of 
obstructive opposition to changes, it says nothing about the original reasons, or rather: the 
need for institutional change. This “need” is the other explanatory factor in the analysis of 
change.  
First of all, the pressure for institutional change is – so the basic assumption – “performance” 
related: Things are not going well, and the public demands changes. “Performance” can refer 
to the health system’s achievement in terms of outputs, both health outputs (mortality) and 
beyond-health outputs (responsiveness). The need for change is also driven by the input side, 
i.e. the level and also the growth of health expenditure. Both, input and output, are to some 
degree “objective” reasons for change, but there is also the citizens’ satisfaction as the 
“subjective” reason for change. Even if the HCS works quite well by objective standards, 
citizens may still demand changes. Low achievement levels and high dissatisfaction create 
(public) pressure for institutional changes. If, on the contrary, achievement in all regards, and 
also satisfaction are high, there is factually no need for reforms. Things are going well, and 
one would expect little or no changes. The operationalization of “pressure” is given by the 
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achievement levels, which were discussed in chapter 9 above: the consumption of financial 
resources, the production of health as well as beyond-health outputs and the efficiency of the 
HCS as measured by the WHO. Low values in all achievement indicators indicate low levels 
of performance, and underachievement.  
 
However, even if system “performance” and satisfaction are low, and there is the perceived 
need for changes expressed by the citizens or by other actors (in the HCS or maybe even 
outside actors like the WHO or the OECD), this does not necessarily imply that institutional 
change actually occurs. As was argued in chapter 5, it depends on the HCS and the political 
system, whether such reforms actually occur. As was shown in chapter 4 on the problems 
inherent to delegation relationships, inefficiency of the HCS implies that some actors extract 
rents. Institutional change aiming at an increase of efficiency implies that these actors either 
lose the rents (have to deliver the same levels of output at lower costs) or have to put in more 
effort (have to produce more output at the same levels of input). In any case, the utility for the 
actors decreases, and the expectation is that they will use their influence to avoid such 
pressure. It was argued that organized actors are more likely able do this, which implies that 
certain groups are more likely to block changes than others. But furthermore it was argued, 
that the chances to block institutional changes also depends on the possibilities to obtain 
access to the political system, in particular parties in government, and to make a direct veto 
player cast its veto against an institutional change. 
The operationalization of the feasibility of institutional changes is done using three 
intervening variables of the potential reform resistance in the HCS: 1) by the number of 
Societal Actors, i.e. the stakeholders which might be concerned by the changes, 2) by the 
number of Parties in Government, as the access points in the political environment which can 
be used to obstruct changes and 3) by the Indirect Veto Power indicator, combining both 
features.  
 
Apart from the number of stakeholders, which could have an interest in obstructing reforms, 
the possibilities of institutional changes might also be influenced by the current design of the 
HCS. To control for this possibility I have also used a selection of the institutional dimensions 
defining the institutional setting in each of the HCS in 1995 as explanatory variables. 
 
The analysis is done using a regression analysis, regressing the magnitude of total change, 
given in the rightmost column of table 12.1 above, on the explanatory variables. As elaborated 
above, the dependent variable, TotalChange, used in the analysis of institutional change is the 
sum of the normalized change, which was obtained by rescaling the amount of change on 
each institutional to a scale ranging from 0 to 1, and then adding up the individual changes 
over all sectors.  
 
The explanatory institutional variables were described already in the above chapters. The 
small number of cases required to exclude some of the variables. The results of the regression 
analysis using the performance and the individual institutional dimensions are given in table 
12.2 below. 
 
Table 12.2.  Factors affecting Institutional Change in Health Care Systems 
 
Performance1 Performance2 Setting1 Setting2
HCE -0.666 -0.629
dTHCE_rel 0.481 0.506  
LifeExpTotal 0.146 0.273  
InfMortality 0.076 0.102  
LifeLostNet 0.064 0.105  
Med. Fatalities -0.022 -0.026  
RespIndex 0.913 0.847  
WHO1 -0.244 -0.291
SocActors -0.064 -0.625  
PiG -0.108 -0.108  
IndVetoPower -0.075 -0.661
Agency 0.463 0.365
Hospital_Autonomy 0.375 0.328
Hospital_Competition 0.022 0.021
Purchaser_Autonomy 0.615 0.612
Purchaser_Competition 0.176 0.095
GovernmentalControl 0.398 0.414
Financial_Control (Identification) -0.317 -0.211
Financial_Control (No Sanctioning) 0.117 0.186
R2 0.295 0.286 0.491 0.483
N 21 21 22 22  
 
Remark: 
Dependent Variable: Normalized Total Change 
Coefficients are beta-coefficients 
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Health System Performance as a Factor for Institutional Change 
The models Performance1 and Performance2 use as explanatory variables the health and 
beyond-health outputs, excluding satisfaction, which is available for too few cases only. The 
two model variants are differing in that either the SocActors and PiG or the combination of 
both, the IndirectVetoPower, was used to cover the political environment as the 
intermediating variable.  
The basic hypotheses are: 1) that a low achievement in the outputs leads - ceteris paribus - to 
more institutional changes, 2) that a political and societal environment which is not amenable 
to reforms is characterized by less institutional change. The analysis of the effects refers to the 
magnitude of the effect of each explanatory variable for the change, measured by the beta-
coefficient. The effects are not significant, which was to be expected given the small number 
of cases.  
 
The coefficients found are to some degree surprising. Of the four health outputs, only life 
expectancy – which is, as will be remembered, the least reliable indicator of the health 
system’s performance in producing health – matters, and strikingly, the direction of the effect 
is contrary to what one would have expected: there is more institutional change in HCS where 
the life expectancy – whether attributable to the HCS or not – was already high in 1995.  
 
The less efficient a HCS scored in the WHO’s evaluation in the mid 90s, the more this HCS 
was changed afterwards. This is of course not to say that the HCS changed as a reaction to the 
WHO’s report. However, the finding indicates that countries, with HCS that are less efficient 
in producing health outputs, engaged in stronger efforts to change their system, presumably in 
order to increase efficiency.  
 
Despite the fact that the issue of cost control and cost containment dominated health politics 
in the period studied, higher levels HCE actually reduced the incidence of institutional 
change: in HCS in which the level of expenditure was higher in 1995, less institutional change 
occurred in the following decade. What lead to change was not the level of HCE but rather, 
whether it its development was out of proportion to the growth of GDP. The indicator of the 
change of HCE relative to the change in GDP; dTHCE_rel, exerts a strong an effect on the 
incidence of change. When HCE increased at about the same rate as GDP, the growth was 
tolerated, irrespective of the levels of HCE. Only when HCE increased at a higher rate than 
GDP, it lead to changes, presumably to limit the growth to the rate of GDP growth. Taken 
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together, this indicates that the “target variable” health policy makers have in mind is the 
percentage of HCE relative to GDP, not the absolute figures of HCE per capita. Whether this 
makes sense from the viewpoint of health politics is questionable, because it implies that HCE 
may increase for no other reason than that GDP increases. While this makes sense to the 
degree that salaries in the health sector increases in line with GDP, the argument that 
countries are ready to spend more money in absolute terms on health for the only reason that 
more income is available puts the idea that health is a necessity in question.  
 
Given that research on the determinants of satisfaction showed that the level of 
responsiveness is so important for citizen’s satisfaction and that the demand for more 
responsiveness is observable in the public debate about the health system in many countries, 
see Mossialos (1997) and Kohl/Wendt (2004), the effect of the responsiveness indicator is 
surprising. The coefficient obtained contradicts the presumption that HCS with low levels of 
responsiveness changed more, presumable to increase responsiveness. The opposite is true: 
health systems, which were already responsive in the mid90s, when the WHO evaluated HCS 
responsiveness for the first time, underwent more institutional change than systems which 
were less responsive at that time. Because unfortunately there is no data on the level of 
responsiveness for a later date, closer to 2004, it is not possible to say, whether the changes 
aimed or actually increased responsiveness. 
 
Including the political environment to the performance indicators matters only little for 
institutional change: neither the SocActors, the PiG, nor the combined IndirectVetoPower 
variable matters much, when compared to the impact of the performance variables. The 
direction of the coefficients found is however in line with the original hypothesis as 
formulated in chapter 5. The effects are however so weak, that they can be ignored, at least 
when used a model which included the performance.  
The explanatory power of the performance variables in combination with the political 
environment variables is low: only 29% of the variation in the overall institutional change can 
be accounted for. While not reported, it was tested whether there is an explanatory 
contribution when only the environment variables (SocActors and PiG in a first variant, and 
IndirectVetoPower in a second one) are used to predict the magnitude of change. The findings 
indicate, that there is no explanatory contribution of either one of the variables.  
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Institutional Settings as Factors for Institutional Changes 
The institutional setting might be a determinant of institutional change, because of the high 
degree of path-dependency found in the development of complex systems; see Pierson (2000) 
for the argument and Altenstetter/Busse (2005) for the German example. Indeed, case studies 
on health reforms showed for many HCS, that if there are certain structures already in place, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to implement certain changes. Other changes might be 
implemented because they are more compatible with the system as it is or because they create 
less opposition from actors in the HCS. It might also be that certain institutional features 
prohibit any “real” changes at all, which means that if changes are observed, they are nothing 
more then “window dressing”. The institutional features used in the analysis reported in table 
12.2 above, are primarily those structural features, which concern the existence and the 
competencies of agents. Not the incentives for the actors, nor issues which concern the 
patients, like for instance cost-sharing.  
 
As the models Setting1 and Setting2 show, the institutional setting as it was in 1995 explains 
the occurrence of institutional change during the period of 1995 to 2004 much better than the 
“objective“ performance in 1995. The version Setting1, using societal actors and parties in 
government, accounts for 49 %, the version Setting2, with the indirect veto power, accounts 
for 48% of the variance in the total institutional change. The most important variables are the 
following: 
Agency – generally, the existence of actors as autonomous, state-independent entities strongly 
affects the occurrence of changes. The relationships between these actors, e.g. whether one 
type of actor has some kind of control over another type of actor (e.g. whether a purchaser can 
audit a provider) or whether actors of the same type (e.g. hospitals or purchasers) are 
competing among each other for clients does not matter; see the coefficients of the 
competition dimensions. The level of agency increases the magnitude of institutional change. 
Purchaser Autonomy – systems with autonomous purchasers and, to a lesser degree systems 
with autonomous hospitals, have experienced more change. The underlying mechanism might 
be that independent actors are more active in demanding changes, than providers, who are 
“part of the hierarchy”, an explanation which is supported by the research on professional 
organizations; see for instance Schulenburg (1987) and Moran (2004).  
Governmental control – Because the state is doing the changing, one would expect that in 
health systems in which the central government’s control was already high in 1995, more 
change occurs. This does not imply that there is a change towards a stronger role of the state. 
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It just implies that the state is already a player in the system and no outsider and thus is seen, 
also by itself, as being in charge of the operation and the institutional design of the HCS. 
Government involvement matters, the coefficient confirms the hypothesis, but not as much as 
one would expect.  
 
Regarding the interaction with the political environment shows, that including the political 
environment per se does not improve the explanatory power. It is, again, the number of 
Societal Actors – which includes the number of organized providers of medical services but 
also other societal stakeholders with different interests, like employers – not the number of 
parties in government, which matters most for the occurrence of change. The direction of the 
effect is in line with the hypothesis: the more stakeholders, the less change. Combining both 
to the IndirectVetoPower variable captures the same effect as the societal actor variable.  
The interpretation of this finding is, that political system in the narrow sense of a fragmented 
political system characterized by multiparty governments, which offers many access points 
for organized societal actors to induce at least one of the governing parties to block change on 
their behalf, does not matter for the occurrence of institutional changes. The number of 
organized actors with a stake in the HCS’ operation matters much more, indicating that the 
connection between the societal domain and the political domain is not probabilistic by 
nature, but that it is sufficient to gain access to one party. 
 Table 12.3.  Factors affecting Institutional Change in Health Care Systems 
 
Syndrome1 Syndrome2 Environment1 Environment2
IncentiveProblem 0.154 0.193
PurchaserSyndrome 0.389 0.318
HospitalSyndrome 0.421 0.427
FinControlSyndrome -0.183 -0.228
GovernmentalControl 0.449 0.429
SocActors -0.289 0.060
PiG -0.103 -0.150
IndVetoPower -0.378 -0.057
R2 0.256 0.277 0.028 0.003
N 22 22 22 22  
 
Remark: 
Dependent Variable: Normalized Total Change 
Coefficients are beta-coefficients 
 
To test in particular for the effect of multicollinearity in the setting of few cases and many 
variables, which is for the analysis of change an even more severe problem than for 
achievement and efficiency, the Normalized Total Change variable was also regressed on the 
institutional syndromes and on the environment variables. The results are given in table 12.3. 
As in the previous analyses, the first version contains SocActors and PiG, the second version 
contains Indirect Veto Power.  
As for the findings, they are as far as the direction of the coefficients is concerned, similar to 
the above findings, and to some degree in line with the hypothesis.  
Systems with more societal stakeholders experienced less change, a finding which can be 
interpreted as a confirmation of the argument that change will necessarily be disadvantageous 
to some actor, and this actor will try to gain access to the political system to obstruct this 
change. SocActors and Indirect Veto Power basically measure the same thing, viz. the number 
of stakeholders. The number of parties in government, i.e. the number of access points does 
not matter.  
As for the institutional variables, combined here to the syndromes, autonomous purchasers 
and autonomous hospitals matter for change, and so does in particular the role of the 
government: the stronger the role of the government, proxied by the levers it had at hand in 
1995, the more change.  
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However, the findings have to be seen skeptical, because, while the coefficients are more 
often than not in line with the expectation, the explanatory power is low and in the case of the 
environmental variables, it is virtually zero.  
 
 
To summarize the findings of the analysis of institutional change, the overall picture is also 
inconsistent.  
Regarding the “pressures” for change, performance of the HCS seemingly does not affect the 
occurrence of institutional changes. There is no evidence that HCS which are 
“underperforming” by any objective measure are changed more than the better performing 
ones.  
Regarding the proposed explanation of changes or rather the obstruction of changes, the 
evidence is equally inconclusive. Societal actors are not blocking changes by default. While 
the overall involvement of stakeholders (in particular of stakeholders outside of the HCS) 
decreases the magnitude of change, more “Agency” in the HCS itself goes together with more 
change. This is counterintuitive, because the overwhelming theme in HCS reform during the 
period studied was cost-control respectively the increase of HCS “performance”. Both themes 
imply institutional changes, which are a disadvantage for the actors in the HCS, putting them 
under more pressure to “perform” well, to show more effort and to renounce chances of 
extracting financial and non-financial rents. In short, one would have expected opposition and 
efforts to obstruct such changes, in particular by the agents in the HCS. Thus, the finding that 
a) health systems with more “Agency” and more agents underwent more changes and b) the 
level of “Agency”, the number of agents, was not changed could imply that the changes came 
about with the consent of the agents. And this in turn put the changes one could observe in a 
different light, viz. one could speculate, that despite the public rhetoric, the changes made life 
actually easier for the agents.  
Regarding the most relevant determinants of change, the finding is that the institutional 
structures as they were in 1995 determined the magnitude of institutional change in the 
decade following, indicating that path-dependency is most important for understanding 
changes.  
 
 285
Part VI: Summary and Conclusion 
 
13. The Delegation Approach and the Comparative Analysis of 
Health Systems 
 
The motivation underlying the present study arose out of two observations “from the field”:  
First, the substantial variation in health system achievements and efficiency, the inputs 
consumed and the outputs produced by health systems which are organized in very different 
ways. 
Second, the equally substantial variation in the manner and degree to which politically 
accountable actors respond to the first variation, by either intervening within a HCS’ given 
institutional setting or by reforming the HCS’ institutional setting. 
The purpose of the study was to investigate to what degree an institutional approach, in 
particular the delegation approach as a descriptive and explanatory instrument, is able to 
contribute to accounting for both variations. 
 
At the theoretical level, the working program of the study consisted of conceptualizing a) why 
and how the current institutional setting impacts on the health system’s achievement levels 
and efficiency; b) why and when the interplay among certain institutional features may be 
important and c) why the health system’s political environment and also the interaction 
between the political system and the number of organized groups in the HCS impact on the 
system’s  “performance” - i.e. on the achievement and the efficiency of the HCS.  
 
At the empirical level, the working program consisted of gathering institutional data followed 
by a descriptive and explanatory analysis of the institutional data and its effects on health 
system achievement and efficiency. 
Regarding the comparison of complex systems, which HCS undoubtedly are, the delegation 
approach can be used as a descriptive tool. A delegation-based comparison proceeds by 
differentiating the HCS into a network of relationships between principals and agents, in 
which tasks are delegated from the former to the latter. Contrary to descriptive and often 
narrative case studies, this information can then be gathered in a straightforward way: is a 
certain delegation relationship given or not? Is a certain control mechanism implemented in 
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this relationship or not? Having institutional information in this easily “comparable” form 
also allows to investigate the effect of institutional constellations by combining features.  
Based on the delegation approach and a detailed analytical description of the HCS in terms of 
principals, agents, delegated tasks, incentives and incentive problems, a list of institutional 
features, an Health Care System Inventory was derived; see chapter 8 for a brief description. 
Using this inventory, institutional data on 22 OECD health systems was gathered in the first 
phase of the overall study; see Kotzian (2007).  
 
Regarding the first question, the explanation of variation in HCS achievement and in 
particular efficiency, the delegation approach allows predictions about the effect of 
institutional settings at system level, which are assumed to be the explanatory variables, on 
those system level features, which are assumed to be dependent variables, like achievement 
and efficiency. Both are linked by the intermediate step of rational individual behavior, which 
is oriented at the incentives set by the institutions and then is aggregated, yielding certain 
system-level effects.  
Basically, the delegation approach predicts that agents will use leeway to extract rents, 
financial ones as well as non-financial ones, and this will lower achievement and in particular 
efficiency of the HCS. The more delegation and the more severe the incentive problems, the 
stronger the adverse effects on achievement and efficiency. For all delegation relationships in 
HCS, control mechanisms can be implemented, and the prediction and hypothesis is, that 
implementing appropriate control mechanisms will reduce the severity of the problem, 
increasing both achievement and efficiency.  
 
Regarding the second question on the factors influencing institutional change, the study used, 
in addition to the delegation approach, a broader, institutionalist framework to explain certain 
forms control, exercised from outside the HCS, and also institutional change. With regard to 
the effect of the political and societal environment in which the HCS is embedded, the 
explanation proposed used the leeway of the government, and the interaction between the 
political system and the societal actors with a stake in the health system’s operation. The 
prediction and hypothesis is, that the more able the government is to act, the fewer societal 
stakeholders exists, and in particular the lower the chances for an indirect veto power, the 
higher achievement and efficiency of the HCS. The assumed mechanism is in all three cases 
that external control holds efficiency decreasing tendencies inherent to the HCS as a 
subsystem in check. But to be effective the external controller, viz. the government, must be 
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able to impose its will onto the health system – this gets more difficult, the more parties are in 
government, the more societal actors have a stake in the HCS and the more likely it is that a 
certain societal actor has enough influence to make at least one party in government cast its 
veto against such an intervention.  
 
The explanation of HCS achievement and efficiency is based on the following three broad 
concepts: 
Built-in control – these aspects of control are the built-in mechanisms as discussed in chapter 
4. They work by at setting the “right” incentives; i.e. design the delegation relationship 
between principal and agent in a way which assures that the agent’s behavior does not deviate 
from the principal’s interests, and they work by making actors behaving in a certain way 
because it is in their well understood self-interest to do so. In particular, this form of control 
works without a third party actively exercising control activity. The main institutional 
dimensions operationalizing this concept are Agency, Remuneration_Incentives, 
Hospital_Autonomy, Hospital_Competition, Purchaser_Autonomy, Purchaser_Competition, 
Patient_Involvement, Pharma_Access&Sales, Access to medical services, 
Quality_Information, Quality_Enforcement, FinControl_Identify and 
FinControl_NoSanctioning.  
For the built-in control mechanism as well as for the problem of incentives, the idea of the 
institutional syndromes implied that certain combinations of features exert a more pronounced 
effect than does each of the individual features. The most straightforward example is, that 
delegation per se is not so much of a problem but becomes one, if it co-occurs with the 
incentive to increase the quantity of services for reasons of income maximization. 
Independent, self-employed actors are in a better position to act self-interested than are 
employed actors who are subject to hierarchical control. The syndromes created were 
IncentiveProblem, referring to the combination of agency and remuneration incentives, 
HospitalSyndrome and PurchaserSyndrome, both referring to the combination of actor’s 
autonomy to respond to competition and the actual degree of competition, the 
FinancialControlSyndrome and the QualitySyndrome, both combining the availability of 
information about a certain actor’s behaviour with the option to sanction this actor. 
External operative control – As for the government’s possibilities to exercise control from 
the outside, there are firstly those levers existing currently by which the government can 
interfere into the HCS’ operation. For example, operative control comes in the form of 
determining the overall budget or to replace decisions made by the societal actors if the 
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government believes them to be inappropriate. These levers are “operative” in the sense, that 
the HCS under its current design allocates these competencies to the government. This 
institutional dimension was covered by the GovernmentalControl variable, which covers the 
degree to which the government can intervene by determining parameters of the HCS, such as 
prices or catalogues of services.  
External structural control – is a mode of control which refers to the government’s formal 
power to change the HCS’ institutional setup, if the HCS in its current setup – including the 
built-in control mechanisms and the levers for external operative currently available for the 
government – performs poorly. The capacity to exert external structural control was 
operationalized by three variables: the number of Parties in Government, the number of 
Societal Actors and the Indirect Veto Power, as the multiplicative interaction among both. 
External control is policy making, and all three factors lower the government’s capacity for 
this.  
 
Mind that the external control, the threat to exercise competencies, and even more the threat 
to change the constitution of the health system, to reallocate competencies or to put decisions 
under political control, may exert an efficiency increasing effect even without actual exercise 
of the capacity. The threat alone may be sufficient.  
For both modes of external control, the focus was put on the central government, as the actor 
which is seen as in charge of the constitution of the HCS. The argument, in particular with 
regard to external structural control is that it may well be the task of the local municipality’s 
administration to manage the provision of health care in the municipality, but it is the central 
government’s task to design the system and if the system, including all the lower tiers of 
administration, does not work, it is the central government’s task to intervene.  
 
 
As for the statistical implementation, the study’s comparative design combined quantitative 
and qualitative elements. The original variables were gathered in a dichotomous way, is a 
feature given or not. Then this data was subjected to data reduction using polychoric principal 
component analysis which yielded the latent institutional dimensions underlying the 
organization of a certain HCS sector, and the location of the individual HCS in this 
“institutional space”. The relationship between indicators of achievement efficiency on the 
one hand and the scores obtained on the other hand, were then analyzed using quantitative 
methods, in particular regression. The data base was comparatively small, with only 44 data 
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points, defined by a country in a year. Following the strategy proposed by King et al. (1994), 
the design tested many implications of the explanatory model, deriving implications for inputs 
(levels and dynamics), outputs (health and beyond-health) and efficiency. 
 
 
How well does the chosen approach, the delegation and the institutionalist approach, perform? 
The performance of the approach has to be evaluated with regard to two aspects: first, its 
utility as a descriptive instrument, which allows to describe and compare a larger number of 
HCS, a task which is in itself of interest. But secondly, the utility of the approach is measured 
by its explanatory power. Explanatory power, established causal relationships between certain 
institutional features on the one hand and levels of achievement and efficiency on the other, 
would be the precondition of “institutional engineering”, which is, in the end, the ultimate 
driver of research in this domain.  
 
Delegation as a Framework to Compare and Describe Health Systems 
Regarding the description of HCS, the delegation framework was found to be a reasonably 
useful tool. The basic strategy of the delegation-based comparison consisted of renouncing an 
a priori typologization into system types in favor of looking at how delegation, the autonomy 
and independence of agents are handled in the various systems, irrespective of their formal 
status, “type” and “label”. 
The most important finding is that the formal status or “label” of an agent does indicate little 
of the actual role of this agent and the same is true for the basic functional principles of the 
system.  
At the level of actors, agents may be formally independent, but factually be under close 
supervision of the government with little or no decision making competencies. This is 
particularly the case for purchasers, which can be public entities like county councils or 
municipalities but also formally independent insurance funds, which are in some countries 
factually just as politically controlled as a NHS bureaucracy. The degree to which health 
insurance funds are autonomous in defining contractual relations with their clients varies 
substantially and is largely independent from their formal status. Another instance is the 
hospital sector. Hospitals are, apart from Belgium, in public ownership in all countries 
included in the study. However, within the label “non-profit public-ownership”, the hospitals’ 
factual say about issues concerning it directly, like the investment in capacity or in medical 
technology, as well as the financial pressures a hospital is under, in particular the budget 
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constraint, all these features which affect how a hospital as an institution behaves, differ 
substantially among countries. And again there is no association with a certain type of health 
system. There are public health systems, in which hospitals are operated as “enterprises”, 
bearing the full financial responsibility, and there are hospitals in corporatist health systems, 
where the state is known to stand in for the hospitals and they act in full awareness of this 
fact.  
At the level of the health system and its functional principles, the delegation approach focuses 
on the degree of competition, which is seen as the main institutional mechanism counteracting 
the problems inherent to delegation relationships. Putting actors under competitive pressure is 
seen as the main lever to incentivize them to perform well in their assigned tasks, be these the 
provision of medical services or the administration of health service provision. The overall 
setting in a health system – denoted most often as either purchaser-provider-split or public-
integrated types – does say very little about the factual competition in the HCS. On the 
demand side, the argument is that putting purchasers under competition will induce them to 
behave as a “good agent” on behalf of their clients. One precondition for competition among 
purchasers is that citizens have the choice among different purchasers. But in particular the 
choice among purchasers does not depend strictly on their status. A health insurance system 
with several formally and factually independent health insurance funds and free choice of the 
funds by the citizens does not imply, let alone guarantee competition among them. Nor does a 
regionally based public health system, in which public entities such as local governments or 
municipalities fulfill the purchaser function, preclude competition. Even if municipalities are 
not officially allowed to differ what medical services they cover, their internal efficiency and 
management quality may well affect what they can factually offer and in particular the 
waiting times. The resulting competition is based on “voting by feet”, i.e. by citizens moving 
into municipalities with better access, and may be stronger than in systems where a formal 
competition is installed and purchasers are formally allowed and even actively encouraged to 
differ in contribution and services, but do not. 
Renouncing a priori typologizations in favor of looking for single properties, which can 
basically occur in all health systems, is a fruitful way of engaging in a comparison. To 
summarize, there is an undisputable value of the delegation approach for a structured 
comparison of very diverse health care systems under a single theoretical framework.  
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Delegation as an Explanatory Factor in Health System Performance 
Do the analyses based on the structured description tell us something about the relevance of 
the organization of delegation and control for the “performance” of the health systems? Does 
the organization of delegation and control actually matter for the performance of the HCS?  
To test for such relationships, two strategies were chosen. First, the approach of studying 
bivariate correlations, which reflects the perspective of a naïve health-policy maker who is 
asking health system researchers, whether there are stable relationship between institutional 
variables and outcome variables which allow a tailored intervention in the sense that health 
policy makers change the institutional setting in a particular sector and as a result achieve a 
certain effect in the outcome variables. The multivariate regression analysis, which was 
conducted as a second approach, reflects the more sophisticated view of the health system 
researcher, asking are there – ceteris paribus – certain effects, which are stable, independent 
from the institutional setting in other sectors of the HCS. 
 
To report the main insight first, the results are obviously dissatisfying. There are no consistent 
associations of institutional features, isolated or combined to syndromes, with indicators of 
achievement and efficiency. To successfully confirm a theory, one must derive hypotheses, 
concrete statements about what to expect in what regards, and the empirical analyses must 
confirm these expectations. The approach chosen turned out to pose substantial problems in 
both regards.  
a) In the step of defining what relationships to expect at the empirical level, a serious problem 
arises from the fact that the delegation approach focuses on the financial impact of 
institutional structures, i.e. on levels of HCE and growth rates of HCE, and much less on the 
overall efficiency in the sense of input/output ratios. The derivation of statements in particular 
for the variables covering the input side is straightforward: More delegation and less control 
should cause higher levels of expenditure, because uncontrolled delegation allows the agents 
to extract rents. But this is only one side of the coin. The other side is the effect of delegation 
and control on the outputs of the HCS. Making statements about the effect of delegation and 
control on the health system’s outputs (health output as well as beyond-health output) is not 
that straightforward. The basic mechanism is that delegation and control operate via the 
incentive to provide more services. The assumption is that a share of these services is 
basically unnecessary (from a medical point of view) and provided only for the sake of 
increasing the provider’s income. But the overall effects of this “incentive to oversupply” are 
not unambiguously adverse. More services may well imply more health output, because in the 
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end, they may have an effect of health. In particular, they may respond to a demand by the 
patients. Supply side measures aiming at reducing or removing the incentive or demand side 
measures limiting the access to services may have a counterproductive effect in the sense that 
the achieved cost control actually lowers the output, leaving the overall efficiency of the HCS 
as such unchanged. Equally, it is possible that the readiness to provide more services and the 
incentive to be responsive to the patient’s wishes does not automatically imply that the quality 
is high and that the health output levels increase. More services may be produced but at the 
same time the effort and diligence put into each service may be lower, for the very reason that 
the provider is providing so many services.  
Thus it is difficult to derive unambiguous statements about the overall HCS efficiency, which 
is the combination of input and output of the HCS. While it is possible to deduce hypotheses 
from the delegation approach for the health outputs, these are not as strong, and not as 
stringent as those deduced for the expenditure. One would presume that in particular 
expenditure and expenditure dynamics react to the organization of delegation and control. For 
HCS achievement, proxied by output variables such as life expectancy and infant mortality, 
and efficiency, proxied by the WHO’s efficiency score, the predictions are ambiguous, 
because of positive as well as negative consequences. With regard to the interpretation of 
effects found or rather not found, this poses the awkward situation that there is either no effect 
at all, or simultaneously a positive and a negative effect, canceling each other out.  
 
b) Given the evidence found in the empirical analyses, what can be said about the relevance of 
the institutional economics respectively the delegation approach as a factor for explaining 
differences in the achievement and efficiency of health systems? Regarding the empirical 
evidence, the problems of the delegation approach get even more serious. To summarize the 
findings, there are, on the whole, only very few stable relationships between institutional 
dimensions respectively institutional syndromes on the one hand, and indicators of HCS 
achievement on the other. One of the more stable ones is that Agency adversely affects health 
outputs, and that installing remuneration incentives to provide more care affects health 
outputs positively.  
In particular regarding the institutional syndromes, which should capture efficient 
combinations and settings, the effects found are inconclusive. In only very few cases a 
specific combination of certain institutional dimensions, which should be more relevant from 
a theoretical point of view, is empirically more relevant than individual variables. Compared 
to the individual institutional dimensions, on which the institutional syndromes are based, the 
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magnitude of the correlations found does not indicate a substantial value added in terms of 
explanatory power. Combining two dimensions, each of which has a certain effect, in a way 
which according to the institutional economics approach is particularly optimal (or 
particularly detrimental) for achievement or efficiency, does not prove to have a more 
substantial effect. Regarding the direction of the effects, i.e. whether a certain institutional 
variable increases or decreases a certain output indicator, these are at times in line, but at 
times also clearly diverging from what was predicted. An example is the degree of agency in 
the HCS, which usually goes together with lower levels of health output (lower life 
expectancy, more life years lost). The remuneration incentive – i.e. the fact that there is an 
incentive to oversupply services – does usually affect the achievement in terms of health 
outputs positively. But combining both to the IncentiveProblem-syndrome – independent 
agents who have the incentive to increase the quantity of services – has an erratic effect on 
various health outputs.  
 
Thus, one important result of this study is, that even detailed knowledge about how delegation 
and control are organized in a range of health systems does not tell us something about the 
“performance” of these health systems. This observation can be interpreted in several ways. 
First, the lack of stable relationships can mean that the institutional variables chosen and the 
latent institutional dimensions extracted from these are invalid in the sense of lacking 
construct validity. In this case, the institutional dimensions obtained measure the wrong thing 
or nothing at all. The “inventory”-approach to data gathering as such was designed to look for 
and to capture differences beyond the mere typologization of health systems into the 
“standard types”. In particular, the data gathering effort aimed at capturing the common as 
well as the distinctive features between public-integrated systems and systems with a 
purchaser-provider-split. An illustration of this validity problem would be that the agency 
dimension, which is a summary indicator of the frequency with which tasks are delegated to 
actors which are self-employed and hence independent agents, may not measure delegation, 
but something else entirely. But in this regard, the descriptive sections and the findings 
presented in chapter 10 make sense. It is unlikely that all the institutional variables and all the 
latent dimensions obtained from compressing these are completely out of touch with the 
institutional features in the health systems included in the study. But even those institutional 
dimensions, which are prima facie of high validity, do not exert consistent effects.   
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Second, the lack of stable relationships can mean that the institutional data is valid, but 
describes the HCS for a point in time, which is not sufficiently close enough to the available 
achievement data. While the achievement data is quite close to the points in time, for which 
institutional data was sampled, it might be nevertheless be the case that the achievement 
levels have changed in the meantime. Looking at the achievement data, for which time series 
are available, indicates that the levels of the indicators used, for input consumption as well as 
output achievement, are quite stable in the short run and in particular the differences between 
the HCS regarding the indicators used are also quite stable: A health system which is 
notorious for its lack of responsiveness and “customer”-orientation will not change for the 
better within the two years between 1995 (for which the institutional data was gathered) to 
1997 (the year for which the responsiveness indicator was gathered in the WHO survey).  
 
Third, it may be the case that the institutional variables are valid, but that there exists for the 
countries and for the period covered by this study no substantial relationship between the 
institutional setting and the HCS’ achievement or efficiency. However, against this 
interpretation stands the finding that the explanatory power of all institutional variables 
combined seems to matter for the achievement levels. There are typically co-occurrences of 
features, but it is, given the limitations arising from the small data set, difficult to differentiate 
which institutional feature has which effect. Many institutional features are correlated, but 
what can also be said is that the combination of individual institutional features into the 
syndromes does not work.  
 
Fourth, the lack of stable relationships (correlations as well as regression coefficients) may be 
due to the small size of the data set and multicollinearity among the institutional variables. A 
typical observation was, that the inclusion of different variables, e.g. when two variables are 
replaced by the institutional syndrome which covers a certain combination of both, changes 
the coefficients obtained for the other institutional variables substantially. This instability is a 
strong indication of a small-n-problem, aggravated by the risk that there could be a substantial 
correlation between different dimensions obtained by compressing the institutional 
information in certain sectors. All this hints at multicollinearity. As a first test for the problem 
of multicollinearity, the correlations between the individual institutional variables and the 
institutional syndromes were calculated. The highest occurring correlation among the 
institutional dimensions is the one between agency and the remuneration modes (.79), and the 
highest occurring correlation between the IncentiveProblem and the remuneration modes 
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(.85). All other correlations between individual institutional dimensions and institutional 
syndromes are way below that level, usually .25 or lower. And even in the case of agency, 
remuneration modes and IncentiveProblem, no analysis included the three of them 
simultaneously. The problem persisted, when the syndromes rather than the individual 
variables were used. If multicollinearity was the source of the problem, the situation should 
have improved, because the correlations among the syndromes are much lower and also the 
ratio of cases and independent variables used is better. An additional attempt to counter the 
problem by conducting a PCA using only the most “typical” institutional features of each 
sector yielded a solution, which was too complex to be of any practical value. Furthermore, it 
was tested whether combining all control syndromes into one dimension, would yield an 
improvement. The idea was, that the IncentiveProblem captures the problem, and that an 
additive index of all control syndromes captures the countermeasure, a kind of “overall 
control”. But this did also nothing to change the fact that the effects found are erratic. It has to 
be mentioned, that this “erratic” pattern of supporting, contradicting or absent relationships 
was also obtained when using the bivariate correlations.  
 
Whatever the reasons, the main problem of the delegation approach is that the empirical 
findings are inconclusive at best: While the theory – delegation, if uncontrolled lowers 
efficiency – and its application to health care organization and delivery makes perfect sense, 
some of the empirical findings – i.e. the coefficients obtained in regressions of indicators of 
HCS achievement and efficiency on institutional variables – make, at least at times, no sense 
at all. Some coefficients are perfectly in line with the theory. In other cases, the finding is not 
actually in line with the prediction, but there exists a reasonable argument to account for the 
finding by a mechanism, which is outside of the delegation respectively institutionalist 
approach, but known from other studies. But in the case of many other coefficients, they 
clearly contradict the theory. Respectively, it is very hard to come up with a causal 
mechanisms by which this finding can be accounted for, unless one is willing to engage in ad 
hoc explanations and conceptual stretching of a truly degenerative kind. Finally, some 
findings just don’t make any sense at all but are contradicting the findings made in other 
analyses of achievement indicators.  
 
An implicit general methodological assumption underlying this study is, that if a theory, a 
causal mechanism is strong and robust enough, it will show up even if there is little data and 
problems of measurement. There are several small-n-studies in comparative politics, many of 
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which are confronted with similar problems, and a common strategy to counter this consists of 
deriving many testable implications and predictions: If the argument is true, what empirical 
indicators will be affected in what ways? cf. King et al. (1994). Such a strategy and thus the 
“test” is, if anything, biased to find confirmation of the theory. In the empirical sections, many 
dependent variables were used, but still, there is no consistent pattern. It is not the case that 
there are few contradictions mixed with many confirmations. Rather, there are few 
confirmations mixed with many contradicting findings and a lot of “white noise”. By this 
standards, the delegation approach is no strong theory for explaining health system 
performance in industrialized countries.  
 
Delegation, Institutional Settings and Institutional Change 
Just as in the case of the institutional correlates of health system achievement and efficiency, 
the utility of the approach developed for the analysis of change is ambiguous. The approach’s 
utility as a heuristic tool is offset by the fact that the evidence regarding the effect of 
institutional structures, in particular delegation to independent actors, on institutional change 
is mixed at best.  
On the descriptive level, the systematic survey of many specific aspects of the institutional 
setting for two points in time allows to capture and to describe institutional change in a way 
which is highly illustrative. The latent institutional dimensions define a property space in 
which the HCS can be located and where institutional changes show up as movements. Both, 
the magnitude and directions of changes can be easily detected and analyzed. Instead of 
looking at dozens of individual features, one can look for both universal trends and national 
particularities. The sum of all movements a HCS made during the observation period yielded 
the total change, which was explained in the next step, using performance, and institutional 
features as explanatory variables.  
On the explanatory level, that is when analyzing the causes of total institutional change, three 
findings stand out: 
a) The first finding is that institutional change seems not to be driven by the objective 
“performance” of the HCS. One would have expected that the health system is primarily 
evaluated in terms of its health production and thus is primarily changed if not producing 
enough health or failing to avoid losses of life years which could be avoided. This is 
obviously not the case. Nor is change driven by high levels of HCE. Despite the rhetoric and 
the dominance of cost containment as a theme, the health systems surveyed were not changed 
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because they were consuming too many resources. On the contrary, health system which 
consumed more resources underwent less change in the observation period.  
b) The second finding is that the institutional setting of the HCS is a much stronger 
determinant of institutional change, explaining twice as much of the variation in the degree of 
institutional change than the performance of the institutional structure. Together with the 
finding from the analysis of the achievement levels in chapter 11, this finding indicates that 
health system development is a path-dependent process, largely independent from the 
“objective” performance of the system. Institutional settings seem to allow or prohibit 
changes. However, while there are some stable effects, such as that the number of 
stakeholders reduces change, it is largely unclear, what the exact contribution of a particular 
institutional feature is and how the effect works. 
c) The third finding is that the political environment, understood in the narrow sense of a 
political system which offers many or few access points for organized societal actors to 
obstruct change, does not matter for the occurrence of changes. The number of organized 
societal actors with a stake in the HCS’ operation matters much more, indicating that the 
connection between the societal domain and the political domain is not probabilistic by 
nature, but that for obstructing change it is sufficient to gain access to one political party. It 
also indicates that it is more likely that groups have established, traditional contacts to certain 
parties rather than engaging in ad hoc contacting – a finding which is in line with many case 
studies on health system reforms.  
 
 
As an overall conclusion, one has to state that despite their theoretical attractiveness, neither 
the delegation approach nor the idea of indirect veto power empirically live up to the 
expectations in terms of actually explaining what is happening in the health care systems of 
industrialized countries.  
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15. APPENDIX : Health Care Systems Inventory   
 
Remark: Institutional data was asked for each country for 1995 and 2004 
Part A: Providers and Consumers of Health Services  
 
1. Primary Care / Outpatient Care 
Occupational Status of the Providers of Primary care / Outpatient Care 
Please indicate the predominant occupational status of the providers of medical services in 
[country] for the following groups of medical providers. 
 
OS1  Primary Care Physicians /General Practitioners (GP) are predominantly 
 Self employed  
 Employed 
 Employed, but with the possibility to provide additional services on own account 
O  Primary Care is predominantly provided by Hospitals (out-patient departments etc.) 
 
OS2  Specialists (Orthopedics, eye doctors, radiologists etc) are predominantly 
 Self employed  
 Employed 
 Employed, but with the possibility to provide additional services on own account 
O  Specialized medical care is predominantly provided by Hospitals 
 
 
OS3  Dentists are predominantly 
 Self employed  
 Employed 
 Employed, but with the possibility to provide additional services on own account  
O  Dental care is predominantly provided by Hospitals 
 
OS4  What is the prevailing distribution channel of medicines and pharmaceuticals for out-
patient use in [country]? 
 Privately owned pharmacies   
 Publicly owned pharmacies 
 Physicians 
 Hospitals 
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OS5  What is the predominant occupational status of providers of laboratory services, like 
analysis of blood samples, tissue analysis. Are they  
 self employed /independent firms 
 employed and salaried by Hospitals 
 laboratory services are predominantly provided by Hospitals  
 other (please specify) 
 
Remuneration Modes in Ambulatory Care / Outpatient Care 
 
R1A  Could you please indicate the predominant remuneration mode for the majority of 
services provided by general practitioners / primary care physicians 
 Capitation per inscribed patient 
 Capitation for patients in the area 
 Fixed prospective budget (independent of numbers of patients inscribed) 
 Budget based on past costs  
 Coverage of all costs arising  
 Fundholder Model  
 Salary 
 Fee for service with fixed fees 
 Fee for service with variable fees 
 Other (please specify) 
 
R1B  Can the provider of primary care increase his income one way or the other by extending 
the quantity of services provided in a given case, i.e. for a patient? 
 Yes, (please specify how) 
 No, the GP’s income is fixed 
 
R2A  Could you please indicate the predominant remuneration mode for the majority of 
services provided by specialists/providers of specialized ambulatory services (eye 
specialist, Orthopedists etc.)? 
 Capitation per inscribed patient 
 Capitation for patients in the area 
 Fixed prospective budget 
 Budget based on past costs  
 Coverage of all costs arising 
 Fundholder Model  
 Salary 
 Fee for service with fixed fees 
 Fee for service with variable fees 
 Other (please specify) 
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R2B  Can the provider of specialized medical services increase his income one way or the 
other by extending the quantity of services provided in a given case, i.e. for a patient? 
 Yes, (please specify how) 
 No, the provider’s income is fixed 
 
R3A  Could you please indicate predominant remuneration mode for the majority of services 
provided by Dentists? 
 Capitation per inscribed patient 
 Capitation for patients in the area 
 Fixed prospective budget 
 Budget based on past costs  
 Coverage of all costs arising  
 Fundholder Model  
 Salary 
 Fee for service with fixed fees 
 Fee for service with variable fees 
 Other (please specify) 
 
R3B  Can the dentist increase his income one way or the other by extending the quantity of 
services provided in a given case, i.e. for a patient? 
 Yes, (please specify how) 
 No, the dentist’s income is fixed 
 
R4  How are the physicians (like surgeons, anesthetists etc.) working in a hospital 
remunerated? 
 Fixed Salary 
 Fee for service 
 Other (please specify) 
 
R5   How is the income of pharmacists related to the quantity of medicines sold? 
 A percentage of the total value of the medicines sold  
 An amount per package sold  
 A fixed remuneration, independent of the quantity of sold  
 Difference between the price at which the Pharmacy buys the medicine and the 
retail price 
R6  How are laboratory services (analyses of tissue samples etc.) predominantly remunerated 
in [country]? 
 Budgets 
 All costs arising are covered 
 Cost plus allowance 
 Fee for services 
 other (please specify) 
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2. Hospitals and In-Patient Care 
 
H1  Would deficits of a Hospital be covered by the state or some other institution? 
O  Yes, deficits of Hospitals are covered  
 completely by another institution, e.g. the state, health authority, insurance funds 
 partly by another institution 
O  No, deficits of Hospitals are not covered  
 
H2  In the case that a Hospital realizes a surplus – who decides how this surplus is used? 
 the Hospital itself, e.g. can use it for investments 
 Purchaser (e.g. Insurance Funds, Health Authorities) 
 Municipality /Local- or Municipal Government 
 Region / regional government 
 National / central government 
 
 
H3  Which of the following actors is the most influential decision maker in questions of 
investments in capacity, i.e. the number of beds in existing Hospitals? 
 the Hospital itself  
 Purchaser (e.g. Insurance Funds, Health Authorities) 
 Municipality /Local- or Municipal Government 
 Region / regional government 
 National / central government 
 
 
H4 Which of the following actors is the most influential decision maker in questions of 
investments in the medical technology available in the Hospitals (e.g. procurement of new 
medical devices)? 
 the Hospital itself  
 the Purchaser (e.g. Insurance Funds, Health Authority) 
 Municipality /Local- or Municipal Government 
 Region / regional government 
 National / central government 
 
H5 Which of the following actors is the most important for deciding on the creation of new 
Hospitals? 
 Purchaser ( Insurance Funds, Health Authorities) 
 Municipality /Local- or Municipal Government 
 Region / regional government 
 National / central government 
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H6 Which of the following actors is most influential for deciding on closing of existing 
Hospitals? 
 Purchaser ( Insurance Funds, Health Authorities) 
 Municipality /Local- or Municipal Government 
 Region / regional government 
 National / central government 
 
H7  In some countries, several Hospitals offering the same kind of services (e.g. cover the 
same indications, the same degree of specialization etc.) exist in the same region.  
In others, a Hospital is typically the only provider of in-patient care in a region.  
What is the prevailing situation in [country]? 
 There is usually only one Hospital for in-patient care in a certain region 
 There is usually more than one Hospital in a region offering in-patient care 
 There are many Hospitals offering basic in-patient care in a certain region but 
only one offering specialized in-patient care, e.g. cardiac surgery 
 
H8  If there is more than one Hospital to chose from, do the costs of treatment (e.g. cost per 
case, the per diem etc.) differ among these Hospitals, or are the costs of treatment the same 
for all Hospitals in a region / for a similar degree of specialization? 
 Costs differ among Hospitals  
 Costs are the same for all Hospitals, independent of the specialization 
 Costs are the same for all Hospitals of similar degree of specialization 
 
H9  What is the predominant mode of remuneration for in-patient services and Hospitals? 
 Case based remuneration (e.g. DRG) 
 Cost reimbursement / ex-post budget: all costs are covered 
 Prospective fixed budget 
 Global capped budget 
 Fee for service 
 per diem 
 per capita enrolled in a list 
 per capita in the area assigned to the hospital 
 other (please specify) 
 
H10 Can the Hospital increase the remuneration received for a case one way or the other by 
extending the quantity of services provided to a patient or extending the length of a patient’s 
stay in the Hospital? 
 Yes, (please specify how) 
 No 
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3. Pharmaceuticals  
PH1    Which of the following regulations concerning pharmaceuticals are in place in 
[country]? 
 Negative Lists (pharmaceuticals that not covered by the Health System, i.e. are 
excluded from reimbursement by the Health System) 
 Positive Listing (a list, from which the prescriber can choose) 
 Pharmaceutical budget for individual prescribers, like physicians or hospitals 
 Overall Pharmaceutical budget 
 Grouping of Pharmaceuticals. In some countries, medicines are grouped to classes 
of equivalent medicines for similar illnesses. Sometimes, the Health System 
reimburses or pays only for the cheapest medicine in a such a class of medicines. 
If the patient wants another medicine, he has to pay the difference.  
 
PH2    Is the price or the coverage by the Health Care System of a new medicine based on a 
evaluation of its medical efficacy and degree of innovation compared to existing medicines?  
 Yes, the price is based on an evaluation of medical efficacy 
 Yes, the coverage is based on an evaluation of medical efficacy 
 No  
 
PH3   Generic products are medicines which are chemically identical to a branded medicine, 
but sold in a different dosage, form and under a different name. In some countries, branded 
medicines can be substituted by cheaper generic products, in others, this is forbidden.  
How is generic substitution regulated in [country]? 
 Generic substitution is forbidden  
 Generic substitution is encouraged 
 Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary  
 Generic substitution is compulsory 
 
PH4   If generic substitution is possible, who decides actually, whether a generic substitute of 
a branded medicine is used or not?  
 Prescriber, e.g. physician ( e.g. by indicating that the pharmacists may substitute 
or by prescribing a certain active chemical entity, no product name)  
 Pharmacists 
 Patient can tell whether he wants a generic or not  
 
PH5   Can the patient reduce his costs, e.g. the co-payment for medicines, by choosing a 
generic medicine or the cheapest product of a therapeutic class? 
 There are no co-payments for medicines 
 Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a less expensive but equivalent product 
 Co-payments cannot be reduced by choosing a less expensive but equivalent 
product 
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4. The patients 
4.1 “Cost-Reimbursement” and “Services in kind” 
CR   In some countries, medical providers are first paid by the patients, who are later 
reimbursed by the Purchaser (e.g. Insurance Funds / Health Authority). In others, patients are 
not involved in the payment of the provider.   
Under service in kind, the patient is not involved in the payment of providers, in particular 
the patient does not receive a bill. 
Under cost reimbursement the patient receives the bill from the provider, which is handed in 
for reimbursement to the Purchaser, e.g. the Insurance Fund or Health Authority. 
 
Which is the prevailing mode of payments in the Health Care System in [country]?  
General Practitioners, 
Primary Care Physicians 
Cost reimbursement…  
bill passed on                          O 
bill paid and reimbursed later O 
 
Services in kind  O 
 
Specialists 
Cost reimbursement…  
bill passed on                          O 
bill paid and reimbursed later O 
 
Services in kind  O 
Laboratory services,  
e.g. measurement of lipid 
levels 
Cost reimbursement…  
bill passed on                          O 
bill paid and reimbursed later O 
 
Services in kind  O 
 
Dentists  
Cost reimbursement…  
bill passed on                          O 
bill paid and reimbursed later O 
 
Services in kind  O 
 
Dentures 
Cost reimbursement…  
bill passed on                          O 
bill paid and reimbursed later O 
 
Services in kind  O 
Hospital / 
In-patient services  
Cost reimbursement…  
bill passed on                          O 
bill paid and reimbursed later O 
 
Services in kind  O 
 
Medicines 
Cost reimbursement…  
bill passed on                          O 
bill paid and reimbursed later O 
 
Services in kind    O 
Medical devices, like 
spectacles  
Cost reimbursement…  
bill passed on                          O 
bill paid and reimbursed later O 
 
Services in kind  O 
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4.2. Co-payments to medical services and medical goods 
Thinking about medical services and medical products which are covered by the health 
system in [country]. 
 
CP1  Do patients in [country] have to pay a co-payment for the medical services and products 
listed below? If so, is it a certain amount, independent of the costs of the service or is it a 
percentage of the costs of the service? 
 
Services of General Practitioners 
/ Primary Care 
O    no  co-payment  O   yes  a certain percentage 
O   yes  a certain amount    
Specialists/Specialized Services O    no  co-payment   O   yes  a certain percentage 
O   yes  a certain amount    
In patient services / Hospitals O    no  co-payment   O   yes  a certain percentage 
O   yes  a certain amount    
Laboratory tests, e.g. analyses of 
blood samples 
O    no  co-payment   O   yes  a certain percentage 
O   yes  a certain amount    
Dental care / Dentists O    no  co-payment   O   yes  a certain percentage 
O   yes  a certain amount    
Dentures / “false teeth” O    no  co-payment   O   yes  a certain percentage 
O   yes  a certain amount    
Medicines O    no  co-payment   O   yes  a certain percentage 
O   yes  a certain amount    
Medical devices e.g. spectacles O    no  co-payment  O   yes  a certain percentage 
O   yes  a certain amount    
 
 
CP2  Are there exemptions from co-payments? 
O  No, there are no exemptions from co-payments 
O  Yes,  
 there is a upper limit for the total sum of co-payments payable per period 
 people under a certain income are exempted from co-payments 
 people with a certain health status (e.g. chronically-ill-status) are exempted from 
co-payments 
 certain groups - e.g. students, children or elderly - are exempted  
 
 329
CP3   Can the patient cover the costs of the co-payments by an Supplementary Insurance? 
O  No, an insurance covering the co-payments is forbidden 
O  Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover co-payments,  
 .... usually it covers the complete co-payment 
 .... usually it covers only a share of the co-payment 
 … it may not cover the complete co-payment 
 
4.3. Gatekeeping, Choice and Access to In-Patient-Care, Hospitals and Specialists 
In some countries, the patient can directly visit a Specialist or a Hospital (no gatekeeping).  
In other countries, the patient has to visit his General Practitioner / Primary Care Provider 
before going to a specialist or a Hospital (gatekeeping).  
Formal regulations on Gatekeeping 
Is there gatekeeping of General Practitioners for Hospitals  O Specialist  O 
If there is gatekeeping - how strict is the gatekeeping factually handled in [country]? 
a) Gatekeeping to specialists, like orthopedics, eye specialists etc.,  
… cannot be skipped  O 
… can be skipped, but it incurs higher costs O 
… can be skipped, but the service is not covered O 
b) Gatekeeping to Hospitals and inpatient services 
… cannot be skipped  O 
… can be skipped, but it incurs higher costs O 
… can be skipped, but the service is not covered O 
Actual choice of providers 
Apart from formal gatekeeping, has the patient (after the gatekeeper has agreed to the 
referral)… 
… free choice of the Specialist (eye doctor etc.)? Yes   O No   O 
… free choice of the Hospital ? Yes   O No   O 
… free choice of the Dentist?  Yes   O No   O 
 
Independent of gatekeeping regulations: Do patients actually have the choice in the sense 
that there are several providers offering services? Do patients have the choice among 
… different Specialists ? Yes   O No   O 
… different Hospitals ? Yes   O No   O 
… different Dentists ? Yes   O No   O 
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Part B: Societal Actors and their Role for the Health Care System  
Health Care Systems differ with regard to, whether societal actors, e.g. Health Insurance 
Funds, exist at all, are organized and involved in the day to day operation of the Health Care 
System. 
This section is about the existence of organized groups in the Health Care System and their 
involvement in the Health Care System in [country]. 
 
Is there a organization of the 
following groups and actors? 
If existent, in which of the following questions is the 
group involved or has a say?  
 
General practitioners 
/ Primary Care  
Physicians 
O yes   
O no  
 Catalogue of Primary care services covered 
by the health system    
 Level of remuneration of Primary care 
services (budgets, fees etc.) 
 Determination of how Primary care services 
are remunerated (e.g. whether by fee-for-
service or budgets etc.)  
 Determination of the top-executive level of 
their organization   
Specialists  
(e.g. eye doctors, 
orthopedics) 
O yes   
O no  
 Catalogue of specialized medical services 
covered by the health system    
 Level of remuneration of specialized 
medical services (budgets, fees etc.) 
 Determination of how the specialized 
services are remunerated (e.g. whether by 
fee-for-service or budgets etc.)  
 Determination of the top-executive level of 
their organization   
Laboratory services 
(e.g. Laboratories 
conducting analyses 
of blood and tissue 
samples etc)  
O yes   
O no  
 Catalogue of laboratory services covered by 
the health system    
 Level of remuneration of laboratory 
services (budgets, fees etc.) 
 Determination of how laboratory services 
are remunerated (e.g. whether by fee-for-
service or budgets etc.)  
 Determination of the top-executive level of 
their organization   
Dentists  O yes   
O no  
 Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system    
 Level of remuneration of dental services 
(budgets, fees etc.) 
 Determination of how dental services are 
remunerated (e.g. whether by fee-for-
service or budgets etc.) 
 Determination of the top-executive level of 
their organization   
 Others 
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Is there a organization of the 
following groups and actors? 
If existent, in which of the following questions is the 
group involved or has a say?  
Hospitals O yes   
O no  
 Catalogue of inpatient services covered by 
the health system    
 Level of remuneration of inpatient services  
 Determination of how inpatient services / 
hospitals are remunerated (e.g. whether by 
fee-for-service or budgets etc.) 
 Determination of the top-executive level of 
their organization   
 Others 
 
Health Insurance 
Funds 
O yes   
O no  
 Catalogue of services covered by the health 
system  
 Level of contributions to the Health 
Insurance Fund 
 Mode of how the contribution is levied ( as 
a fixed premium, percentage of income etc.)
 Level of remuneration of medical services 
(amount of the budget, fee etc.)  
 Determination of how medical services are 
remunerated (e.g. whether by fee-for-
service or budgets etc.) 
 Determination of the top-executive level of 
their organization    
 Others 
 
Patients  O yes   
O no  
 Catalogue of medical services covered by 
the health system  
 Level of contributions to the health system 
 Mode of how the contribution to the health 
system is levied (e.g. by a fixed premium, 
percentage of income etc. ) 
 Level of remuneration of medical services  
 Determination of how medical services are 
remunerated (e.g. whether by fee-for-
service or budgets etc.) 
 Determination of the top-executive level of 
their organization   
 Others 
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Is there a organization of the 
following groups and actors? 
If existent, in which of the following questions is the 
group involved or has a say?  
Employers O yes   
O no  
 Catalogue of medical services covered by 
the health system  
 Level of contributions to the Health System 
 Mode of how the contribution is levied 
(fixed premium, percentage of income) 
 Level of remuneration of medical services  
 Determination of how medical services are 
remunerated (e.g. whether by fee-for-
service or budgets etc) 
 Employers pay a part of a citizen’s 
contribution to the Health Care System 
 Others 
 
Pharmacists  O yes   
O no  
 Retail prices of pharmaceuticals  
 Lists and catalogue of pharmaceuticals 
covered by the health system   
 Determination of how much pharmacists 
earn, e.g. profit margins  
 Determination of how pharmacists are 
remunerated (e.g. a percentage of the retail 
price, a fixed amount per prescription etc.) 
 Determination of the top-executive level of 
their organization   
 Others 
Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
O yes   
O no  
 Prices of pharmaceuticals  
 Overall expenditure for pharmaceuticals 
 Lists and catalogue of pharmaceuticals 
covered by the health system    
 Determination of the top-executive level of 
their organization   
 Others 
 
Other Actors and 
Groups: ………….. 
O yes   
O no  
 Catalogue of services covered by the health 
system  
 Catalogue of specialized services covered 
by the health system    
 Level of remuneration of services  
 Determination of how the services are 
remunerated (e.g. whether by fee-for-
service or budgets etc.) 
 Determination of the top-executive level of 
their organization   
 Others 
In some countries, there are traditionally good links among some groups in the Health Care 
System, as the ones listed above, and some political parties.  
Are in [country] such links among a party and a societal group of those mentioned above?  
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Part C: Measures to ensure quality of medical treatment 
Q1 Is there in [country] an institution which sets clinical guidelines?  
 Yes, a national level institution  
 Yes, a regional / local level institution  
 No 
 
Q2 For which of the following sectors do clinical guidelines exist in [country]? 
 Usage of Pharmaceuticals 
 Hospital treatments 
 Usage of High Technology (CAT Scans, MRI etc.) 
 Out patient treatment 
 
Q3  Is there an institution gathering and distributing information on medical efficacy of 
different treatments for the same illness? 
 Yes, a national level institution  
 Yes, a regional / local level institution  
 No 
 
Q4  Is there an institution gathering and distributing information on the cost effectiveness of 
different treatments for the same illness? 
 Yes, a national level institution  
 Yes, a regional / local level institution  
 No 
 
Q5  Is there an institution gathering information on the quality of providers of medical 
services? (E.g. a ranking of hospitals like the star-ranking in the UK, reports of the 
occurrence of medical failures, maltreatment etc.) 
 Yes, a national level institution  
 Yes, a regional / local level institution  
 No 
 
Q6  Is the information on the quality of providers published or made available? 
 Yes, but only to the providers themselves  
 Yes, published to everybody  
 No 
 
Q7  Do General Practitioners / Physicians have to renew their approbation or licence to 
provide medical services from time to time (recertification) ? 
 No, once GPs / Physicians have obtained their licence, they don’t have to renew it 
 Yes, but recertification is voluntary 
 Yes, medical providers are obliged to renew their licence periodically 
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Part D: Role of the Central Government for the Health Care System 
In some countries, the National or Central Government has fundamental direct control over 
the Health Care System or can intervene substantially by other means.  
In other countries, the Central Government restrains itself more, leaving the day-to-day 
operation of the Health Care System to societal, Non-State-Actors, like Health Insurance 
Funds, and Organizations of Medical Providers.  
 
Which level of government is most important for control and interventions of the state in the 
Health Care System in [country]?  
  Central government  
  Regional / Provincial government 
  Local government (Municipality /County/ Community)  
 
Thinking about the Central Government in [country]: 
If the competence is held by another level of government, e.g. regional or local, please 
indicate the appropriate level 
 
 
CG1    If there are negotiations among Providers of medical services on the one side and 
Health Authorities/ Health Insurance Funds on the other side, in which e.g. issues of level of 
remunerations, fees or coverage are negotiated.  
What is the timing and the role of the Central Government’s participation in these 
negotiations? 
 
O  There are no Negotiations, the Government controls all aspects of the Health System 
O  There are Negotiations, but the Central Government has no role in the negotiations 
 
O  The Government participates during the negotiations 
 
O  The Government participates after the negotiations, it can 
 approve or disapprove the result, but without consequences for the negotiation 
results. 
 unilaterally change the results reached  
 set results unilaterally, if the negotiations failed to reach an outcome 
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Unilateral competencies of the Central Government 
The following questions concern the competencies of the central government: Which 
elements of the Health Systems can be set by the central government unilaterally?  
Unilaterally refers to whether the Central Government has currently the legal possibility to 
determine the aspect, e.g. by making directive or issuing a decree etc.  
Not, whether the Central Government actually does exert the competence, but has the formal 
right to do so under the current laws.   
 
If the competence is not held by the Central Government, please indicate the 
appropriate level of government 
 
CG2  Which elements of the Primary Care Sector can be controlled by the Central 
Government unilaterally?   
 Catalogue of Primary Care services covered by the health system  
 Questions of capacity (e.g. number of physicians per capita or in a region) 
 The overall budget for expenditure for Primary Care 
 The way Primary Care is remunerated (e.g. fee for service or a per-capita budget 
etc.) 
 The level of remuneration of Primary Care services, e.g. the amount of fees 
 The way, the providers of Primary Care are organized, e.g. regional level or 
national-level organization. 
 Determine the top-level management of the organization of providers of Primary 
Care 
 
 
CG3  Which elements of the sector providing specialized medical services ( orthopedics, eye 
doctors, radiologists etc) can be controlled by the Central Government unilaterally? 
 Catalogue of specialized medical services covered by the health system  
 Questions of capacity (e.g. number of specialists per capita or in a region) 
 The overall budget for expenditure for specialized medical care  
 The way specialized medical services are remunerated (e.g. fee for service or a 
per-capita budget etc.) 
 The level of remuneration of specialized services, e.g. the fees or budgets 
 The way, the providers of specialized care are organized, e.g. regional level or 
national-level organization. 
 Determine the top-level management of the organization of providers of 
specialized care 
O  Specialized medical services are provided predominantly by Hospitals  
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CG4  Which elements of the sector providing dental care can be controlled by the Central 
Government unilaterally? 
 Catalogue of dental services covered by the health system  
 The overall budget for expenditure for dental services and dental care 
 Questions of capacity - e.g. number of dentists per capita or in a region 
 The way dental care is remunerated - e.g. fee for service or a per-capita-budget 
 The level of remuneration of dental care, e.g. the amount of fees, the budgets etc. 
 The way, the providers of dental care are organized, e.g. a regional level or 
national-level organization. 
 Determine the top-level management of the organization of providers of dental 
care 
O  Dental services are provided predominantly by Hospitals  
O  Dental services are predominantly paid by the patients themselves 
 
 
CG5  Which of the following elements of the in-patient / Hospital sector can be controlled 
by the Central Government unilaterally?  
 Catalogue of in-patient services covered by the health system  
 The national overall budget for in-patient services 
 The number of Hospitals in a region 
 The size of Hospitals in a region (number of beds) 
 The investments in medical technology in Hospitals  
 Employment decisions in Hospitals (number and type of staff employed) 
 Actual remuneration level (e.g. level of fees; hospital’s overall budget) 
 The mode how in-patient services provided by Hospitals are remunerated (e.g. 
remuneration by per-diem instead of DRG)  
 Organizational / administrative questions (e.g. how the Hospitals are organized 
and administered) 
 The usage of medical technology in Hospitals  
 
 
CG6  Which of the elements of the pharmaceutical sector can be controlled by the Central 
Government unilaterally? 
 Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by the Health System 
(positive/negative lists) 
 Price of a medicine  
 Overall Budget for expenditure for pharmaceuticals 
 Pharmaceutical budget for individual prescribers (Hospitals, Physicians) 
 Number of Pharmacies in a region 
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CG7  Which of the following elements of the Health System as a whole can be controlled by 
the Central Government unilaterally? 
 Catalogue of medical services covered by the health system  
 The overall budget for health expenditure  
 The level of citizen’s contributions to the health system ( e.g. amount of 
premiums or the percentage of income going into the Health financing) 
 The way negotiations among the Societal Actors in the Health System, like 
Medical Providers, Insurance Funds, Health Authorities, are conducted (e.g. 
whether negotiations take place at national or regional level etc.) 
 
CG8   In some countries, the organizations of Medical Providers and Health Insurance Funds/ 
Health Authorities internally decide on the composition of the top level administration (the 
executive board etc.) of the organization. In other countries, the head of these organization is 
determined externally by the Government.  
How are these positions determined in [country]? 
Top-level management of the Medical Provider(s) organization(s) is (are) determined by... 
 the Central Government  
 the provider organization  
 
Top-level management of the Health Authority(s) is determined by... 
 the Central Government 
 the Health Authority  
 
Top-level management of the Health Insurance Fund(s) is determined by... 
 the Central Government 
 the Health Insurance Fund  
 
CG9  By what means does the Central Government exert a control and supervision on the 
activities of the Health Authority? 
 Health Authorities are obliged to produce an annual report for the government or a 
government agency, in which all costs (administrative costs, expenditure for 
health services purchased) are listed. 
 Budget plans must be endorsed by the Government 
 Publication of the administrative costs of the Health Authorities 
 Health Authorities must apply for a formal approval of an increase of 
contribution/premiums and must deliver reasons for this.  
 The government can replace the administration of the Health Authority 
 Others (please specify) 
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CG10  By what means does the Central Government exert a control and supervision on the 
activities of the Health Insurance Funds? 
 Health Insurance Funds must submit an annual report to the government or a 
government agency, in which all costs (administrative costs, expenditure for 
health services purchased) are listed. 
 Budget plans must be endorsed by the Government 
 Publication of the administrative costs of the Health Insurance Funds 
 Health Insurance Funds must apply for a formal approval of an increase of 
contribution/Premiums and must deliver reasons for this 
 The government can replace the top level administration of a the Health Insurance 
fund 
 Others (please specify)  
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Part E: Administration and Operation of the Health Care System 
1. Purchasers of Health: Health Insurance Funds and Health Authorities 
By Health Insurance Funds I refer to for private or public, non-profit or for profit 
organizations which act as an insurance but which are not part of the state administration. 
By Health Authorities I refer to institutions which are part of the public administration. 
Examples are local or regional Health Boards, local governments, county councils, Primary 
Care Trusts etc.  
 
If there is more than one level of administration, think about the level that is in direct contact 
with the providers, i.e. negotiates contracts etc. 
 
HIF1  Could you please characterize the predominant status of the Health Insurance Funds in 
[country]?     
Health Insurance Funds are  
 non-profit Insurance Funds like public Insurance Funds, mutualities etc 
 for-profit insurance companies 
 only formally independent from the public administration 
 other (please specify) 
 
 
HA1  How would you characterize the status of the Health Authority mainly financing / 
organizing the provision of health care in [country]? 
 the Health Authorities are under direct control of the Central Government (e.g. by 
the Ministry of Health)   
 the Health Authorities are part of the national administration  
 the Health Authorities are part of the regional government 
 the Health Authorities are part of the local government   
 the Health Authorities are institutions independent of the local or national 
government 
 
 
HIF2  How many Health Authorities or Health Insurance Funds, that can offer the full 
coverage of a health insurance, exist in [country]? 
Can you give the approximate number? 
Or, Can you indicate the approximate number? 
 One / up to 5 / up to 10 / up to 50 / more than 50 
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HIF3  Which of the following medical services can be provided by the Health Insurance Fund 
/ Health Authority itself? 
 None, all services are contracted with independent medical providers 
 ambulatory care for minor treatments like immunization against influenza 
 ambulatory care also for substantial treatments 
 in-patient services by Hospitals operated by the Health Insurance Funds / Health 
Authority 
 
HIF4  In some Health Care Systems, citizens are free to choose the Health Insurance Fund/ 
Health Authority. In others, they are assigned by law, e.g. all self employed / public 
employees are members of a certain Health Insurance Fund, all people living in a certain area 
are members of a certain local Health Authority.  
How is the situation in [country]? 
 Citizens have a free choice 
 Citizens are assigned by occupation 
 Citizens are assigned by income level 
 Citizens are assigned by place of living 
 
HIF5  Is it possible that the citizen’s contributions (premiums, percentage of income, tax 
rates) to the Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities vary, or are the contributions the 
same for all Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities in [country]? 
 Contributions actually differ  
 Contributions may differ, but factually all charge the same contributions 
 Contributions are not allowed to differ 
 
HIF6  Is it possible that the catalogues of benefits and medical services covered or offered 
vary among different Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities?  
 The medical services covered actually differ  
 The catalogues of services covers may differ, but factually all cover the same 
medical services 
 The catalogue of medical services covered is not allowed to differ 
 
HIF7  Is it possible that the same Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority offers different 
packages of contributions and covered services to the citizens? Examples are that the citizen 
agrees to go to the general practitioner first, before visiting a specialists or accepts that some 
services, e.g. dental care, are not covered. In return, the citizen pays a lower contribution. 
 Yes, a citizen can chose among different packages  
 No 
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HIF8  In some countries, the citizen can obtain a bonus, if they participate in preventive 
health checks on a regular basis. Examples of these are a reduced contribution rate, a 
repayment or lower co-payments.  
Is that the case in [country]? 
 Yes, there is a bonus if the patient participates in preventive health checks etc. 
 Yes, there is a malus if the patient does not participate in preventive health checks 
etc. 
 No, neither bonus nor malus in relation to the participation to preventive health 
checks etc. 
 
HIF9   Is there a financial equalization among the different Health Insurance Funds / Health 
Authorities, e.g. risk equalization among different Health Insurance Funds / Health 
Authorities where Funds are taken from one Health Insurance Fund/Health Authority and 
given to another one or subsidies are allocated according to need?  
 Yes, there is a substantial financial equalization  
 Yes, but not substantial  
 No, there is no financial equalization among the Health Insurance Funds / Health 
Authorities 
 
 
HIF10   If a Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority realizes a surplus, who decides on 
what is done with the surplus? 
 The Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority itself 
 The state 
 Others ………… 
 
 
HIF11   If a deficit arises for a Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority, is this deficit 
covered? 
 No, the deficit is not covered 
 Yes, it is covered by the state 
 Yes, it is covered by (please specify) ………… 
 
 
HIF12   How is the top level administration of the Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority 
determined? 
 by the Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority itself 
 by the state 
 by other means ( please specify) ………… 
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2. Purchasers and Providers of Medical Care 
 
CO1  Can the Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority identify individual providers, e.g. 
individual GPs or Hospitals, who overspend? 
 Yes, for Hospitals 
 Yes, for GPs 
 No  
 
 
CO2   Do the Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities have the possibility to exclude 
individual providers of medical services (individual physicians, Hospitals etc.) from the 
provision of services, if they significantly oversupply medical services, provide insufficient 
quality or work in an inefficient way? 
 Yes, Hospitals can be excluded 
 Yes, Physicians can be excluded 
 No 
 
 
CO3   Do the Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities usually receive a detailed bill or 
statement from an individual provider, e.g. a Hospital or a GP, which lists all medical services 
and medical goods which were provided in an individual case?  
 Yes, from Hospitals 
 Yes, from GPs  
 No  
 
 
CO4   Can the Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities force the providers (Hospitals / 
Physicians) to abide by clinical guidelines?  
 Yes, Hospitals can be forced to abide by clinical guidelines  
 Yes, GPs can be forced to abide by clinical guidelines 
 No  
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3. Parameters of the Health Care System  
N1  How and by whom is the catalogue of medical services covered by the Health System 
determined? (Which medical services are covered in the Health System, and which have to be 
purchased by the patients themselves) 
O  Unilateral decision  
 by the State (e.g. by law or decree) 
 by the Purchaser (Health Insurance Fund, Health Authority) 
 by the Providers of medical services 
O  Negotiations among the …. 
 State and Providers 
 State and Purchaser (e.g. Health Insurance Fund, Health Authority)  
 State, Purchaser and the Providers of medical services 
 Purchasers and Providers of medical services 
 
N2   What describes best the way the level of remuneration for medical services, e.g. the fees, 
budgets etc, are set in [country]? 
O  Unilateral decision  
 by the State (e.g. by law or decree) 
 by the Purchaser (Health Insurance Fund, Health Authority) 
 by the Providers of medical services 
O  Negotiations among the …. 
 State and Providers 
 State and Purchaser (e.g. Health Insurance Fund, Health Authority)  
 State, Purchaser and the Providers of medical services 
 Purchasers and Providers of medical services 
 
N3   Apart from the amount of remuneration, the mode in which a provider is remunerated 
can differ. Services can be remunerated by fee for service, capitation etc..   
What describes best the way the mode in which a provider of medical services is remunerated 
is determined in [country]? 
O  Unilateral decision  
 by the State (e.g. by law or decree) 
 by the Purchaser (Health Insurance Fund, Health Authority) 
 by the Providers of medical services 
O  Negotiations among the …. 
 State and Providers 
 State and Purchaser (e.g. Health Insurance Fund, Health Authority)  
 State, Purchaser and the Providers of medical services 
 Purchasers and Providers of medical services 
 
 
